Carvel Johnson v. Ramona Denise Robinson
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Date FiledAugust 6, 2026
Docket01-26-00637-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Opinion issued August 6, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-26-00637-CV
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CARVEL JOHNSON, Appellant
V.
RAMONA DENISE ROBINSON, Appellee
On Appeal from the 165th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-28626
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Carvel Johnson, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the
trial court’s order denying his motion for summary judgment signed on June 8, 2026.
After we notified him that we lacked jurisdiction over his appeal, he requested that
we treat his appeal as a petition for writ mandamus. We grant his request and deny
his petition for writ of mandamus.
Discussion
“[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.”
Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale,
273 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that
jurisdiction is fundamental in nature and cannot be ignored). Whether we have
jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v.
Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007).
Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v.
Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). An appellate court has jurisdiction
to consider an appeal from an interlocutory order only if a statute explicitly
authorizes an interlocutory appeal. CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447–48
(Tex. 2011); see, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (authorizing
appeals from certain interlocutory orders).
Johnson seeks to appeal from the trial court’s order denying his motion for
summary judgment. Because the order from which Johnson appeals is not a final
judgment or otherwise appealable order, we issued a notice directing him to file a
response, within 10 days of our notice, demonstrating—with citation to the record,
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statutes, rules, and case law—why this Court has jurisdiction over his appeal. See
Villarreal v. Zukowsky, 54 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg
2001, no pet.) (“[A]ppeals may be had only from final orders or judgments, and
interlocutory orders may be appealed only if permitted by statute.”). Johnson filed a
timely response, but his response does not establish that our Court has jurisdiction
over his appeal.1 To the contrary, his response confirms that he is appealing from the
trial court’s denial of his summary judgment motion—an order over which we lack
appellate jurisdiction. Stuart v. Puente, No. 02-25-00641-CV, 2025 WL 3684003, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 18, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal
for lack of jurisdiction where appellant “attempt[ed] to appeal from the trial court’s
order denying his motion for summary judgment”).
Perhaps recognizing as much, in his response, Johnson also requests that we
treat his appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. We grant his request and will
treat his appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Bizkeeping Corp. v. Benton,
714 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (“When
appellants timely ask us to construe their appeal as a mandamus petition if appellate
jurisdiction is lacking, we do so rather than dismissing the appeal.”).
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Johnson also filed a “Verified Affidavit . . . Regarding Jurisdiction” on July 21,
2026 arguing, among other things, that the challenged June 8 order should be
considered final because it “dispose[d] of all claims and parties.”
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To obtain mandamus relief, a relator must establish that the trial court
committed a clear abuse of discretion or violated a duty imposed by law and there is
no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124,
135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). With a few exceptions not applicable here,
orders denying motions for summary judgment are not subject to mandamus relief
because there is typically an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Ooida Risk Retention
Group, Inc., 475 S.W.3d 905, 913 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (orig.
proceeding) (“Mandamus is generally unavailable when a trial court denies summary
judgment, no matter how meritorious the motion.”).
We thus deny Johnson’s petition for writ of mandamus and dismiss all
pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guiney.
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