In Re Christopher Read Windham v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
Date FiledOctober 7, 2026
Docket09-26-00393-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-26-00393-CR
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IN RE CHRISTOPHER READ WINDHAM
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Original Proceeding
Criminal District Court of Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24DCCR1937
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Christopher Read Windham filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and, in
the Alternative, Writ of Prohibition against the Criminal District Court of Jefferson
County, Texas. We deny the petition.
At his request, Windham was transferred from federal custody to Jefferson
County pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, art. III. The indictments on which the detainer had been lodged
were dismissed after Windham was not tried within the 180-day time limit. See id.
art. III(a).
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In Trial Cause Number 24DCCR1937, the State indicted Windham on a
charge of aggravated sexual assault for conduct that was not charged in any of the
indictments on which the State lodged a detainer.
Windham filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court denied
on September 9, 2025. On September 24, 2026, more than a year after the trial court
denied Windham’s motion to dismiss, Windham filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate the September 9, 2025 order denying
the motion to dismiss Trial Cause Number 24DCCR1937 “to the extent that ruling
permits trial without applying Article V(d) and Article V(e)[,]” or in the alternative
to prohibit the trial court from trying Windham for an offense that is not from the
same transaction as the offenses which form the basis of the detainer without first
obtaining Relator’s presence “through lawful independent process consistent with
Articles V(d) and V(e).” See id. art. V(d), V(e).
Windham concedes the 180-day period for commencing a trial and the
corresponding dismissal requirement are limited to the charges on which the detainer
is lodged. See State v. Votta, 299 S.W.3d 130, 135-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
(holding the lower court erred in dismissing charges for bail jumping and failure to
appear where nothing in the record indicated detainers were filed for those charges).
He argues the State should not be allowed to use custody obtained under the
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Interstate Agreement on Detainers when the original detainer prosecutions have
ended.
Mandamus “might be an appropriate remedy” for the denial of a motion to
dismiss for violating the Interstate Agreement on Detainers “[i]f the trial court rules
against the defendant and the defendant’s entitlement to relief is indisputable, as a
matter of fact and law[.]” Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
After reviewing the petition and record, we conclude that Windham has not
established that he has an indisputable right to relief and that appeal will not be an
adequate remedy. Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus or a
writ of prohibition.
PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on October 6, 2026
Opinion Delivered October 7, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.
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