Oppidan Homes VI, LTD. v. James Timothy Work

Opinion issued August 31, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00414-CV ——————————— OPPIDAN HOMES VI, LTD., Appellant V. JAMES TIMOTHY WORK, Appellee On Appeal from the 189th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2021-51199 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellee James Timothy Work purchased a new home from Appellant Oppidan Homes, VI, Ltd. Claiming there were construction defects in the property, Work sued Oppidan in state court and later filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. The parties ultimately arbitrated their disputes, and the arbitrator issued an award in favor of Oppidan awarding Oppidan attorney’s fees and costs. Work moved to vacate the award in state court and Oppidan cross- moved for confirmation of the award arguing no grounds existed for vacatur. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Work’s application and vacated the award. On appeal, Oppidan argues that the trial court erred in vacating the award because Work did not meet his heavy burden to establish one of the exclusive statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award under Section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act. We agree with Oppidan that no grounds exist for vacatur of the award. We reverse the trial court’s order granting Work’s application to vacate the award and render judgment confirming the award. Background Work purchased a new home from Oppidan. The sales contract executed by Work and Oppidan contained an arbitration clause that required the parties to submit their disputes to binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). In August 2021, Work sued Oppidan in state court asserting various causes of action stemming from alleged construction defects in the home. Oppidan moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Before the trial court ruled on Oppidan’s motion to compel arbitration, Work filed a 2 demand for arbitration with the AAA. The AAA appointed attorney Michael Mazzone as the sole arbitrator. Arbitrator’s Disclosures Pursuant to the AAA rules, Mazzone made disclosures to the parties shortly after his appointment. He used the AAA General Arbitrator Oath Form, which directs arbitrators to: [P]lease disclose any past or present relationship with the parties, their counsel, or potential witnesses, direct or indirect, whether financial, professional, social or of any other kind. This is a continuing obligation throughout your service on the case and should any additional direct or indirect contact arise during the course of the arbitration or if there is any change at any time in the biographical information that you have provided, it must also be disclosed. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of disclosure. If you are aware of direct or indirect contact with such individuals, please describe it below. Failure to make timely disclosures may forfeit your ability to collection compensation. All disclosures will be brought to the attention of the parties. Question 3 on the form focuses on relationships with the parties and their counsel. It states, “Have you had any professional or social relationship with counsel for any party in this proceeding or the firms for which they work?” Mazzone responded, “YES,” and under “Comments” he added: Several years ago I was counsel for a subcontractor in a multi-party case in which Mr. Faria [Oppidan’s counsel] represented one of the other parties in the case. Mr. Faria is or has been counsel in one or more matters in which I was appointed the arbitrator, but none of those matters proceeded to a final hearing and I believe all of those matters were settled before the final evidentiary hearing. 3 The form further asked: (1) in Question 5, “Have you had any professional or social relationships of which you are aware with any relative of any of the parties to this proceeding, or any relative of counsel to this proceeding, or any of the witnesses identified to date in the proceeding?” and (2) in Question 9, “Have any of the party representatives, law firms or parties appeared before you in past arbitration cases?” Mazzone responded “Yes” to both questions, and he referenced his response to Question No. 3 for further comment: “See no. 3 above.” After his initial disclosure, Mazzone made three supplemental disclosures in which he provided additional information about prior arbitration proceedings involving counsel for Work and Oppidan. On June 7, 2023, he disclosed that [e]arlier this year, I was appointed in one AAA arbitration in which Mr. Freeman [Work’s counsel] was counsel for one of the parties. I believe that matter settled; there was no final evidentiary hearing in that case. Regarding one of the AAA matters in which I was the arbitrator and in which Mr. Bradley’s firm [Oppidan’s counsel] was counsel for one of the parties did go to final hearing (contrary to my original disclosure), but neither Mr. Bradley nor his firm appeared at the final hearing. Apparently, the Bradley client changed counsel before the final hearing. On February 13, 2024, Mazzone further disclosed: I served as the arbitrator in Susan Baker et al v Kimball Hill Homes and Garber v Highland Holes. In both of these matters, Mr. Lynn DeGeorge was named as an expert witness by one of the parties and the Freeman Law Firm [Work’s counsel] for one of the parties in the Barber matter. I do not recall if even [sic] of these matters went to final hearing. 4 And on June 3, 2024, he disclosed: “In [] light of Respondent’s [Oppidan’s] designation of experts, I make the following additional disclosure: “Secretariat is a former client of Haynes and Boone. The last time the firm billed Secretariat was in March of 2022.” No one filed an objection to Mazzone’s appointment as an arbitrator based on his initial or supplemental disclosures. Final Award and Work’s Motion to Vacate The final arbitration hearing commenced on August 6, 2024. The parties presented a total of nine witnesses who testified over four days, and they introduced more than 110 exhibits, which Mazzone reviewed.1 On October 21, 2024, Mazzone issued an award in which he denied all of Work’s claims, awarded Oppidan its attorney’s fees and costs, and ordered the parties to bear their own costs for the AAA and arbitrator fees. On January 20, 2025, Work filed an application to vacate the arbitration award on grounds of evident partiality, complete irrationality, manifest disregard of the law, and corruption.2 Work alleged that after Mazzone issued the arbitration award, 1 The appellate record does not contain a complete record of the arbitration proceedings. See Amoco D.T. Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (stating party seeking to vacate arbitration award bears burden of presenting complete record that establishes grounds for vacatur). 2 Although Work also moved to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds that the award was procured by corruption and that Mazzone had exceeded his powers by 5 Work learned that Mazzone had been appointed as the arbitrator in Christian Flores and Daniel Flores v. Coventry Homes—a separate arbitration proceeding in which Oppidan’s counsel, Ian Faria, represented a different homebuilder who had been sued by a homeowner. Work alleged that even though Mazzone had been appointed as the arbitrator in the Flores proceeding, Mazzone had not supplemented his disclosures to reveal his appointment or that on March 5, 2024, he had granted summary judgment in that proceeding in favor of the homebuilder, awarding the homebuilder $31,582 in attorney’s fees, plus costs and arbitration fees. Oppidan filed a response to Work’s motion to vacate and a counter application to confirm the award arguing that no ground existed for vacatur of the award. After a hearing, the trial court granted Work’s application to vacate the arbitration award and denied Oppidan’s application to confirm. This appeal ensued. Vacatur of Arbitration Award under FAA Oppidan moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA and Work does not dispute that the FAA governs the parties’ arbitration proceeding.3 Under the FAA, rendering “a completely irrational decision,” Work does not argue on appeal that the trial court’s order vacating the arbitration award can be affirmed on either ground. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (corruption), (4) (arbitrator exceeded his powers). Work confirms in his brief that he is not pressing the issue of corruption on appeal. And nowhere in his brief does Work argue that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. 3 When reviewing claims under the FAA, we look to federal law to resolve substantive issues, but we apply state law to resolve procedural issues. See Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992); see also Builders First Source-S. Tex., LP v. Ortiz, 515 S.W.3d 451, 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 6 an arbitration award must be confirmed unless it is vacated under Section 10 or modified or corrected under Section 11. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11; Cooper v. WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008)); see also Vargas v. Rigid Glob. Bldgs., LLC, 654 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (stating Section 10 provides exclusive grounds for vacating arbitration award). Section 10(a) of the FAA—which sets forth the exclusive grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award—provides that a trial court may vacate an arbitration award (1) “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,” (2) “where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,” (3) “where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced,” or (4) “where the arbitrators exceeded 2017, pet. denied). “Whether a case is governed by the [FAA] or the [Texas Arbitration Act (“TAA”)], many of the underlying substantive principles are the same.” Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 56 n.10 (Tex. 2008). The statutory grounds for which Work seeks vacatur are also nearly identical under both statutes. Compare 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(2), (4) (stating evident partiality and exceeding powers are grounds for vacatur under FAA), with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 171.088(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(A) (same grounds under TAA). For purposes of this opinion, we cite cases decided under the FAA and TAA. See Forest Oil Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 56 n.10 (relying interchangeably on cases discussing FAA and TAA); see also Deaton v. Law Offs. of Steven M. Johnson, P.C., 697 S.W.3d 676, 692 n.8 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.) (“Because the substantive principles that are applicable to our analysis in this appeal and the available grounds to review an arbitration award are the same under [the FAA and TAA], we may find guidance in court decisions that arise under either.”). 7 their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4); see also Cooper, 832 F.3d at 544 (stating Section 10 of FAA “provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award”) (citing Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009)). A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears a heavy burden to establish one of the grounds set forth in Section 10(a), and courts must resolve any doubts or uncertainties in favor of upholding the award. See Cooper, 832 F.3d at 544; see also Vargas, 654 S.W.3d at 6 (“In seeking vacatur of the Award under the FAA, Vargas bears a heavy burden to prove one of the above statutorily enumerated grounds.”); see generally Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 568, (2013) (stating vacatur of arbitrator’s decision under FAA warranted “only in very unusual circumstances”). We review a trial court’s decision to confirm or vacate an arbitration award de novo and, if the court resolves any disputes about material facts, we review the court’s factual findings for legal and factual sufficiency. Port Arthur Steam Energy LP v. Oxbow Calcining LLC, 416 S.W.3d 708, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); Amoco D.T. Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837, 844 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). “Because Texas law favors arbitration, judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow.” E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., Inc. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2010) 8 (footnote omitted); Forged Components, Inc. v. Guzman, 409 S.W.3d 91, 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (explaining that arbitration award “is presumed valid and entitled to great deference”). An arbitrator’s award on “matters submitted to [the arbitrator] is given the same effect as the judgment of a court of last resort.” CVN Grp., Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Tex. 2002). “All reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of the award, and none against it.” Id.; see also Stage Stores, Inc. v. Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“We review a challenge to an arbitration award under a ‘heavy presumption’ in favor of confirming the award, and we must resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration.”). Evident Partiality Oppidan argues that the trial court erred in granting Work’s application to vacate the arbitration award because Work neither met his burden to show that Mazzone acted with evident partiality nor presented the trial court with another statutory basis for vacatur. According to Oppidan, Mazzone satisfied his disclosure obligations when he initially disclosed that “Mr. Faria [Oppidan’s counsel] is or has been counsel in one or more matters in which [Mazzone] was appointed the arbitrator,” and Mazzone had no obligation to supplement his disclosures to disclose either his appointment in the Flores arbitration or the outcome of that proceeding. Even if Mazzone had a duty to make such supplemental disclosures, Oppidan argues 9 no objective observer could view Mazzone’s appointment in Flores or his decision to grant summary judgment for the homebuilder in that proceeding as evidence that Mazzone was partial towards Oppidan. Work responds that the trial court did not err in vacating the award because there is legally and factually sufficient evidence supporting the court’s implied finding of evident partiality. According to Work, an arbitrator’s “failure to disclose when there is an obligation to do so is legally sufficient evidence of evident partiality.” He argues that “a failure to disclose is evidence of partiality by itself.” A. Applicable Law Under the FAA, parties may apply to vacate an arbitration award based on grounds of evident partiality. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2); Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2014). A neutral arbitrator is evidently partial if he fails to disclose information that might—to an objective observer—create a reasonable impression of his partiality towards one of the parties. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997); Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 529 (applying TUCO standard for evident partiality to cases where FAA applies). An arbitrator need not disclose trivial relationships or connections, and the nondisclosure itself—rather than actual partiality or bias— establishes the factual basis for the evident partiality ground. See Tenaska Energy, 10 Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 524–25; see also Burke v. Houston PT BAC Off. Ltd. P’ship (Bank of Am.), 726 S.W.3d 828, 832 (Tex. 2025). Contrary to Work’s contention, the nondisclosure of information—standing alone—is not a basis for vacating an arbitration award. See Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating “nondisclosure alone does not require vacatur of an arbitral award for evident partiality”); Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 77 (2nd Cir. 2012) (“The nondisclosure does not by itself constitute evident partiality. The question is whether the facts that were not disclosed suggest a material conflict of interest.”). Rather, the “standard for evident partiality . . . requires vacating an award if an arbitrator fails to disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality, but information that is trivial will not rise to this level and need not be disclosed.” Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525. To prevail on its motion to vacate, Work thus had to establish not just that the arbitrator failed to disclose information but also that the undisclosed facts “might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of [Mazzone’s] partiality.”4 Work did not satisfy this burden. 4 In arguing that nondisclosure of information by itself establishes evident partiality, Work focuses on the statement in Tenaska that “evident partiality is established from the nondisclosure itself, regardless of whether the nondisclosed information 11 B. Analysis In the trial court, Work’s main argument in support of his evident partiality challenge was that Mazzone was obligated, but failed, to disclose his service in the Flores proceeding. He argued that “Mazzone’s failure to provide supplemental disclosures regarding his involvement in [the Flores] arbitration and determination in favor of Mr. Faria’s client [in that proceeding] require[d] vacatur [of the award] . . . for evident partiality.” On appeal, Work argues that the AAA’s Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes required Mazzone to disclose his involvement in the Flores arbitration and his failure to comply is sufficient to establish evident partiality. Because the material underlying facts are not in dispute, we review de novo whether the undisclosed information—had it been disclosed—might convey to an necessarily establishes partiality or bias.” Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525 (quoting TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d at 636) (emphasis in original). But that statement merely clarifies that a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award need not establish that the undisclosed information “actually [resulted in] partiality or bias,” because courts apply an objective standard. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525. Indeed, in reviewing the moving party’s claim of evident partiality, the court in Tenaska did not end its analysis after finding a failure to disclose. Rather, clarifying that the nature of the undisclosed facts is relevant to the analysis, the Tenaska court went on to review the nature of the undisclosed information to determine whether evident partiality was established. See id. (applying “the standard for evident partiality to these facts” to determine whether “the information the trial court found [the arbitrator] did not disclose . . . might create a reasonable impression of partiality to an objective observer . . . .”); see also Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 77 (2nd Cir. 2012) (holding that “nondisclosure does not by itself constitute evident partiality” and instead courts focus on whether the undisclosed facts “suggest a material conflict of interest”). 12 objective observer a reasonable impression that Mazzone was partial to one party. See Burke, 726 S.W.3d at 832 (stating “whether the undisputed facts convey an impression of partiality is a question of law”). Based on the record before us, we conclude Work failed to establish evident partiality. Under Canon II of the AAA Rules, an arbitrator is required to disclose—prior to accepting an appointment—“any known existing or past financial, business, professional or personal relationships which might reasonably affect impartiality or lack of independence in the eyes of any of the parties.” Am. Arb. Ass’n & Am. Bar Ass’n, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (2004), https://www.adr.org/media/urfbtl4d/commercial_code_of_ethics_for_arbitrators_2 010_10_14.pdf (last accessed Aug. 21, 2026). Arbitrators “should make a reasonable effort to inform themselves” of any such relationships and their obligation to disclose such relationships is a continuing duty that lasts throughout every stage of the arbitration proceeding. See Canon II.B-C. When he was appointed, Mazzone disclosed his professional relationship with Faria in his AAA General Arbitrator Oath Form, where he stated that he and Faria had been co-counsel for separate parties in a case in the past, and that he also had been an arbitrator in other cases where Farias was counsel for one of the parties: “Mr. Faria is or has been counsel in one or more matters in which I was appointed the arbitrator.” Mazzone thus satisfied his duty to disclose his professional 13 relationship with Faria. To the extent Work argues that Mazzone also had a duty to disclose his specific appointment in the Flores case and his ultimate ruling in that proceeding, the AAA rules expressly require disclosure only of the arbitrator’s professional relationships with the parties and their counsel. Work has not cited, nor have we found, any binding authority requiring the disclosure of information detailing the style of a specific arbitration or the results of such proceeding. The cases on which Work relies are inapposite and do not establish that an arbitrator must disclose such specific information. See Rodas v. La Madeleine of Tex., Inc., No. 05– 14-00054-CV, 2015 WL 1611780 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 10, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.), Alim v. KBR (Kellogg, Brown & Root)—Halliburton, 331 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.), and Honeycutt v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 25 Cal. App. 5th 909 (Cal. App. 2018). In Rodas, the court expressly declined to address whether the trial court had erred by denying Rodas’ application to vacate the award based on grounds of evident partiality. See 2015 WL 1611780, at *1, 2 & n.2. Rather, the court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying Rodas’ motion to compel discovery because the requested discovery was “directed at [Rodas’] evident partiality grounds for attempting to vacate the award” and Rodas was “entitled to conduct reasonable discovery to flesh out all relevant undisclosed facts.” Id. at *6. 14  In Alim, the court held that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose that one party’s counsel had appeared before him in a prior arbitration in which counsel had represented the party’s former parent company constituted evident partiality. 331 S.W.3d at 182. Unlike Mazzone—who disclosed that Faria “is or has been counsel” in other arbitrations over which he presided, the arbitrator in Alim denied he had a prior relationship with the parties or their counsel and that any of the parties’ representatives had appeared before him in past arbitrations.5 Id. The undisclosed information was that the arbitrator had served as an arbitrator in a matter where counsel for one of the parties had represented the party’s related entity and that counsel for one of the parties had met the arbitrator when their firms represented opposing parties in a lawsuit. Id. at 180. Work’s reliance on Honeycutt is also misplaced. Under California law, an arbitrator is required to disclose “matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that the arbitrator would be able to be impartial,” which the court stated, included service as an arbitrator for a party or lawyer for a party. Honeycutt, 25 Cal. App. 5th at 930. Relying on California law and different 5 The arbitrator “answered ‘No’ to the following question: ‘Have any of the party representatives, law firms or parties appeared before you in past arbitration cases?’ In that same notice, [the arbitrator] then attested, under oath, that he had ‘diligently conducted a conflicts check’ and that he had ‘performed [his] obligations and duties to disclose in accordance with the Rules of the [AAA], Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators and/or all applicable statutes pertaining to arbitrator disclosures.’” Alim, 331 S.W.3d at 180. 15 vacatur standards, the court held the trial court had erred in confirming the arbitration award because the arbitrator’s failure to disclose he had been appointed to four arbitration proceedings in which counsel for one of the parties appeared on behalf of another client during the pendency of the arbitration violated California’s ethical standards, and the violation alone was sufficient to establish evident partiality. See id. at 931–32. Given the different facts and vacatur standard, we do not find Honeycutt persuasive. In any event, we need not decide whether Mazzone had an obligation under the AAA to disclose his specific appointment in the Flores proceeding or the outcome of that arbitration, because even if he did, we conclude the undisclosed information did not establish evident partiality. The standard for evident partiality “requires vacating an award if an arbitrator fails to disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality, but information that is trivial will not rise to this level and need not be disclosed.” Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525. The decision in Grupo Unidos por el Canal, S.A. v. Autoridad del Canal de Panama is instructive on this point. In that case, Grupo Unidos moved to vacate the arbitration award on grounds of evident partiality because the arbitrator did not disclose to the parties until late in the proceeding that he served as an arbitrator in an unrelated matter in which one of Autoridad del Canal’s attorney’s represented 16 one of the parties. 78 F.4th 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2023). The court held that such undisclosed information did not establish evident partiality. The court held that “[r]epeated appearances establish only familiarity, and familiarity ‘does not indicate bias.’” Id. (quoting Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2002)). The same holds true here. After he was appointed as the arbitrator in this case, Mazzone disclosed that he had a prior professional relationship with Oppidan’s counsel Faria and that Faria “is or has been counsel in one or more matters in which [Mazzone] was appointed the arbitrator.” (Emphasis added.) While Work’s arbitration proceeding was pending, Mazzone was appointed as an arbitrator in Flores—a separate and unrelated arbitration proceeding involving different parties and facts. Oppidan’s counsel Faria represented the homebuilder in Flores. Mazzone granted summary judgment in favor of Faria’s client in the Flores matter and awarded the homebuilder $31,582 in attorney’s fees, plus costs and arbitration fees. Although Mazzone made three supplemental disclosures while Work’s arbitration proceeding remained pending, Mazzone did not disclose that he had been appointed as the arbitrator in Flores or the outcome of the Flores arbitration, which occurred seven months before Mazzone issued the arbitration award in Work’s arbitration proceeding. Work argues that the “failure to make the [additional disclosures] is very troubling and raises a legitimate concern that the arbitrator was attempting to 17 obfuscate the extent of service as an arbitrator in cases involving Oppidan’s counsel and law firm.” But at most, the undisclosed facts merely provide additional details regarding what Mazzone had already disclosed and Work already knew— Mazzone’s ongoing professional relationship with Faria based on Faria’s role as counsel in multiple arbitrations where Mazzone served as arbitrator—a disclosure to which Work did not object. See id. (stating arbitrator’s familiarity with party’s counsel based on repeated appearances “does not indicate bias” and stating “[w]e’re hard pressed to see how this in any way questions [the arbitrator’s] impartiality”). We thus cannot conclude that the undisclosed information is such that it might, to an objective observer, have created a reasonable impression of Mazzone’s partiality toward Oppidan. See Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525; Cf. Burke, 726 S.W.3d at 832–33 (holding undisclosed substantive communications between one party’s counsel and potential arbitrator that directly related to the “very matter under consideration” for arbitration, including counsel’s promise to arbitrator that, based on such communications, arbitrator would be placed at “the top of [that party’s] list” for appointment, might reasonably create impression of partiality to objective observer). We thus conclude that Work did not meet his heavy burden to show that Mazzone acted with evident partiality. 18  Other Grounds for Vacatur In addition to evident partiality, Work also moved to vacate the arbitration award on grounds of complete irrationality and manifest disregard of the law. Oppidan argues that complete irrationality and manifest disregard of the law are not valid grounds for vacatur under the FAA. Work acknowledges that manifest disregard of the law and complete irrationality are not viable grounds for vacating an arbitration award. He asserts, however, that he is making this argument to preserve the issue because “[t]he issue has not been fully resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.” See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584 (holding Section 10 of FAA “provide[s] the FAA’s exclusive grounds” for vacatur of an arbitration award); Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010) (“We do not decide whether manifest disregard survives our decision in Hall Street . . . as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); WEH- SLMP Invs., L.L.C. v Wrangler Energy, L.L.C., No. 05-19-00271-CV, 2020 WL 994697, at *4 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The federal circuit courts are split as to whether ‘manifest disregard’ survived Hall Street as an independent ground for review or as a ‘judicial gloss’ on the statutory grounds for vacatur.”). 19  Although other federal circuit courts continue to recognize nonstatutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award under the FAA after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hall Street, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and Texas intermediate courts—including ours—have interpreted Hall Street otherwise. See Citigroup Global Mkts., 562 F.3d at 358 (“In light of the Supreme Court’s clear language [in Hall Street] that, under the FAA, the statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds for vacatur, manifest disregard of the law as an independent, nonstatutory ground for setting aside an award must be abandoned and rejected.”); Allstyle Coil Co., L.P. v. Carreon, 295 S.W.3d 42, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“The United States Supreme Court held that [Section 10 provides] the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award when a party has moved for confirmation of the award in the trial court.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Hall St. Assocs.); see also Vargas, 654 S.W.3d at 9–10 (stating “the grounds on which a trial court may vacate an arbitration award under the FAA are limited to those expressly identified in section 10 of the FAA, to the exclusion of all other potential grounds”) (citing Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584, and listing cases holding courts may not vacate arbitration award under FAA on nonstatutory grounds). Complete irrationality and manifest disregard of the law are not one of the grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award under Section 10 of the FAA, and thus under binding precedent, neither ground can support a trial court’s decision to vacate 20 an arbitration award. See State v. Beck, 695 S.W.3d 729, 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (stating courts of appeals are “of course, obligated to follow [its] own precedent”). Because Work did not meet his burden to show that Mazzone acted with evident partiality, and complete irrationality and manifest disregard of the law are not viable grounds for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA, we hold the trial court erred in granting Work’s application to vacate the arbitration award. Under the FAA, a “court ‘must’ confirm an award unless the award is vacated under Section 10 or modified or corrected under Section 11.” Cooper, 832 F.3d at 544 (citing Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 582); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.087 (stating trial court “shall confirm” arbitration award unless grounds are offered for vacating, modifying, or correcting award); see also Vargas, 654 S.W.3d at 6 (stating party seeking to vacate arbitration award under FAA “bears a heavy burden to prove one of the . . . statutorily enumerated grounds” set forth in Section 10(a)). Because no grounds existed for vacatur under Section 10, and no one moved for modification or correction of the award under Section 11, Oppidan was entitled to confirmation of the award. See Belfiore Developers, LLP v. Sampieri, No. 01-17- 00847-CV, 2018 WL 1161558, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing order vacating award and rendering judgment confirming award). 21  Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s order granting Work’s application to vacate the award and render judgment confirming the award. Veronica Rivas-Molloy Justice Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil. 22