Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont __________________ NO. 09-26-00227-CV __________________ SEREIVANDY KIM, Appellant V. CEDAR WOODS COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee __________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 457th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 26-05-07334 __________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION In this accelerated appeal, Sereivandy Kim (“Appellant” or “Kim”) challenges the trial court’s denial of his application for a temporary injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4). In his application, Kim sought a mandatory injunction that would require Cedar Woods Community Association, Inc. (“Appellee” or “Cedar Woods”) to restore possession of a residence to Kim while Kim and Cedar Woods litigate Kim’s suit to quiet title over the residence. 1 In five issues, Kim contends: (1) an order authorizing a foreclosure in previous litigation between Kim and Cedar Woods is void because the trial court signed the order on a Sunday; (2) the foreclosure order is void because the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution within thirty days of the date the trial court signed the order; (3) the homeowners’ association that obtained the foreclosure order lacks clean hands and consequently cannot obtain relief; (4) the foreclosure order is void because the homeowners’ association failed to serve him with citation or petition; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying injunctive relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the order denying a temporary injunction. Background In April 2026, Kim, a self-represented party, filed an Original Petition to Quiet Title, which the District Clerk assigned Trial Cause Number 26-05-07334 in the 457th District Court of Montgomery County. In his Original Petition, Kim alleges that in June 2022 Cedar Woods filed an expedited proceeding to foreclose on Kim’s residence for nonpayment of assessments. The District Clerk assigned the case Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993. Kim alleges the citations issued in the case were returned unserved. Kim alleges that on Sunday, August 7, 2022, at 5:37:03 p.m., the trial court signed “Property Owners Association Agreed Order on Application for Expedited Foreclosure.” Kim further alleges that the order was filed four days earlier 2 and any signatures purporting to represent his agreement were placed on the document without his knowledge, participation, or consent. In his Original Petition, Kim alleges that an entry in the Registry of Actions for Trial Cause Number 22-06- 06993 for August 26, 2026 states: “CANCELED — ‘Dismiss for Want of Prosecution’ — with the notation ‘Agreed Resolution[.]’” Kim alleges the residence was purportedly sold at a foreclosure sale for approximately $300,000, and the current record of title reflects 627 Oak Circle Dr E LLC owns the property. In his Original Petition, Kim asks the trial court to render a declaratory judgment that the Trustee’s Deed is void because Kim was never served with citation in Cause Number 22-06-06993, the order authorizing Cedar Woods to foreclose was signed on a Sunday, the order was electronically filed days before it was signed, Kim never agreed to the foreclosure order, and Trial Cause Number 22- 06-06993 was dismissed, thus voiding the foreclosure order. In addition to seeking a declaratory judgment that the Trustee’s Deed is void, Kim seeks damages for wrongful foreclosure because the foreclosure was conducted in violation of section 209.009 of the Texas Property Code, which requires a court judgment before a property owners association may foreclose on a residence. On May 4, 2026, Kim filed Plaintiff’s Emergency Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Mandatory Injunction. In his application Kim asked the trial court to issue a mandatory injunction ordering Cedar Oaks to immediately restore 3 possession of the property located at 627 Oak Circle Drive East to Kim. On May 4, 2026, the trial court signed an order denying a temporary restraining order. On May 20, 2026, Kim filed Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction and Mandatory Injunction to Restore Possession. Kim asserted that Cedar Woods was served with citation on May 18, 2026, and the citation was filed the following day. Kim alleged immediate action was necessary because the Kim family had been evicted on May 20, 2026.1 On May 21, 2026, the trial court signed an order denying the Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction and Mandatory Injunction to Restore Possession. On May 21, 2026, Kim filed Plaintiff’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Denial of Ex Parte Emergency Injunctive Relief and Request for Expedited Evidentiary Hearing. On June 2, 2026, Cedar Woods filed Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. In its motion, Cedar Woods asserted that Kim brought the lawsuit in error against the wrong defendant. Cedar Woods alleged, “While the Association did file an Application for Expedited Foreclosure Pursuant to Rule 736 due to the Plaintiff’s 1 In the brief he filed in this accelerated appeal, Kim states that his family was forcibly displaced from 627 Oak Circle Drive East in April 2023. In a Motion to Expedite filed by Kim in this appeal, Kim explains that after they lost their home to foreclosure his credit was damaged and they had to pay rent of $2,300 per month for a dwelling, and the eviction that occurred in 2026 concerned a residence at a different address. 4 failure to pay [his] assessments, the Association did not foreclose on the Plaintiff’s property.” In the motion, Cedar Woods states, “The party who foreclosed on the Plaintiff’s property is the Plaintiff’s lender, Guild Mortgage Company.” According to Cedar Woods and as indicated in exhibits attached to the motion, in 2018 Kim secured a loan through Guild Mortgage that was secured by a Deed of Trust. The mortgage company initiated a non-judicial foreclosure that occurred on December 6, 2022, and a Substitute Trustee’s Deed conveyed the property to Guild Mortgage Company, LLC. The Substitute Trustee’s Deed recites: Kim conveyed the property to Trustee in trust to secure payment of a note; the beneficiary, Guild Mortgage Company, LLC, declared that Kim defaulted on the note; notices stating the time, place, and terms of sale were mailed, posted, and filed, as required by law; and the substitute trustee sold the property to the highest bidder on December 6, 2022. On June 4, 2026, Cedar Woods filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss that asked the trial court to dismiss the suit pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. On June 4, 2026, Kim perfected this accelerated appeal. Standard of Review “A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). A trial court will only issue a temporary injunction 5 if the applicant establishes: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim if the injunction is not granted. Id. We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a temporary injunction for abuse of discretion. Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017). Under an abuse of discretion standard, we cannot overrule the trial court’s decision unless the trial court acted unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner, without reference to guiding rules or principles. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211. We cannot substitute our judgment for the trial court’s reasonable judgment even if we would have reached a contrary conclusion. Id. “The trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s decision.” Id. (citation omitted). We limit the scope of our review to the validity of the order, without reviewing or deciding the merits of the underlying case. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex. 1978). Discussion We address Kim’s issues out of order. In issue five, Kim contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Kim’s application for a temporary injunction without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argues Rule 680 makes an evidentiary hearing mandatory. Rule 680 states: In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the application for a temporary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible date and takes precedence of all matters except older matters of the same character; and when the application comes on 6 for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall proceed with the application for a temporary injunction and, if he does not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 680 (emphasis added). Rule 680 requires the trial court to set a hearing if it grants a temporary restraining order ex parte, not if it denies a temporary restraining order. Here, the trial court denied Kim’s application for a temporary restraining order. Consequently, Kim has not shown that the trial court violated Rule 680. See id. Kim applied for a mandatory injunction that would require Cedar Woods to immediately return possession of the residence to Kim, but Kim alleged that the title to the property is currently in 627 Oak Circle Dr E LLC, not in Cedar Woods. Under the circumstances, the trial court could deny the application for a temporary injunction on its face because Kim judicially admitted that Cedar Woods is not in possession of and thus, has no control over the property Kim wanted restored to him immediately. We overrule issue five. In issue three, Kim contends every argument in Cedar Woods’s Motion to Dismiss depends upon the validity of the foreclosure order. He argues Cedar Woods does not have clean hands—he does not explain why—and he contends Cedar Woods cannot receive relief on that ground alone. Kim misunderstands Cedar Woods’s argument in the trial court. Cedar Woods argues it was the incorrect party to the suit to quiet title because the entity that foreclosed on the property was Guild 7 Mortgage, acting under the power granted to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust, not Cedar Woods acting under the power granted by the foreclosure order in Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993. Cedar Woods presented the issue as one of Kim’s standing, but regardless of the way in which it framed the issue, the validity of the foreclosure order in Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993 is irrelevant to the grounds stated in Cedar Woods’s motion to dismiss. Instead, Cedar Woods argues there was no nexus between the foreclosure order and the Substitute Trustee’s Deed that conveyed the property to Kim’s mortgage lender under a power of sale granted in a Deed of Trust. We overrule issue three. Kim’s remaining issues concern the proceedings that occurred in Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993, which is not on appeal before us, nor does it appear to be part of the underlying case in this matter. That said, we cannot resolve the merits of the underlying case in this accelerated appeal from the denial of an application for a temporary injunction. See Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 861-62. We may review issues, however, to determine whether the trial court erred by impliedly finding that Kim failed to establish a probable right to the relief sought in the lawsuit. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. In issue two, Kim contends the underlying foreclosure order from 2022 which he now complains about is void because the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution on August 26, 2022. The factual assertion in the brief is not borne out 8 by Kim’s Original Petition and the exhibits attached to the pleading, which indicate the trial court cancelled a previous setting for an August 26, 2022 hearing on dismissal for want of prosecution because the parties reached an agreed settlement on the Rule 736 application for expedited foreclosure on August 7, 2022. In issue four, Kim argues that the foreclosure order is void because the Register of Actions for Trial Cause Number 22-06-06993 shows the citations that issued in the case were returned unserved. Assuming Kim did not receive service of process in the case, the foreclosure order would not be void if Kim entered an appearance in the case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120. In issue one, Kim contends the foreclosure order is void because the trial court signed the order on a Sunday. Kim contends, “Texas district courts do not hold court on Sundays in routine civil proceedings[,]” citing as authority section 22.004 of the Government Code. That section of the Government Code grants the Supreme Court full rulemaking power on the practice and procedure in civil actions, allows the Supreme Court to amend rules and provides that its rules and amendments shall remain in effect unless and until disapproved by the Legislature, repeals prior laws governing practice and procedure, and provides for the Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure for particular situations. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.004. It does not prohibit courts from signing orders on Sundays. Kim does not distinguish Rule 9 4 or explain why an order signed on a Sunday would not become effective the following day. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 4 (regarding computation of time). Even if we assume without deciding that the factual assertions Kim makes in his application for a temporary injunction are true, the trial court could still within its discretion decide Kim is not entitled to a temporary mandatory injunction against Cedar Woods. Kim has not shown that he conclusively established that he has a probable right to the relief sought in the application for a temporary injunction such that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the application. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. We overrule issues one, two, three, four, and five. Conclusion Having overruled the issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s Order Denying Emergency Temporary Injunction and Mandatory Injunction to Restore Possession. AFFIRMED. W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice Submitted on August 17, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 20, 2026 Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ. 10