Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont __________________ NO. 09-26-00420-CV __________________ IN RE DEBORAH KAY SWAN __________________________________________________________________ Original Proceeding 284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 26-01-00747 __________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Relator Deborah Kay Swan filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(b). Swan complains that the trial court abused its discretion by treating Swan’s October 5, 2026 Notice, Objections, Request for Rulings, Supplemental Rule 145 Evidentiary Submission, and Preservation of Error Regarding Judicial Comments Concerning Plaintiff’s Alleged Wealth, Bitcoin Account, and Defendant’s Unverified Accusations as though it included a Motion to Recuse, by declining to recuse voluntarily in an Order signed on October 6, 2026, and by referring the case to the Presiding Judge of the Second Administrative Judicial Region “for assignment of a judge to consider the Motion.” 1 We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Swan’s Notice included the following: VI. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AND APPEARANCE OF PREJUDGMENT Plaintiff respectfully preserves an objection based upon the appearance created when the Court characterized Plaintiff as possessing substantial or “vast” wealth and referenced Plaintiff’s Bitcoin account while disputed accusations concerning Plaintiff’s finances remained unresolved. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1) provides for recusal when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Rule 18b(b)(2) addresses personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party, and Rule 18b(b)(3) addresses personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts. Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(A) provides that a judge should act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canon 3 requires judicial duties to be performed impartially and diligently. 2 See State v. Audi AG, 634 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. 2021);[1] Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 453–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (discussing the objective impartiality standard). Plaintiff is not asking the Court to accept Plaintiff’s characterization of the hearing without examination. Plaintiff is asking that the record reflect the specific statements, the evidence relied upon, and the basis for any financial or credibility finding so that the decision is demonstrably grounded in the evidence rather than in an impression concerning Plaintiff’s wealth or character. Swan asked the trial court to “[p]reserve Plaintiff’s objections concerning judicial impartiality, prejudgment, and reliance upon unverified accusations[]” and “[s]tate the Court’s rulings on these objections so that Plaintiff may obtain meaningful appellate review.” Swan notes that she did not file a motion to recuse that invoked Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a. We agree, and we would not have faulted the trial court if it had not treated the Notice as a Motion to Recuse. That said, Swan cited Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 18b and a Canon of Judicial Conduct, and stated, “Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1) provides for recusal when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” It was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion for the trial court to proceed cautiously and refer the matter to the Regional Presiding Judge for whatever action he deems appropriate. 1 This is not a citation to an actual authority. “Allegations of bias and prejudice typically are not enough to sustain claims that constitutional due-process rights have been violated.” State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 692 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. 2022) (citation omitted). “[M]ere allegations of bias and prejudice are generally insufficient to establish a constitutional violation[.]” Id. at 477 (citation omitted). 3 See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 74.047 (“A presiding judge may perform the acts necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter and to improve the management of the court system and the administration of justice.”); 74.059(c)(3) (A district court judge shall “request the presiding judge to assign another judge to hear a motion relating to the recusal of the judge from a case pending in his court[.]”). Swan argues that she “promptly removed any possible ambiguity by expressly stating that Relator had not moved for recusal” in her Objection to and Correction of Court’s Recharacterization of Plaintiff’s October 5 Filing; Notice that Plaintiff Did Not Move for Recusal; and Request for Clarification and Preservation of Record, filed October 9, 2026. As we indicated above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the Presiding Judge of the Second Administrative Judicial Region will determine what action he now deems appropriate. On the record before this Court, we conclude Relator has failed to meet her burden to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus and any request for temporary relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a), 52.10. PETITION DENIED. PER CURIAM Submitted on October 28, 2026 Opinion Delivered October 29, 2026 Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ. 4