Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00398-CV IN THE INTEREST OF I.J.L.G., I.J.W.G., N.M.G., and A.Z.G. From the 81st Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas Trial Court No. 25-05-0353-CVA Honorable Melissa Uram-Degerolami, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 14, 2026 AFFIRMED Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her four children, I.J.L.G., I.J.W.G., N.M.G., and A.Z.G. 1 On appeal, Mother asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request to extend the automatic dismissal deadline. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401. Mother also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that: (1) she committed each of the termination grounds listed in sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) 2; (2) the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services 1 To protect the identities of the children, we refer to the children and their family members by initials or aliases. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 The legislature amended Section 161.001(b)(1) and repealed subsection (O). See Act of May 16, 2025, 89th Leg. R.S. ch. 211, § 2, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 573, 574–75. The amendments apply only to suits affecting the parent-child 04-26-00398-CV (the Department) made reasonable efforts to return the children to her prior to the commencement of the final hearing, but a continuing danger existed that prevented the return of the children; and (3) termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b), (f). We affirm. BACKGROUND The Department’s involvement began in January 2025 when the children’s father reported that five-year-old I.J.W.G. had been sexually abused. At that time, A.Z.G. was two, N.M.G. was four, and I.J.L.G. was about to turn seven. They were living with their father and paternal grandmother; Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. The father became uncooperative with the investigation, and the Department lost contact with the family for the next two months. On March 29, 2025, officers with the Pleasanton Police Department were dispatched to Mother’s home after she threatened a household member. The father was arrested earlier that month, and the paternal grandmother left the children with Mother. When Officer Raul Cuevas contacted Mother, he observed that she was “spaced out” and under the influence of drugs. Mother and the children lived in the home with several other people, some of whom were known drug users. Mother also spoke to Department investigator Jessica Lucio that night and admitted to using methamphetamine 20 or 30 minutes before police arrived. She signed a safety plan that designated the children’s paternal grandfather as a Parental Child Safety Placement (PCSP). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 264.901(2). The Department’s subsequent attempts to contact Mother were unsuccessful. The Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the children relationship that are pending on or after the effective date of the amendments; thus, we apply the law in effect at the time the suit was pending below. Id. § 3. -2- 04-26-00398-CV on May 7, 2025, and the trial court adopted Mother’s family plan of service as a court order on June 26, 2025. The children were physically abused and neglected by their grandfather and were removed from his home in November 2025. Mother had not seen the children since March, nor had she maintained contact with the Department. Then, two days after the children changed placements, Mother contacted the Department and agreed to meet with caseworkers Paris Rex and Lydia Escobar. Mother used methamphetamine on December 1 before the meeting and was under the influence while she reviewed her service plan with Rex and Escobar. At Mother’s first court appearance three days later, the trial court conditioned Mother’s parent-child visitation upon her successful completion of an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. Thereafter, Mother refused to meet with her caseworkers or avail herself of services, and her communication was sporadic—“she would pop up” by sending a text message or email after weeks of silence. In February 2026, Rex and Escobar visited Mother at the home where she occasionally resided to encourage her participation in services. They arranged Mother’s substance abuse assessment and psychological evaluation and sent new referrals for additional services. Mother experienced homelessness in March, did not provide proof of employment, and never submitted to drug testing. The trial court set the case for a bench trial to commence on April 30, 2026. Mother contacted a residential treatment facility in early April. When the parties appeared for trial, Mother requested an extension of the dismissal deadline so she could begin a 45-day inpatient treatment program. She had not participated in any additional services since the hearing in March nor submitted to a single drug test while the case was pending. The trial court denied Mother’s request and proceeded with the bench trial. -3- 04-26-00398-CV The Department presented the testimony of Mother, Lucio, Department investigator Oscar Mora, Officer Cuevas, Rex, and Escobar. The trial court heard that Mother began smoking methamphetamine before the children were born, used methamphetamine while supervising the children, and last used “earlier” on the day of trial. At that time, the three older children were in a group home, and A.Z.G. was in a separate foster home. At the close of evidence, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights and found that, despite the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother, a continuing danger prevented their return. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW “[T]he natural right which exists between parents and their children is one of constitutional dimensions.” D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)). To that end, the involuntary termination of parental rights “must always be a last resort and never a first impulse.” In re H.S., No. 24-0307, 2026 WL 1614496, at *1 (Tex. June 5, 2026). A termination order must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the parent committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1), and that termination is in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007. In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge to the trial court’s findings, we “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *7 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. -4- 04-26-00398-CV 2002)). In doing so, we “assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Because “the factfinder remains ‘the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor’” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Id. (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support a challenged finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). While “giv[ing] due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing,” we “consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. Under these standards, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009). SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(D) & (E): ENDANGERMENT Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that she endangered the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). -5- 04-26-00398-CV Termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to subsection (D) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection (E) authorizes termination of parental rights upon proof that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). “[E]ndangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that ‘expose[s a child] to loss or injury’ or ‘jeopardize[s]’ the child.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). The term means “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment,” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012), but “does not require actual harm,” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533). Thus, to terminate a parent’s rights for endangerment under subsections (D) or (E), the “parent’s endangering conduct need not ‘be directed at the child,’” nor must “the child actually suffer[] injury.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533); In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2024). “[T]ermination under [subsection] (D) requires that the child’s environment is a source of endangerment, and the parent’s conduct may create that dangerous environment.” C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 310. “A parent’s drug use, violence, or other abuse may make the child’s environment endangering to the child.” In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d 120, 128 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.). “A parent acts ‘knowingly’ when the parent is aware that the environment creates a potential danger to the child but the parent disregards that risk.” Id. Because conditions or surroundings cannot endanger a child unless the child is exposed thereto, the relevant time frame for evaluating subsection (D) is before the child’s removal. J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749. -6- 04-26-00398-CV Under subsection (E), the focus is on the parent’s conduct and whether the endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re I.J.S., No. 04-23-01023-CV, 2024 WL 3056673, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 20, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Termination under subsection (E) must rest on a parent’s voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct rather than a single act or omission. Id.; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). “A factfinder may infer endangerment from ‘a course of conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277. “Even evidence of criminal conduct, convictions, and imprisonment prior to the birth of a child” may amount to a course of conduct that endangered the child’s well-being. In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); see Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (explaining that illegal drug use and offenses that occurred before the child’s birth may be considered as part of a course of conduct that endangers a child). Drug use and its effects on the parent’s life and ability to parent may demonstrate an endangering course of conduct. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 & n.4. Mother’s methamphetamine use began before the children were born and continued through the day of trial. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (“A court properly may consider actions and inactions occurring both before and after the child’s birth to establish a ‘course of conduct.’”). While the children briefly lived with Mother, she exposed them to her drug use, violence, and other drug users and criminals in the home. See In re E.A.R., 583 S.W.3d 898, 909 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied) (noting that under subsection (D), “[i]nappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child[ren]’s home or with whom the -7- 04-26-00398-CV child[ren] [are] compelled to associate on a regular basis in [their] home is part of the [children’s] ‘conditions or surroundings’”). When the Department contacted Mother in March 2025, Mother told Lucio that she smoked methamphetamine because the children “were stressing her out.” The children had been with Mother for just over a week, which was the longest she had ever cared for them. Mother initially denied smoking methamphetamine in the children’s presence and stated that she smoked outside. Upon further questioning, Mother clarified that she “never left [her] kids alone.” She explained that the children “were around [her]” when she used, “but not close,” and she “would blow [the smoke] outside.” Mother’s methamphetamine use in the children’s presence while she was their sole caregiver undoubtedly exposed the children to an unreasonable risk of harm. See In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d 520, 530 (Tex. 2023) (a parent’s methamphetamine use poses an immediate danger to a child’s physical health or safety). Mother disappeared when the children were placed with their grandfather and only communicated sporadically after she reinitiated contact. Despite the Department’s repeated rehabilitative efforts, Mother disregarded orders to drug test and participate in residential treatment. Rather than showing a modicum of remorse, Mother exhibited apathy and nonchalance about her ongoing drug use. Mother’s minimization of her endangering conduct, refusal to participate in drug treatment or other services, and decision to risk losing her children by continuing to use illegal drugs support the trial court’s endangerment findings. See In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (holding that parents’ history of drug use and failure to begin a 12-step program, “despite repeated requests by the Department,” supported the finding under subsection (E)); In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (holding evidence that father “engaged in illegal -8- 04-26-00398-CV drug use during the pendency of the termination suit, when he knew he was at risk [of] losing his children, . . . was legally sufficient to support a finding of endangerment”). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). We likewise conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232– 35 (Tex. 2019) (requiring appellate review of grounds (D) and (E), and a detailed analysis if affirming on either ground). We overrule Mother’s second issue. Because only one statutory ground is necessary to support a termination order, we need not address Mother’s issues in which she challenges the remaining grounds. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN Mother contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that terminating her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). There is a strong presumption “that it is in a child’s best interest to be raised by his or her parents.” In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex. 2020); see TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131. Texas law likewise presumes that the prompt and permanent placement of a child in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. -9- 04-26-00398-CV CODE § 263.307(a). Courts may use the following non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Evidence pertaining to any of the factors set forth in Section 263.307(b) 3 may also be relevant to the best interest determination. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b). Proof of each factor is not required; in some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002); In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). And evidence of one or more statutory termination grounds is often relevant to the best interest inquiry. H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *13. This is particularly true if the evidence indicates that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the child. C.H., 89 3 These factors include (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out- of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the Department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing the child and other children under the family’s care with: (A) minimally adequate health and nutritional care; (B) care, nurturance, and appropriate discipline consistent with the child’s physical and psychological development; (C) guidance and supervision consistent with the child’s safety; (D) a safe physical home environment; (E) protection from repeated exposure to violence even though the violence may not be directed at the child; and (F) an understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b). - 10 - 04-26-00398-CV S.W.3d at 27. In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination is in the child’s best interest. In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied). Mother’s persistent and unapologetic use of methamphetamine, a “so-called hard drug[],” “implicates most of the Holley factors.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). A parent’s continuing pattern of drug use can support a best interest finding due to the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the children.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281. Such risks were reality in this case—Mother smoked methamphetamine while caring for the children, threatened a household member in the presence of the children, and exposed them to other drug users and criminals in the home. Mother’s methamphetamine use continued after removal, which coincided with a lack of stable, drug-free housing; she intermittently stayed in the same home surrounded by drug users, and experienced homelessness the month before trial. Consequently, Mother’s assurance that her parenting capabilities were unaffected by her drug use is unavailing. Furthermore, the Department’s and trial court’s repeated rehabilitative efforts were met with recalcitrance. She was under the influence of methamphetamine during her first meeting with Rex and Escobar, and when she testified at trial. Mother testified that she “doesn’t believe in rehab,” but reluctantly agreed to begin a 45-day inpatient substance abuse treatment program nearly a year after removal. Mother purportedly intended to rely on AA/NA meetings to achieve sobriety, and “[did]n’t believe [she] would continue to use drugs” if the children were returned to her. However, Mother had previous opportunities to achieve and maintain sobriety—the Department intervened in 2022 or 2023 based on Mother’s and the father’s substance abuse, but the investigation “was unable to [be] complete[d]” due to the parents’ lack of cooperation. See In - 11 - 04-26-00398-CV re T.B., No. 09-20-00172-CV, 2020 WL 6787523, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“factfinder may consider prior CPS history of neglect, drug abuse, or lack of care for the children”). As such, Mother’s minimization of her extensive drug problem permits the inference that she was unwilling and unable to give her children a safe, drug-free home environment. See E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 610. The trial court could also infer that Mother’s past endangering conduct may recur if the children were returned to her. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Mother’s instability and indifference went beyond her drug use. Prior to November, Mother was voluntarily absent from the children’s lives, did not disclose her whereabouts or communicate with the Department, and attended no court hearings. Most of Mother’s service plan remained incomplete—even after meeting with her caseworkers, she refused to acknowledge that her services were court-ordered. She likewise ignored the trial court’s explicit order to attend inpatient treatment because “she did not have time,” and it “wasn’t even a choice that [she] was going to go with” until a few weeks before trial. Mother’s continued drug use and failure to participate in services indicate an unwillingness and inability to meet her children’s future needs or seek out necessary available resources in the future. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.); In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Additionally, Mother’s acts and omissions indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and her excuses therefor suggest her unwillingness to prioritize the well-being of her children over her own interests. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371– 72. Although none of the children were in adoptive homes, a “lack of evidence about definitive plans for permanent placement and adoption cannot be the dispositive factor.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at - 12 - 04-26-00398-CV 28. Otherwise, terminations would regularly be subject to reversal on the sole ground that “an adoptive family has yet to be located.” Id.; see also In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). Significantly, the children were “doing very well” in their placements and their needs were being met. The Department planned to find a permanent home for the children upon the termination of Mother’s and the father’s parental rights. On the other hand, Mother articulated no plans for the children and failed to provide them with a safe, stable home while they were in her care. The trial court therefore properly determined that this factor does not weigh against a best interest finding. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d at 732. Finally, Mother’s significant pattern of parental indifference “supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in [the children’s] best interest under every one of the Holley factors.” A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 823. During Mother’s prolonged absence, the children were physically abused and neglected in the care of their grandfather. They often went to school hungry, dirty, and in clothes and shoes that did not fit them. The children reported sleeping on the floor at their grandfather’s girlfriend’s house and having to steal food. Escobar also recalled that I.J.L.G. felt abandoned by her parents. It is evident that Mother’s clear disinterest in parenting her children jeopardized their physical and emotional well-being. See id. at 834; see also Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Consequently, the trial court properly determined that Mother was not “fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities” of parenthood. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003). We conclude that the record shows multiple circumstances from which the trial court may have reasonably discerned a “pattern of conduct that is inimical to the very idea of child-rearing.” J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Accordingly, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that - 13 - 04-26-00398-CV termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. We overrule Mother’s third issue. REASONABLE EFFORTS TO RETURN THE CHILDREN Mother next contests the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children under Section 161.001(f). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(f)(1). Enacted in 2023, Section 161.001(f) provides that the trial court may not terminate the parent-child relationship unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that: the [D]epartment made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before the commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the parent. Id. “The Department’s implementation of a family service plan is generally considered a reasonable effort to return the child to the parent.” In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (collecting cases). But it is not the exclusive means of establishing the Department’s reunification efforts; ultimately, the inquiry is “whether the Department made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.” Id. (quoting In re J.A., No. 04-20-00242- CV, 2020 WL 5027663, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)). The trial court identified several reunification efforts that are firmly founded in the record. Despite Mother’s inconsistent communication and unknown whereabouts, the Department created a service plan for Mother and attempted to serve her on multiple occasions since May 2025. Rex testified that the Department attempted to contact Mother “via phone calls, text message[s],” left voicemails, and went to “any address” associated with Mother. She also contacted Mother’s family members, who “all declined” to serve as the children’s placement. - 14 - 04-26-00398-CV Once Mother resurfaced in November 2025, Escobar and Rex met with her to discuss her service plan requirements. Mother failed to make progress, so Escobar and Rex met with her again in February 2026 to encourage and facilitate her participation. As set forth above, the evidence is abundantly clear and convincing to support the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with Mother before trial commenced. We overrule Mother’s third issue insofar as it relates to the Department’s reunification efforts. SECTION 263.401: DENIAL OF DISMISSAL DEADLINE EXTENSION Finally, Mother argues that the trial court erroneously denied her request to extend the automatic dismissal date pursuant to Section 263.401(b). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401. She argues that she misunderstood “the nature of the Department’s involvement” and “was not even served or aware that her services were court[-]ordered until less than five months prior to trial.” The legislature enacted section 263.401 to encourage the prompt resolution of suits in which the Department seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Tex. 2021). In a parental termination proceeding, a trial on the merits must commence by “the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the [D]epartment as temporary managing conservator.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a). The failure to do so without a valid extension deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the suit and results in an automatic dismissal. Id. § 263.401(b). The trial court may only retain the case on its docket if it finds: (1) “extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the [D]epartment”; and (2) “continuing the appointment of the [D]epartment as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child.” Id. An extraordinary-circumstances finding is mandatory if: (1) a parent has made a good faith effort to - 15 - 04-26-00398-CV successfully complete the service plan but needs additional time; and (2) on completion of the service plan, the court intends to order the child returned to the parent. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(b-3); see H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *5. In substance abuse cases, if the trial court ordered “a parent to complete a substance abuse treatment program, the court shall consider whether the parent made a good faith effort to successfully complete the program” in determining whether extraordinary circumstances justify an extension. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(b-2). Subject to the statutory limitations, we review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny an extension for an abuse of discretion. See H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *5; In re K.L.B., No. 26-0077, 2026 WL 1614379, at *1–2 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (Sullivan, J., concurring in denial of petition for review). The evidence established that Mother made no effort to engage in services between March and November 2025 and made minimal progress thereafter. A parent’s apathy or flagrant defiance is the antithesis of a “good faith effort,” as the term presupposes a lack of culpability. See, e.g., In re B.R.T., No. 04-22-00416-CV, 2023 WL 29381, at *3–4, *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 4, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the mother did not establish that she made good faith efforts because her noncompliance was due to her choice to reschedule appointments and drug tests, and she did not maintain employment because she was pregnant); In re B.A., No. 09-20-00216-CV, 2021 WL 1217334, at *8–10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 1, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (no good faith effort where the father gave “pushback,” “did not make any efforts to work services,” and did not take it seriously); cf. In re K.L.B., 2026 WL 1614379, at *1 (“[A]t least in substance abuse cases, the focus is now on whether the parent made a good-faith effort to complete the [treatment] program, rather than on [the parent’s] relative responsibility for not doing so.”). - 16 - 04-26-00398-CV Here, Mother was entirely at fault for her purported misunderstanding or ignorance of her service plan requirements and delayed participation in proceedings. She was under the influence of methamphetamine when she met with Rex and Escobar in December, and “didn’t believe that [they] were really there due to a court order in regard to her children.” It is well-settled that “parents cannot blunder their way into extraordinary circumstances” through drug use or willful noncompliance. In re C.G., No. 02-20-00087-CV, 2020 WL 4518590, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that Mother’s excuses did not amount to extraordinary circumstances. See In re J.M., No. 02-21-00346- CV, 2022 WL 872542, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that “[f]ather’s inability to complete services . . . was the consequence of his own actions,” and was not an extraordinary circumstance). Of further significance, Mother largely overlooked the best interest of her children in requesting an extension. Despite her failure to promptly seek drug treatment, she asserted that it was in her children’s best interest “to already be back home.” The trial court rationally discredited Mother’s half-hearted capitulation and instead prioritize stability and permanence for the children. On this record, delaying permanency based on Mother’s failure to grasp the severity of her inaction would have been contrary to the children’s best interest. See In re M.K.V., 648 S.W.3d 478, 484 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s requested extension. We overrule Mother’s first issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Adrian A. Spears II, Justice - 17 -