Full Opinion

Opinion filed September 3, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00074-CV __________ IN THE INTEREST OF P.G., A CHILD On Appeal from the 326th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11824-CX MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of the mother 1 to her child, P.G. 2 In two issues, the mother, Appellant, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that: (1) termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest; and (2) the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to return the child to her prior to the commencement of the 1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the alleged father. Only the mother appealed. 2 To protect the identities of the child and the child’s family members, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). final hearing, but a continuing danger existed that prevented the return of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(2), (f) (West Supp. 2025). We affirm the trial court’s order. Termination Findings and Standards “The natural right which exists between parents and their children is one of constitutional dimensions.” D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)). To that end, the Department must “clear[] a high bar” to terminate one’s parental rights. In re K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *6 (Tex. June 5, 2026); see also In re H.S., No. 24-0307, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8–9 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (re-emphasizing that terminating parental rights “‘is always the last resort’ . . . permissible to protect children from serious harm . . . [and] may be exercised only in the absence of other legitimate options.” (quoting D.V., 722 S.W.3d at 861)). To support termination under this heightened standard, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019). In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well- being of the child; and (3) was the cause of the child being born addicted to alcohol 2 or a controlled substance, other than a controlled substance legally obtained by prescription. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (Q). The trial court further found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of our deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). Because “the factfinder remains ‘the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor’” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Id. (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted against the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). The Evidence Presented at Trial Appellant traveled extensively for her work as a truck driver and lived in several different states. She drove “trucks back and forth to a shop when they were 3 broken down” but did not work every day and did not know her monthly income. A few days before P.G.’s birth, Appellant drove to Abilene to tow a truck, then she and her coworker checked into a hotel while waiting on a part. On March 26, 2025, Appellant “started feeling contractions,” and became “anxious and nervous” because she “didn’t know how to handle birth.” Appellant asked her coworker for methamphetamine because she “thought it’d just calm [her] down.” When P.G. was born on March 27, 2025, both she and Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine. The Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of P.G. the next day, and placed her in an adoptive foster home where she remained until the final termination hearing. Appellant left Texas soon after P.G. was removed. In May 2025, the Department created a family plan of service for Appellant that was adopted as an order of the trial court. As part of Appellant’s service plan, she was ordered to submit to random drug testing and test negative for illegal substances, participate in counseling, complete parenting classes, attend parent-child visitation, maintain stable employment, and obtain safe, stable, drug-free housing. She participated in counseling, parenting classes, and completed her required psychological and substance abuse assessments. Appellant maintained her employment “tak[ing] the trucks back and forth from [the] shop when they’re down.” She “only work[ed] when need[ed],” which was “maybe three times a week,” and was paid $100 per truck. She consistently tested negative for illegal substances until January 2026, when the results of her urinalysis (UA) and hair follicle drug test were both positive for methamphetamine. Appellant’s visitation with P.G. “was very sporadic.” Appellant requested to reduce her weekly in-person visits with P.G. to every other week, and only attended eight out of the twenty-eight scheduled visits. She missed visits due to car trouble, 4 lack of financial ability to travel, and illness; January 9, 2026, was the last visit that she attended before the final hearing. The trial court conducted the final termination hearing on February 27, 2026. The Department presented the testimony of Appellant, permanency supervisor Brittany Elizondo, and the foster mother. Appellant admitted to using methamphetamine the day before she gave birth, despite knowing at the time that it could adversely affect her and P.G. According to Appellant, she had only ever used methamphetamine once, and “[had] no idea” why she tested positive in January 2026. Appellant lived in several different states while the case was pending, and she did not attend any court settings aside from the final hearing. She testified that she had been living in a camper in Bastrop for “[m]aybe a month, give or take.” When asked about her childcare plan for P.G. while she traveled for work, Appellant explained that, until she figured out “what [she] wanted to do” and “where [she] wanted to be” long-term, her boss’s wife would take care of P.G. According to Elizondo, P.G. was “doing great” in her foster home, and they were “ready to adopt her” if Appellant’s parental rights were terminated. She was developmentally on track, did not require services, and had no health concerns. The foster mother testified that P.G. was “the perfect addition” to their family and described her as “sunshine in human form.” P.G. “ha[d] grown very attached” to the family, “fit right in” with her three older siblings, “met all of her milestones,” and referred to her foster father as “dada.” The Department sought to terminate Appellant’s parental rights to P.G. Elizondo testified that termination was in P.G.’s best interest based on the child’s bond with her foster family, and that there was no “other option that would give her a stable living environment.” Although Appellant requested that the Department consider P.G.’s adult paternal sibling as a possible placement, the Department had 5 not completed the process of a home study under the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC).3 Elizondo explained that the sibling ultimately disclosed that, based on her belief that P.G. should be returned to Appellant, she did not want to serve as P.G.’s placement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights and found termination to be in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (Q), (b)(2). This appeal followed. The Best Interest of the Child In her first issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in P.G.’s best interest. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). Because the trial court, as the factfinder in this case, was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, we will not disturb its determinations so long as they are not unreasonable. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). There is a strong presumption that termination is not in a child’s best interest; therefore, a parental-termination order “must always be a last resort and never a first impulse.” H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *1. With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). In fact, evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest finding. C.H., 3 The ICPC ensures that children placed outside of their home state receive the same protections and services that would be provided if they remained in their home state. See FAM. §§ 162.101–.107 (West 2020). 6 89 S.W.3d at 27–28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Nevertheless, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. The best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)). To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266; see also H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *9 (Although the heightened standard of appellate review applies to both the grounds for termination and the best interest analysis, evidence that supports a finding under subsection (b)(1) “may also be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under [s]ubsection (b)(2).”). This is particularly true if the evidence 7 indicates that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Moreover, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. A parent’s substance abuse “implicates most of the Holley factors,” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied), and can support a best interest finding due to the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the child[].” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279–81 (Tex. 2024); see J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550 (“[D]rug use and its effects on the parent’s life and ability to parent and care for a child may establish an endangering course of conduct.”); In re R.R.L., No. 11-25-00263-CV, 2026 WL 616107, at *7 (Tex. App.— Eastland Mar. 5, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Evidence of endangerment is relevant to the best interest analysis.). Notably, a parent’s use of “so-called hard drugs” such as methamphetamine is treated differently than the use of “less destructive ones” like marihuana. E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 608. Here, Appellant admitted to using methamphetamine while pregnant, which “supports a finding of direct injury to the child.” In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 8 (Tex. 2024) (relating to endangerment); In re T.B., No. 09-20-00172-CV, 2020 WL 6787523, at *8, *11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Evidence of endangerment, such as drug use or lack of care for the children, also bears on the best interest determination.). She also informed hospital personnel that she received minimal prenatal care, purportedly due to traveling for work. The trial court could have rationally concluded that Appellant risked P.G.’s safety and well-being by using methamphetamine during pregnancy and failing to seek prenatal care. See J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“[A] parent’s neglect of her child’s medical or dental needs endangers the child . . . as well as a parent’s failure to properly supervise her young child.”); In re W.R.I.F., No. 05-25-01458-CV, 2026 WL 992202, at *2, 10–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 13, 2026, pet. filed) (The mother’s failure to seek prenatal care and drug use during pregnancy prompted the Department’s involvement and supported the eventual termination of her parental rights.). Appellant’s endangerment of P.G. and disregard for her health and safety permitted the inference that Appellant is unable to meet the physical and emotional needs of the child in the future. See In re U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d 391, 402 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“In reviewing the parenting abilities of a parent, a fact finder can consider the parent’s past neglect or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children.”); see also In re S.B., 597 S.W.3d 571, 584 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied) (“Neglect can be as dangerous to the children’s well-being as direct physical abuse.”). Moreover, despite Appellant’s denial of methamphetamine use after P.G.’s removal, the trial court could have reasonably found based on the positive drug test results in January 2026 that Appellant used methamphetamine in the months before the final hearing. Appellant’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of the underlying termination suit, when she was at risk of losing her child, 9 supports the trial court’s best interest finding. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551 (citing In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). But Appellant’s infrequent drug use is not evaluated in isolation. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. At the time of the final hearing, P.G. was almost a year old. When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider whether the children have bonded with their caregivers, are well-cared for by them, and whether the children have spent minimal time with a parent. In re E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d 310, 334 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.). The evidence demonstrated that P.G. had been with her foster family since she was removed. Her foster mother described P.G.’s development and attachment to the family, and the medical care she received while in their care. From the foster mother’s and Elizondo’s testimony, the trial court could rationally infer that P.G. had formed a strong bond with her caregivers, who had provided a safe, stable, permanent home for the child and were meeting her physical and emotional needs. By contrast, Appellant attended just eight out of the twenty-eight scheduled visits with P.G. and never appeared at a single court setting aside from the final termination hearing. A parent’s ability, desire, and motivation to attend court settings, visit with their child, and comply with other required services are considerations for the trial court in its best interest determination. In re D.K., 696 S.W.3d 787, 796–97 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2024, no pet.); see also In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 834 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“When a parent consciously decides to be present in his or her child’s life on a sporadic basis only and solely when it suits the parent to do so . . . this behavior in and of itself jeopardizes the child’s emotional well- being.”). Furthermore, Appellant’s plans for herself and the child were ill-defined. See U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d at 402 (“The fact finder may compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and determine whether the plans and expectations 10 of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined.”). Appellant did not have a permanent residence, nor had she determined any type of long-term employment or where she “wanted” to settle; instead, she lived in a borrowed camper and moved from state to state. And because her part-time employment required extensive travel, her childcare plan was to leave P.G. with her boss’s wife. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Appellant failed to demonstrate her ability to provide P.G. with a safe, stable, drug-free home environment. When compared to the Department’s plan for P.G.—to be adopted into a stable home environment by a family with whom she has bonded—this factor weighs heavily in favor of termination. See Holley, 577 S.W.2d at 371–72; J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d at 257 (stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children). In this case, the trial court need not ignore Appellant’s lack of stability simply because she substantially complied with her service plan requirements—such compliance was insufficient to alleviate the Department’s and the trial court’s concerns for P.G.’s safety under the circumstances. See In re G.H., No. 11-26- 00012-CV, 2026 WL 1992098, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 10, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In light of the young child’s need for prompt and permanent placement and Appellant’s uncertain living situation, the trial court could have rationally concluded that preserving Appellant’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 742 (considering the parent’s unstable and uncertain living situation in upholding the trial court’s best interest finding); In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2021) (stating that the Family Code “does not require termination when a severe restriction or limitation on access can also be in the best interest of the child while preserving the possibility that the parent and child may continue to have a relationship in the future”). Upon considering the evidence as it relates to Appellant’s actions and inactions, the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, the 11 emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, Appellant’s lack of demonstrable parental abilities and stability, and her prior drug use, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. Section 161.001(f): Reasonable Efforts and Continuing Danger In Appellant’s second issue, she challenges the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to her before the commencement of the final hearing, but a continuing danger remained in her home that prevented the return of the child to her. See FAM. § 161.001(f). Pursuant to Section 161.001(f), the trial court may not terminate the parent- child relationship unless: [T]he [trial] court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . .that . . . the [D]epartment made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the parent. Id. Enacted in 2023, subsection (f) imports the phrase “reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent” from Section 161.001(b)(1)(N), the “constructive abandonment” statutory termination ground. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (f); In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (quoting FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (f). Consistent with the prevailing judicial interpretation of that phrase, the Department’s implementation of a family service plan is generally considered a reasonable effort to return the child to a parent. M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 329 (collecting cases); see also In re T.R., No. 01-25-00924-CV, 2026 WL 958570, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2026, pet. filed); In re H.B.S., No. 12-26-00007-CV, 2026 WL 960744, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 8, 12 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.). However, evidence of a service plan is not absolutely required nor is it the exclusive means of establishing the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the child. M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 329 (collecting cases). Instead, the pertinent inquiry “is whether the Department made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.” Id. (quoting In re J.A., No. 04-20-00242-CV, 2020 WL 5027663, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)); In re J.H., No. 01- 25-00854-CV, 2026 WL 968923, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 10, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Here, the Department implemented a service plan for Appellant, facilitated her required services, arranged parent-child visitation, and maintained consistent communication. Appellant argues that, irrespective of the aforementioned actions, the Department’s failure to offer transportation for visits undermines all other reunification efforts. Elizondo testified that although Appellant “wouldn’t just no show” for a visit without providing notice, “sometimes it was the day of.” Appellant’s service plan requires that she “request transportation . . . 24 hours in advance” if she is unable to transport herself to visitation. There is no indication in the record that Appellant ever requested transportation accommodations; instead, “whenever [she] couldn’t make the visit[s],” she asked “if [they] could do a video” visit. Appellant further complains that the Department’s failure to complete the ICPC-approved home study for P.G.’s paternal adult sibling constitutes a lack of reasonable reunification efforts. Elizondo explained the delay in pursuing P.G.’s adult sibling as a placement option—“initially, she was living in Indiana,” but asked for additional time because “she said she’s moving to Florida. . . . [A]nd she would let us know.” The Department “wait[ed] around” for six or seven months until the adult sibling moved and “finally said that she was ready,” but also stated “that she doesn’t want to be [a] placement because she believe[d] that [Appellant] needs to 13 have [P.G.] back.” Under the circumstances, the trial court, as the factfinder, could have reasonably concluded that the Department made reasonable efforts to return P.G. to Appellant. See M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 332–33. Finally, Appellant re-urges that, because her January 2026 drug screens were “false positive[s]” and the Department failed to retest her, there was no evidence of a continuing danger that prevented P.G.’s return to Appellant. We reiterate that the trial court was entitled to credit the evidence of Appellant’s positive drug tests the month before the final termination hearing, and we, as an appellate court, have no basis to overturn the trial court’s credibility determinations that are supported by the record. See K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *8 n.2; see also D.K., 696 S.W.3d at 796 (“The law recognizes the factfinder’s unique position to observe and sense the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.”). Here, the trial court was permitted to disbelieve Appellant’s denial of drug use and consider Appellant’s positive drug tests in determining that a continuing danger prevented P.G.’s return to Appellant. See K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *8 n.2. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the order of the trial court. W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE September 3, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 14