Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00100-CR ___________________________ EX PARTE ANTHONY JAMES FLOYD On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. C-2-W012791-1743431-AP Before Wallach, Kerr, and Birdwell, JJ. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Anthony James Floyd filed a habeas corpus application under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.072, the trial court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Because we hold that the trial court did not err by denying relief, we will affirm.1 Background In 2008, Floyd was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for assault causing bodily injury. The deferred adjudication order did not contain an affirmative family-violence finding. In 2022, Floyd was charged with assault against a family member, enhanced by the prior conviction; the indictment alleged that the 2008 offense had been committed against a member of Floyd’s family or household or a person with whom Floyd had a dating relationship. See Gomez v. State, No. 2-09-086-CR, 2010 WL 1730832, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 29, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that “Section 22.01 of the [P]enal [C]ode elevates a misdemeanor assault-family-violence offense to a third-degree felony if the defendant has a prior conviction for assault-family violence” and that “a defendant who pled guilty in the prior family violence case and received deferred adjudication is treated as a defendant who has a prior conviction”). To the new offense, Floyd pled guilty under a plea bargain, was placed on deferred 1 We have considered this appeal without briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 31.1(a). 2 adjudication community supervision, and was subsequently discharged after completing it successfully. Floyd filed his habeas application in February 2026. In the application, he alleged four grounds for relief, all based on the same premise—that the more recent offense could not have been enhanced by the 2008 conviction because the trial court’s order in the 2008 case did not contain a family-violence finding. The State filed an answer asserting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because Floyd’s application did not sufficiently allege that he continued to suffer collateral consequences from the 2022 deferred adjudication order and thus his application did not show that he was restrained. The trial court referred the matter to a magistrate, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 6(d), who determined that Floyd had not alleged any facts to show that he was suffering from collateral consequences and that Floyd was “manifestly entitled to no relief”; consequently, the magistrate denied the application as frivolous. See Ex parte Holland, No. 05-17-01422-CR, 2018 WL 3949545, at *8 (Tex. App.— Dallas Aug. 17, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that when a trial court determines that it has no jurisdiction to grant relief on an Article 11.072 application, it must conclude that the applicant is manifestly entitled to no relief and deny the application as frivolous). The trial court signed an order adopting the magistrate’s actions. Floyd now appeals. 3 Discussion I. Article 11.072 applications “Article 11.072 provides an opportunity for habeas corpus relief for defendants convicted of a felony or misdemeanor and ordered to community supervision.” Ex parte Jones, No. 2-07-388-CR, 2008 WL 3185168, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). When an application is filed under Article 11.072, a writ of habeas corpus issues by operation of law. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 4; Ex Parte Betancourt, No. 08-05-00063-CR, 2006 WL 1875576, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 6, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The trial court then has two options to rule on the application. Ex parte Lively, No. 03-24-00015-CR, 2024 WL 1811437, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op. and order, not designated for publication). The first option “allows for summary dismissal of facially frivolous applications.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Baldez, 510 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.)). This procedure applies when, “looking solely to the face of the application and attached documents,” the court determines that the applicant “is manifestly entitled to no relief,” in which case the trial court must deny the application as frivolous. Id. (quoting Baldez, 510 S.W.3d at 495); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 7. “In all other cases,” the trial court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lively, 2024 WL 1811437, at *1; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 7. The trial court may grant or deny the 4 application in whole or in part; if the application is denied, the applicant may appeal. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 8. In our review of the trial court’s ruling, “[i]f the resolution of the ultimate question turns on an application of legal standards, we review the determination de novo.” Jones, 2008 WL 3185168, at *1; cf. Ex parte Zantos-Cuebas, 429 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (stating that a determination from the face of an application that the applicant is manifestly entitled to no relief is one that does not involve making fact findings or evaluating witness credibility and thus determination that application is frivolous is reviewed de novo). II. Analysis Chapter 11 applies to persons who are restrained in their liberty. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 11.01, 11.64; Ex parte Kleinman, 721 S.W.3d 400, 403–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). In this case, Floyd had already been discharged from his community supervision. His application alleged that “he continues to suffer collateral consequences from the conviction and affirmative findings entered in this cause.” However, he provided no further information. Thus, on the face of the application, he was not entitled to relief. See Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452, 458 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting that “[a]n applicant seeking habeas relief should allege with specificity the facts establishing his confinement—the details of his physical custody or the nature of collateral consequences he suffers—lest his application be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction”); Ex parte Glass, 203 S.W.3d 856, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) 5 (Johnson, J., concurring) (stating that an application under Article 11.072 “must plead collateral consequences from the improper conviction” if the applicant has been discharged). Approximately two months after the trial court signed its order and Floyd filed his notice of appeal, he filed in the trial court his “Applicant’s Verified Reply to State’s Answer, Affidavit, Memorandum of Law, and Declaration” in which he alleged that he was confined in federal prison and that the 2022 order was affecting his security level. Assuming that this allegation would have been sufficient to show collateral consequences, it came too late for the trial court to have considered it in ruling on the application. See Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (providing that “[a]n appellate court may not consider factual assertions that are outside the record” and that “an appellate court’s review of the record itself is generally limited to the evidence before the trial court at the time of the trial court’s ruling”). Because Floyd’s application failed to allege facts showing that he was restrained, the trial court correctly concluded that he was not entitled to relief. Moreover, even if the trial court had considered Floyd’s reply, each ground for relief in his application was based on the premise that because the 2008 order did not contain an affirmative family-violence finding, it could not be used to enhance the 6 2022 offense.2 This assertion is an incorrect statement of the law. See Gomez, 2010 WL 1730832, at *1. When the State uses a conviction involving family violence to enhance a subsequent offense, the State may prove that the complainant in the prior case was a family member or a member of the defendant’s household when the prior offense occurred by (1) producing the prior judgment, if the prior judgment contains a family-violence finding, or (2) producing extrinsic evidence regarding the relationship between the defendant and the complainant of the prior offense. See id.; see also Goodwin v. State, 91 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). Thus, a lack of a family-violence finding in the 2008 order would not have prohibited the prior conviction’s being used to enhance a subsequent offense, and Floyd was therefore manifestly not entitled to relief on any of the grounds asserted in the application. See Ex parte Beck, 541 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (noting that we can uphold a trial court’s judgment if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case); Ex Parte Martin, Nos. 02-25-00382-CR, 02-25-00383-CR, 2 The grounds were: (1) that the indictment was defective because the enhancement was based on the 2008 order; (2) Floyd’s plea was involuntary because it had been induced by the State’s pursuit of a felony charge based on the 2008 order; (3) Floyd’s trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate or challenge the invalid enhancement and misadvised Floyd regarding punishment—Floyd alleges that he was “advised he faced felony punishment despite the enhancement being invalid”—and (4) his due process rights were violated because the State may not obtain a conviction based on a legally invalid enhancement. 7 2026 WL 318437, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 5, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). Conclusion Because the trial court did not err by determining that Floyd was manifestly not entitled to relief and that his application was frivolous, we affirm the trial court’s order. Per Curiam Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Delivered: September 3, 2026 8