Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 22, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00090-CV __________ IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ADDISON KAY BAYOUTH, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON On Appeal from the County Court at Law Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1777 OPINION This appeal arises from the trial court’s order that dismissed Appellant LaNoard Murad Bayouth’s application for appointment as permanent guardian of the estate of Addison Kay Bayouth and awarded attorney’s fees to Appellee, Tammie Lynn Bayouth. In two issues, LaNoard argues: (1) the trial court erred when it found that LaNoard lacked standing to file a guardianship application because he had an interest that was adverse to Addison; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Tammie attorney’s fees based on a finding that LaNoard’s application was brought in bad faith and lacked just cause. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1055.001(b)(1) (West Supp. 2025), § 1155.151(c) (West 2020). We affirm. I. Factual Background LaNoard and Tammie divorced on July 1, 2010. The divorce proceeding was filed in the 326th District Court of Taylor County, in cause no. 41062-C. Tammie was awarded primary custody of her and LaNoard’s daughter, Addison, and LaNoard was ordered to pay child support to Tammie for Addison’s benefit. This child support obligation continued after Addison turned eighteen because she is disabled and has been adjudicated to be totally incapacitated. Tammie, with no objection from LaNoard, was appointed as the permanent guardian of Addison’s person on July 15, 2024. Because LaNoard became disabled, he received monthly social security disability payments. LaNoard paid $2,650 per month in child support for Addison’s benefit, which was paid directly to Tammie. An additional monthly social security disability payment of $1,829, because of LaNoard’s disability, was also paid for Addison’s benefit directly to Tammie as Addison’s representative payee. Tammie also received a lump-sum social security payment of $21,264 on Addison’s behalf in December 2023. On January 31, 2024, LaNoard filed a petition to modify his child support obligation in the 326th District Court, in cause no. 41062-C. On August 30, 2024, LaNoard filed an amended petition to modify his child-support obligation alleging that he was entitled to a credit against his child support payments equal to the amount of the social security payments that he made to Tammie on behalf of Addison. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.132 (West Supp. 2025). 2 On September 13, 2024, LaNoard filed the instant application to be appointed permanent guardian of Addison’s estate. In his application, LaNoard asserted that “[a]lternatives to guardianship and available supports and services to avoid guardianship were considered, but none were feasible and would avoid the need for a guardianship of the estate.” Furthermore, his application listed Addison’s property as “personal effects [and] monthly Social Security benefits in the estimated amount of $1,850.00, and . . . child support from [LaNoard] in the amount of $2,650.00.” In response to LaNoard’s application, Tammie filed a motion in limine pursuant to Section 1055.001(c) of the Estates Code, asserting that LaNoard lacked standing to apply for guardianship of Addison’s estate because of his adverse interest that arose from his filing of the petition to modify his child support obligation in the 326th District Court. LaNoard responded that his only adverse interest pertained to Tammie, not Addison, because Tammie received the payments; on appeal, he contends that he was only seeking to receive the statutory credit provided by Section 154.132 of the Family Code, as alleged in his amended petition to modify. He also stated in his response, without including it in his application, that the reason he was pursuing guardianship was to prevent Tammie’s mismanagement of the payments that were due Addison. At the hearing on the motion in limine, Tammie testified that Addison was nineteen and diagnosed with Down Syndrome, which required a heightened level of care, with Tammie being her primary caretaker. Tammie stated that a special needs trust with First Financial Trust and Asset Management Company was created for Addison soon after she was born that “has not really been funded,” but it was something she wanted to fund; she testified that she tried to discuss the matter of funding the trust with LaNoard but he would not agree to it. Tammie testified that she originally provided her personal bank account information to deposit Addison’s 3 social security payments in that account but about four months later, she opened a separate account for Addison for the monies to be deposited into. Tammie also described how the litigation had “been hard on Addison” and that it took time away from Tammie’s care for her and was a financial burden. LaNoard testified that, by the modification proceeding that he initiated in the 326th District Court, it was his intent to reduce his child support obligation by “$1,800 per month or more.” LaNoard acknowledged that he did not pay his monthly child support directly to Addison and both the child support payments and the social security benefits for her benefit were paid directly to Tammie. LaNoard further acknowledged the existence of the irrevocable special needs trust for the benefit of Addison that was managed by the First Financial Trust Department, which was obligated to manage the trust “for Addison’s needs based on her best interest.” LaNoard stated that he filed his application for guardianship “because of mismanagement of the money and how [Addison would] be taken care of afterwards if it’s continued to be mismanaged.” LaNoard also stated that he had not proposed alternatives to guardianship but that he was “willing to discuss all options.” On cross-examination by Addison’s attorney ad litem, who supported Tammie’s motion in limine, LaNoard acknowledged that Tammie was the representative payee for the social security payments due Addison, Tammie was the obligee under the trial court’s child support order, and the only other property that Addison possessed consisted of nominal personal effects. LaNoard also acknowledged that a special needs trust was an alternative to guardianship for the management of any property that belonged to Addison. LaNoard asserted that he explored one alternative ground to guardianship that was not acceptable to him—a special needs trust controlled by Tammie. The following exchange then occurred: 4 Q. All right. Your current special needs trust is operated by -- the trustee is First Financial Trust, right? A. Right. Q. So there are other trustees that would be possibilities? A. True. Q. Okay. What other alternatives did you explore? A. None. After this exchange, LaNoard acknowledged that he considered an Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) account but did not find it to be a reasonable alternative because the funding requirements were capped at one-hundred thousand dollars. When asked why the cap concerned him given the existing trust, LaNoard explained that he was concerned about how the trust was managed by First Financial and his lack of input into the creation of any trust for Addison’s benefit. However, LaNoard later stated, “I have no concerns about how [the trust] is being run.” Finally, LaNoard answered affirmatively when asked whether he was aware that alternatives to guardianship exist that he and Tammie could explore. The trial court, in ruling on Tammie’s motion in limine, stated: The fact of the matter is, there was a filing to establish an estate -- guardian of the estate position. In looking at the pleadings in and of themselves, I think the case law is pretty firm on this. That in and of itself proves there is an adverse interest; therefore, there is a conflict. I’m going to grant your motion in limine. Hearing arguments in regards to the just cause [and] bad faith based on the fact of the timing of the filings, I do find bad faith and just cause. I award attorney’s fees. The trial court signed an order consistent with its oral pronouncements. See EST. §§ 1055.001(b)(1), (c), 1155.151(c). No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed. 5 II. Analysis A. LaNoard’s Standing In his first issue, LaNoard argues that the trial court erred when it determined that LaNoard had an interest adverse to Addison and therefore lacked standing to file a guardianship application. 1. Standard of Review “[W]hether a party has standing to participate in a guardianship proceeding is a question of law” that we review de novo. In re Guardianship of E.M.D., No. 11- 20-00042-CV, 2020 WL 6193990, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 22, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Guardianship of Miller, 299 S.W.3d 179, 188 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)); In re Guardianship of Benavides, No. 04-13- 00197-CV, 2014 WL 667525, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 19, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself should serve as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” E.M.D., 2020 WL 6193990, at *3 (quoting In re Guardianship of Bernsen, No. 13-17-00591-CV, 2019 WL 3721339, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 8, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). When the record contains separate factual recitations, “all findings necessary to support the trial court’s judgment are implied.” Miller, 299 S.W.3d at 188 (citing Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992)); Silverio v. Silverio, 625 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (“Even in instances when a judgment contains factual recitations, when separately filed findings of fact are not requested or made, a judgment will be upheld based on implied findings.” (citing In re Castillo, 101 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. denied))). Because the only evidence presented at the hearing regarding LaNoard’s standing was that he has an action pending in the district court to modify 6 his child support obligation, we presume LaNoard’s district court filing was the basis for the trial court’s determination that LaNoard had an adverse interest to Addison and thus lacked standing. See Silverio, 625 S.W.3d at 684. 2. Application Any person has the right to apply for the guardianship of a ward’s estate unless that person “has an interest that is adverse to [the] proposed ward or incapacitated person.” See EST. § 1055.001. If the applicant has an interest that is adverse to the interests of the proposed ward, the applicant lacks standing to apply for the guardianship. See id. “Because the Estates Code does not define what constitutes an interest adverse to the proposed ward, we must look to its ordinary meaning and appellate court decisions addressing standing challenges to formulate an understanding of how the term has been applied in different contexts.” Bernsen, 2019 WL 3721339, at *6. We have held that when there is no evidence of how the proposed ward would define their interests, which appears to be the circumstance here, an interest is adverse to the ward’s “when the applicant’s interests would not promote and protect the proposed ward’s well-being.” E.M.D., 2020 WL 6193990, at *3 (quoting In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 379 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding)). Other courts of appeals have applied a similar interpretation. See Betts v. Brown, No. 14-99-00619- CV, 2001 WL 40337, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 18, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“[A]n interest is adverse to an interest of a proposed ward under [the Probate Code predecessor to Section 1055.001] when that interest does not promote the well-being of the ward.”). Furthermore, the ordinary meaning of the term “adverse interest” is “an interest that is opposed or contrary to that of someone else.” E.M.D., 2020 WL 6193990, at *3 (quoting Bernsen, 2019 WL 3721339, at *6). 7 While the Texas Supreme Court has not directly addressed what constitutes an “adverse interest” in the context of Section 1055.001, it has favorably cited the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ analysis of Section 1055.001 in Betts when describing adversity of guardianship proceedings in another context.1 See Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 379 n.52 (citing Betts, 2001 WL 40337, at *4). LaNoard argues that the proper inquiry for determining the existence of adversity is “whether the relief sought would materially harm the ward’s welfare, not merely whether the petitioner’s interest is a potential conflict.” Tammie urges an interpretation based on the ordinary meaning of the term that existing case law has expressed. We conclude that the proper inquiry for determining adversity is guided by our decision today and others that we have cited—Thetford, E.M.D., and Betts. The standard for determining whether an applicant has an interest adverse to the potential ward that would deprive the applicant of standing differs from the standard for determining whether a person has a conflict of interest and is precluded from being appointed guardian. E.M.D., 2020 WL 6193990, at *3. The standards differ because “standing under [S]ection 1055.001(b)(1) is a threshold requirement that must be met to simply proceed with an application which is unlike the merits[-]based determination of which person should be appointed as guardian.’” Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of Gilmer, No. 04-14-00362-CV, 2015 WL 3616071, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)). In Thetford, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of adversity as it relates to 1 guardianship proceedings in the context of a lawyer’s ability to represent a third-party seeking guardianship over that same lawyer’s incapacitated client under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 375. 8 At the outset, we address LaNoard’s contention that the petition he filed in the district court to credit the social security payments Addison receives against his child support payments paid for her benefit constitutes “an action expressly permitted by statute and one that did not reduce the total support [Addison] received.” LaNoard’s monthly child support obligation was $2,650 and Tammie received an additional $1,829 monthly social security payment on Addison’s behalf because of LaNoard’s disability. If the trial court were to grant LaNoard’s petition, his monthly child support payment would be reduced by or “subract[ed] from” the amount of the monthly social security disability payment made for Addison’s benefit—and it would then become $821. See FAM. §§ 154.132(a), 157.009. Therefore, while LaNoard’s contention is correct that his total monthly child support amount may not change—which appears to be the basis of his argument, especially in his reply brief—the total amount of money that Tammie would receive for Addison’s benefit would if LaNoard prevailed in the district court on his petition to modify because Tammie currently receives monthly child support and social security payments for Addison’s benefit. We believe the court’s analysis in Benavides as to what constitutes an “adverse interest”—a case that both parties cite—to be instructive. In Benavides, the applicant was involved in an action apart from the guardianship application in which she sought to invalidate a prenuptial agreement and reclassify the ward’s separate property as community property. Benavides, 2014 WL 667525, at *1. The applicant’s attempt in Benavides to reclassify the disputed property would have potentially deprived the ward of a future half-interest in that property. Id. In affirming the probate court’s order granting the appellees’ motion in limine, the court held that the litigation filed by the applicant caused the applicant to have an adverse interest to the proposed ward. Id. 9 Like the nature of the motion that was apart from the guardianship application in Benavides, Appellant essentially seeks to change and recharacterize a portion of the funds that will be received for Addison’s benefit in the future. In this instance, and even if LaNoard is correct2 that he is entitled to a modification of his monthly child support payment, the result of the adverse inquiry for the purpose of determining his standing to apply for a guardianship of her estate remains the same. As in Benavides, LaNoard seeks to “reclassify” a portion of the social security funds that would be paid for Addison’s benefit and in turn transform it into a credit for his existing child support obligation, thus significantly reducing the total amount of funds that would be received for Addison’s benefit in the future. See In re Guardianship of Valdez, No. 04-07-00712-CV, 2008 WL 2332006, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 4, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the person contesting the application had an interest adverse to the proposed ward when he filed a trespass-to-try-title lawsuit against the proposed ward). Under either scenario, the underlying adversity is a pending and separate proceeding filed by LaNoard that seeks to reduce the property that will be received for Addison’s benefit in the future, while he simultaneously seeks to obtain an offset for himself. This is an interest that is “opposed or contrary” to the ward and does not “promote and protect the proposed ward’s well-being”—i.e., it is an adverse interest. See Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 379; Betts, 2001 WL 40337, at *4. The case before us contrasts with the facts in Betts, which LaNoard relies on to support his argument. See Betts, 2001 WL 40337, at *4. There, the court held that no adverse interest existed because the proposed ward merely guaranteed a loan 2 We express no opinion regarding LaNoard’s entitlement to a modification of his child support obligations to account for social security—a matter more appropriately resolved in the separate modification proceeding that he filed in trial court cause no. 41062-C in the 326th District Court. 10 for the applicant and in doing so granted the lender a security interest in the ward’s assets. Id. There was also no showing that the applicant’s interest “would be contrary to promoting the well-being of [the proposed ward.]” Id. Unlike in Betts, Addison’s monthly benefits are not only potentially at risk because of LaNoard’s conduct. Instead, LaNoard is actively seeking to reduce the monthly income that Tammie would receive for Addison’s benefit. Because the Legislature requires this credit be applied in certain circumstances, that LaNoard might be entitled to it does not automatically render his interest less adverse. In Benavides, the applicant’s separate action was based on the laws that govern the division of marital property. Here, the separate, pending modification action filed by LaNoard is based on the Family Code’s treatment of social security benefits in determining the amount of a person’s child support obligation. Thus, just as the spouses’ litigation over the division and character of their marital estate did not diminish the adverse character of the interest in Benavides, because the Family Code allows one to take advantage of the very credit that LaNoard seeks does not diminish or negate his adversity to Addison. In his reply brief, LaNoard asserts that Benavides is inapplicable because that case involved “direct litigation by a plaintiff against a ward as a defendant.” However, it is not the style or nature of LaNoard’s child support modification action that makes his interest adverse. Rather it is, as explained above, his desire to obtain a ruling that would reduce the income that he would pay to Tammie in the future for Addison’s benefit and transform it into an offset in his favor, a result that would certainly not promote Addison’s well-being. Moreover, other courts have held that an adverse interest exists even when there is no direct pending litigation between the proposed ward and the guardian. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Olivares, No. 07- 07-0275-CV, 2008 WL 5206169, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2008, pet. 11 denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the applicant had an interest adverse to the ward when the evidence showed he engaged in self-dealing and despite having the ability to earn wages, he lived off the potentially incapacitated ward’s finite estate). Bernsen, another case on which LaNoard relies, further shows that LaNoard’s interest is adverse to Addison’s. In Bernsen, the court held that an applicant who was involved in litigation against the proposed ward would nonetheless have an interest adverse to the ward’s interest even if she “disclaimed all rights to inherit money and property.” Bernsen, 2019 WL 3721339, at *10. The court reasoned that even if the applicant did not have a direct link to the litigation, because her children would have possibly received money from the underlying suit and because she would thus have an obligation to manage those monies, “the trial court could infer that [the applicant] is placing the welfare of her children above [the proposed ward.]” Id. Thus, Bernsen confirms that it is the interest of the proposed guardian when compared to the interest of the proposed ward that is the focus of the adversity inquiry, not the style of the case and how the parties are designated. Decisions that involve self-dealing, and suing the proposed ward, share a common feature—the proposed guardian is not acting in the ward’s best interest while instead promoting the guardian’s own interest. While no court has directly addressed the factual scenario that we are confronted with here, we conclude that when a proposed guardian is actively involved in a separate pending action that seeks to reduce the monthly income that he is obligated to pay for the ward’s benefit, while at the same time channeling that same income to himself, such affirmative action constitutes an interest adverse to the proposed ward. Therefore, because LaNoard is currently involved in a separate legal action that has the potential to deprive Addison of significant funds, while simultaneously retaining those funds for himself, we hold that LaNoard “has an interest that is adverse” to Addison as contemplated by 12 Section 1055.001. See EST. § 1055.001(b), (c). As such, in this case, the trial court did not err when it found that LaNoard lacks standing to apply for the guardianship of Addison’s estate. Accordingly, we overrule LaNoard’s first issue. B. Award of Attorney’s Fees In his second issue, LaNoard challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Tammie because it found that LaNoard’s guardianship application was brought in bad faith and without just cause. 1. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to a guardian that are related to a guardianship application for an abuse of discretion. In re Guardianship of A.B., 630 S.W.3d 489, 493 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. denied) (citing Meduna v. Holder, No. 03-02-00067-CV, 2003 WL 124214, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 16, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Thus, we will reverse an award of attorney’s fees in a guardianship dispute “only if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of Laroe, No. 05-15-01006-CV, 2017 WL 511156, at *20 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 8, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision and do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id. The trial court’s findings can be supported by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 495–96. Moreover, for purposes of an attorney’s fee award, the trial court is entitled to make inferences from the factual evidence as to a party’s motivation and credibility. Id. at 497 (citing McCain v. NME Hosps., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 757–58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ)). 13 2. Application The Estates Code authorizes the assessment of attorney’s fees against a party to a guardianship proceeding who is found to have “acted in bad faith or without just cause in prosecuting or objecting to an application in the proceeding.” EST. § 1155.151(c) (emphasis added). As we have held, because the statute uses the disjunctive term “or,” a finding of either bad faith or lack of just cause will justify an attorney’s fee award. A.B., 630 S.W.3d at 496. The trial court may not appoint a guardian for a proposed ward unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “alternatives to guardianship that would avoid the need for the appointment of a guardian have been considered and determined not to be feasible.” EST. § 1101.101(a)(1)(D). Alternatives to a guardianship include the creation of a special needs trust and the appointment of a representative payee. See id. § 1002.0015(4), (7). Here, in granting Tammie’s request for attorney’s fees, the trial court found, and stated on the record, that LaNoard’s application was brought in bad faith and without just cause. A finding on either basis will support an attorney’s fee award. As such, we will address each finding in turn. a. Just Cause In this context, the term “just cause” means that the action must have a legal basis that is reasonable under the circumstances and be factually supported during the hearing. A.B., 630 S.W.3d at 496. For the trial court to find that a party acted “without just cause,” that party must have either provided (1) no evidence of any factual grounds for bringing the action, or (2) grounds that were unreasonable or did not support the legal basis proffered. Id. Unlike bad faith where the focus is one’s improper motive, the “just cause” inquiry here turns on the absence of a legal basis to bring the action or a dearth of factual support. Id. Furthermore, a party lacks just 14 cause when that party is unable to provide any evidence to raise a substantial fact issue on that party’s claim. Id. at 496–97. The trial court also may consider one’s reckless ignorance of the current condition and/or the needs of the prospective ward for whom application of guardianship concerns. Id. at 497. LaNoard argues there was just cause to file his application because the record demonstrates that Tammie: “(1) deposited [Addison]’s back benefits into her personal account for four months; (2) failed to timely complete representative payee reporting; and (3) [d]elayed establishing a separate account for [Addison]’s funds.” Tammie responds that based on the evidence presented at the motion in limine hearing, a guardian of Addison’s estate was not necessary. Based on this record, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that LaNoard filed his guardianship application without just cause. In A.B., we held that the proposed ward’s father contested an application for guardianship without just cause when his pleadings were in stark contrast to his in-court testimony. Id. at 497– 98. The father’s pleadings indicated that his daughter was “very competent and can easily function with a modest amount of assistance.” Id. at 497. However, during the application hearing, the father testified that the proposed ward could not manage her finances, make complex business decisions, vote responsibly, choose where to live, or provide food, clothing, and shelter for herself. Id. Additionally, the evidence that the father presented consisted of testimony from a lay witness who made observations about the proposed ward during the witness’s limited interactions with her. Id. at 498–99. In this case, LaNoard’s application asserts that alternatives to guardianship were considered but none were feasible and would obviate the need for guardianship of Addison’s estate. However, at the hearing, LaNoard testified that alternatives to guardianship were feasible—a key finding that is necessary before a trial court grants 15 a guardianship application. Particularly, LaNoard acknowledged that a special needs trust is an alternative to guardianship and testified that he has no issues with the way that First Financial is managing the in-place special needs trust on behalf of Addison. Rather, LaNoard’s complaint is that he had no input as to how the trust is managed, not that this alternative is infeasible. LaNoard acknowledged that Tammie is the representative payee for Addison and both the child support and social security monies are paid directly to Tammie, which is a statutorily authorized alternative to guardianship. See EST. § 1002.0015. LaNoard further acknowledged that Addison has no substantial personal property; therefore, the only property that LaNoard expressly mentioned in his application was subject to an alternative to guardianship—either the special needs trust or Tammie’s function as representative payee. Thus, like the differences in the applicant’s assertions in his petition in A.B. when compared to his testimony at the hearing, LaNoard’s testimony, which conflicts with the contentions in his application, supports the trial court’s finding that he filed the application without just cause. Although LaNoard argues that the reason he filed the application was because he was concerned about Tammie’s mismanagement of the funds that were paid for Addison’s benefit, the only evidence presented to support this argument is that Tammie first deposited the monthly social security income due Addison into Tammie’s personal account for four months, before transferring those funds into a separate account for Addison’s benefit, and that she cannot remember exactly when she filed a payee report. However, the trial court as the factfinder, was entitled to give little or no weight to this evidence, especially considering the conflicting evidence presented by LaNoard about his concerns of the management of Addison’s property. See A.B., 630 S.W.3d at 498–99 (discussing how in a just cause determination, the trial court was entitled to give little or no weight to evidence 16 presented by the party against whom attorney’s fees were assessed, particularly when the circumstances indicate that the evidence is weak). Finally, the evidence regarding how these proceedings have negatively affected Addison further supports the trial court’s determination that LaNoard acted without just cause in filing the guardianship application. See id. at 496–97. Given the deferential standard of review that we must employ, and the nature of the evidence and pleadings that the trial court considered, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that LaNoard filed his application for guardianship of Addison’s estate without just cause. b. Bad Faith “Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but is the ‘conscious doing of a wrong for [a] dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose.’” A.B., 630 S.W.3d at 495 (quoting Laroe, 2017 WL 511156, at *21). For bad faith, there must be an improper motive that underlies the party’s actions. Id. at 495–96. Because LaNoard’s application for guardianship was filed approximately two weeks after he filed his amended petition in which he seeks to modify his child support obligation, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the application was brought without a proper motive—namely, to circumvent the district court’s disposition of LaNoard’s pending petition to modify. As we have discussed, LaNoard asserted in his application that alternatives to guardianship were not available, but his testimony at the hearing contradicted his assertion. LaNoard listed in his application that his areas of concern—Addison’s child support funds, social security benefits, and personal effects—needed to be protected. However, at the time his application was filed, other measures were in place to protect Addison’s estate—Tammie receives Addison’s child support payments on her behalf, Tammie receives Addison’s social security benefits on her 17 behalf as payee, and there is a special needs trust in place for Addison’s benefit. See In re Guardianship of Yung Lo Yang, No. 02-16-00353-CV, 2017 WL 2979826, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a party opposed a guardianship application in bad faith when evidence indicated that the party acted contrary to the ward’s interests and undermined the proceeding). Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances and the trial court’s ability to also rely on circumstantial evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that LaNoard filed his application in bad faith and for the improper purpose of circumventing the pending child support modification action to gain control over Addison’s property. Accordingly, we overrule LaNoard’s second issue. III. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the order of the trial court. W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE October 22, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 18