In the Interest of L.S., a Child v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket14-26-00541-CV
JudgeWise
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion filed November 10, 2026
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-26-00541-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF L.S., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 505th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 22-DCV-298147
OPINION
In this appeal from the termination of her parental rights to L.S. (Liam),
Mother challenges Foster Mother and Foster Father’s standing to file a suit affecting
the parent-child relationship (SAPCR).1 Concluding that the trial court correctly
determined that Foster Parents had standing to seek termination and adoption under
1
“Liam” is a pseudonym. We use fictitious names to identify the minor and other
individuals involved in this case. Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
section 102.005, and as a matter of first impression, that section 102.0031’s affidavit
requirement does not apply to nonparents who satisfy section 102.005, we affirm.2
BACKGROUND
Because Mother’s arguments on appeal concern Foster Parents’ standing
rather than the merits of the trial court’s termination decision, a lengthy recitation of
facts is unnecessary. Liam was born on March 10, 2022, while Mother was
incarcerated. Liam has lived continuously with Foster Parents since April 2022. 3 In
October 2022, Foster Parents filed an original petition seeking to terminate Mother’s
parental rights to Liam. Later, Foster Parents amended their petition to seek
adoption. The case proceeded to trial, and on May 12, 2026, the trial court signed an
order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Liam and appointing Foster Parents as
joint managing conservators.4 Mother appeals.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Mother did not challenge Foster Parents’ standing in the trial court. For the
first time on appeal, she argues that Foster Parents lacked standing under either
section 102.003(a)(9) or 102.003(a)(12), or that they lost standing under those
provisions by failing to file an affidavit as required by section 102.0031.
In response, Foster Parents contend that: (1) Mother has waived any standing
challenges; (2) the trial court expressly found that Foster Parents had standing under
section 102.005, a finding unchallenged by Mother in her opening brief; and (3)
2
All references herein are to the Texas Family Code.
3
Mother signed a Temporary Placement Agreement giving Loving Houston Adoption
Agency the right to arrange foster care for Liam. The Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services was not involved in the underlying proceedings. At the time that Foster Parents initiated
suit against Mother, no orders concerning Liam were in place.
4
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Liam’s unknown father.
2
section 102.0031’s nonparent affidavit requirement does not apply to those with
standing under section 102.005. We reject Foster Parents’ waiver arguments but
agree with the remainder of their contentions.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and is a threshold issue
in a custody proceeding. In re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018). As
part of subject matter jurisdiction, standing cannot be waived and may be raised for
the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court sua sponte.5 In re E.G., No. 14-
14-00967-CV, 2016 WL 1128137, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 22,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852
S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993); In re A.C.F.H., 373 S.W.3d 148, 150 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2012, no pet.)). Standing is a question of law we review de novo. In re
H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155. In evaluating standing, we construe the pleadings in the
plaintiff’s favor and consider relevant evidence offered by the parties. Id.
The Texas Legislature has provided a comprehensive framework for standing
in the context of suits involving the parent-child relationship. In re K.S., 492 S.W.3d
5
We recognize that in In re J.W.G., No. 14-17-00389-CV, 2017 WL 5196223 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 9, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.), this court held that the Department
could not challenge whether a grandfather met the statutory requirements for maintaining suit
under the Family Code for the first time on appeal. Id. at *6 (citing In re K.S., 492 S.W.3d 419,
423 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). In so holding, we distinguished
constitutional standing, which can never be waived and may be raised by a party or court at any
time, even on appeal, from statutory restrictions on who can bring suit, which “affect a plaintiff’s
right to relief rather than the court’s jurisdiction.” Later, the Texas supreme court decided In re
H.S., which also concerned a grandparent’s ability to maintain a suit under the Family Code. 550
S.W.3d 151, 152 (Tex. 2018). In re H.S. characterized the issue as one of standing—not statutory
prerequisites to suit—and reiterated the familiar principle that without standing, a court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 155. Based on this language, we decline to hold that Mother has
waived her standing challenges.
3
419, 423 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). When standing is
conferred by statute, we use that statutory framework to analyze whether the petition
has been filed by a proper party. Id. The party seeking relief must allege and establish
standing within the parameters of the language used in the statute. Id.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to de novo review.
Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002). When
interpreting statutes, we presume the legislature’s intent is reflected in the words of
the statute and give those words their fair meaning. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155.
We analyze statutes “as a cohesive, contextual whole, accepting that lawmaker-
authors chose their words carefully, both in what they included and in what they
excluded.” Id. (quoting Sommers v. Sandcastle Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 749, 754
(Tex. 2017)). We presume that the legislature intended the entire statute to be
effective. Vitol, Inc. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 529 S.W.3d 159, 168 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Another fundamental principle of
statutory construction is that, when construing a statute, a reviewing court must
consider the act as a whole and not just as single phrases, clauses, or sentences.
Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Tex. 2015). We must give
effect to each provision of a statute so that none is rendered meaningless or mere
surplusage. TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016).
B. Standing under Section 102.005
In their live pleading, Foster Parents asserted that they were not related to
Liam but had “standing to bring this suit under Texas Family Code section
102.003(a)(12), inasmuch as they are the foster parents of this child, the child was
placed in their home by the Department of Family and Protective Services, and the
child has remained in their care for over 12 months.” Alternatively, Foster Parents
claimed standing “under Texas Family Code section 102.003(a)(9), inasmuch as
4
they have had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months
ending no more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of this petition.”
Mother’s first two issues concerning Foster Parents’ standing under these
subsections, respectively. However, in its termination order, the trial court expressly
found that Foster Parents had standing under section 102.005:
The Court finds that [Foster Parents] filed their Petition to Terminate
Parent-Child Relationship on October 19, 2022. The Court further
finds that at the time that the Petition to Terminate Parent-Child
Relationship was filed [Foster Parents] had had actual possession and
control of the child for not less than two months during the three-month
period preceding the filing of the petition and that they had substantial
past contact with the child sufficient to warrant standing to request
termination of the parent-child relationship joined with a petition for
adoption in accordance with Texas Family Code § 102.005.
We consider whether the record supports the trial court’s finding of standing under
section 102.005, and if so, we need not address Foster Parents’ standing under
section 102.003(a)(12) or (a)(9). See, e.g., In re I.H., No. 14-26-00463-CV, 2026
WL 3132249, at *9 & n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 20, 2026, no pet.
h.) (mem. op.) (describing section 102.005 as an independent basis for standing); In
re E.G., 2016 WL 1128137, at *2 (explaining that section 102.005 “confers standing
on an individual who may not have standing under section 102.003 (the more general
provision governing standing)”); see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Section 102.005 details the standing requirements for a person filing “[a]n
original suit requesting only an adoption or for termination of the parent-child
relationship joined with a petition for adoption.” Tex. Fam. Code § 102.005. The
version of section 102.005 in force at the time of Foster Parents’ suit provided that
“[a]n original suit requesting only an adoption or for termination of the parent-child
relationship joined with a petition for adoption may be filed by . . . (3) an adult who
has had actual possession and control of the child for not less than two months during
5
the three-month period preceding the filing of the petition . . . or (5) another adult
whom the court determines to have had substantial past contact with the child
sufficient to warrant standing to do so.” Tex. Fam. Code § 102.005(3), (5). 6 The
record reflects—and Mother does not dispute—that Liam has lived exclusively with
Foster Parents since April 2022, a few weeks after his birth. See, e.g., In re M.J.R.B.,
No. 12-11-00004-CV, 2012 WL 4502433, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 28,
2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that foster parents with whom child had lived for
seven months prior to filing of suit met standing requirements under both subsections
(3) and (5) of section 102.005).
Mother argues that “control must mean more than the control that is implicit
in having care and possession of the child” and suggests that Foster Parents lacked
standing under section 102.005(3) because they had no “legal” control of Liam.7
However, the Texas supreme court rejected this argument in interpreting the
meaning of “actual care, control and possession of the child” under section
102.003(a)(9). See In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 160 (“The statute does not require the
nonparent to have ultimate legal authority to control the child, nor does it require the
6
This section of the Family Code was amended effective September 1, 2025. Foster Parents
filed suit on October 18, 2022, before the effective date of the amendments. We therefore apply
the former law, and all citations to the Family Code in this opinion (other than citations to Section
102.0031, discussed below) are to the version effective prior to the September 1, 2025
amendments.
7
Mother contends that without imposing some legal aspect to the definition, of control, a
kidnapper could have standing to sue for termination and adoption under section 102.005(3), “so
long as he kept the child for two months prior to filing suit despite doing so without superior legal
right to the child or consent of the parent.” Maybe so, at least under former section 102.005(3).
But that is a problem for the legislature, not the courts. See In re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 884–85
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (recognizing legislature’s policy choice in
enacting section 102.004 to expand standing to those who may not have standing under section
102.003). In any event, the current version of section 102.005 is much narrower than the former.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 102.005 (current version).
6
parents to have wholly ceded or relinquished their own parental rights and
responsibilities.”).
Mother also argues that the trial court erred in finding standing under section
102.005 because Foster Parents did not specifically identify that section as a basis
for standing in their pleadings. 8 Mother raised no challenges to Foster Parents’
pleadings in the trial court. Regardless, Foster Parents’ second, third, and fourth
amended petitions all stated that they sought termination of Mother’s parental rights
and adoption of Liam. And in an affidavit attached to her fourth amended petition
(the live pleading), Foster Mother stated that Liam had lived with her and Foster
Father since April 4, 2022. Thus, we conclude that Foster Parents’ petition alleged
facts sufficient to show that they had “actual possession and control of the child for
not less than two months during the three-month period preceding the filing of the
petition” as contemplated by section 102.005(3) and “substantial past contact” with
Liam as contemplated by section 102.005(5). See In re D.A., No. 02-14-00265-CV,
2015 WL 510255, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(concluding trial court erred in finding grandmother lacked standing; although she
did not identify specific statute under which she sought standing, her affidavit
outlined facts establishing “substantial past contact” under 102.005(5)).
We overrule Mother’s first and second issues.
8
Foster Parents argue that Mother waived any challenge to a finding of standing under
section 102.005 by failing to address it in her opening brief. After Foster Parents raised the issue
of section 102.055 in their brief, Mother addressed it in her reply. Therefore, Mother did not waive
her section 102.005 arguments. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.3 (“The appellant may file a reply brief
addressing any matter in the appellee’s brief.”) (emphasis added).
7
C. Affidavit Required by Section 102.0031
Mother’s third issue concerns recently enacted section 102.0031, 9 titled
“Required Affidavit for Standing of Nonparent”:
(a) A nonparent who files or intervenes in a suit affecting the parent-
child relationship in which another party to the suit is a parent of
the child shall execute and serve with the nonparent’s initial
pleading an affidavit that:
(1) attests, based on the nonparent’s personal knowledge or
representations made to the nonparent by a person with
personal knowledge of the matter, that denying the relief
sought would significantly impair the child’s physical
health or emotional development; and
(2) contains facts that support the allegation under Subdivision
(1).
(b) The court shall deny the relief sought and dismiss the suit or strike
the intervention, as applicable, unless the court determines, based
on the affidavit, that the affidavit contains facts adequate to
support the allegation under Subsection (a)(1).
Tex. Fam. Code § 102.0031. In her opening brief, Mother argues that even if Foster
Parents had standing under section 102.003(12) or section 102.003(9) as they alleged
in their petition, they lost standing under either provision by failing to file the
affidavit required by section 102.0031. In response, Foster Parents argue that section
102.005 provided an independent basis for standing, and the affidavit requirement
does not apply to that provision. In her reply, Mother contends that section 102.0031
applies to all suits filed by nonparents where a parent is a party. We agree with Foster
Parents.
9
Section 102.0031 was effective September 1, 2025, and applies not only to suits filed
after that date, but also to “a suit affecting the parent-child relationship that is pending in a trial
court on or after the effective date.” Act of May 15, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 236, §§ 4–5, 2025
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 236 (to be codified at Tex. Fam. Code § 102.0031).
8
This is an issue of first impression. At the time of this opinion, only two cases
have meaningfully discussed section 102.0031. See In re S.N., No. 02-25-00525-CV,
2025 WL 3713587 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 22, 2005, orig. proceeding); In re
L.S., No. 02-26-00574-CV, 2026 WL 3011028 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 6,
2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Both cases described section 102.0031 as
“effectively add[ing] an additional requirement to former Section 102.003(a)(9).”
See In re S.N., 2025 WL 3713587, at *3 n.2; In re L.S., 2026 WL 3011028, at *2.
Neither case concerned the interplay between section 102.0031 and section 102.005,
if any.
Our primary goal in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s
intent. See Martin, 498 S.W.3d at 74. In determining legislative intent, we may look
to the language of the statute, its legislative history, the nature and object to be
obtained, and the consequences that would follow from alternate constructions. State
v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). Section 102.0031 was part of a series
of amendments to the Family Code that began with Senate Bill 2052. The Statement
of Intent for Senate Bill 2052 explained that with these amendments, the legislature
sought to codify the Texas supreme court’s ruling in In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804
(Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding), and to “clarif[y] that suits by nonparents requesting
conservatorship, possession, or access to the child must overcome the presumption
that a parent acts in the best interest of the parent’s child and it is in the best interest
of a child to be in the care, custody, and control of a parent.” Senate Comm. on
Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 2052, 89th R.S. (2025). In re S.N. provides
a concise summary of In re C.J.C.:
The question that the majority and concurring opinions in In re C.J.C.
addressed is what [a nonparent] needed to show before the trial court
could properly appoint him as a possessory conservator with visitation
rights. Despite the absence of supporting language in the applicable
statute, [603 S.W.3d at] 813, the majority concluded that the father was
9
entitled to a presumption that he was a fit parent and was acting in [the
child’s] best interest and that [nonparent] had presented no evidence to
rebut either presumption, id. at 819–20.
2025 WL 3713587, at *6.
As Foster Parents point out, this case does not concern conservatorship,
possession, or access—the considerations at issue in In re C.R.C.—but termination
and adoption. Standing to seek termination and adoption is governed by an entirely
different statutory provision: section 102.005. While section 102.003 concerns
“general standing” to file a SAPCR, section 102.005 deals with a specific type of
SAPCRs: those seeking only termination and adoption. See In re I.H., 2026 WL
3132249, at *10; In re E.G., 2016 WL 1128137, at *2. If the legislature wanted to
impose the affidavit requirement on suits seeking termination and adoption, it could
have done so. See In re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d at 884–85 (discussing legislature’s
decision to provide another basis for standing in addition to the standing afforded by
section 102.003). Indeed, a similar provision exists within the grandparent access
statute. See Tex. Fam. Code 153.432; see also In re S.N., 2025 WL 3713587, at *4
(discussing “nearly identical language” in section 153.432). In the absence of a clear
legislative intent to impose section 102.0031’s affidavit requirement on those
claiming standing under section 102.005, we decline to do so. See Christus Health
Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2013) (“We must take the
Legislature at its word, respect its policy choices, and resist revising a statute under
the guise of interpreting it.”).
We overrule Mother’s third issue.
10
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Ken Wise
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Wise, Wilson, and Antú.
11