William Kenneth Ball v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Date FiledAugust 13, 2026
Docket01-25-00761-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Opinion issued August 13, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00761-CR
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WILLIAM KENNETH BALL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 149th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 100924-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, a second-
degree felony punishable by up to twenty years’ imprisonment. The trial court
deferred a finding of guilt and, in accordance with the parties’ plea bargain
agreement, placed appellant on community supervision for seven years.
The State later filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision
and adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated his community supervision terms.
Appellant pleaded true to the State’s allegations and executed a waiver of his right
to appeal in exchange for the State's recommendation that punishment be assessed
at four years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. The trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision,
adjudicated him guilty, and, consistent with the State's recommendation, assessed
punishment at four years’ confinement. The trial court certified both that appellant
had waived the right of appeal and that this was a case in which he had no right of
appeal. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) restricts a defendant’s right to
appeal in a plea-bargain case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ART. 44.02. But that rule does not restrict a defendant's right to appeal from a
proceeding adjudicating guilt following deferred adjudication community
supervision. See Hargesheimer v. State, 182 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
Nevertheless, this case involves a separate agreement in which appellant
expressly waived his right to appeal in exchange for separate consideration from the
State at the revocation hearing. Courts have enforced such waivers under ordinary
waiver principles. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, No. 01-14-00358-CR, 2015 WL
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1778605, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Nickerson v. State, No. 01-14-00683-CR, 2015 WL
1407855, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Mendez v. State, 558 S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Radford v. State, No. 05-18-00764-CR, 2018
WL 6616896, at *1 (Tex. App.––Dallas Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
When a defendant waives his right to appeal in exchange for consideration
from the State, and the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant
may not appeal. Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697-99 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009); Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The record here reflects that appellant signed and swore to a stipulation of
evidence and judicial confession in which he pleaded true to the allegations in the
State’s motion to adjudicate guilt. The document recites the parties’ agreement that
the State would recommend revocation of appellant's community supervision, four
years’ confinement, and no fine. It also contains a separate waiver provision stating:
As part of my agreement with the prosecutor to plead true, I AGREE TO
WAIVE any right to appeal I may have concerning any issue or claim in this
case, including my plea of true or admission of guilt.
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Appellant separately initialed the waiver provision. The trial court then found the
allegations true, adjudicated appellant’s guilt, and assessed punishment in
accordance with the agreed recommendation.
We acknowledge one arguable ambiguity in the record. During the
adjudication hearing, after confirming appellant's waiver of appeal, the trial court
stated:
THE COURT: As part of this plea, did you waive your right to appeal?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Do you understand you still have a limited right to
appeal to the Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas? If you cannot afford
an attorney, one will be appointed for you. If you cannot afford a copy
of this record, one will be provided.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
The trial court was likely referencing that “no appeal waiver serves as an absolute
bar to all appellate claims.” Ex parte Castillo, 664 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2022) (quoting Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 237, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744, 203 L.
Ed. 2d 77 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). In any event, the trial court’s general
admonition concerning appellate rights did not negate appellant’s express oral and
written waivers. The record contains a clear, specific, and bargained-for waiver of
appeal that appellant acknowledged both in writing and orally. See Broadway, 301
S.W.3d at 697-99; Blanco, 18 S.W.3d at 219-20.
Because appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right
to appeal in exchange for the State’s punishment recommendation, appellant has no
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right of appeal in this case. See Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 12 n.12 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. All pending
motions are dismissed as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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