Full Opinion

Opinion filed August 31, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00072-CV __________ IN THE INTEREST OF B.B. AND B.B., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 326th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11756-CX MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of the mother 1 to her children, B.B. and B.B.2. 2 The mother, Appellant, presents a single issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the 1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father. Only the mother appealed. 2 To protect the identities of the children and the children’s family members, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). children’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2025). We affirm the trial court’s order. I. Termination Findings and Standards The Texas Supreme Court recently stated that the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) must “clear[] a high bar” to terminate one’s parental rights. In re K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *6 (Tex. June 5, 2026); see also In re H.S., No. 24-0307, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8–9 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (re-emphasizing that terminating parental rights “‘is always the last resort’ . . . permissible to protect children from serious harm . . . [and] may be exercised only in the absence of other legitimate options.” (quoting D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. 2025))). To support termination under this heightened standard, the Department must present clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) termination is in the best interest of the children. See FAM. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019). This standard “is unforgiving” and “the government may not sever the legal ties between parents and children without clearing [this] high bar.” In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The trial 2 court further found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of our deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). Because “the factfinder remains ‘the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor’” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Id. (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted against the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). II. Background and The Evidence Presented at Trial The Department received a report on August 28, 2024, that the conditions of Appellant’s home were “deplorable.” Three-year-old B.B. and one-year-old B.B.2 were very dirty and appeared as if they had not been bathed for several days. B.B. 3 “had feces caked on his feet,” and was walking through broken glass on the floor. The father had recently been sentenced to imprisonment, and Appellant permitted “an unknown person” to watch the children. Four days earlier, Appellant was arrested for possession of methamphetamine in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams, a third-degree felony; she was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision eight months later. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (West Supp. 2025). In September 2024, Appellant was given the opportunity to participate in family-based safety services (FBSS).3 The maternal grandmother and her husband served as the temporary Parental Child Safety Placement (PCSP) for ninety days. The children were returned to Appellant on December 4, 2024, Appellant’s friend agreed to serve as a safety monitor, and FBSS caseworker Teresa Beckham attempted to facilitate services for Appellant. Even after Appellant violated the safety plan within two weeks of its implementation, Beckham afforded Appellant numerous opportunities to comply and participate in services. Beckham first “referred her . . . to get on Medicaid and food stamps,” but Appellant never accomplished those tasks. The children “did not have Medicaid, they did not have a doctor,” and Beckham “[did not] know how long it had been” since the children’s last medical appointment. Appellant told Beckham that she used methamphetamine in August 2024, so Beckham requested that Appellant drug test throughout the FBSS case; after October 10, 2024, Appellant refused to submit to drug testing at least seven times, despite Beckham’s requests. 3 “Family-based safety services are protective services provided to a family whose children are not in the conservatorship of the Department” to: (1) protect the children from abuse and neglect; (2) help the family reduce the risk of future abuse or neglect; and (3) prevent the removal of the children from their home.” 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE pt. 19 ch. 700 subch. G div. 2 § 710 (2021). 4 Appellant stopped permitting Beckham to enter her home around November or December 2024. Beckham recalled an attempted home visit on January 24, 2025—Appellant cracked the door to speak to Beckham but did not allow her inside. When Beckham told Appellant that she needed to see the children, Appellant brought each child to the door wrapped in a blanket because they were not wearing clothes. Beckham noticed that B.B.2 had a black eye, which Appellant said was caused by B.B. hitting her with a toy. Beckham spoke to the maternal grandmother, who revealed that Appellant told her a different story—that B.B.2’s black eye was caused by B.B.2 falling off the bed. On January 13, 2025, Appellant’s neighbor called the police upon seeing an unknown male outside with the children. The male ran as law enforcement approached him and the children, but he was ultimately apprehended and arrested for evading arrest or detention. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04 (West Supp. 2025). Beckham went to Appellant’s home and spoke to the male, Kevin Starr. Starr disclosed that he had been living in Appellant’s home despite the determination that, “because of his background,” he “did not need to be around the children.” Starr had continued living with Appellant, who “would tell him to hide” in a shed or behind a curtain each time Beckham visited the home. Appellant arrived and “said that [Starr] wasn’t supposed to be there . . . [and] wasn’t supposed to be with the kids.” Starr stated that “he thought they were in a relationship,” but, to Starr’s confusion, Appellant “wanted him to be arrested” that day. Once she entered Appellant’s home, Beckham observed that “it was very, very cold inside” because the home did not have heat or electricity. She asked Appellant if there was a warm, safe place she could take the children, but Appellant told her to leave and not to return. 5 Law enforcement and FBSS caseworker Angela Goodloe-Ewing went to Appellant’s home on February 3, 2025, because it was reported that B.B. was alone outside without pants or shoes and had crossed the street. Goodloe-Ewing asked Appellant to submit to drug testing, but she refused. Department investigator Christina Burrow accompanied Goodloe-Ewing to Appellant’s home the next day. Burrow observed from outside the home that a front window “had been busted out, and there was glass surrounding the floor.” She also saw “a pile of roofing material” and “boards that had screws in them.” On the way to the back door of the home, “because the front door was not working,” she saw “a lot of power tools[,] [r]eclaimed lumber[,] [and] [j]ust a lot of hazards that would not be good for kids.” While Burrow and Goodloe-Ewing spoke to Appellant outside, B.B. was also outside and shoeless. The inside of Appellant’s home “was also very filthy,” and a “stagnant,” “dirt odor” permeated the home. B.B.2 was asleep in a travel crib and “[t]here was a half- eaten corn dog beside her.” Appellant “said [B.B.2] had fallen asleep eating the corn dog.” Both B.B. and B.B.2 “were very dirty . . . [Burrow] could tell it had been a few days since they had had a bath, at least.” When Burrow attempted to speak to Appellant about the Department’s concerns, she told them to leave. Burrow then spoke to the neighbors, who witnessed “a lot of people coming in and out of Appellant’s home” at “odd hours,” and would only stay for a brief period. They also reported “a chemical-type ammonia smell coming from the home.” Burrow approached the mail carrier while he was on his route, who recalled “smell[ing] marihuana coming from the home.” Because of Appellant’s lack of cooperation and the Department’s concerns for the children, the Department sought and was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the children on February 7, 2025. The children were tested for illegal drugs on February 10, and both tested 6 positive for methamphetamine. They were originally placed with their maternal grandmother and her husband but were later moved to a foster home because of their grandmother’s health concerns. The Department created a family plan of service for Appellant that the trial court amended, approved, and adopted as an order of the court. Appellant’s service plan requirements included that she maintain sobriety, submit to random drug testing, attend counseling, complete parenting classes, attend parent-child visitation, and acquire her own stable, drug-free housing. Appellant participated in twenty- eight counseling sessions before her counselor went on leave in July 2025. She also completed parenting classes and attended visits with the children. The father was released from prison in March 2025 and resumed living with Appellant at the home from which the children were removed. Department caseworker Jessica Mowrer attempted to view the parents’ home before they were evicted in November 2025, but she was denied access in August, September, and October. Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine in June and October 2025, and ignored Mowrer’s instructions to drug test in March, May, August, November, and December 2025. On August 28, 2025, Appellant gave birth to another child, I.B., and tested positive for methamphetamine at the hospital. The Department removed I.B. when she was two weeks old, after which Appellant stopped working services. Because she also stopped complying with the terms and conditions of her deferred adjudication community supervision, in December 2025, the State filed a motion to adjudicate her guilt and to revoke her community supervision on the possession-of- methamphetamine charge. The final termination hearing commenced on January 30, 2026, and concluded on February 12, 2026. Appellant was not present on January 30. The 7 father and Mowrer attested to their belief that Appellant was at Serenity House, a residential treatment facility in Abilene. However, Mowrer could not verify that Appellant was at Serenity House because Appellant never signed a release. Mowrer likewise testified that, because of the pending motion to adjudicate, there was an outstanding warrant for Appellant’s arrest. The children, then ages two and four, were still living in a foster home at that time and were “doing really well.” B.B. was participating in applied behavioral analysis (ABA) therapy, and B.B.2 was in speech therapy. Appellant’s brother, P.M., who lived with his wife in Illinois, expressed the desire to adopt the children. The Department submitted a home study under the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC)4 and planned to place the children with P.M. once he acquired his foster care license. P.M. reported having a close relationship with the children prior to removal and had phone calls with them while awaiting his approval as their placement. At the final hearing on January 30, Mowrer testified that Appellant had not addressed the reasons for removal, including her mental health and drug use, and was unsure whether Appellant had any housing following her discharge from treatment. Mowrer explained that, despite Appellant’s love for the children, she had not shown the ability to provide a safe, stable environment or care for the children “without using drugs.” The father testified that he had established a permanent residence a week before the final termination hearing commenced, and Appellant was not living with him. Appellant was discharged from residential treatment on February 5 and was arrested on her outstanding warrant a few days later. She was still in custody when 4 The ICPC ensures that children placed outside of their home state receive the same protections and services that would be provided to them if they remained in their home state. See FAM. §§ 162.101– .107 (West 2020). 8 the final hearing resumed on February 12. Appellant testified that she spent approximately a month in Serenity House, but she did not sign a release because she “didn’t need to,” and had not sent Mowrer a certificate of completion. She did not know her sobriety date, and “was worried about just getting sober and not worried about anything else other than that.” When asked about her history of substance abuse, she reported using methamphetamine “[o]nce every several months” since around 2018, and that her methamphetamine use increased after the children were removed. Appellant denied using methamphetamine around the children, refused to acknowledge that the children tested positive upon removal, then blamed others for their exposure. She posited that the children’s methamphetamine exposure “could have came [sic] from anywhere” and that she “had people watching them” while she worked. Appellant also testified that she had worked full time for a company named You First HandyMan Services. With respect to her housing, Appellant provided the same home address as the father, which contradicted his testimony that they did not live together in his new home. The father previously testified that after their eviction, they “kind of went [their] separate ways.” And although he transported Appellant to Serenity House, he “[had] her blocked on everything” because of their “disagreements” and his anger with her over the children’s removal. Appellant claimed that she “did more than try” to complete her services and demonstrate her progress, but stated, “[I]t’s not easy when you have a caseworker and your team being completely against you.” She disputed Mowrer’s testimony regarding drug testing because the dates “weren’t adding up.” She subsequently acknowledged receiving Mowrer’s text messages that instructed her to submit to drug testing on the disputed dates. Appellant likewise averred that, despite repeated requests for a list of approved treatment facilities, the Department never provided 9 her with the necessary information and thus “set [her] up to fail.” She was then asked on cross-examination: [THE DEPARTMENT]: So you don’t recall Ms. Mowrer telling you about Concho Valley? [APPELLANT]: She told me about it. What am I supposed to do, remember it in my brain off the top of my head, the first day she tells me about it? . . . [THE DEPARTMENT]: And did you recall her telling you about Nexus? [APPELLANT]: I don’t remember her telling me about any of it. Following the hearing, the trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights and found termination to be in the best interest of the children. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). This appeal followed. III. The Best Interest of the Children In her sole issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). Because the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, we generally do not disturb the factfinders determinations so long as those determinations are not unreasonable. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). There is a strong presumption that termination is not in a child’s best interest; therefore, a parental-termination order “must always be a last resort and never a first impulse.” H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *1. With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re 10 C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). In fact, evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest finding. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27–28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Nevertheless, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. The best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)). To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266; see also H.S., 2026 11 WL 1614496, at *9 (Although the heightened standard of appellate review applies to both the grounds for termination and the best interest analysis, evidence that supports a finding under subsection (b)(1) “may also be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under [s]ubsection (b)(2).”). This is particularly true if the evidence indicates that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Moreover, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. Appellant’s pattern of substance abuse “implicates most of the Holley factors.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). It is well-established that a parent’s continuing pattern of drug use can support a best interest finding because of the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the child[ren].” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279–81 (Tex. 2024); see also In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (The parents’ years of drug use supported the trial court’s best interest finding.). Such risks are present in this case—Appellant 12 admitted to using methamphetamine for eight years; she was arrested for possession of methamphetamine four days before the Department intervened; and the children tested positive for methamphetamine upon removal. See J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550 (“[D]rug use and its effects on the parent’s life and ability to parent and care for a child may establish an endangering course of conduct.”); In re R.R.L., No. 11-25- 00263-CV, 2026 WL 616107, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 5, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Evidence of endangerment is relevant to the best interest analysis.). The trial court could have rationally concluded that Appellant risked the children’s safety and well-being by failing to provide adequate care and supervision. Both children appeared unbathed and very dirty on multiple occasions, and the home was described as “deplorable” and “very filthy.” See In re A.L., 545 S.W.3d 138, 148 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (considering parent’s “extraordinarily unsanitary” home in best interest analysis). During the FBSS case, B.B. was seen wandering into the street unsupervised and walking barefoot among safety hazards such as broken glass, screws, and power tools. See In re S.B., 597 S.W.3d 571, 584 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied) (parents “jeopardized the children’s physical and emotional health by allowing them to live in unsanitary conditions” and “neglecting their physical condition”). Appellant violated the safety plan by refusing to allow the Department access to the children and her home, permitting unauthorized adults to watch the children in her absence, and failing to provide the children with a home that had heat or electricity when cold weather conditions existed. She further failed to take the children to their necessary medical appointments or acquire Medicaid, despite the Department’s prompting. See J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d at 254 (“[A] parent’s neglect of her child’s medical or dental needs endangers the child, as well as a parent’s failure to properly supervise her young child.”) (internal citations omitted). 13 Here, Appellant’s endangerment of the children and her repeated disregard for their health and safety permitted the inference that she was unable to meet their physical and emotional needs in the future. See In re U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d 391, 402 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“In reviewing the parenting abilities of a parent, a fact finder can consider the parent’s past neglect or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children.”); see also S.B., 597 S.W.3d at 584 (“Neglect can be as dangerous to the children’s well-being as direct physical abuse.”). In addition to Appellant’s history of drug abuse, the conditions of Appellant’s home prior to removal, and the children’s positive drug tests, the trial court could consider Appellant’s irresponsible choices after removal. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346; In re T.B., No. 09-20-00172-CV, 2020 WL 6787523, at *8, *11 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence of endangerment, such as drug use or lack of care for the children, also bears on the best interest determination). For instance, Appellant’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of the underlying termination suit, when she was at risk of losing her children, supports the trial court’s best interest finding. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551 (citing In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). Appellant had been on deferred adjudication community supervision for a third-degree felony offense, possession of methamphetamine, since April 2025, which further elevated the risk of her continued drug use. See In re A.M., No. 11-25-00253-CV, 2026 WL 545550, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 27, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Any criminal activity that exposes the parent to the potential for incarceration is relevant to the best interest analysis.). Moreover, Appellant used methamphetamine while pregnant with I.B., who was removed two weeks after she was born. See In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (a 14 parent’s drug use during pregnancy “supports a finding of direct injury to the child[ren]”); see also R.R.L., 2026 WL 616107, at *7 (Courts may look to a parent’s treatment of other children in the family in deciding whether that parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the child, which is likewise relevant to the best interest analysis. (citing Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.))). We do not disregard Appellant’s substantial compliance with her service plan, and recent attempts to achieve and maintain sobriety. While “recent improvements made by [the parent] are significant, evidence of improved conduct, especially of [a] short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a [parent’s] long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.” J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346; see also In re M.A., No. 11-26-00054-CV, 2026 WL 2339171, at *13 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 13, 2026, no pet. h.); In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 479 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.) (“[R]ecent improvement alone is not sufficient to avoid termination of parental rights.” (quoting In re K.D.C., No. 02-12-00092-CV, 2013 WL 5781474, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.))). That is especially true here, considering Appellant’s repeated opportunities to participate in services dating back to the FBSS case, as well as her continued minimization of culpability, refusal to acknowledge that the children tested positive for methamphetamine, and her attempts to blame the Department for her failure to complete certain service plan requirements. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“A fact finder may infer from a parent’s failure to take the initiative to complete the services required to regain possession of his child that he does not have the ability to motivate himself to seek out available resources needed now or in the future.”). “Despite [Appellant’s] eleventh-hour efforts to change, a reasonable factfinder could nonetheless have 15 inferred that [Appellant’s] established pattern of unprotective conduct would continue.” In re A.M., No. 02-26-00083-CV, 2026 WL 1615179, at *7 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth June 4, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re G.H., No. 11-26-00012- CV, 2026 WL 1992098, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 10, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (The parents’ substantial compliance with their service plans was insufficient to alleviate the Department’s and trial court’s concerns for the child’s safety under the circumstances.). Importantly, Appellant failed to demonstrate her willingness or ability to provide the children with a safe, stable, drug-free home environment. See J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d at 257 (“Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children.”). She did not mention her plans for the children, only that she lived at the same address as the father after her discharge from inpatient treatment. The father, however, testified that he and Appellant were not in a relationship, he did not want to have any contact with her, and she did not live with him. The trial court was permitted to credit the father’s testimony and infer that Appellant—who had been arrested and was in custody at the time of the final hearing—not only lacked stable housing for the children, but for herself as well. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741. Conversely, the Department planned to place the children with P.M., their maternal uncle, who hoped to adopt them. See U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d at 403 (“The fact finder may compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and determine whether the plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill- defined.”). Upon considering the evidence as it relates to Appellant’s actions and inactions, the emotional or physical danger to the children now and in the future, the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, Appellant’s lack of parental abilities and stability, her history and pattern of drug abuse, and her drug- 16 related criminal activity, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal. IV. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the order of the trial court. W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE August 31, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 17