In Re Magaly A. Espinosa v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
Date FiledOctober 22, 2026
Docket09-26-00404-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-26-00404-CV
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IN RE MAGALY A. ESPINOSA
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Original Proceeding
410th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 19-01-00898
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator Magaly A. Espinosa filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and
motions for temporary relief. The Real Party in Interest, Paul Jacob Carlson, filed a
response. As discussed more fully below, we deny the petition for a writ of
mandamus and any motions for temporary relief.
On April 16, 2026, the associate judge for the 410th District Court signed
temporary orders in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship. The Temporary
Orders changed the parent with the right to determine the child’s residence from
Espinosa to Carlson. On May 14, 2026, the presiding judge signed temporary orders
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de novo that kept the temporary orders in effect and expanded the orders to include
in-person supervised visitation. On August 14, 2026, the trial court signed an
amended docket control order that set the case for trial on October 5, 2026.
Espinosa filed her initial petition for a writ of mandamus and request for
temporary relief on October 1, 2026, more than five months after the temporary
orders came into effect and mere days before the date set for the trial. In her
mandamus petition, Espinosa sought a stay of the trial, the return of the child to her
under the terms of the January 17, 2020 Order Adjudicating Parentage, and
possession of the child’s passport. On October 2, 2026, we denied Espinosa’s request
for temporary relief and requested a response from Carlson.
Espinosa filed a motion asking this Court to enjoin the trial court from signing
a final order and filed a Second Amended Petition for a writ of mandamus. In her
Second Amended Petition, Espinosa contends the trial court abused its discretion:
(1) by affirming and incorporating temporary orders that altered the primary
residence designation during a pending modification suit absent an affidavit that
stated adequate facts of significant impairment required by Family Code section
156.006(b)(1); (2) by refusing to issue written findings explaining the variance from
the Standard Possession Order as required by Family Code section 153.258; (3) by
compelling mediation over Espinosa’s objection without holding an evidentiary
hearing as required by Family Code section 153.0071(f); (4) by directing the court
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reporter pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145 to withhold the verbatim
reporter’s record of the de novo hearings until Relator filed a case in the appellate
court; (5) by appointing Carlson as temporary sole managing conservator, although
in August 2019 he was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for
stalking Espinosa, which Espinosa argues is credible evidence of family violence for
purposes of Family Code section 153.004; and (6) through the cumulative effect of
the complained-of actions, by depriving Relator of her constitutional rights to
procedural due process, equal protection, and the right to meaningful review.
Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy that issues only to correct a clear
abuse of discretion for which the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. See In
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). Mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for challenging a temporary order
that is not appealable. Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991) (orig.
proceeding). Nonetheless, we must weigh the benefits of mandamus review against
the detriments. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig.
proceeding).
Mandamus is not issued as a matter of right, but at the discretion of the court,
and whether the writ should issue is largely controlled by equitable principles.
Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
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For instance, an appellate court may deny mandamus relief concerning temporary
orders when a final judgment is imminent. See In re Williams, No. 03-25-00013-CV,
2025 WL 209427, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 15, 2025, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]) (mem. op.).
Entry of a final order renders moot any complaints about a temporary order.
See In re A.A., No. 08-14-00085-CV, 2014 WL 3953490, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso
Aug. 13, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). In this case, the trial has concluded.
Although the mandamus record remains unclear regarding rendition of judgment,
impending final orders may displace the need for mandamus relief. In re S.B., 720
S.W.3d 147 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding) (Young, concurring). We deny the
petition for a writ of mandamus and any motions for temporary relief. See Tex. R.
App. P. 52.8(a), 52.10.
PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on October 8, 2026
Opinion Delivered October 22, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.
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