Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-26-00188-CV Rodolfo Marroquin, Appellant v. Marissa D. Villarreal, Appellee FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-AG-16-000005, THE HONORABLE JAN SOIFER, JUDGE PRESIDING M E M O RAN D U M O PI N I O N Rodolfo Marroquin filed this pro se appeal from the trial court’s order, rendered after a bench trial, denying his petition to modify the parent-child relationship. Marroquin is a joint managing conservator of 11-year-old Child with the exclusive right to designate Child’s primary residence within Travis and contiguous counties, while Marissa D. Villarreal is a joint managing conservator of Child with standard unsupervised possession. Marroquin requested an order appointing him sole managing conservator of Child and requiring that Villarreal have only supervised possession of their Child for at least 12 months without any automatic step-up provision. On appeal, Marroquin argues that because his petition was denied in a “bare order” stating only that the evidence did not support modification, the trial court acted unreasonably in the application of its discretion and failed to evaluate the conservatorship and possession issues properly. But the trial court was not required to recite its application of the law to the facts in its order, and Marroquin made no request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the evidence adduced at the bench trial fails to show any abuse of discretion, we will affirm the trial court’s order. DISCUSSION Trial courts have wide discretion in determining issues of custody, control, possession, support, and visitation matters involving children. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982). We review trial-court rulings on motions to modify conservatorship under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021). No abuse of discretion occurs when some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision. Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). In family-law cases, the abuse-of-discretion standard overlaps with traditional standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. at 587-88. Thus, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 587. To determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry, analyzing whether (1) the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) the trial court erred in its application of that discretion. Id. at 588. Traditional standards for legal and factual sufficiency come into play with the first question. Id. When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would 2 support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822, 827 (Tex. 2005). When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which he has the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001). And when a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which he has the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 242. When conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we consider all the record evidence and set aside the trial court’s order only if the evidence is so weak as to make the finding clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). We defer to the factfinder’s implicit determinations of credibility and weight to be given to the evidence. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). As the factfinder in a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). To obtain his requested modification of the parties’ 2022 order, Marroquin had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the circumstances of the child, the conservators, or other parties affected by the order had materially and substantially changed since the prior order, and (2) the modification would be in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 156.101(a)(1). Marroquin’s appeal focuses on the evidence that, in his view, showed a material and substantial change in circumstances. The trial court’s order denying Marroquin’s petition expressly found that “modification of the current order in this case is not supported by the evidence.” Because the trial court did not issue findings of fact, all facts necessary to support the ruling and supported by the evidence are implied in favor of the 3 judgment, subject to a legal and factual sufficiency challenge of the reporter’s and clerk’s records. See Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 296; Izen v. Laine, 614 S.W.3d 775, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (“The primary purpose for findings of fact is to assist the losing party in narrowing his issues on appeal by ascertaining the true basis for the trial court’s decision.”). The evidence at the November 2025 bench trial on Marroquin’s motion to modify shows that the order was supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. 1 The trial court heard testimony from the parties and Marroquin’s two witnesses: an investigator with the Department of Family and Protective Services, and a counselor from Child’s school. The investigator testified that she visited Child at school in April 2025 as to an allegation that Child had been locked in a room at his mother’s home, but that his main concerns were his mother’s drinking and that he “had to sneak and get food.” Summarizing her interview with Child, the investigator stated that “[t]here was no fear within mom’s house besides that she has tried to whoop him, but he would move out of the way. So the physical abuse part, that is the part that I ha[d] to look at.” The investigator ruled out any physical abuse and neglect of Child and noted that Villarreal’s “ETG” (alcohol) and drug test results were negative. On direct examination from Marroquin, the investigator denied that Child told her anything about being kept in a room for long periods, going for long periods without food, caring for his baby sibling himself, or Villarreal being in an impaired condition and not attending to him. And the investigator testified that the notification of rights 2 that the Department provided to Marroquin 1 Both parties represented themselves here and below. Villarreal did not file a brief. 2 The incomplete notification-of-rights exhibit was one page of a two-page document. 4 in April, which listed an allegation that Child had been locked in a room, was based only on what had been reported. The next witness was with the Child’s school counselor, who met with him in December 2024 because he was distressed about an incident over Thanksgiving break with his mother and expressed fear about going to her home. The counselor “recall[ed] making a report” to CPS (Child Protective Services) after Child reported that his mother slapped his face, butt, and leg; yelled at him; and called him names. Child, who was then 10 years old, also reported that several years before, when he was four or five, mother “choked” him to where he could not see and thought he would die, and when Child told his dad about this, his dad laughed and told him “to be cool.” Child told the counselor that his dad “has a revolver and a bunch of knives,” that he “might as well get a gun” to protect himself if his mom tried to do that again. Child also told the counselor that he wanted both his parents to go to jail, and that the only people he could trust were the judge and the police. Marroquin then called himself as a witness and testified that Child never mentioned being choked, but when Child told him Villarreal was mean and aggressive, he told Child not to worry about it. Marroquin then introduced exhibits about events that predated the parties’ 2022 order and thus did not occur between the issuance of that order and the requested modification. 3 When admitting the exhibits, the trial court clarified that “to the extent that they show something before the last order, I’m going to take it only as history.” Marroquin argued 3 The exhibits consisted of (1) a five-year old police report—making no mention of Child—about Villarreal’s altercation with an aunt, (2) photographs of Child’s bruising that were submitted in connection with the 2022 order that contained a family-violence finding against Villarreal, and which Marroquin said did not “show[ ] the main concerns for today but just to support the—the last order from 2022,” and (3) some pages from the parties’ 2022 order. 5 that Villarreal violated the parties’ prior order based on the concerns reported to the counselor and the Department: “long confinement, respondent being impaired, and my son caring for the—for the baby violate those duties.” The trial court then heard testimony from Villarreal, who denied choking Child, locking him in his room, and making him go to his room for long periods that required him to sneak out to get food. She also denied drinking or doing drugs, noting that her job requires random hair follicle and urine testing and that she was still nursing her infant child. Further, Villarreal recalled that Marroquin filed for modification only after she told him that she was going to contact “child support” to see if they could lower her payments because she had borne another child and the factory where she works had cut her hours. Villarreal testified that when the modification hearing was originally set in October 2025, Marroquin asked to meet her on the first floor of the courthouse—specifically telling her to not to bring her phone and not have her mother present—where he offered to return some amount of child support that Villarreal had paid if she would agree to give him full custody of Child and limit herself to only supervised visits. Villarreal called Marroquin’s offer a “bribe”: So we went and stood by the stairs that are right there. And he asked—he told me if I agreed to the term[s]—of what he’s asking for, full custody and for me to get supervised visits, that he would send me back the child support money[;] he said through Western Union or Walmart to Walmart, or he said in however way that he could send it [back]. I did deny it because I would not choose money over my own child, whether I’m struggling or not. And reason being why he did not reset the case until another date in October [was] because I never responded to that. And he also called me that same day, after having that conversation, to remind me if I changed my mind, to—do not text him, to call him if I agreed. And I did not agree. Marroquin does not dispute the truth of Villarreal’s testimony about his offer. And her testimony logically fits the timeline shown in the pleadings and evidence, indicating 6 that a motive for the filing of the modification was Villarreal’s expressed interest in a child-support reduction. Text messages admitted during the modification hearing show that several messages Villarreal sent to Child’s phone—which Marroquin controls—went unanswered, but on June 16, days before Marroquin filed his modification petition, she texted Marroquin: Not sure what reason you think that it’s ok to keep [Child] away from me or be able to even talk to me either. Neither one of us has full custody[,] and you’re acting like it’s only your say about that and that’s not right. All for what? Because I said I was going to contact child support because of my hours being short now. Ten days later, on June 25, Marroquin signed the certificate of service for his modification petition. According to Villarreal, the home Marroquin shares with his parents is “mentally unsafe” for Child. She testified that Child said that his paternal grandparents tell him that she is dead, that his grandmother is his “real mom,” and that he should call his grandmother his mom. Villarreal further testified that Marroquin is involved with Child only minimally, as Child is left at home with his grandparents while Marroquin “leaves throughout the day or through the night,” and the “grandparents go and pick him up from school.” Villarreal also testified that before “this year,” when she was working weekends, she was told that Child would cry and ask when she would be home. She points out that if a child feared their parent, they would not cry or express to others that they were missing the parent. Nevertheless, Marroquin argues on appeal that he was entitled to modification of the 2022 order based on evidence at trial showing a safety outcry to Child’s school counselor, which led to a report to the Department about Child’s fearfulness, his being locked in his room, 7 and food-related concerns. Marroquin also assumes that the trial court denied his modification petition without properly applying sections 153.004 and 153.005 of the Family Code to the evidence at trial because the order itself did not specify otherwise. 4 We disagree. Marroquin’s allegations about Villarreal’s abuse of Child and about her alcohol and drug use were disputed at trial. The evidence showed that the Department ruled out the abuse and neglect allegations against Villarreal, and Villarreal’s alcohol and drug tests were negative. Villarreal testified without objection and in some detail that the motivation for the modification petition was her expressed interest in seeking a child-support reduction due to her decreased wages and the birth of another child. Except for the incomplete notification-of-rights document relating to the ruled-out allegations and a few pages from the 2022 order, Marroquin’s exhibits related to matters that pre-existed that order rather than evidence establishing a material and substantial change in circumstances since the rendition of that order. See Tex. Fam. Code § 156.101(a)(1). The trial court, as fact finder at the bench trial, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to given to the evidence. See Golden Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761; McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 696. Here, the trial court could have credited (1) testimony from the investigator and Villarreal about the ruled-out allegations of abuse and neglect, and (2) the investigator’s testimony showing that Child was experiencing “no fear within mom’s house” as of April 2025, toward its finding that “modification of the current order in this case is not supported by the evidence,” and its implicit finding that there had been no 4 When determining whether to appoint joint managing conservators and what terms of possession, access, and visitation are appropriate, trial courts must consider “credible evidence” presented of a parent’s history or pattern of past or present child neglect or abuse or family violence. See generally Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004-.005. Neither of these statutes require any specific recitations in trial court orders on conservatorship, possession, and access. 8 material and substantial change in circumstances. 5 We do not “second-guess the trial court’s resolution of a factual dispute by relying on evidence that is either disputed, or that the court could easily have rejected as not credible.” In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. 2003). Because Marroquin failed to demonstrate that the evidence established, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of his requested modification, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the order denying his petition. And because Marroquin failed to demonstrate that the evidence supporting the trial court’s express finding that modification is unwarranted, and the implicit finding that there had been no material and substantial change in circumstances, is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s order. Having reviewed the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Marroquin’s petition. And we reject Marroquin’s legally unsupported assumption that the trial court did not properly evaluate the conservatorship and possession issues based on a “bare order” denying his petition. We overrule Marroquin’s appellate issues. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s Order Denying Petition to Modify the Parent-Child Relationship. _______________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice 5 Marroquin concedes that the record “contains testimony the trial court could consider in Appellee’s favor. DFPS ruled out physical abuse, and alcohol/drug testing was negative.” 9 Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Theofanis and Crump Affirmed Filed: August 31, 2026 10