Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00642-CV James BABER, Appellant v. LVNV FUNDING LLC, Appellee From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025CV09650 Honorable David J. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding PER CURIAM Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 7, 2026 DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION This is an appeal from a March 30, 2026 default judgment. Because appellant did not file a motion for new trial or other appellate-deadline-extending motion within 30 days of the signing of the default judgment, the notice of appeal was due on April 29, 2026, and a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due on May 14, 2026. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1, 26.3. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on August 10, 2026. In his notice of appeal, appellant represented that he did not receive timely notice of the default judgment. 04-26-00642-CV If a party has no notice of the trial court’s judgment, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.2 allows, in some circumstances, additional time for that party to file documents. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2; TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a. The deadline to file a motion for new trial and notice of appeal will run from the day a party receives notice of judgment, rather than the day judgment is signed, if the party (1) complies with the sworn motion, notice and hearing requirements mandated by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(5); and (2) proves he received notice of the judgment more than twenty (but less than ninety-one) days after it was signed. See In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a). Specifically, Rule 306a(5) requires the party alleging late notice of judgment to file a sworn motion with the trial court establishing the date the party or his counsel first learned of the judgment. See In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d at 686 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(5)). The clerk’s record does not reflect that appellant followed the procedures outlined in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a. Thus, it appears that Rule 306a’s additional time provisions do not apply and that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal because appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal. See Perez v. Perez, 658 S.W.3d 864, 870 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“Compliance with the provisions of Rule 306a is a jurisdictional prerequisite.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Weseman, No. 04-24-00470-CV, 2024 WL 4497984, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 16, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because Rule 306a does not apply, the appellate deadlines were not extended and [appellant] did not file a timely notice of appeal.”). While we recognize that appellant is proceeding pro se in this appeal, he is held to the same rules and standards as licensed attorneys, including the applicable rules of procedure. See, e.g., Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 52–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). -2- 04-26-00642-CV On August 20, 2026, we ordered appellant to show cause by September 21, 2026 why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant did not file a response to our order. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. PER CURIAM -3-