Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00284-CV IN THE INTEREST OF J.B.K., A CHILD On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 85290L2, Honorable Jack M. Graham, Presiding November 5, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. Father appeals the judgment terminating his parental rights to J.B.K. 1 In three issues, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the predicate-ground and best-interest findings. We affirm. 1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we will refer to the appellant as “Father,” to the mother of the child as “Mother,” and to the child by her initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). BACKGROUND The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services became involved after police answered a welfare-check call on August 14, 2024. Police found a woman holding a baby, J.B.K., born just three days earlier, in her arms. She seemed “disconnected” or “disoriented.” At times, it seemed she did not “even acknowledge that she had the baby in her hand.” An officer asked her to sit to prevent the baby from falling. Medics later took the woman and J.B.K. to the hospital. After medics arrived, police spoke with Father in the upstairs apartment. He played a video game on the couch and seemed unconcerned about the woman and baby outside. He initially said he was the woman’s cousin,2 that he was visiting, and that he would be leaving for another state the next day. The field paramedic testified Father appeared intoxicated. Concerned for the child’s safety, the responding officer called the Department. When the Department began investigating, Mother was receiving treatment at a behavioral health facility. She identified Father as the father of J.B.K., but he did not identify himself as the father. He claimed the child was his niece and reiterated his plans to leave the State.3 Investigators identified no other family. The Department removed the child, and the trial court later held an adversary hearing. 2 Another witness testified Father might have identified himself as the woman’s brother. 3 He was later adjudicated to be J.B.K.’s father. 2 J.B.K. was placed in foster care with a couple who had a ten-month-old. J.B.K. fit in well, and the family wants to adopt her. Witnesses described her as “happy” and said she loves her home, toys, and room. She stays home with her foster mother on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays and attends a mother’s day out program at a church on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Mother and Father visited J.B.K. twice in person and also participated in virtual visits. Initially, they could not visit in person because Mother and Father lacked transportation.4 Later, the couple moved to Colorado and did not return for in-person visits. The move complicated their efforts to complete their service plans despite the Department’s assistance. The court held a final hearing on April 10, 2026. At the close of the hearing, the court found termination of Father’s parental rights was in J.B.K.’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). It further terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1)(N) of the Family Code.5 See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N). The parents were assigned a family support worker who was there to assist in arranging 4 appointments and providing transportation, among other things. 5 Mother’s rights were also terminated on that ground, but she is not a party to this appeal. The trial court noted it could not “quite get there” with regard to the alleged (D) and (E) grounds against each parent. 3 ANALYSIS Standard of Review and Applicable Law A parent’s right to the “companionship, care, custody, and management” of his or her child is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). See also In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). We therefore strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and construe involuntary-termination statutes in the parent’s favor. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). But “the rights of natural parents are not absolute” and “[t]he rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities.”6 In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) (citing In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994)). Although a parent’s acts or omissions may justify termination, the child’s best interest remains the primary focus. See id. To terminate parental rights under section 161.001, the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) a statutory predicate ground and (2) the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. at § 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). The petitioner must establish both elements; best interest alone cannot support termination. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 6 The Texas Constitution was amended in 2025 to acknowledge parental rights and responsibilities. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 37. It affirms a parent’s responsibility to nurture and protect a child and affirms a parent as the primary decision maker for the child’s upbringing. 4 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied). “Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. We will affirm the termination order if the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support any alleged statutory ground the trial court relied upon in terminating the parental rights if the evidence also establishes that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d at 894–95. Subsection (N) provides the rights of a parent may be terminated when there is sufficient proof the parent “constructively abandoned the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than six months, and: (i) the department has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (ii) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child; and (iii) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N). See also In re J.W., 615 S.W.3d 453, 463–64 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.). Reasonable efforts to return a child need not include physically returning the child; preparing and administering a service plan may suffice. In re G.P., 503 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied); In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2011, no pet.). Without evidence of each required element, a constructive- abandonment finding fails. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 633 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). 5 To terminate parental rights, a trial court must also find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In re K.N., 741 S.W.3d 165, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 535, at *2–3 (Tex. June 5, 2026). Under Texas law, “there is a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent.” In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). Terminating parental rights “must always be a last resort and never a first impulse.” In re K.N., 2026 Tex. LEXIS 535, at *2. However, a trial court must also presume “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is . . . in the child’s best interest.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). In assessing best interest, the fact finder considers the entire record and all relevant circumstances. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27–29. We consider the factors set forth in section 263.307 of the Family Code as well as those enumerated in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). Application Father challenges both findings. Sufficiency of the Evidence Under Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) The Department established it had served as J.B.K.’s managing conservator for more than six months. Father disputes only the remaining elements. As to reasonable reunification efforts, the Department introduced both parents’ service plans. Several witnesses described the Department’s efforts to reunite the family. Father was cooperative and completed parenting classes, albeit with scores that were “not that great,” and finished therapy but did not complete other services. The Department 6 helped the parents access services but struggled to obtain releases and proof of completion. It also struggled to obtain home photographs, employment verification, and other documents. As to significant contact, the record shows the parents primarily had virtual visits with J.B.K. due to transportation issues and because Mother and Father moved to Colorado while this case was pending. Father later moved to Houston but did not seek in-person visitation at any time. Father attended most virtual visits, although he was often at work during the calls, was distracted, and would log off and on the calls. One witness did note that J.B.K. “seem[ed] to” be making a connection with Father during virtual visits as she got a little older. Father also seemed to enjoy watching his daughter on camera and was appropriate in those virtual interactions. Nevertheless, unlike the parent in In re D.T., Father did not make “numerous written requests asking for visitation.” See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 633. In fact, when the Department offered to arrange bus tickets so he could travel to see J.B.K., he did not take that opportunity and did not seek other means of travel or request other resources to permit such travel.7 Further, when Father moved to Houston, Texas from Colorado not long before the final hearing, he made no effort to stop and see J.B.K. The record also does not indicate Father attempted to maintain as much contact as possible with J.B.K. Compare In re A.D., No. 12-17-00334- CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 9671, at *12 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding evidence insufficient under section 161.001(b)(1)(N) because the father maintained contact as much as possible from prison through sending letters asking about 7 The parents said they wanted airline tickets. 7 his children and receiving letters and photographs in return). Father chose to move away from J.B.K. and forego in-person visits, even when it was recommended by a counselor that he have those visits. In re I.D., No. 05-21-00244-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7695, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 17, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (finding constructive abandonment when parent submitting to drug tests to secure visits with child was within parent’s control). J.B.K.’s foster mother testified the parents missed several visits, ended others early, visited in person only twice, and were often distracted during calls. Other witnesses likewise described Father repeatedly leaving and rejoining Zoom visits. The foster mother also testified Father made little effort to engage J.B.K. during visits. He would yell her name at her to get her attention, but when she didn’t respond due to her young age, the foster mother felt he “got a little frustrated at her.” She did not like the way Father spoke and interacted with J.B.K. and did not believe the child had “any idea who [the parents] are.” J.B.K. was a newborn when removed from her parents and not yet two years old by the time of the final hearing. A licensed professional counselor testified at the final hearing that she worked with the parents. She stated, “One of the things that I focused on predominately was the attachment issue, and how it was so very, very important for them to be able to have face-to-face meetings and visits. That any time you go for a long period of time without contact with an infant, that infant is not going to have any connection to them as parents.” She later said: [It’s] been backed up by research for decades is that children typically form attachment during that first -- usually first year, starting usually 8 around the time of about eight months up to one. About 12 months is really kind of seen as a critical timeframe. If you don’t have contact with the child during that time, especially when a child is in foster care, they’re going to form that connection, or that kind of glue that holds them together with whoever is their primary caregiver. And if [Father and Mother] were not present, then the child would basically see them as strangers. And they would have to really work to build that connection to that child, because the child doesn’t know them, and would probably be pretty guarded or wary. You could also have a child at that point, if they are taken away from the foster parent, and they have formed a bond, they actually would go through a depression, and, again, feel that they’ve been abandoned by the persons who were their caregivers. The witness said the absence of an emotional bond posed a “real risk of neglect or not having a positive bond and development from that point.” In her view, one or two in-person visits over 18 months did not amount to significant contact, which requires regular “touching, holding, [and] interacting” with the child. She also testified the Father did not seem concerned about his lack of physical contact with J.B.K. A reasonable factfinder could find Father failed to maintain significant contact with J.B.K. The final requirement concerns Father’s ability to provide a safe environment. A safe environment refers “to the acceptability of living conditions and the parent’s conduct in the home.” L.S. v. Tex Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-26-00361-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 8690, at *25 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 10, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). The record reflects Father’s house in Houston where he was living with his uncle appeared to be clean, safe, and appropriate. Witnesses expressed no concerns about his uncle. Father also appeared to have a new job. Nevertheless, the record supports concerns regarding continued ties to Mother and Father’s denial of her mental health challenges. Significantly, given J.B.K.’s young age and time away from Father, there 9 were serious concerns about bonding, attachment, protectiveness, and J.B.K.’s overall welfare. Witnesses questioned whether Father understood how to meet J.B.K.’s physical and emotional needs. See In re I.D., 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7695, at *17–18 (considering children’s age of 18 months and requiring “constant attention” as a factor in whether father showed ability to provide a safe environment). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b) (factors relevant to parent’s ability to provide child with a safe environment). Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s finding Father lacked adequate parenting skills and could not provide J.B.K. with a safe environment. Under the applicable standard, sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(b)(1)(N). Sufficiency of the Evidence Under Section 161.001(f) Father separately challenges the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(f) of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(f). This provision requires “the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that ‘the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the parent.’” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(f). Clear and convincing evidence is proof that will produce in the fact finder’s mind “a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. “The concept of a ‘reasonable effort’ to return the child is effectively a sliding scale, depending on the situation.” C.R.F. v. Tex. Dep’t. of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-25-00750-CV, 10 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 8365, at *24–25 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). In assessing whether the Department proved “reasonable efforts to return the child,” we may reference case law addressing reunification efforts under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N). See In re A.J.L., No. 04-25-00651-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 3226, *8–9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 8 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). Relevant considerations include whether the Department created a family service plan tailored to the issues that led to removal, made referrals for and provided services to assist the par- ent in completing that plan, facilitated visitation and worked to make visits successful, provided transportation or virtual services when requested, and attempted to identify or pursue relative placements. Id. In reviewing the relevant considerations, we determine whether reasonable efforts were made, not whether ideal efforts were made. In re M.V.G., 440 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet.). As we discussed in our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding under 161.001(b)(1)(N), the Department created a service plan for the parents. While Father was cooperative and completed parenting classes, he did so with scores that were “not that great,” and finished therapy but did not complete other services. Witnesses did not feel he understood how to adequately parent J.B.K. and had not learned skills with which to do so. Additionally, the parents were assigned a family support worker who was there to assist in arranging appointments and providing transportation, among other things. The Department arranged for courtesy caseworkers when the parents moved to other 11 locations. The Department also helped the parents access services but struggled to obtain releases and proof of completion. In particular, the parents struggled to complete services once they chose to move to another state, despite the Department’s attempts to facilitate those services. Next, our analysis above discussed in-depth the paucity of in-person visits between Father and J.B.K. and the nature of the virtual visits. Significantly, as we addressed above, was the lack of bond created between J.B.K. and Father due to the child’s young age at removal and lack of in-person visits. Also before the court was evidence of Father’s apparent absence of concern over that failure to bond. The trial court had before it evidence of the detrimental effect such a lack has on a young child. The record indicates also the Department inquired into possible relative placement for the child but none were available. The parents indicated they had no familial support in the area. The record further supports the trial court’s finding that a continuing danger remains if J.B.K. is returned to Father. As previously discussed, the Father initially did not disclose he was J.B.K.’s father and appeared unconcerned about what occurred with the Mother at the time of removal. He continued to express little concern about Mother’s mental health issues throughout the case. By the final hearing, uncertainties regarding continued ties to Mother remained as Father said both he intended to marry and live with Mother when she got out of jail and that he would not allow her to live with him if she was not permitted to live with J.B.K. Ties with Mother are of particular concern because of Father’s denial of Mother’s mental health challenges and his apparent belief the child is 12 safe with her. Further, at one point, Father told caseworkers the Mother was in the hospital when she was actually incarcerated. Significantly, given J.B.K.’s young age and time away from Father, there were serious worries about bonding, attachment, protectiveness, and J.B.K.’s overall welfare. Witnesses questioned whether Father understood how to meet J.B.K.’s physical and emotional needs. We find the evidence legally and factually sufficient, given the record before us, to support the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(f). We overrule Father’s challenge on this point. Best Interest As to best interest, witnesses testified both parents wanted custody but appeared not to understand J.B.K.’s physical and emotional needs. They did not complete all of the services, did not have a history of stable employment or housing, and Father appeared to be in denial about Mother’s mental health challenges. It also appeared Father was attempting to hide Mother’s incarceration during the case. Witnesses voiced concerns Father would allow Mother back into the home after her release from prison. Father testified he would place J.B.K.’s interests first and not have Mother live with him. Witnesses also expressed concern over Father’s prolonged absence from in- person visits. The licensed counselor testified to the deleterious effects resulting from such lack of contact. The Department offered to arrange in-person visits, but Father declined those opportunities. He had not attempted to bond with the child in person and 13 had not worked toward improving his parenting skills.8 Department witnesses testified it did not appear Father learned from the classes he took. Father offered no plan to care for J.B.K. if she returned to him. By contrast, the foster parents had a suitable home and stable employment. They met J.B.K.’s physical and emotional needs. J.B.K. fit in well with the family, including the couple’s biological ten-month-old child, and was happy there. She calls her foster parents “mom and dad.” J.B.K. loved the home, her room, and her toys. She stayed home with her foster mother three days a week and attended a church program on the other two weekdays. The foster parents’ families are both within 90 miles of their location and are very involved with J.B.K. The foster parents expressed their love for J.B.K. and their desire to adopt her. Caseworkers described the foster parents as “wonderful.” Another witness testified to her observations of J.B.K. with her foster family. She said, “It’s the sweetest thing. I always think I love watching [J.B.K.] with [foster mother]. I love watching just a daughter with her father and [foster father] is just meant to be her dad. [The foster parents] are just incredible with her. They play with her, and just like she is theirs. There is not really many words to describe that just seems like it’s meant to be. She just immediately puts her arm out for them when they come to pick her up, and it’s extremely loving with her. And she gives it right back.” 8 We agree with Father that the Supreme Court has very recently found that less-than-complete compliance with a service plan alone is not enough to support a termination finding, see In re H.S., __ S.W.3d __, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 533 (Tex. June 5, 2026). 14 Numerous witnesses testified it was in J.B.K.’s best interest to remain with her foster family. Under the applicable standard, sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Alex Yarbrough Justice 15