Isabel Sanz-Willeford v. Southwood Financial LLC as Trust Manager for Southwood Financial Trust I
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
Date FiledAugust 5, 2026
Docket07-26-00299-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00299-CV
ISABEL SANZ-WILLEFORD, APPELLANT
V.
SOUTHWOOD FINANCIAL LLC AS TRUST MANAGER FOR
SOUTHWOOD FINANCIAL TRUST I, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 251st District Court
Randall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 87075C, Honorable Ana Estevez, Presiding
August 5, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Isabel Sanz-Willeford, appeals from the trial court’s order granting
partial summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Southwood Financial LLC as Trust
Manager of Southwood Financial Trust I (“Southwood Financial”). Because the order is
neither a final judgment nor an interlocutory order made immediately appealable by
statute, we dismiss the appeal the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Southwood Financial sued Sanz-Willeford asserting claims for breach of
promissory note, breach of contract, quantum meruit, promissory estoppel, and unjust
enrichment. It later moved for summary judgment on its breach of promissory note and
breach of contract claims. The motion did not address its remaining claims for quantum
meruit, promissory estoppel, or unjust enrichment. By order signed May 8, 2026, the trial
court granted summary judgment. In the order, the trial court expressly struck through
language stating, “This Judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is
appealable.” Sanz-Willeford thereafter perfected this appeal.
We have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment or from an
interlocutory order made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con
Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex.
1998) (per curiam). “[W]hen there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an
order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every
pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes
of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06.
The May 8, 2026, summary judgment order satisfies neither of the requirements
necessary to constitute a final judgment. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06. It contains
no language indicating finality, and it does not dispose of Southwood Financials’
remaining claims. Accordingly, the order is interlocutory. In the absence of a statute
expressly authorizing an interlocutory appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction and must
dismiss the appeal.
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By letter of July 7, 2026, we notified the parties that it did not appear we have
jurisdiction and directed them to show grounds for continuing the appeal by July 21, 2026.
Neither party responded.
Because there is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order,
we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
Per Curiam
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