Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00647-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE WILLIAM TRAVIS HAWK JR. AND REBECCA MAE HAWK ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Silva, Peña, and West Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam1 By pro se petition for writ of mandamus, relators William Travis Hawk Jr. and Rebecca Mae Hawk seek various forms of relief against the judge of the trial court, the District Clerk of Victoria County, and “Victoria County, Texas, as to Title II/section 504 access and coordinator duties.” Relators contend that they filed a petition for bill of review 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). with a statement of inability to afford payment of court costs (statement) completed by William; however, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the statement before issuing citations against the defendants in the bill of review proceeding. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145. In sum, relators seek mandamus relief: (1) vacating the directive for a hearing on indigency; (2) ordering the immediate issuance of citations; and (3) restricting public access to William’s statement. Relators have filed a motion for temporary relief regarding these issues, and they have also filed a “Verified Complaint and Motion to Confirm Indigent Status, Withdraw Unauthorized Fee Demands, and Direct the Clerk to Cease Further Fee Collection” (Verified Motion and Complaint). First, relators seek relief, in part, against the judge of the trial court. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available in limited circumstances to correct clear errors in exceptional cases.” In re Rogers, 728 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex. 2026) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citation modified); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). To obtain a writ of mandamus, the relator must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Lapuerta, 732 S.W.3d 548, 555 (Tex. 2026) (orig. proceeding). After they filed this petition for writ of mandamus, relators advised this Court that: (1) the trial court has now issued citations for three of the eight defendants in the bill of review proceeding; (2) the trial court has requested Rebecca to submit her own statement; and (3) the trial court’s register now states that, “Per Judge Williams— Statement of Inability to Pay approved.” Relators contend that these events do not render this original proceeding moot. Given the breadth and number of relators’ complaints in their petition for writ of mandamus, we agree that this matter is not moot. However, we 2 nevertheless determine that relators have not met their burden to obtain mandamus relief. See In re Lapuerta, 732 S.W.3d at 555. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, as to relators’ request for relief against the judge of the trial court, and we likewise deny relators’ motion for temporary relief. Second, relators seek mandamus relief, in part, against the District Clerk and Victoria County. Article V, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, and states that the courts of appeals “shall have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a). Section 22.221 of the Texas Government Code provides the main source for the original jurisdiction of the intermediate courts of appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221; In re Cook, 394 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2012, orig. proceeding). In pertinent part, this section provides that an intermediate appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus against specified judges in its district and “all other writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the court.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221(a), (b), (c). Our mandamus jurisdiction does not extend to the District Clerk or Victoria County, and relators have not established that mandamus is necessary to enforce this Court’s jurisdiction. See id.; In re Arabzadegan, No. 03-26-00233-CV, 2026 WL 679464, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 11, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Jackson, No. 01- 25-00069-CR, 2025 WL 554197, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 20, 2025, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Therefore, we dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction, in part, as to these requests for relief. Third, relators contend that they are authorized to proceed as indigent in this original proceeding and in all other matters. Given the allegations herein and the state of 3 the record, and in our sole discretion, we are of the opinion that good cause exists to suspend Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 5 in this original proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 2 (allowing the suspension of appellate rules in certain circumstances), 5 (governing the payment of fees in civil cases). Therefore, although we do not make an indigency determination in this case, we waive the fees in this matter. Accordingly, we dismiss relators’ Verified Complaint and Motion as moot, in part, as it pertains to this case, and we deny relators’ Verified Complaint and Motion, in part, as to their request for a blanket determination of indigency in all causes. In conclusion, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, as to relators’ complaints against the judge of the trial court, and we deny relators’ motion for temporary relief. We dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction, in part, as to relators’ complaints against the District Clerk and Victoria County. We dismiss relators’ Verified Complaint and Motion in part and deny it in part as stated herein. PER CURIAM Delivered and filed on the 25th day of September, 2026. 4