Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00435-CR IN RE ENJE MOORE, RELATOR ORIGINAL PROCEEDING October 27, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ. Relator, Enje Moore, has filed with this Court his petition for writ of mandamus by which he requests that we (1) issue an emergency stay to effectively “freeze the lower court dates”; (2) “take judicial notice of the systematic due process violations perpetrated within the Randall County Courthouse framework”; and (3) “issue a binding Writ of Mandamus ordering this fabricated felony cause to be dismissed with prejudice, permanently barring further institutional oppression.” For the reasons that follow, we deny Relator’s petition. BACKGROUND It appears from the mandamus record provided by Relator that he is the subject of a criminal proceeding styled The State of Texas v. Enje Dewan Moore and bearing the cause number 34196C in the 251st District Court of Randall County, the Honorable Ana Estevez, presiding. In that cause, he filed a motion to dismiss based on a claim that he has been denied a speedy trial. The trial court denied that motion on August 17, 2026. Both before and after the trial court’s denial of Relator’s motion, he filed several documents pro se, despite having been represented by appointed counsel throughout the proceeding. In these filings, Relator expressed his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, the continued delays in the trial court, and the judicial system generally. He filed his petition for writ of mandamus in this Court seeking a variety of relief. We address his requests in turn. MANDAMUS STANDARD Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when a relator can show that (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and (2) no adequate appellate remedy exists. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). ANALYSIS First, Relator asks that we grant an emergency stay by which we freeze all pending court dates in the trial court. He cites no purpose to be served during the freeze, nor does he cite what might serve as an endpoint of the stay. We deny this request. 2 As an initial matter we note that Relator has, on more than one occasion, raised a speedy-trial claim in the trial court, suggesting to us that visiting further delay by “freezing” all pending court dates is not the relief Relator intends—or should intend—to seek. Relator requests an indefinite freeze, it would seem. Mandamus may lie to compel a trial. See Ex parte Sheffield, 685 S.W.3d 86, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). But it is not the proper vehicle to either compel indefinite delay or seek review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on a speedy-trial claim, if we could read Relator’s petition as such. See id. at 88 (“Vindication of the speedy trial right must be had through a motion to dismiss followed by appeal after trial if the motion is wrongly denied.). We cannot grant Relator’s requested relief of an indefinite stay of all proceedings. Beyond that and to the extent he seeks a temporary stay pursuant to Rule 52.10, the instant opinion finally disposes of this cause, and thereby, it makes a temporary stay under Rule 52.10 unnecessary and ineffective. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, an order granting temporary relief is effective until the case is finally decided.”). We deny Relator’s request for an emergency stay of proceedings. As for the request that we take judicial notice of systemic due process violations perpetrated within the Randall County courthouse framework, we may not grant such relief by mandamus. First, we cannot grant mandamus relief in the nature of judicial notice. A court may judicially notice an adjudicative fact only if it is not subject to reasonable dispute because it either is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. TEX. R. EVID. 201. Any “systematic due process violations perpetrated within the Randall County Courthouse framework” is certainly 3 subject to reasonable dispute; it is not the proper subject of a request to take judicial notice. Furthermore, the Texas Government Code governs this Court’s mandamus jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221; In re Dunn, No. 07-25-00105-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 2494, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 10, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). A court of appeals may issue writs of mandamus against (1) a judge of a district, statutory county, statutory probate county, or county court in the court of appeals district; (2) a judge of a district court who is acting as a magistrate at a court of inquiry under Chapter 52 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the court of appeals district; or (3) an associate judge of a district or county court appointed by a judge under Chapter 201 of the Family Code in the court of appeals district for the judge who appointed the associate judge. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221(b). The “Randall County Courthouse framework” does not fall within the list of those against whom mandamus may issue. We therefore decline to issue mandamus relief against the entirety of the Randall County courthouse. To the extent Relator asks us to make such a conclusion regarding the alleged due process violations, mandamus relief is likewise unavailable. To grant this relief, we would have to exercise discretion and resolve factual issues. “It is well established Texas law that an appellate court may not deal with disputed areas of fact in an original mandamus proceeding.” In re Angelini, 186 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding); see State ex rel. Hill v. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Dist., 34 S.W.3d 924, 926 (2001) (observing that mandamus relief is unavailable where the requested act requires discretion or resolution of unsettled law). Relator has not shown himself entitled to the relief he has requested. 4 For the same reason, we cannot fulfill his third request, to issue a writ of mandamus ordering that the pending criminal proceeding against him be dismissed with prejudice. See In re Angelini, 186 S.W.3d at 560. He has not specifically urged a legal basis for doing so, but assuming it relates to his speedy-trial claim, we note another reason we cannot grant the relief requested. As we have observed, a relator is eligible for mandamus relief only when he can establish two prerequisites: first, that he has no other adequate remedy at law; and second, that under the relevant law and facts, the act he seeks to compel is “ministerial.” Smith v. Gohmert, 962 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc). So, if Relator’s request that we order the proceeding dismissed with prejudice is one based on his claim that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial, which it appears to be, then mandamus is likewise unavailable because he has an adequate remedy by law in the form of an appeal that could challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. See Ex parte Sheffield, 685 S.W.3d at 88; see also Smith, 962 S.W.2d at 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“In any event, we continue to believe that a defendant seeking to compel a dismissal of an indictment on speedy trial grounds has an adequate remedy at law and, therefore, has no need for the drastic remedy of mandamus.”); Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1991) (“Absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, a denial of a motion to dismiss . . . is a ruling incident to the ordinary trial process which will not be corrected by mandamus, but by the legal remedy of the ordinary appellate process.”). We deny Relator’s relief on this basis as well. 5 CONCLUSION Having concluded that Relator has not shown himself entitled to extraordinary relief on any of the grounds asserted, we deny Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. Laura A. W. Pratt Justice Do not publish. 6