Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00227-CV IN THE INTEREST OF P.S.-S., A CHILD On Appeal from the 237th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-2024-FM-2050, Honorable Kelley Tesch, Presiding November 2, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ. Appellant, G.S., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, P.S.S.,1 following a suit brought by Appellee, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. The trial court found statutory grounds for termination under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) of the Family Code and determined that termination was in P.S.S.’s best interest.2 Appellant challenges only the legal and factual sufficiency of the best-interest finding. We affirm. 1 We use initials to refer to the parties to protect their identity. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). 2 The child’s mother executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment and is not party to this appeal. BACKGROUND Appellant first met P.S.S. when she was approximately two years old, when DNA testing established his paternity. He began paying child support and had supervised contact with P.S.S. during an earlier Department investigation involving the child’s mother. Although Appellant initially testified that P.S.S. had lived with him for eight months, he acknowledged that the Department had placed her with his mother and limited his contact to supervised visits because of his marijuana use. In June 2020, Appellant killed his sister’s former boyfriend. P.S.S. was not present. Appellant was incarcerated in February 2023 and has remained confined since then. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter in October 2025 and received a ten-year sentence. His earliest parole eligibility date is February 2028, and his projected release date is February 2033, when P.S.S. will be fourteen. The Department removed P.S.S. from her mother’s care in September 2024 after her youngest half-sibling tested positive for cocaine at birth. Appellant was incarcerated at the time. The Department developed a service plan that accounted for Appellant’s confinement. Beginning in May 2025, caseworker Emily Sumpter visited him monthly, at times providing parenting packets, photographs, and updates about P.S.S. She also offered to deliver letters or cards to the child. Appellant returned no completed packets and sent no correspondence through Sumpter. Although he initially testified that he had completed the packets, he conceded on cross-examination that he had not. He testified 2 that his jail classification prevented him from attending parenting classes and that he had sent approximately two letters and a birthday message through other means. Appellant identified his mother as a possible placement for P.S.S.3 Sumpter testified that she never responded to the Department’s inquiries, although Appellant disputed that account. He expressed a desire to remain in his daughter’s life and hoped to obtain employment, maintain sobriety, and care for her after his release. Following removal, P.S.S. initially lived with a maternal aunt. In March 2026, she and her younger sister moved into their maternal uncle’s home. Although the placement was recent, the uncle had maintained regular contact with the children throughout the case. Sumpter testified that P.S.S. was happy, bonded with her uncle, and receiving appropriate care. The uncle intended to adopt both girls. The caseworker, attorney ad litem, and guardian ad litem recommended termination. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights, and this appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW Parental rights implicate fundamental constitutional interests. The Department therefore must establish by clear and convincing evidence both a statutory ground for termination and that termination serves the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012). 3 Appellant testified that he also identified several other relatives. Sumpter, however, testified that he identified only his mother. 3 In reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We defer to reasonable credibility determinations without disregarding undisputed contrary evidence. Id.; In re H.S., 741 S.W.3d 4, 17 (Tex. 2026). In a factual sufficiency review, we consider the entire record and determine whether the disputed contrary evidence is so significant that the factfinder could not reasonably have formed that firm belief or conviction. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). Assessing whether terminating a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest requires a consideration of multiple factors, including those identified in section 263.307(b) and Holley v. Adams, such as the child’s desires and needs, potential dangers, parental abilities, proposed plans, placement stability, and the parent’s acts or omissions and explanations for them. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). Although the law presumes that preserving the parent-child relationship serves the child’s best interest, it also favors prompt and permanent placement in a safe environment. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). The Supreme Court of Texas recently emphasized that best interest remains an independent requirement, not automatically established by proof of a predicate ground for termination. H.S., 741 S.W.3d at 23–24. Accordingly, although Appellant does not challenge the predicate findings, we independently examine whether the evidence supports termination as being in P.S.S.’s best interest. 4 ANALYSIS Appellant emphasizes that he did not cause P.S.S.’s removal and that his criminal conduct did not involve her. The record does not establish that he physically harmed P.S.S. or that his mental-health diagnoses endangered her. Nor does incarceration alone establish that termination serves a child’s best interest. See Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533–34 (Tex. 1987); In re S.R.L., 243 S.W.3d 232, 235–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Nevertheless, courts have recognized that limited parental involvement4 and prolonged incarceration5 may support a best-interest finding. At trial, Appellant had been incarcerated for more than three years. His earliest parole eligibility remained nearly two years away,6 and his projected release would not occur until P.S.S. was fourteen. The trial court could also consider Appellant’s efforts to maintain their relationship. Appellant established paternity, paid child support, exercised earlier supervised visitation, and testified that he sent letters and a birthday message. His daughter’s mother had also initially interfered with their relationship. This evidence favors preserving his parental rights. But even accepting that testimony, Appellant’s contact during the present case remained limited. He sent no correspondence through the caseworker despite her repeated offers to deliver it. He also completed none of the parenting packets provided 4 See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 824 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). 5 See In re J.G.S., 550 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). 6 Although Appellant hoped for early release, any possibility of parole remained uncertain. See In re C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. 2022) (holding that a factfinder may disregard parole-related testimony especially when it is barely more than conjecture). 5 during her monthly visits. Although his confinement allegedly restricted access to some services, the packets afforded him an opportunity to improve his parenting skills. The trial court could consider his failure to use that opportunity when evaluating his willingness and ability to parent P.S.S. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(10)–(12). The parties’ proposed plans further support the finding. Appellant hoped to obtain employment, maintain sobriety, and care for P.S.S. with his family’s assistance after release. But those plans depended on uncertain future events, and the evidence did not reveal a workable placement through his family. Although Appellant testified that his mother was available as a potential placement, the trial court could credit Sumpter’s testimony that she never responded to the Department’s inquiries. See In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014). Meanwhile, P.S.S. had lived with other relatives throughout the case and developed a relationship with her uncle. Although she had lived in his home for only five weeks when trial concluded, the caseworker testified that he was meeting her needs and intended to adopt her with her sister. Although the record does not establish P.S.S.’s wishes concerning Appellant, the evidence that she was happy and well cared for in her uncle’s home bears on the stability of her proposed placement. Although a favorable placement or prospective adoption does not alone justify termination, the trial court heard additional evidence supporting its best-interest finding. Appellant’s prolonged incarceration prevented him from assuming P.S.S.’s care, his efforts to maintain their relationship remained limited, and his plans for reunification depended on uncertain future events. Meanwhile, P.S.S. was receiving appropriate care 6 from an uncle with whom she had an established relationship and who intended to adopt her and her sister. Considering these circumstances together, the trial court could reasonably find that termination served P.S.S.’s best interest. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination served P.S.S.’s best interest. And, when considering the entire record, including Appellant’s efforts to establish and maintain contact, his explanations for incomplete services, his possible parole, his family support, his lack of involvement in the removal, and the recent placement with the uncle, we likewise conclude that the contrary evidence is not so significant as to prevent the trial court from reasonably forming that firm belief or conviction. The evidence is therefore supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Appellant’s parental rights to P.S.S. Lawrence M. Doss Justice 7