Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00597-CV ___________________________ JOHNATHAN COOPER, Appellant V. JAMES WARREN ST. JOHN, Appellee On Appeal from the 153rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 153-330985-21 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Johnathan Cooper, acting pro se, attempts to appeal from the trial court’s “Order Summarily Denying Plaintiff[’s] Motion to Recuse Judge R.H. Wallace, Jr.” signed August 25, 2026, and the trial court’s “Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Substitution of Counsel,” signed August 26, 2026. Generally, our appellate jurisdiction is limited to reviewing final judgments. Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 319 n.1 (Tex. 2007); Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). We may also review interlocutory orders when authorized by statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.01(a) (listing appealable interlocutory orders). “An order denying a motion to recuse is an unappealable interlocutory order.” Hawkins v. Walker, 233 S.W.3d 380, 401 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(j)(1) (A)(“An order denying a motion to recuse may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.”). Likewise, an order granting a motion to substitute counsel is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order. Wieder v. Elmore, No. 09-05-402-CV, 2005 WL 3073797, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 17, 2005, no pet.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal from an “Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Substitution of Counsel”). Because neither order appeared to be appealable, we notified Cooper by letter of our concern that we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. We cautioned him that 2 unless he or another party filed a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we could dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. Cooper filed a response, but it does not establish grounds for continuing the appeal. We also noted that Cooper had requested in his notice of appeal that we treat the appeal as a request for mandamus relief.1 We instructed him to file a petition for writ of mandamus and a mandamus record by September 24, 2026, and advised that we would dismiss the appeal if he failed to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3. Cooper did not comply. Because neither order is a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See Hawkins, 233 S.W.3d at 401; Wieder, 2005 WL 3073797, at *1. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.2 See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). /s/ Brian Walker Brian Walker Justice Delivered: November 12, 2026 1 Cooper’s notice of appeal states, “This Court has Jurisdiction to treat this appeal as a request for Mandamus relief. For which Plaintiff Request. Plaintiff has already sought preparation of the Clerk[’s] Record and will file brief with[]in 30 days of receipt of Clerk[’s] record.” 2 Cooper recently attempted to appeal orders from the same underlying suit that were likewise neither a final judgment nor appealable interlocutory orders. Cooper v. St. John, No. 02-26-00493-CV, 2026 WL 2794512, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 17, 2026, no pet. h.). We dismissed that appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id. 3