Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-26-00384-CV Karla Cecilia Contreras Ocampo, Appellant v. Manuel Lopez Galvan, Appellee 1 FROM THE 421ST DISTRICT COURT OF CALDWELL COUNTY NO. DCCV-24-111, THE HONORABLE AMANDA MONTGOMERY, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Karla Cecilia Contreras Ocampo filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s “Final Judgment and/or Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Manuel Lopez Galvan.” Upon initial review of the notice of appeal and a motion for emergency stay filed by Contreras Ocampo (which was denied), the Clerk of this Court sent Contreras Ocampo a letter informing her that this Court appears to lack jurisdiction over the appeal because there was no indication that the trial court’s order had disposed of her claims against the other named defendant, Carlos Negrete Ocampo. Thus, there did not appear to be a final and appealable judgment, and our jurisdiction is limited to appeals in which there exists a final or 1 Appellant’s notice of appeal identified appellee as both Manuel Galvan Lopez (in the case style) and Manuel Lopez Galvan (in the body of the notice). Our review of the record reflects that appellee’s name is Manuel Lopez Galvan, so we have restyled the case to reflect appellee’s correct name and to remove another defendant, Carlos Negrete Ocampo, who is not affected by the trial-court order that appellant challenges. appealable judgment or order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.012; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that appeal generally may only be taken from final judgment that disposes of all pending parties and claims in record unless statute provides for interlocutory appeal). The Clerk requested a response from Contreras Ocampo explaining any basis that exists for this Court’s jurisdiction. Both Contreras Ocampo and Lopez Galvan filed responses. In her response, Contreras Ocampo contended that Negrete Ocampo had never been served and he was not an active defendant, meaning that we could regard the judgment as final for purposes of appeal. See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex. 2004) (reaffirming rule that order that does not dispose of all parties may be final if party who was not disposed of “was never served with citation and did not file an answer, and nothing in the record indicated that the plaintiff in the case ever expected to obtain service upon the remaining party” (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962))). Contreras Ocampo argued in the alternative that we should abate the case to allow the order to be finalized. Lopez Galvan informed the Court that he had affirmative claims still pending in the trial court, and the trial court’s summary judgment in his favor had not disposed of those affirmative counterclaims. After the clerk’s record was filed, Lopez Galvan filed an opposed motion to dismiss Contreras Ocampo’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In his motion, Lopez Galvan reiterates his argument that the trial court has not signed a final and appealable order disposing of all claims and parties and argues against Contreras Ocampo’s alternative argument for an abatement. He contends that an abatement is inappropriate here, where he has unresolved counterclaims and more is required to achieve a final order than a simple ministerial act, such as signing a nonsuit order. 2 Our review of the clerk’s record and of the trial court’s “Order Granting Defendant Manuel Lopez Galvan’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment” confirms that the order is not an appealable interlocutory order because it does not finally dispose of all claims and all parties. See Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998) (“Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction.”); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (specifically permitting appeal of various interlocutory orders but not permitting appeal from partial summary-judgment order). The order disposes only of Contreras Ocampo’s affirmative claims against Lopez Galvan and does not address Lopez Galvan’s pending counterclaims. In addition, the order expressly reserves for future consideration Lopez Galvan’s request for an order invalidating a lis pendens filed by Contreras Ocampo. There are a few ways for a trial court’s order to become a final judgment without a trial. See Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. 2024). A trial court’s order is final if it (1) actually disposes of all remaining parties and claims then before the court (regardless of whether it includes unequivocal finality language), or (2) includes unequivocal finality language that expressly disposes of all claims and parties. Id. (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (concluding default judgment that did not purport to dispose of all parties and all claims, did not actually dispose of punitive-damages claim, and lacked unequivocal finality language was not final and appealable judgment); McNally v. Guevara, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“Because the judgment does not appear final on its face, and because it did not dispose of the defendants’ claim for attorney fees, it was not an appealable judgment.”). 3 In addition, “[a]s a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final.” Sealy Emergency Room, 685 S.W.3d at 820 (quoting Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O’Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2001)). None of those circumstances are present here, and accordingly, the summary judgment is not yet final and appealable. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020) (“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court’s interlocutory orders merge into the judgment and may be challenged by appealing that judgment.”). While in an appropriate case, we may abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for entry of a signed, written order, we decline to do so under the circumstances present here. Compare Davidson v. Davidson, No. 03-19-00542-CV, 2019 WL 7042942, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 20, 2019, order) (per curiam) (abating appeal and remanding for entry of final order where record reflected that trial court had rendered oral ruling), with e.g., Cobb v. Campbell, No. 03-20-00037-CV, 2020 WL 828652, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction because no final and appealable judgment); In re X.M.P., No. 05-18-01416-CV, 2019 WL 180698, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing without prejudice to filing new notice of appeal after trial court signs judgment); see also Ganesan v. Reeves, 236 S.W.3d 816, 817 (Tex. App.— Waco 2007, pet. denied) (explaining that appellate courts are not required “to docket and hold an appeal open until there is an appealable judgment or order at some future date”). Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, we grant Lopez Galvan’s motion to dismiss, and we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). 4 __________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction Filed: October 23, 2026 5