In the Interest of R.A.P., a Child v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 13th District
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket13-26-00523-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NUMBER 13-26-00523-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF R.A.P., A CHILD
ON APPEAL FROM THE 444TH DISTRICT COURT
OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina
Appellant Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his
son Rex. 1 By five issues, Father challenges the trial court’s findings regarding statutory
grounds for termination, its finding regarding the child’s best interest, and the appointment
of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) as
permanent managing conservator. We affirm.
1 We refer to the child and his family members by aliases in accordance with the rules of appellate
procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
The trial court held a de novo termination hearing on May 21, 2026. Rex was born
on August 14, 2024, and was twenty-one months old at the time of trial. The evidence
provided is as follows.
A. Jimenez
Maria Jimenez, a caseworker with the Department, testified that Rex was removed
from Mother and Father at birth because they all tested positive for cocaine and because
Mother did not receive any prenatal care.
Jimenez stated Father attended an adversarial hearing on September 12, 2024,
and requested Rex be placed in his care. At the hearing, the trial court ordered that Father
submit to a hair follicle drug test and that a clean test was necessary before Rex may be
placed with him. 2 Jimenez stated that on September 27, 2024, Father’s hair follicle tested
positive for cocaine, benzoylecgonine, cocaethylene, and cocaine metabolite. In October
2024, Father’s urinalysis tested positive for cocaine. The trial court ordered Father to
complete services including supervised visitations, a psychosocial evaluation, individual
and family counseling, random drug testing, and a substance abuse assessment; the
court also ordered Father to pay child support and provide a safe home environment.
Father was a no-show to a required drug test in November. On December 4, 2024,
Father’s urinalysis tested positive for cocaine, and Father was again a no-show on
December 30, 2024. On January 27, 2025, Father tested positive for cocaine,
benzoylecgonine, cocaethylene, cocaine metabolite, and “normal cocaine.” Father was
2 At the hearing, when the trial court inquired whether Father’s hair follicle would show whether he
used any illegal substances, Father informed the trial court that he may have used marijuana “nine or ten
months ago.”
2
arrested in February 2025 for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and reckless driving and
was subsequently transferred to a detention center.
Jimenez testified that before Father was incarcerated, Father missed eleven out
of twenty-one offered visits with Rex and last visited Rex on February 2, 2025. Jimenez
stated Father completed his psychosocial evaluation and the substance abuse
assessment but did not complete the other court-ordered services. For example, Father
completed his substance abuse assessment on February 14, 2025, but he was
incarcerated two days later and could not complete the individual treatment sessions.
Upon his release from immigration detention in October 2025, Father was deported.
Jimenez contacted Father’s attorney and learned Father was in Mexico. Jimenez
was unable to do a home study of Father’s home in Mexico because Father never
provided her with an address. Jimenez attempted to have Father drug test in Mexico;
however, Father refused to tell her where he was located and responded, “What business
is that of yours?” Jimenez did not even know what city Father lived in because Father
would not disclose that information to her. When Jimenez explained she needed Father’s
location to attempt to get him services such as visitation and drug testing, Father told her
to put the visits “on pause.” Jimenez contacted Father’s attorney about Father’s
residence, but Father’s attorney informed Jimenez he did not know where Father was
residing in Mexico.
Jimenez testified that Rex has been with his foster family since the day after his
birth, and they are ready to adopt him. The foster family is the only family Rex has ever
known. Throughout the case, the foster family has always provided Rex with stability and
has always been “very caring, very nurturing, very loving towards him.” According to
3
Jimenez, Rex is “extremely loving” towards his foster family. She has observed when the
foster family arrives home from work that Rex would immediately crawl up to them asking
to be carried. When Jimenez tried to carry him, Rex would immediately leave her and
return to his foster family. Rex was meeting all of his milestones in the foster home,
graduated from some programs, and was doing well in occupational therapy.
Jimenez opined termination of Father’s parental rights was in Rex’s best interest
because Father could not provide him with a safe and stable home. Father has never
provided the Department with a residence address for the Department to assess, which
was concerning to the Department. Furthermore, the last drug test Father underwent in
January 2025 was positive, and when Jimenez asked Father to submit to a drug test just
one month before trial, Father did not respond to her even though he “read” the message.
Jimenez stated Father did not demonstrate he can parent Rex or provide for the child’s
needs. For example, Father suggested Rex be placed with his paternal grandmother.
However, the paternal grandmother was not a suitable placement because she had
limited income, she required an in-home health provider due to a disability, she did not
have a relationship with Rex, she was unable to provide two relative references, her home
was not suitable, and she had several prior cases with the Department that were
substantiated as “abuse occurred.” Lastly, Jimenez stated Father has not seen Rex in
over a year.
B. Father
Father testified that although he was present at the hospital at Rex’s birth, he did
not know Rex’s date of birth. Father stated he was aware Rex tested positive for drugs at
birth and that is what led to the Department’s removal of Rex from Mother. Father stated
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he would see Mother during her pregnancy with Rex but denied knowing Mother used
drugs. However, Father testified Mother has a drinking problem and needed help from
the government “some kind of counseling” or something “psychological.”
Father acknowledged his hair follicle test was positive, but he could not “recall” for
what drug specifically. Father’s family service plan required “some classes,” but he was
unsure which ones specifically. Nonetheless, Father stated he was unable to complete
them because he was incarcerated for ten months beginning on February 16, 2025, after
being arrested for DWI and reckless driving. During his custody, he was transferred to an
ICE detention center where he remained until his release in October 2025. Upon his
release, he was deported to Mexico where he remained for five months.
Father stated he reentered the United States and was arrested again on March 31,
2026, is currently in a federal detention center, and will likely be deported again. Father
testified he will try to live in the United States but acknowledged he will be subject to
arrest, and, if so, will do “more time.” In this regard, Father stated his plans for Rex
included taking him to Mexico until Father “get[s] [his] things ready to get back” to the
United States.
Regarding his criminal history, Father stated he was arrested in 2004 for DWI, and
he pleaded guilty to domestic violence in 2000. According to Father, he has not used an
illegal substance in a year-and-a-half, and he “thinks” the last illegal substance he used
was cocaine. He claimed since Rex was born, he has not used any illegal substances
and has been “clean” despite Jimenez’s testimony regarding Father’s positive drug tests.
Father testified that the trial court granted Father weekly visitation rights for four
hours; however, he requested each visit be reduced to two hours because four hours was
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too long to have a newborn baby at McDonald’s. Father denied missing eleven out of
twenty-one visits and stated that he only missed two or three visits. Although Father has
not visited Rex since 2025, he would like for Rex to live with him in his brother’s house in
Mexico. 3 Alternatively, he would like for Rex to be placed in paternal grandmother’s care,
denied paternal grandmother was unsuitable for Rex, and denied she had prior history
with the Department.
C. Foster Family
The foster dad testified that when Rex arrived in their care, Rex was underweight.
They have provided Rex with a safe environment. Rex has a routine and a bonded
relationship with extended family, such as grandparents, cousins, uncles, aunts, etc. The
family testified that Rex attends daycare and is on target for meeting his milestones.
According to foster dad, if the trial court would terminate Father’s rights, the foster family
would be willing to adopt Rex.
D. Trial Court Ruling
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:
I understand you tried hard to try to get your kid back. However, you know,
look where you’re at. You keep getting into trouble, and you keep
committing these crimes. And now you’re in a situation where you’re going
to get deported . . . . And so now you’re going to be deported. You’re not
going to be able to come back to this country. And now you have a situation
where you have a son that’s here . . . . But either you’re going to want him
over there or you want him here because it’s not going to be one or the
other . . . . I’m going to make a choice for him. So[,] my choice is for him to
stay here. I don’t want him to be over there because I don’t know if—well,
what you’ve expressed to this court is not very much. You’re not showing
me anything really good because I don’t see a history—I don’t see
something that, for this child, is going to grow up and live beside you that’s
going to allow this child to flourish, to become somebody that’s going to be
important, or to grow up in a family, or to be something good.
3 Father admitted he does not know what size clothes Rex currently wears.
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The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights and found by clear and convincing
evidence that: (1) he constructively abandoned the child who had been in conservatorship
of the Department for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to
return the child to Father, Father has not regularly visited or maintained contact with the
child, and Father has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe
environment; (2) Father used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the
health or safety of the child, and failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse
program; and (3) termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and the child
was in the child’s best interest. 4 See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O), (b)(2). The
trial court appointed the Department as permanent managing conservator of Rex. This
appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
The natural right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children is one
of constitutional magnitude. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). However,
parental rights are not absolute. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). “Just as it is
imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child
relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be
sacrificed merely to preserve that right.” Id.
Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated through proceedings brought under
Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001. To obtain
termination of parental rights, the Department must (1) establish one or more of the
statutory acts or omissions enumerated as grounds for termination under that statute, and
4 The trial court also terminated Mother’s rights. Mother is not a party to this appeal.
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(2) prove that termination is in the best interest of the children. Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–
(U), (b)(2). We review a parental rights termination appeals under the clear and
convincing evidence standard. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). In applying
this standard, “the reviewing court must undertake ‘an exacting review of the entire record
with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498,
503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)).
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a termination case, we
consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding “to
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that its finding was true.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. We defer to the factfinder’s
conclusions, indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of that finding,
and presume the factfinder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its findings, so long as
a reasonable factfinder could. In re K.A.C., 594 S.W.3d 364, 372 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2019, no pet.). “We disregard any evidence that a reasonable [factfinder] could have
disbelieved, or found to have been incredible, but we do not disregard undisputed facts.”
Id.
In a factual sufficiency review, the inquiry is whether from the evidence a factfinder
could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the challenged findings. See id.
We must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have
found to be clear and convincing. Id. We consider whether disputed evidence is such that
a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its
finding. Id. “If the disputed evidence that a reasonable [factfinder] could not have credited
in favor of the finding is so significant that a [factfinder] could not reasonably have formed
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a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.
III. SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(O)
By his third issue, Father argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support termination under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(1)(O) and that Section
161.001(d) bars termination because he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was unable to comply with the trial court’s order, he made a good-faith effort to comply,
and the failure to comply was not attributable to him.
A. Applicable Law
Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) provides a ground for termination
based on clear and convincing evidence the parent “used a controlled substance . . . in a
manner that endangered the health or safety of the child, and: (i) failed to complete a
court-ordered substance abuse treatment program; or (ii) after completion of a court-
ordered substance abuse treatment program, continued to abuse a controlled substance.”
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O). A court may not order termination under Subsection
(b)(1)(O) if a parent proves by a preponderance of evidence that the parent was unable
to comply with the court order, made a good faith effort to comply, and the failure to comply
is not attributable to any fault of the parent. Id. § 161.001(d). The burden is on the parent
to prove this defense. Id.
B. Analysis
In October 2024, the trial court informed Father that in order for him to be
considered as a potential placement for Rex, Father needed to provide a clean hair follicle
test because Father “was positive for cocaine, and you know how [the trial court] feel[s]
about that.” The trial ordered Father to complete random drug testing, a substance abuse
9
assessment, and individual substance abuse counseling. There was evidence Father did
not complete his substance abuse assessment until February 2025 and was arrested two
days later. Father tested positive for cocaine, benzoylecgonine, cocaethylene, and
cocaine metabolite on September 27, 2024, October 2024, December 2024, and January
2025, and was a no-show for drug tests in November and December. Nonetheless, Father
argues there is no evidence that he used controlled substances “in a manner that
endangered this child” because Rex was removed at birth and was never in Father’s
“possession for a single unsupervised minute.” Father suggests because Rex was
removed at birth—after Rex tested positive for cocaine—the Department did not establish
the required nexus between Father’s substance use and Rex’s endangerment. We
disagree.
“[A] parent’s endangering conduct need not ‘be directed at the child or that the
child actually suffers injury.’” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex.
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). Instead, a factfinder
may infer endangerment under (O) from a parent’s “course of conduct” when it “presents
substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” Id. “[A] child is
endangered when the environment or the parent’s course of conduct creates a potential
for danger which the parent is aware of but disregards.” In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 110
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.).
Father continually tested positive for cocaine while termination proceedings were
pending, knowing it jeopardized his relationship with his child and after the trial court
informed him that a clean hair follicle test was required before any placement with Father
could be considered. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009) (noting mother’s
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continued narcotics use after child’s removal and in face of drug testing jeopardized her
relationship with her child); In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 407‒408 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (concluding evidence of parent’s positive drug tests, after
the Department received a referral that parent used narcotics, was sufficient to support
finding of endangerment under subsection (E)); S.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective
Servs., No. 03-21-00085-CV, 2021 WL 3437890 at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 6, 2021,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that “Father’s continuing to test positive for illegal drugs during
the first year of the case supported a finding by the district court that Father’s illegal drug
use had been an ongoing habit that created an endangering environment for the
children”). In fact, Father refused a drug test in April 2026—just one month before the de
novo hearing. See In re M.M., No. 13-13-00543-CV, 2014 WL 895514, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 6, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A fact finder may reasonably
infer from a parent’s repeated failure to attend scheduled drug screenings that the parent
avoided testing because the parent was using drugs.”). “[A] parent’s decision to engage
in illegal drug use during the pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of
losing a child, supports a finding that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the
child’s physical or emotional well-being.” In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied).
Regardless, Father further argues the good-faith exception bars termination under
Subsection (O). Subsection (d) states a trial court “may not order termination under
Subsection (b)(1)(O) based on the failure by the parent to comply with a specific provision
of a court order if the parent proves by a preponderance of evidence” the parent was
unable to comply and that the failure to comply was not the parent’s fault. TEX. FAM. CODE
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§ 161.001(d). But a parent who continuously tests positive for controlled substances—
while termination proceedings are pending after the trial court informed them further use
was prohibited—cannot satisfy either prong of this defense because it is the parent’s own
conduct that prevents completion of the treatment program and produces a positive result.
See In re S.A., 665 S.W.3d 59, 70 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2022, pet. denied). Evidence that
Father continued to use illegal drugs even though he knew that his parental rights were
in jeopardy is conduct showing a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct,
which by its nature, endangers a child’s well-being. See id. Furthermore, the record
reflects that Father refused to provide the Department with his residence address in
Mexico to continue to drug test, and he refused to drug test just one month before the de
novo hearing. These facts cannot support a finding that Father was unable to comply with
the trial court’s court order or that Father made a good-faith effort to comply. See In re
R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d 370, 382 (Tex. 2023) (applying the good-faith exception to the prior
version of subsection O and stating that “nothing less than strict compliance will suffice
to avoid termination” for certain provisions in a family service plan such as “requir[ing] a
parent suffering from drug addiction to complete a drug treatment program or requir[ing]
a parent just released from prison to refrain from re-offending” because “[e]ven a single
or slight violation of these or other material service plan provisions could justify
termination”); see also In re I.O., 645 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no
pet.) (“Given A.O.’s history of relapses, the trial court reasonably could have found that
she had not made a good faith effort to successfully complete her most recent program.”).
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and
recognizing the factfinder as the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor,
12
we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that
Father used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health and safety
of Rex and failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program. See
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O). Moreover, after reviewing all the evidence, we
conclude the evidence contrary to the trial court’s finding is not so significant that a
factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction in favor of that finding. See In
re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
uphold the termination on Subsection (O) grounds, we need not address Father’s second
issue regarding the Subsection (N) ground. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex.
2019) (per curiam). We overrule Father’s third issue.
IV. CONTINUING DANGER
By his first issue, Father argues “the record contains no evidence of a ‘continuing
danger’ in [his] home” as required under Section 161.001(f)(1) and that the trial court’s
finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child “before the
commencement of a trial on the merits” are equally unsupported. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(f)(1).
A. Applicable Law
Section 161.001(f)(1) provides the trial court may not order termination of the
parent-child relationship under a statutory ground unless it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that “the [D]epartment made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent
before the commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts,
a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the
parent.” Id. “[C]reating and implementing a service plan is generally considered a
13
reasonable effort to return a child to his or her parent.” In re T.R., __ S.W.3d __, No. 01-
25-00924-CV, 2026 WL 958570, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2026, pet.
denied). “The Department is required to make ‘reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.’” Id.
(quoting In re N.K.T., No. 01-16-00439-CV, 2016 WL 6277415, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)). As relevant here, in considering challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence to support continuing-danger findings, several courts
have found relevant that the parent failed to abide by the service plan, continued to test
positive for illegal drugs, and was incarcerated and physically unable to care for the child.
See In re T.R., __ S.W.3d __, 2026 WL 958570, at *13 (collecting cases).
B. Discussion
Here, the Department developed a service plan for Father, and the trial court
ordered completion as a prerequisite to reunification. The Department provided Father
with drug testing, arranged for Father’s evaluations for counseling and assessments, and
worked with Father to arrange visits with Rex. After Father was released from detention,
the Department provided Father with resources to resume some services and attempted
to obtain Father’s location to provide further services. See C.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &
Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00852-CV, 2019 WL 3367524, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin July
26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding the Department made reasonable efforts to
return child to parent by developing service plan, attempting to communicate with parent,
assisting parent with scheduling visits, and determining whether parent secured drug-free
housing). When Father refused to provide the Department with his location, the
Department contacted Father’s attorney to try to obtain it. Furthermore, the Department’s
reasonable efforts also included asking Father for fictive kin placement—although Father
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was unable to provide an alternative suitable placement. See In re E.J., No. 11-26-00077-
CV, 2026 WL 3022641, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 8, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.);
In re L.C.M., 645 S.W.3d 914, 922 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (determining “the
Department’s efforts to place the child with relatives constitutes legally and factually
sufficient evidence that reunification was attempted”).
There was evidence Father failed to abide by the service plan, continued to test
positive for illegal drugs, and was incarcerated, detained, deported, and physically unable
to care for Rex. See In re T.R., __ S.W.3d __, 2026 WL 958570, at *13. Furthermore, the
trial court was permitted to consider Father’s unstable living accommodations both in the
United States and Mexico, current incarceration, and imminent deportation in determining
that a continuing danger prevented Rex’s return to Father. See In re E.J., 2026 WL
3022641, at *7. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to Father before the
commencement of trial and that a continuing danger to the child remained in the home
that prevented his return. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(f)(1); In re A.J.L., No. 04-25-
00651-CV, 2026 WL 1020548, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 8, 2026, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (concluding continued danger remained where “at the time of the trial, concerns that
led to removal—including substance abuse, instability, and unsafe conditions—remained
unresolved”). We overrule Father’s first issue.
V. BEST INTEREST
By his fourth issue, Father argues the evidence was insufficient to support the best
interest finding.
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A. Applicable Law
In determining the child’s best interest, the factfinder should consider the Holley
factors: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the present and future physical and emotional
needs of the child; (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child;
(4) the parental abilities of the persons seeking custody; (5) the programs available to
assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the
plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the
home or proposed placement; (8) acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the parents’
acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These factors
are non-exclusive, and the best interest finding does not require proof of any unique set
of factors. See In re J.J.C., 302 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009,
pet. denied). Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children. In re
J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). “There is a
strong presumption that the best interest of the child is served by keeping the child with
its natural parent, and the burden is on [the Department] to rebut that presumption.” In re
D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). “[T]he fact-
finder may choose to give greater weight to one factor over others.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 27.
B. Discussion
1. The Desires of the Children
“When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider
whether the children have bonded with their caregivers, are well-cared for by them, and
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whether the children have spent minimal time with a parent.” In re E.M., No. 11-24-00310-
CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.);
In re K.J., No. 02-25-00093-CV, 2025 WL 1600219, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 5,
2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The evidence provided Rex had been with his foster family
since birth, and they were the only family Rex ever had. Rex was well-bonded with the
foster family, had a routine and extended family with them, and the foster family had
expressed a desire to adopt him, which would be a “blessing” to them. The foster family
had provided for Rex, medically, physically, and emotionally, and Rex was meeting his
milestones. On the other hand, Father has not visited Rex since February 2025 and
instructed the Department to “pause” visitation. See In re J.P., No. 06-25-00055-CV, 2025
WL 2937452, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 16, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding the
evidence supported the first Holley factor because “Jimmy was removed from Mother at
birth, Mother was unable to visit Jimmy due to her incarceration, and Jimmy became
bonded to Dan and Tilly”). From this testimony, the factfinder could rationally infer that
Rex formed a strong bond with his caregivers and that Father has shown an unwillingness
to bond with Rex.
2. Present and Future Physical and Emotional Needs of the
Children and the Present and Future Emotional and Physical
Danger to the Children
Jimenez testified Rex was born positive for cocaine, and there was evidence
Mother and Father, too, tested positive for cocaine. Furthermore, Father tested positive
for controlled substances throughout termination proceedings, was a no-show to at least
two scheduled tests, and refused to provide a drug test after October 2025. 5 See In re
5 One of Father’s drug screens revealed a higher substance level than a previous test.
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L.T., No. 02-22-00197-CV, 2022 WL 15053329, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 27,
2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering a pattern of drug use and refusal to submit to drug
tests as evidence supporting best-interest finding). Father’s refusal to abide by the trial
court’s drug test requirements reflects a dysfunctional parent-child relationship because
Father was either unwilling or unable to maintain the sobriety necessary to provide for
Rex’s physical and emotional needs, even though he knew his parental rights were in
jeopardy. Evidence that a parent continued to use illegal drugs knowing his parental rights
were in jeopardy is conduct showing a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of
conduct, which endangers a child’s well-being. See In re E.G.A., No. 01-24-00204-CV,
2024 WL 3941021, at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2024, pet. denied)
(mem. op.).
Father was arrested for DWI and reckless driving, was just released from
incarceration at the time of trial for entering the county illegally, and he stated it was likely
he was about to be deported again. 6 “A parent’s repeated arrests and incarcerations are
evidence that the parent will be unable to satisfy his children’s emotional and physical
needs.” In re K.M., No. 01-19-00285-CV, 2019 WL 3949483, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Aug. 22, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Because Father did not have any
contact with Rex for over a year while he was incarcerated for DWI and reckless driving
and then deported without giving the Department the opportunity to conduct a home study
and provide services, the trial court could have determined that Father is unable to provide
for Rex’s physical and emotional needs. In re A.S.E. a/k/a A.E., No. 01-26-00200-CV,
2026 WL 2234160, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 4, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem.
6 Rex’s ad litem argued that it is highly unlikely that Father would stay in the country due to Father
being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude in the past.
18
op.).
3. Parental Abilities of the Persons Seeking Custody and the Programs
Available to Assist Those Persons Seeking Custody in Promoting the
Best Interest of the Children
While Father testified he has “a place to stay,” Father could not provide the
Department with any information regarding his current residence. Consequently, there
was no evidence Father could provide Rex with a safe and stable home. Although Father
testified he was living with his grandmother and uncle in a house in Mexico and then his
brother and sister-in-law in another house in Mexico, Father refused to provide the
Department with details regarding his residence and instead stated it was not the
Department’s business where he was living. In fact, Father requested a “pause” on
visitation to withhold his location. See In re E.J., 2026 WL 3022641, at *5 (“[A] parent’s
ability, desire, and motivation to visit with their child are considerations for the trial court
in its best interest determination.”).
Father testified he was just released from a detention center due to “time-served”
credit for new charges for reentering the United States illegally, and once these
termination proceedings are finished “they [a]re going to pick [him] up and, I guess, send
[him] back to Mexico.” See In re J.P., 2025 WL 293742, at *3 (providing Mother had no
means to provide for her child’s needs because she was incarcerated and could not
physically be with her child). Because of Father’s imminent deportation, Father requested
the trial court to place Rex with his paternal grandmother—who is disabled, requires a
provider, has prior CPS substantiated child-abuse history, and has never bonded with
Rex. The trial court could have inferred that this demonstrated Father exercised poor
judgment and lacked parenting skills. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119 (“A parent’s
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inability to provide adequate care for her children, unstable lifestyle . . . lack of parenting
skills, and poor judgment may be considered when looking at the children’s best
interest.”).
Father agreed he has been in and out of incarceration or detention since Rex’s
birth but nonetheless believes that his actions in the past two years reflected that he has
“provided a safe and stable home” for Rex. See id.; see also In re R.M.H., No. 04-23-
00765-CV, 2023 WL 8103188, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 22, 2023, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citation omitted) (“[C]riminal conduct and incarceration affects a parent’s life
and the ability to parent, thereby subjecting a child to potential emotional and physical
danger.”). As illustrated above, the record demonstrates otherwise, and the factfinder
could infer that Father does understand the gravity of his behavior, demonstrating a lack
of parenting skills.
4. Plans for the Children by the Individuals or Agency Seeking Custody
and Stability of the Home or Proposed Placement
Father’s plans for himself and Rex were ill-defined while the Department provided
evidence that Rex is bonding with his foster family, and they intend to adopt him. See In
re G.M., 649 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“The [factfinder] may
compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and determine whether the
plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined.”). Father stated
he gave his apartment in the United States to Mother and was subject to another arrest
with a lengthier sentence if he returned. The trial court could have inferred Father did not
have a permanent residence and uncertainty lay in his future. “An environment which
routinely subjects a child to the probability that she will be left alone because her parents
are once again jailed . . . endangers both the physical and emotional well-being of a
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child.” In re S.D., 980 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
5. Summary
Based on the foregoing, the trial court could have found the parent-child
relationship between Father and Rex was non-existent for over a year. Further, Father
had no excuse for his positive drug tests, refusals to drug test, and refusal to provide the
Department with his residence even when Father knew the continuation of his parent-
child relationship was dependent on it. After viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the best-interest finding, we conclude the evidence was sufficiently clear and
convincing such that a reasonable fact-finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and Rex was in Rex’s
best interest. We overrule Father’s fourth issue.
VI. CONSERVATORSHIP
By his fifth issue, Father challenges the trial court’s appointment of the Department
as Rex’s permanent managing conservator, arguing “no clear and convincing evidence
supports [a finding of] significant impairment from