Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00444-CV IN RE RICHARD MYRON JONES, TTEE, RELATOR ORIGINAL PROCEEDING November 6, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ. Pending before this Court is Jones’ motion for rehearing. We deny his motion, but withdraw our memorandum opinion of October 22, 2026, and substitute the following memorandum opinion in its place. Relator, Richard Myron Jones, TTEE, is a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order that requires him to obtain permission from the local administrative judge (LAJ) prior to filing any new litigation. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.101. By this mandamus proceeding, Jones challenges the LAJ’s October 19, 2026 letter ruling denying him permission to file a petition for writ of mandamus with the Texas Supreme Court that seeks an order that the trial court vacate its January 30, 2025 dismissal order in trial court cause number DC-2024-CV-1593, and rule on numerous post-dismissal motions and discovery requests. See id. § 11.102(f) (authorizing mandamus action challenging LAJ’s denial of permission to file litigation). Entitlement to mandamus relief requires a relator to show that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The LAJ may grant a vexatious litigant who is subject to a prefiling order permission to file litigation “only if it appears to the judge that the litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay.” § 11.102(d). Here, Jones’ petition to the Texas Supreme Court does not identify any authority that would establish that the trial court is clearly abusing its discretion by failing to rule on post-dismissal motions. Further, in his petition for writ of mandamus filed in this Court, all of Jones’ contentions regarding how his claims have merit relate to the determination that he is a vexatious litigant rather than to whether his current litigation appears to have merit. Thus, Jones has not shown that the LAJ clearly abused its discretion by not granting him permission to file his petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court. In his petition, Jones contends that he can challenge the determination that he is a vexatious litigant through his mandamus filing with the Texas Supreme Court because that determination was void since it was made without a mandatory hearing and a void order may be reached by mandamus without a showing that appeal is inadequate. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000). However, a failure to hold a hearing prior to determining that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant is harmless and, therefore, voidable rather than void. See In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d 273, 287 (Tex. 2 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (assuming evidentiary hearing required, failure to hold hearing is harmless); Mullins v. Ortiz, 440 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) (appellant failed to show harm by failure to hold hearing). Consequently, since Jones has failed to establish that the Texas Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to grant the relief he seeks through the petition for writ of mandamus he seeks to file, we cannot conclude that the LAJ clearly abused its discretion by determining that Jones’ litigation appears to lack merit and denying him permission to file the same. Having determined that the LAJ did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying Jones permission to file his mandamus petition with the Texas Supreme Court, we deny Jones’ petition. Judy C. Parker Chief Justice 3