Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont __________________ NO. 09-25-00356-CV __________________ EX PARTE FELTON BRADY __________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 08-12-11340 __________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION In 2009, Felton Brady was adjudicated a sexually violent predator and civilly committed.1 Brady is in a tiered treatment program and is currently residing in the Texas Civil Commitment Center (TCCC). Brady filed Petitioner’s Request for Civil Habeas Corpus Relief from Illegal Restraint of a GPS Leg-Monitor Tracking Device while Indefinitely Detained in a Maximum-Security Facility. He supported his 1 We affirmed the Final Judgment in 2011. See In re Commitment of Brady, No. 09-09-00360-CV, 2011 WL 2420862 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 16, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). 1 request with the following exhibits: (1) Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) Policy 3.36 and Health and Safety Code section 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii)-(iii); (2) Aerial Photo of the Texas Civil Commitment Center; (3) TCCO Supervision Progress Report recommending demotion to Tier 2 effective November 11, 2024; and (4) his declaration complaining that use of GPS monitoring for any reason while he is in the Texas Civil Commitment Center is punitive and violates his liberty interest to be free from excessive bodily restraint. The State filed a response that argued statutory law allows the monitoring, and Brady has not met his burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. On September 12, 2025, the trial court denied Brady’s request for Civil Habeas Corpus Relief. Brady filed a notice of appeal. On June 1, 2026, through a letter issued by the Clerk of the Court, we notified Brady that the order being appealed is neither a final judgment nor an appealable order, and directed the parties to file written responses, and noted Brady’s request for alternative mandamus relief. The State filed a Response to the Court’s Question of Jurisdiction and Brief Against the Granting of a Writ of Mandamus. Brady filed an Amended Appellant’s Brief requesting alternative mandamus relief. Jurisdiction The State contends we lack appellate jurisdiction because the trial court never issued the writ and denied the request for the writ without addressing the merits of the petition. The trial court did not hold a hearing on the matter. Brady states that we 2 have jurisdiction to hear appeals, habeas corpus claims, and mandamus petitions from the 435th District Court, but he presents no argument to explain how the Order, which denied the request for relief without comment, ruled on the merits. Brady asks this Court to consider his brief as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus. See In re Commitment of Renshaw, 672 S.W.3d 426, 427-28 (Tex. 2023); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452-53 (Tex. 2011). The record does not show that the trial court ruled on the merits of Brady’s Request for Habeas Corpus Relief. Therefore, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Brady’s request for habeas corpus relief because, as Brady argues, section 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the Health and Safety Code and the Texas Civil Commitment Office’s Policy Number 3.36 Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking Removal Determination are unconstitutional as applied to him. We do so by exercising our broad original jurisdiction to consider this a petition for writ of mandamus. See Renshaw, 672 S.W.3d at 427-28. Mandamus Standard We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and 3 unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Background On January 5, 2024, the trial court signed a biennial review order that ordered that Brady shall remain a committed person with all requirements and modifications previously imposed remaining unchanged and setting submission on Brady’s next biennial review for October 30, 2025. On August 12, 2026, Brady filed his request for habeas corpus relief. In his request for habeas relief, Brady likened the GPS monitor to a “modern-day electronic-ball-and-chain” and contended that since he was confined, having to wear the GPS monitor constitutes “a punishment mechanism” under TCCO Policy 3.36 and Texas Health and Safety Code section 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii)–(iii), which are unconstitutional as applied to him. He argued that both violate his constitutional “right of freedom from an excessive illegal restraint.” In his declaration, he stated that having to wear the GPS was a “retaliatory act of punishment for the polygraph test indicating deception[.]” Brady asserted, “TCCO forced me to re-submit to a GPS leg-monitor tracking device until I 4 successfully pass[ed] another polygraph test indicating no deception, which is a year or more.” The State responded: that Brady failed to meet his burden to show he was entitled to relief and show that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him; that the TCCO’s decision to use GPS monitors on persons assigned to one of the two most restrictive tiers of treatment was a question of law not requiring an evidentiary hearing; that he did not attempt to differentiate himself from other persons similarly situated; and his request should therefore be summarily denied. The State noted that Brady failed to provide proof of his current treatment level, disciplinary status, that the monitor restricts his liberty, that the statute operates differently as applied to him, or that the treatment center is a maximum-security area. The trial court’s order of September 12, 2025 states: On this day came to be considered Brady’s Request for Civil Habeas Corpus Relief, seeking a declaration that Texas Civil Commitment Office’s Policy 3.36 GPS Tracking Removal Determination and Health & Safety Code 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii) and (iii) Commitment Requirements are unconstitutional as applied to him. After considering the request and the State’s response: the relief requested is DENIED. Issue Brady contends the trial court abused its discretion “by declaring that the Texas Civil Commitment Office’s Policy 3.36 GPS Tracking Removal 5 Determination, and Texas Health and Safety Code § 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii) and (iii) Commitment Requirements are not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant[.]” We recently reviewed the identical issue in another case where a person subject to civil commitment as a sexually violent predator argued the use of a GPS tracking leg monitor was unconstitutional as applied to him. See Ex parte Dupree, No. 09-25-00362-CV, 2026 WL 2529086, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 27, 2026, no pet. h.). Dupree and Brady are housed in the same facility, were demoted to one of the two lowest tiers in TCCP’s tiered treatment program, and their requests for habeas corpus relief and their briefs in the appellate court are virtually identical. In Dupree, we reviewed the as-applied constitutional challenge de novo. Id. at *3. We considered multiple factors in construing the state and its effects, including “its purpose; the circumstances of its enactment; the legislative history; common- law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; a particular construction’s consequences; administrative construction of the statute; and the title, preamble, and emergency provision.” Id. at *4. We rejected Dupree’s argument that forcing him to wear a GPS monitor while confined in the TCCC treatment facility is punitive and concluded the statute and policy “serve express and legitimate government purposes as stated.” Id. Our examination of the record does not reveal evidence that the statute and policy were punitively applied to Brady. The Supervision Progress Report reflects 6 Brady was found to have a needle during a recent polygraph examination and was given a “no opinion” due to “possibly attempting to use counter measures to manipulate the results.” Brady had been presenting work on past assignments as new work and had unapproved contact with his wife through others. In Dupree, we rejected Dupree’s contention that TCCO Policy 3.36 and Health and Safety Code section 841.082(a)(4)(A)(ii)-(iii) are unconstitutional as applied to him because they violate his right to be free from illegal restraint. Id. at *5. Like Brady, Dupree did not pass a polygraph and would be required to pass one before treatment provider would remove the GPS monitor. Id. We concluded the record contained “no evidence of his compliance with treatment modalities, what level of treatment he is in, or anything else that would show that the GPS monitor does not help to ensure his compliance with treatment modalities or to protect the public.” Id. Our examination of the record here reveals no evidence that Brady complied with treatment modalities. Likewise, the record contains neither evidence that shows the GPS monitor does not help to ensure his compliance with treatment modalities nor evidence that wearing a GPS monitor will not protect the public. Rather, the record shows that Brady had to re-submit to a GPS monitor because he failed to comply with treatment which included passing polygraph examinations, completing and presenting assignments, and obtaining approval for contact with his wife. As 7 was the case in Dupree, the evidence “reflects the legitimate statutory scheme of providing ‘long-term supervision and treatment of sexually violent predators’ and protecting the public from them.” Id. (quoting Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.001). Having failed to show the requirement that he wear a GPS monitor was unconstitutional as applied to him—either in illegally restraining his movement or being punitive in nature—Brady cannot establish the trial court abused its discretion by summarily denying his request for habeas corpus relief. Absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, Brady is not entitled to mandamus relief. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Conclusion We conclude that the trial court did not rule on the merits when it summarily denied Brady’s request for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we lack appellate jurisdiction over Brady’s attempted appeal of the trial court’s order and his appeal is dismissed. After considering Brady’s Amended Brief as a petition for a writ of mandamus, we also conclude that Brady failed to show the trial court clearly abused its discretion by refusing to issue the writ of habeas corpus, by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on Brady’s request for habeas corpus relief, or by denying Brady’s request for habeas corpus relief. We conclude Brady is not entitled to 8 mandamus relief. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. APPEAL DISMISSED; PETITION DENIED. PER CURIAM Submitted on September 16, 2026 Opinion Delivered September 17, 2026 Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ. 9