Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00656-CV IN RE Vanessa Lynn CLARK, Relator Original Proceeding 1 PER CURIAM Sitting: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: September 23, 2026 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED; MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS, DISQUALIFICATION, REFERRAL, AND TO STRIKE DENIED On August 21, 2026, relator Vanessa Lynn Clark filed a petition for writ of mandamus. On August 27, 2026, real party in interest, Austin Taylor Sutton, by his attorney, Christopher J. Weber, also appearing in propria persona, filed a motion for sanctions under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.11. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.11. Thereafter, Clark filed a motion to disqualify Weber as Sutton’s counsel, a motion requesting referral of counsel’s conduct to the office of chief disciplinary counsel, and a motion to strike the exhibits to Sutton’s motion for sanctions. After This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 19-041, styled In the Interest of E.J.S., a Child, in the 451st Judicial District 1 Court, Kendall County, Texas, the Honorable Kirsten Cohoon presiding. 04-26-00656-CV considering the petition and the mandamus record, we conclude Clark is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, Clark’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See id. R. 52.8(a). In their motion for sanctions, Sutton and Weber argue Clark’s petition for writ of mandamus is groundless, frivolous, and part of an egregious, multi-year campaign of cross- jurisdictional harassment targeting them. 2 The motion requests sanctions including but not limited to: attorney’s fees incurred in preparing a response to the original proceeding; an order directing the clerk of this court to reject all future notices, applications for writs of mandamus, or other original proceedings filed by Clark arising out of the underlying cause and related causes; termination of Clark’s ability to use the eFile system unless represented by counsel; and a criminal referral to the Bexar County District Attorney’s office. The motion for sanctions and a later-filed supplement include several email messages in which Clark insults and threatens Weber and his family in vulgar and demeaning terms. In response to the motion for sanctions, Clark filed a cross- motion for sanctions and a motion to disqualify Weber. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.11, we may impose sanctions on a party who is not acting in good faith as indicated by filing a petition that is clearly groundless. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.11(a). We exercise the discretion afforded us by Rule 52.11 with caution and only after careful deliberation. In re Lerma, 144 S.W.3d 21, 26 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, orig. proceeding). The ethical rules require lawyers to demonstrate respect for the legal system and those who serve it, including other lawyers. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble 4. “Lawyers should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others.” Id. Though pro se litigants are not subject to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 2 Clark filed several cases in this court and the Texas Supreme Court arising out of Cause No. 19-041: 04-25-00340- CV, 04-25-00803-CV, 04-26-00461-CV, and 25-0531. Relief has been denied in every proceeding. Additionally, the record reveals Clark has initiated suits against Sutton and/or Weber in Kendall County, Bexar County, and the Western District of Texas. -2- 04-26-00656-CV Conduct, their demeanor and conduct should be measured by the same standard. See Gleason v. Isbell, 145 S.W.3d 354, 357–58 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, order) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978) (stating that “[t]he right to self- representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.”)). Nonetheless, we are mindful that any sanctions must “bear a direct relationship to the offensive conduct.” Twist v. McAllen Nat. Bank, 248 S.W.3d 351, 367 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2007, orig. proceeding). While we believe Clark’s emails are grossly inappropriate as between a party and opposing counsel, we hesitate to apply Rule 52.11, which focuses on Clark’s petition. Furthermore, a trial court may be better suited to address Sutton and Weber’s requested relief. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 11.001–.102 (providing mechanism to restrict vexatious litigation by pro se individuals who abuse the legal system). We caution Clark that should she file any “clearly groundless” petition, we may, on our own initiative, impose just sanctions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.11(a). Accordingly, we deny the motions for sanctions and Clark’s motion to disqualify Weber as Sutton’s counsel, motion to refer Weber to the office of chief disciplinary counsel, and motion to strike the exhibits to Sutton’s motion for sanctions. PER CURIAM -3-