Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-26-00504-CV IN THE INTEREST OF L.Z.R., A CHILD On Appeal from the 314th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2024-03142J MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Q.T.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination decree of her parental rights to her child L.Z.R. (“Laura”). 1 Mother contends (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient that there is a continuing danger preventing Laura’s return to her and that termination of her parental rights is in Laura’s best interest; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services as Laura’s sole managing conservator. We affirm. 1 We use pseudonyms to refer to the child and mother involved in this case. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). BACKGROUND The Department filed an original petition in late December 2024, seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to then two-year-old Laura. An affidavit from the Department’s investigator accompanied the petition and stated that the Department had received a referral alleging Mother’s neglectful supervision of Laura and her 11-year-old sister Lucy and reporting Mother has psychosis, post- traumatic stress disorder, and a diagnosis of schizophrenia and depression but is not on any mental health medications or receiving treatment. The affidavit provided that Mother’s sister (“Aunt”) in Ohio had legal custody of Lucy since 2020 but that Mother had taken Lucy, moved to Houston with Lucy and Laura, and was using drugs. Lucy told relatives that she was not enrolled in school, and she and Laura were being hurt. The affidavit further stated that the children had nowhere to go when Mother was arrested in late December 2024 for shoplifting. Laura and Lucy were placed in Aunt’s care. After several pre-trial hearings, trial began in March 2026 and resumed the next month.2 The court signed a decree, terminating Mother’s parental rights to Laura pursuant to Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangerment by environment) and (E) (endangerment by conduct). The court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest and appointed the Department as the child’s sole managing conservator. ANALYSIS I. Sufficiency of the Evidence A. Standard of Review Involuntary termination of parental rights is a serious matter implicating 2 Mother’s parental rights to Lucy are not at issue. 2 fundamental constitutional rights. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); In re L.E.R., 650 S.W.3d 771, 782 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). However, a child’s emotional and physical interests should not be sacrificed to preserve parental rights. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). Parental rights may be terminated if clear and convincing evidence shows (1) the parent committed an act described in section 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code, and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1), (2). The burden of proof is heightened to clear and convincing evidence because of the severity and permanency of the termination of parental rights. In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); see also Tex. Fam. Code. § 161.001. “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007. This heightened burden of proof results in heightened standards of review for evidentiary sufficiency. In re L.E.R., 650 S.W.3d at 782. For a legal sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and we disregard all controverting evidence a reasonable factfinder could disbelieve. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). For a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, including disputed or conflicting evidence, to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. We examine whether the disputed 3 evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that dispute in favor of its finding. Id. The factfinder is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014). “We may not second-guess the factfinder’s resolution of a factual dispute by relying on disputed evidence or evidence the factfinder ‘could easily have rejected as not credible.’” In re V.A., 598 S.W.3d 317, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (quoting In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. 2003)). B. Continuing Danger The Texas Legislature amended section 161.001 of the Family Code in 2023 to require a trial court to make certain written findings as a condition of ordering the termination of parental rights. In re P.Y., 731 S.W.3d 672, 680 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2026, no pet.). As amended, subsection (f) provides that in a suit for termination of parental rights filed by the Department, a court may not order termination under subsection (b)(1) unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence and describes in writing with specificity in a separate section of the order that the Department “made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the parent.” Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(f)(1). Mother argues in her first issue that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents Laura’s return under Family Code section 161.001(f)(1). Mother claims she is “currently completing” recommendations following a substance abuse assessment, is attending counseling, “joined a church that wants to help her with housing,” stopped using drugs in December 2025, and “will have 4 completed classes” in 90 days, and that her probation will also have ended by then. She claims the Department cannot point to a continuing danger that remains other than to assume her drug use continues. We disagree. First, Mother did not have a stable home during the pendency of the case; rather, she lived in a home she admitted is not suitable for children. In fact, she asked the trial court not to return Laura to her for another 90 days because “clearly, I have — I live in a very bad neighborhood, and there’s a lot of things going on,” including a lot of drug use. She admitted she lives in an unsafe environment. There also is no evidence that the church Mother allegedly joined will in fact provide her with stable housing. Second, Mother had no stable employment but stated that a boyfriend is “currently” helping her. She testified she is “unable to do anything for a living,” she received food stamps, and “for employment, at the moment, I’m doing everything in my power to not do anything illegal.” Third, Mother had a history of instability, drug use, and crime. Aunt testified she had to file for custody of Mother’s middle child Lucy when she was seven years old and before Laura was even born. Aunt testified that Mother was extremely unstable and hitchhiked with Lucy, lived at a gas station, lived with random men and in an abusive relationship, wouldn’t enroll Lucy in school, and left Lucy at Aunt’s house in the middle of the night. Some time after Laura’s birth, Mother took Lucy and Laura and moved to Texas. Mother also admitted giving up her oldest daughter over 13 years ago when she was 17 months old because “it was in her best interest.” Evidence showed that Mother has been struggling with sobriety for some time and tested positive for drugs during the pendency of the case. The Department’s family service plan required Mother to take a substance abuse 5 assessment and follow the recommendations. The first assessment recommended 15 individual and six group substance abuse sessions. Yet, Mother was unsuccessful in completing four outpatient treatment sessions in 2025 and then failed to continue. Thereafter, “she went back and forth to wanting to do inpatient versus outpatient, and then in January of 2026, she completed a new assessment”—she was still trying to complete the new recommendations at the time of trial. Mother admitted she “slacked off” but claimed she hadn’t used drugs since December 18, 2025. Mother failed to comply with the Department’s family service plan—she tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana in March 2025 and was a no show or refused drug testing in April 2025, twice in May 2025, in July 2025, and twice in August 2025. She submitted to drug testing at the end of January 2026 and tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana, which shows her testimony that she had not used methamphetamine since December 2025 was untruthful. Fourth, Mother had a criminal history, and her continued drug use and illegal conduct placed her at risk for incarceration—again posing a continuing danger to Laura. Mother was indicted for felony possession of methamphetamine in August 2024. She also was arrested and indicted for misdemeanor theft in December 2024, which led to the removal of Laura and Lucy because the children had nowhere to go. 3 In January 2025, Mother and the State agreed that she would participate in a pre-trial intervention program due to her possession of methamphetamine charge. She agreed, among other things, not to consume or possess drugs, to submit to drug and alcohol testing monthly or as directed by the community supervision department, not to violate any laws, and to participate in community service programs. The trial court signed an order approving the 3 The State moved to dismiss the theft case in January 2025 because “Defendant was convicted in another case.” The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the theft case. 6 intervention program agreement, ordered Mother to perform the agreement, and reset her case to January 2026. The State filed a motion to revoke Mother’s bond in early September 2025 because her community supervision officer informed the State that she had failed to report from February to August, she tested positive for methamphetamine, she failed to provide proof of enrollment in outpatient treatment, she could not be contacted by phone, mail, or in-person visit, and her “whereabouts are unknown and she is considered to be an absconder.” Mother and the State then entered into an addendum to the intervention program agreement, under which she agreed to complete an intensive outpatient treatment program as directed by the community supervision department and provide clean urine samples or face a warrant for her arrest. The trial court approved the agreement, ordering Mother to perform the terms of the agreement and reset the case to March 2026. At the time of trial, no evidence established that Mother was complying with the agreement’s requirements or that the felony case against her was going to be dismissed. If she fails to fulfill the agreement, she will again face arrest and jail time, which poses a continuing danger to Laura. Fifth, due to allegations that Mother has psychosis, post-traumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia, and depression but is not on any mental health medications or receiving treatment, she was required per her family service plan to submit to a psychiatric assessment. She never did, so the Department was unable to verify her mental health state. During trial, Mother admitted her post-traumatic stress disorder was “really bad” and claimed she wasn’t able to get her medication. However, she also testified that she has had post-traumatic stress disorder since childhood, was prescribed medications twice when she was 18 years old, has not taken medications since then because of side effects, and instead received “a 7 treatment called MPR,” which she claimed has helped her and has lasting effect. Given the foregoing, we conclude legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that a continuing danger prevented Laura’s return to Mother, and we overrule Mother’s first issue. C. Best Interest Mother contends in her second issue that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that termination of her parental rights is in Laura’s best interest. The best interest inquiry is child-centered and focuses on the child’s well- being, safety, and development. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. Courts apply a strong presumption that the best interest of the child is served by keeping the child with her natural parents, and it is the Department’s burden to rebut that presumption. In re N.M.P.C., No. 14-24-00594-CV, 2025 WL 380522, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 4, 2025, pet. denied). But prompt and permanent placement in a safe environment also is presumed to be in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(a). No specific set of facts is required to establish that termination is in a child’s best interest. In re K.M.R., No. 14-25-00870-CV, 2026 WL 774099, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19, 2026, pet. denied). The factfinder may consider several factors in determining the child’s best interest, including: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future physical and emotional needs; (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the persons seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the 8 stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the parents’ acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(b) (listing factors to consider in evaluating parents’ willingness and ability to provide the child with a safe environment). This list of factors is not exhaustive, and evidence on all factors is not required to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Child’s Desires At the time of trial, Laura was three years old. When a child is too young to express her desires, the factfinder may consider that the child has bonded with the foster parent, is well cared for by the foster parent, and has spent minimal time with a parent. See In re J.J.L., 578 S.W.3d 601, 610 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). The supervisor testified that Laura has been with Aunt almost since the beginning of the case in February 2025 and is thriving. Child’s Emotional and Physical Needs The need for permanence is a paramount consideration for the child’s present and future physical and emotional needs and a compelling government interest. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Here, Laura has been in her current home with Aunt for over a year. The evidence showed that Aunt’s home is safe and she wants to adopt Laura. Further, the supervisor testified that Laura is having a great time bonding with Aunt and her sister Lucy, she is toilet training, her speech is improving, and she is attending day care. Laura’s educational, medical, dental, and emotional needs are being met, and 9 she is doing well in Aunt’s home. Evidence also showed that neither Laura nor her sister Lucy ever asked to speak to Mother. There was evidence that Laura’s emotional needs were supported by Mother too, however. The supervisor agreed that Mother and Laura are bonded and that Mother did not miss her bi-monthly Zoom visits with Laura, though during some visits Mother discussed inappropriate topics with Laura. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Mother has not had stable housing or employment for years; she admitted to still living in a “very bad neighborhood” at the time of trial. A factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet her child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet her child’s needs in the future. Id. Emotional and Physical Danger to the Child Now and in the Future Mother admits having a history of drug use and missed drug tests but emphasizes that she hasn’t used methamphetamine since mid-December 2025 and still participated in court-ordered treatment at the time of trial. But the evidence shows that she tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana at the end of January 2026, even though that violated the pre-trial intervention program agreement and could result in her going to jail. A pattern of illegal drug use suggests Mother was not willing and able to provide Laura with a safe environment—a primary consideration in determining the child’s best interest. See In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Mother correctly admits that she has been struggling with sobriety for some time. But she did not follow the recommendation that she complete 15 individual and six group substance abuse sessions—in fact, she failed to complete even four. Months later, she couldn’t decide whether she wanted inpatient or outpatient 10 treatment. Then she completed a new assessment but was still trying to complete the new recommendations at the time of trial. There is no assurance that Mother will actually complete the required treatment sessions this time around. Mother also states that Laura was healthy at removal and had no bruises, and there was no testimony that she had physically or emotionally abused Laura. That is true, but endangerment does not require a parent’s conduct to harm the child directly; instead, “a pattern of parental behavior that presents a substantial risk of harm to the child permits a factfinder to reasonably find endangerment.” See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024). We cannot forget that Mother has had no stable home or employment throughout this case and even before. Mother is unable to meet Laura’s most basic needs of nourishment and shelter. Parental Abilities and Stability of Home of the Person Seeking Custody The evidence also shows that Aunt has the ability to care for Laura. She has had custody of Laura’s older sister Lucy for several years before and after Laura’s birth. Laura was placed with Aunt shortly after her removal, is thriving there, and “is having a great time bonding” with Aunt and her sister Lucy. Aunt also has two children of her own, and Mother admits that Aunt’s home is stable. A parent’s inability to provide adequate care for her children, unstable lifestyle, lack of a home and income, and poor judgment may be considered when looking at the child’s best interest. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. Mother presented no concrete plans for how she plans to obtain housing, gain employment, and care for Laura. While she testified that she recently joined a church and that church members want to “help [her] with housing,” there is no evidence supporting her assertion and no members testified to confirm her testimony. Mother completed parenting classes and testified that she was seeing a drug 11 counselor and, as part of her pre-trial intervention program agreement, she was seeing a psychologist once a week. But she never took the psychiatric assessment required by her family service plan—so the Department was unable to verify her mental health. Plans for the Child Aunt wants to adopt Laura and raise her together with Lucy and Aunt’s own two children. Aunt also testified that she would allow Mother to visit Laura and Lucy. Mother, on the other hand, has no concrete plans for Laura and instead asked the trial court to give her 90 more days to complete her pre-trial intervention program agreement for her felony possession of methamphetamine case, complete drug counseling, secure safe housing, and obtain employment. Excuse for Parent’s Acts and Omissions Mother does not point to any excuses for her conduct and omissions except to say she has a history of drug use. * * * Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude it is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental relationship with Laura is in Laura’s best interest. Additionally, in view of the entire record, we conclude that any disputed or conflicting evidence is not so significant as to prevent the trial court from forming a firm belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest. We overrule Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s best interest finding in issue two. II. Managing Conservatorship Mother asserts in her third issue that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the Department as Laura’s sole managing conservator because the court 12 “did not include ‘the specific facts that support the court’s finding’ as required by” Family Code section 153.002(c)(1). We reject Mother’s assertion because section 153.002 applies to cases involving ongoing conservatorship and possession rights, neither of which are implicated in a parental-rights termination case. See In re T.R., No. 01-25-00924-CV, 2026 WL 958570, at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2026, pet. denied); In re K.D., 471 S.W.3d 147, 166 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2015, no pet.). When both parents’ rights are terminated, 4 as here, section 161.207 controls the appointment of a managing conservator. In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d at 356-57. Mother has not presented any complaint regarding section 161.207. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s third issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Katy Boatman Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bridges and Boatman. 4 The trial court also terminated Laura’s father’s parental rights but that termination is not before us on appeal. 13