Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00541-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG WBL SPO I, LLC, Appellant, v. RANCHO TIZON, LLC, JESUS RAFAEL LARRAZOLO, AND IRMA LETICIA FARIAS, Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE 445TH DISTRICT COURT OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina On July 2, 2026, appellant WBL SPO I, LLC, filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Permissive Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3” in this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3 (governing permissive appeals in civil cases). In its motion, appellant stated that the trial court signed a partial summary judgment on June 17, 2026, and appellant required additional time to secure the trial court’s permission to appeal. On July 2, 2026, the Clerk notified appellant that its motion failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3, directed appellant to correct this defect, if possible, and advised appellant that the case would be dismissed if the defect was not cured within ten days. See id. Appellant did not respond to the Clerk’s notice or otherwise correct the defect. We have the inherent power and obligation to ascertain our jurisdiction over an appeal. 1 Coventry Ct., LLC v. Downs of Hillcrest Residential Ass’n, Inc., 728 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex. 2026) (per curiam). In general, we have appellate jurisdiction only over final judgments. Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, 718 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Tex. 2025); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 & nn.11–12 (Tex. 2001). We also have jurisdiction to review certain interlocutory orders when authorized by statute; however, we strictly construe such statutes as narrow exceptions to the general rule requiring finality. Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P., 718 S.W.3d at 237; Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 736 (Tex. 2019). “When a trial court has permitted an appeal from an interlocutory order that would not otherwise be appealable, a party seeking to appeal must petition the court of appeals for permission to appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(a). “The petition must be filed within 15 days after the order to be appealed is signed.” Id. R. 28.3(c); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(f) (“An appellate court may accept [a petition for permissive appeal] if the appealing party, not later than the 15th day after the date the trial court signs the order to be appealed, files in the [proper] court of appeals . . . an application for interlocutory 2 appeal explaining why an appeal is warranted.”). “If the order is amended by the trial court, either on its own or in response to a party's motion, to include the court’s permission to appeal, the time to petition the court of appeals runs from the date the amended order is signed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(c). “The court of appeals may extend the time to file the petition if the party: (1) files the petition within 15 days after the deadline, and (2) files a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b).” Id. R. 28.3(d); see Romero v. Gonzalez, No. 13-16- 00172-CV, 2018 WL 771893, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). “A petition for permissive appeal must be timely to confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals to hear the matter.” See Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Dowdy, No. 01- 20-00817-CV, 2022 WL 1572044, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 19, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Alonzo v. Cabello, No. 13-22-00104-CV, 2023 WL 3243418, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 4, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“An untimely petition cannot invoke this court’s jurisdiction.”). In this case, the trial court signed an order granting partial summary judgment on June 17, 2026. The order is interlocutory, and the trial court’s order did not provide appellant with permission to file an appeal. The papers before the Court do not indicate that the trial court has issued an amended order granting permission to appeal. Therefore, the deadline for appellant to have filed its petition for permissive appeal was July 2, 2026. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(c); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(f). We are unable to grant appellant’s motion for extension of time to file the petition because, although appellant filed its motion on July 2, 2026, within fifteen days after the deadline, appellant did not file the petition within that same period. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(d); Deaton v. Enter. TE Prods. Pipeline LLC, No. 09-18-00007-CV, 2018 WL 651216, at *1 (Tex. App.— 3 Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing an appeal where the appellants filed a motion for extension of time but did not file a petition within the time required). The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file and the applicable law, is of the opinion that we lack jurisdiction over appellant’s motion and attempted appeal. See Alonzo, 2023 WL 3243418, at *2; Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins., 2022 WL 1572044, at *2. Accordingly, we dismiss appellant’s motion and this attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). JAIME TIJERINA Chief Justice Delivered and filed on the 13th day of August, 2026. 4