Shamar D. Bradley v. the Connor Group, Julie Bray Patterson, and Roberto A. Vazquez
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio)
Date FiledMay 20, 2026
Docket04-25-00482-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00482-CV
Shamar D. BRADLEY,
Appellant
v.
THE CONNOR GROUP, Julie Bray Patterson, and Roberto A. Vazquez,
Appellees
From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2025-CV-01071
Honorable Lisa Jarrett, Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 20, 2026
DISMISSED AS MOOT
This interlocutory appeal arises from a suit against Judge Julie Bray Patterson 1 and Judge
Roberto A. Vasquez. 2 Because the appellant has filed a notice of nonsuit abandoning all claims,
we dismiss the appeal as moot.
1
Bexar County Justice of the Peace Precinct 3, Place 1.
2
Bexar County Justice of the Peace Precinct 2, Place 1.
04-25-00482-CV
DISCUSSION
“We are obligated to consider our jurisdiction at all times,” and we lack jurisdiction when
no live controversy remains. Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
Mootness is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction that we review de novo. Sw. Elec. Power
Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. 2020). A case becomes moot when the parties no longer
have a “personal stake in the outcome,” that is, a “concrete interest, however small.” Tex. Dep’t of
Family & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 875 (Tex. 2025)
(quoting Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 161 (2016)).
On February 7, 2025, Shamar D. Bradley sued Judge Patterson, alleging “official
oppression and abuse of authority” arising from an eviction proceeding. After Judge Patterson
recused, the case was transferred to Judge Vasquez, whom Bradley then joined as a defendant.
Both judges filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity, which the trial court
granted. Bradley filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on July 11, 2025. He later filed a notice
nonsuiting “all claims herein asserted by Shamar D. Bradley.”
We ordered Bradley to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot. In
response, he contends the nonsuit is ineffective because it was not served on appellees and that his
motion for sanctions remains pending.
A nonsuit is effective when filed and extinguishes the case or controversy as to the
nonsuited claims, rendering interlocutory orders on the merits moot. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at
Galveston v. Estate of Blackmon, 195 S.W.3d 98, 100–01 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). Service is not
required for the nonsuit to take effect. Orion Invs., Inc. v. Dunaway & Assocs., Inc., 760 S.W.2d
371, 374 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
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04-25-00482-CV
This interlocutory appeal concerns only the trial court’s ruling on appellees’ immunity. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8). Because Bradley has nonsuited all claims against
appellees, no live controversy remains regarding that ruling. A pending sanctions request does not
preserve a justiciable interest in the interlocutory order from which Bradley is appealing.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as moot. See Speer v. Presbyterian Children’s Home & Serv.
Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. 1993). All pending motions are denied.
PER CURIAM
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