Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00613-CV ___________________________ RANDY CHARLES MCMULLEN, Appellant V. MINDY LOUISE HUFFMAN, Appellee On Appeal from the 97th District Court Archer County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-0127A-CV Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Randy Charles McMullen appeals three orders: (1) an “Order Denying Rule 120a TRCP Special Appearance,” (2) an “Order for Capias,” and (3) a “Second Order on Enforcing Property Division.” Because none of these orders is a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory orders authorized by statute. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex. 2001). Absent a conventional trial on the merits, a judgment is final if it either (1) states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties or (2) actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language. Id. at 192–93. To determine whether an order is a final judgment, we should first examine the order’s language itself. In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195, 205–06); In re M & O Homebuilders, Inc., 516 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding). No “magic language” renders a judgment final, and “a trial court may express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and (3) appealable.” In re C.K.M., 709 S.W.3d 613, 617, 618 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020)). 2 This case arises out of Appellee Mindy Louise Huffman’s petition for enforcement of the parties’ final divorce decree. See Tex. Fam. Code § 9.001 (allowing divorce-decree-enforcement suits). After the trial court heard Huffman’s petition, it signed a “Second Order on Enforcing Property Division.”1 In that enforcement order, the trial court granted part of the relief Huffman had requested, but the order stated that “unresolved issues” remained pending before the trial court: “It is further ordered that the unresolved issues in [Huffman’s] Motions for Enforcement of contempt, punishment, her claims for uninsured medical reimbursement, and all non-addressed allegations of violations not addressed herein this [o]rder are reserved until further order of the [c]ourt.” [Formatting altered.] The challenged enforcement order does not say that it is final, does not indicate that it is disposing of all claims and parties before the court, does not state that it is appealable, and expressly reserves ruling on unresolved issues. In short, the order does not state with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment concerning all claims and all parties, and it does not actually dispose of all claims and parties. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93; see also C.K.M., 709 S.W.3d at 618. Accordingly, the order is unappealable. See, e.g., In re K.E.A., 359 S.W.3d 387, 389 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (dismissing appeal because enforcement order reserved issues for later 1 The trial court had signed an earlier enforcement order but had reserved ruling on certain “unresolved issues” in Huffman’s enforcement petition—some of which the trial court then addressed in its second enforcement order. McMullen has not indicated that he wants to challenge the earlier enforcement order. 3 determination); In re A.W.D., 355 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (stating that appellate court was unaware of anything “authorizing an immediate appeal of an interlocutory confirmation order while issues of contempt and enforcement remain pending”). When a trial court signs a final judgment, interlocutory orders merge into the final judgment and may be challenged by appealing that judgment. Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). Because the enforcement order is not final, the trial court’s interlocutory special-appearance and capias orders did not merge into the enforcement order. We must therefore consider whether either of those two interlocutory orders is appealable. Concerning the trial court’s denied special-appearance order, Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly disallows an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a special appearance “in a suit brought under the Family Code,” so it is not appealable. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(7). And as for the challenged capias order, because “an order for capias is not an appealable order,” we lack jurisdiction over that order too. Altenhofen v. Bush, No. 11-18-00168-CV, 2018 WL 3763792, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 9, 2018, no pet.) (citing In re Gonzalez, 993 S.W.2d 147, 157–58 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)). 4 We called these issues to the parties’ attention and gave them ten days to show grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. But that deadline has passed, and neither party has responded. Because no final judgment or appealable interlocutory order has been rendered in this case, we lack appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Delivered: October 22, 2026 5