In Re: Matthew Reuben Phillips v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 12th District (Tyler)
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket12-26-00314-CV
JudgeDavis
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NO. 12-26-00314-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
IN RE: §
MATTHEW REUBEN PHILLIPS, § ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
RELATOR §
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Matthew Reuben Phillips, appearing pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus
seeking relief from Respondent’s order committing him to the county jail for contempt of court. 1
We deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
This original proceeding arises from a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Relator
is the father of one child shared with Real Party in Interest Stephanie Tuma. On October 30,
2023, Respondent issued an order requiring Relator to pay $543.53 per month in current child
support and $394.10 in cash medical support, as well as retroactive child support.
On November 6, 2024, Respondent entered an order finding that Relator failed to pay
court-ordered child support and medical support in January, February, March, and April of 2024.
Relator was in arrears on child support in the amount of $16,921.23, and in arrears on medical
support in the amount of $5,647.44. Respondent found Relator guilty of a separate act of
contempt for (1) each time period where he failed to pay child support and (2) each time period
1
Respondent is the Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge of the 321st District Court in Smith County, Texas.
where he failed to provide medical support. Respondent ordered Relator committed to the
county jail for 180 days for each separate act of contempt (with the sentences to run
concurrently), but in the same order, suspended the sentence and placed Relator on community
supervision for 120 months.
On May 6, 2025, the Office of the Attorney General of Texas (OAG) moved to revoke
Relator’s community supervision, alleging that he failed to pay monthly child support and
medical support on multiple occasions, and further failed to make several required payments
toward the arrears on both child support and medical support. At the hearing on November 3,
Relator appeared without counsel and stated his belief that he qualified for a court-appointed
attorney. Respondent noted that “taking judicial notice of the file … I have given you a couple of
opportunities to get counsel. … You know, I—I guess I could evaluate you, I mean, just for
purposes for having gone through the statutory requirements.” 2
Relator testified that his business (a pool construction company) was about to enter
bankruptcy and had no assets. He wished to “rebuild,” and stated that although he did not have
capital to do so, he had “friends that will help me out.” He lived in a “shop house” he built on
his mother’s property, and his vehicle (a 2020 Ford F450 truck) was in his mother’s name,
although he was the only person who used it. When asked about bank accounts, he stated that “a
buddy” just loaned him $30,000.00, $20,000.00 of which went to paying “other bills,” and the
remaining $10,000.00 going toward his child support arrears. Respondent ruled:
Well, for the very fact that you have – you know, and like I said, there’s a lot of stuff that may not
be titled in your name. You have access to friends that are happily able to fund you, and so
someone – not many people that come before this Court can get a buddy to give them $30,000. …
[M]ost people can’t borrow anywhere close to that kind of money, sir. … So it’s hard for me to
find that you're indigent. So I’m going to deny your indigency request at this time, and we do
need to go forward on this matter.
The revocation hearing proceeded thereafter. Relator testified regarding his spending habits and
income, including multiple airplane trips and charges at restaurants and bars. At the conclusion
of the hearing, Respondent stated:
…[H]ere’s what I’m going to do — and this is the best deal you’re ever going to get, so listen to
me carefully. Number one, I am going to revoke you, okay? And I’m going to – I would
2
Counsel for OAG stated that the hearing was already continued at least twice so that Relator could hire
counsel.
2
otherwise send you to jail and commit you to the Smith County Jail for the 180 days that I’ve
already ordered that you are to be – you know, based on your finding of contempt.
But what I’m going to do is this: Subject to you paying that $10,000 before you leave this
courtroom to Ms. Gustafson – and y’all can record whatever you need to on that – and then you
paying your child support every single month on time, and I’m confirming these judgments and
you pay the payouts that are ordered to be paid on these payments of arrears, on the medical
support and regular support that’s an extra 200 bucks, you pay those. As long as you do those
things, you don’t have to remit to the Smith County Jail.
…
The first month, by the 5th day of the following month of the month you don’t do any of those
things, you will be ordered to go ahead and remit to the Smith County Jail. And if you don’t do it
by 5:00 p.m. of the 5th day of the following month, we will issue an automatic arrest warrant, and
you will be brought in. You won’t know it’s coming. There won’t be a hearing. … [A]s long as
you're doing the things you’re supposed to do and paying your support every month, and paying
on these arrears, and then you pay this $10,000, great.
…
So it’s basically what I would call … a conditional revocation. And I will note that in the docket
notes, that that is his specific current status. So that in the event that he does not pay, a violation
report can be sent to the Court, and I can automatically issue a capias without a hearing going
forward. So that is the order of the Court at this time.
On November 6, Respondent issued an enforcement order.
At a hearing held on October 5, 2026, which OAG’s counsel described as “a status
hearing subsequent to a conditional revocation and a violation report from probation,” Relator
orally requested a continuance to obtain counsel and re-urged to Respondent that he was unable
to afford counsel and should be appointed representation. 3 The following dialogue ensued:
Respondent: I mean, the continuance I’ll put a pin in. But on the question of, you know, whether
you’re on pauper status and could be appointed counsel is kind of a question mark.
Relator: Yes, sir.
Respondent: Because there’s no State action currently requested. This is a status hearing,
probably filed as a result of probation filing a violation report. Am I right, Ms. Prior?
Ms. Prior: 4 Yes, Judge. Due to not making any payments on child support, not paying on
probation fees, and–
Respondent: When was the last time he reported?
Ms. Prior: …[T]he last time I show he reported was June.
…
Tuma’s Counsel: Okay. I’m Janna Gustafson, and I represent the mom, Stephanie Tuma.
…
3
Relator alleges that he filed a written motion for continuance prior to this hearing. The copy of this
motion in the record is unsigned and does not bear a filing stamp, so it is unclear when it was filed. Relator alleges
therein that he consulted with an attorney, who would not have time to review the case materials before the October
5, 2026, hearing, and requested a continuance to “a date in November 2026.”
4
The record does not directly disclose Ms. Prior’s identity, but she appears to be Relator’s community
supervision officer.
3
And normally I would not interrupt; however, before we go into a whole bunch of stuff, this order
that we entered back in November where he was found in contempt, it has some clause into the
actual order of contempt.
…
And it actually provides that he was committed to county jail for 180 days. And following that, if
certain conditions were not met by the end of the month, meaning if he did not pay his current
child support, if he didn’t make his current medical support –
…
– if he did not pay his arrearages and medical support and child support, or pay his supervision
fees, then he was going to be committed to the county jail. But we also have, like, additional
language in here that I’ve never seen in an order. But you crafted it yourself, Judge Wilson.
…
Where it says – and this is on the eighth page of that order. It says that the Sheriff of Smith
County is ordered to arrest Matthew Phillips and commit him to the county jail as ordered above.
Said commitment to run concurrently if the above conditions are not met by the last day of each
month beginning December 1st of 2025, and on or before the last day of each month thereafter
until further order of the Court.
The Court further orders that Matthew Ruben [sic] Phillips, should he fail to comply with the
above-ordered conditions, to appear at the Smith County Jail by 5:00 p.m. on the fifth day of the
month immediately following a month of noncompliance with the above-ordered conditions. And
if he fails to do so, a writ of commitment, arrest warrant, shall issue. So I’m somewhat perplexed
because –
Respondent: He’s standing here. He’s not in jail; right?
Tuma’s Counsel: Exactly.
…
Respondent: And I do reflect what’s in the order as Mrs. Gustafson says. It’s pretty clear this is a
conditional – not like a – this isn’t like regular probation. He’s actually on a conditional
revocation where he has been revoked and is ordered – we deferred his submission to custody.
Relator claimed that he failed to make any payments since June 2026 because he was
“completely bankrupt,” and alleged that his child support payments (for three total children)
were higher than his monthly income. Respondent subsequently ordered:
[W]hat I would do is just take judicial notice of the existing file, the existing commitment order.
Because you have failed to comply with the terms of your release and your deferral of
commitment, you’re ordered to go ahead and submit to custody at the Smith County Jail by 5:00
p.m. today, Mr. Phillips. You’re going to jail. If you do not appear today, a capias is going to be
issued for your arrest tomorrow. So I can’t be more clear than that.
Those are your – that’s the order that’s already in place. That’s what I’m going to comply with,
and that’s what I’m going to order you to do.
Respondent signed a “Change in Status” on October 6, ordering Relator to turn himself in to the
Smith County Jail by “5:00 p.m. on 10/5/2026.” Relator filed this original proceeding on the
same day. On the following day, this Court granted Relator’s motion for emergency relief and
suspended enforcement of the commitment order.
4
Tuma asserts in her response to Relator’s petition that the issue is moot, as the OAG
moved to withdraw the writ of commitment, and Respondent signed an order withdrawing the
writ on October 8. Tuma attaches a copy of the order to her response.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
In civil cases, this court has authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is
restrained in his liberty and it appears that the restraint is by virtue of a trial court’s order,
process, or commitment that results or arises from a violation of a previous order, judgment, or
decree by the trial court. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(d). The purpose of a habeas corpus
proceeding is not to determine the person’s guilt or innocence, but only to determine whether he
has been unlawfully restrained. Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979) (orig.
proceeding). This court will issue a writ of habeas corpus if a relator satisfies his burden of
showing that the contempt order, or underlying order, is void. In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715,
721–22 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
Contempt of court is broadly defined as disobedience to or disrespect of a court by acting
in opposition to its authority. Id. at 721. The power to punish a party who fails or refuses to
obey a prior court order or decree is an inherent power of a court and is an essential element of
judicial independence and authority. Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980) (orig.
proceeding); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 21.002(a). However, “‘[c]ontempt is strong medicine—
the alleged contemnor’s very liberty is often at stake—and so it should be used only as a last
resort.’” In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Ex parte
Pink, 746 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). A trial court’s power and “ability to
punish for contempt is not unfettered,” and its contempt order is void if the order exceeds the
power of the trial court or deprives the relator of liberty without due process of law. Reece, 341
S.W.3d at 366; Barnett, 600 S.W.2d at 254.
ANALYSIS
Relator contends that his commitment to jail following the October 5 hearing is void
because he was unrepresented, did not receive the necessary admonishments, and did not
knowingly and intelligently waive counsel. He further argues that his due process rights were
violated.
5
Although Relator refers to an “October 6, 2026 commitment order,” it is unclear whether
this document is present in the record before us. To the extent Relator suggests the “Change in
Status” document is the commitment order, Relator claims that this document somehow differs
from the “writ of commitment,” another document which seemingly does not appear in the
record. In an original proceeding, the relator bears the burden of providing this Court with a
sufficient record to establish his right to relief. In re Inmon, 703 S.W.3d 852, 853 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2024, no pet.). This includes an appendix containing a “certified or sworn copy of any
order complained of, or any other document showing the matter complained of,” as well as “a
certified or sworn copy of every document that is material to the relator’s claim for relief and
that was filed in any underlying proceeding.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1); 52.7(a)(1). Although
we are mindful of Relator’s pro se status, he must nevertheless comply with all applicable laws
and rules of procedure. See Zhao v. Sea Rock Inc., 659 S.W.3d 119, 128 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2022, pet. denied); In re J.P., 365 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (stating
that “[t]o apply a different set of rules to pro se litigants would be to give an unfair advantage
over litigants represented by counsel”).
Moreover, the October 8, 2026, order attached to Tuma’s response appears to withdraw
any writ of commitment entered by Respondent, and Relator appears to concede the fact of the
withdrawal, stating, “[t]he October 8, 2026, action withdrew the writ of commitment.”
Consequently, Relator’s challenge to the “180-day contempt/commitment” entered following the
hearing on October 5, as set forth in his petition, is now moot. See Ex parte McKenzie, 909
S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. 1995) (dismissing as moot habeas petition because district court vacated
its order holding Relator in contempt and for commitment).
Nevertheless, in his reply to Tuma’s response brief, Relator requests that we determine
“whether the [November] 2025 conditional order remains a presently operative source of
threatened confinement notwithstanding withdrawal of the later writ.” We acknowledge that a
contempt order that suspends a commitment and places the contemnor on community
supervision can be reviewable by habeas corpus if it imposes conditions which constitute a
sufficient restraint on liberty. In re Rivas-Luna, 528 S.W.3d 167, 169 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2017, no pet.). However, even assuming without deciding that we could address this newly
6
raised issue, 5 the November 6, 2025, order is also not present in the record provided by Relator.
See In re Inmon, 703 S.W.3d at 854; In re Daniels, No. 05-20-00501-CV, 2020 WL 2715406,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we also deny the
petition for habeas corpus in relation to the November 6, 2025, order.
DISPOSITION
Having examined and fully considered the record and the applicable law, we conclude
that Relator is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. We deny the petition for writ of habeas
corpus. We lift our stay of October 6, 2026.
C. MICHAEL DAVIS
Justice
Opinion delivered November 10, 2026.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Davis, J.
5
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that “[g]enerally, an appellant may not raise a new issue in a reply
brief because Rule [of Appellate Procedure] 38.3 allows courts of appeals to decide the matter prior to receiving the
reply brief.” Chambers v. State, 580 S.W.3d 149, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Similarly, Rule 52.5 permits a
relator in an original proceeding to file a reply brief, but states that the court “may consider and decide the case
before a reply brief is filed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.5; see also Ex parte Munoz, 139 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2004, no pet.) (noting that “we are prohibited from considering issues raised for the first time in a reply
brief” in a habeas corpus proceeding).
7
COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
NOVEMBER 10, 2026
NO. 12-26-00314-CV
IN RE: MATTHEW REUBEN PHILLIPS, RELATOR
Appeal from the 321st District Court
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 22-5377-D)
ON THIS DAY came to be heard the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Matthew
Reuben Phillips; who is the relator in appellate cause number 12-26-00314-CV and a party to
trial court cause number 22-5377-D, pending on the docket of the 321st Judicial District Court of
Smith County, Texas. Said petition for writ of habeas corpus having been filed herein on
October 6, 2026, and the same having been duly considered, because it is the opinion of this
Court that the writ should not issue, it is therefore CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED and ORDERED
that the said petition for writ of habeas corpus be, and the same is, hereby denied.
C. Michael Davis, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Davis, J.