Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00329-CV IN THE INTEREST OF S.L.B., M.S.B., and M.A.B., Jr., Children From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-PA-00711 Honorable Raul Perales, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 30, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his children, S.L.B., M.S.B., and M.A.B. 1 In his sole issue, Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We affirm. 1 To protect the identity of minor children in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we refer to the children’s parents as “Mother” and “Father,” and we refer to the children using their initials or as “the children.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). The trial court’s order terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the children; however, Mother does not appeal. 04-26-00329-CV BACKGROUND The Department first became involved in this case after it received a referral containing allegations of domestic violence in the home and concerns of substance abuse. The Department provided the family with family-based safety services (“FBSS”) for nearly two years before the children were removed. While the case was in FBSS, the parents were referred to classes to address the domestic violence; however, Mother did not attend and Father only attended four classes before he was discharged for accruing too many absences. Mother and Father also tested positive for drugs during the FBSS period, and Father was consistently testing positive for methamphetamine just before removal. The Department referred the parents to substance abuse treatment. Father was initially referred to outpatient drug treatment, but he only attended four sessions before he was discharged due to inadequate attendance and positive drug tests. Father was then referred to inpatient drug treatment; however, when he refused to do inpatient treatment, the Department referred him again to outpatient drug treatment, but Father did not engage. Father was subsequently incarcerated, and Mother was not in compliance with her safety plan, she did not have stable housing, and she could not identify anyone to be a safety monitor for her and the children while they were in FBSS. Therefore, the Department sought removal. On April 21, 2025, the Department filed a petition seeking the children’s removal and termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights if reunification could not be achieved. The trial court held a two-day bench trial on March 11, 2026 and March 18, 2026. The trial court heard testimony from Kari Russell, the Department’s FBSS caseworker; Karina Espinoza, the Department’s current caseworker; Marianna Flores, S.L.B. and M.S.B.’s residential case manager at their current placement; M.A.B.’s foster mother; and Father. -2- 04-26-00329-CV On April 14, 2026, the trial court signed an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the children. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the youngest child, M.A.B., for failure to acknowledge paternity under section 161.002(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002(b)(1). The trial court found termination of Father’s parental rights to the two oldest children, S.L.B. and M.S.B—and alternatively to M.A.B—was supported under statutory grounds (D), (E), and (O) in subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial court also found it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Father appeals. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the Department has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) one of the predicate grounds in subsection 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence requires “proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply well-established standards of review. See id. §§ 101.007, 161.206(a); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (conducting a factual sufficiency review); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (conducting a legal sufficiency review). “In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of parental rights, we must ‘look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was -3- 04-26-00329-CV true.’” In re J.L.B., No. 04-17-00364-CV, 2017 WL 4942855, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 1, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). “[A] reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “A corollary to this requirement is that a [reviewing] court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. “In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of parental rights, we ‘must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.’” J.L.B., 2017 WL 4942855, at *2 (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). “A [reviewing court] should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “The [reviewing] court must hold the evidence to be factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence contrary to the judgment is so significant that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of the ultimate finding.” In re M.T.C., No. 04-16-00548-CV, 2017 WL 603634, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Further, in a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312, 317 (Tex. 2021). This is because “the trial judge is best able to observe and assess the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility, and to sense the ‘forces, powers, and influences’ that may not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal.” Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 823 (Tex. App.— Austin 2014, no pet.) (quoting In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). We, therefore, defer to the trial court’s factual determinations and judgment -4- 04-26-00329-CV regarding credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; see also In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279 n.50 (Tex. 2024) (“Reviewing courts, however, must defer to the factfinder’s judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, including reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.”). DISCUSSION In his sole issue, Father argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interests. However, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to M.A.B. on the independent ground that he failed to legitimate his paternity of M.A.B. by not filing an admission or acknowledgement of paternity after he was served with citation in the underlying suit. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002(b)(1). The trial court’s best interest finding as to M.A.B. was only made as an alternative ruling to the trial court’s order terminating Father’s rights as an alleged father under subsection 161.002(b)(1). FAILURE TO LEGITIMATE Termination based on a failure to assert or acknowledge paternity is an independent basis for termination that does not require a best interest finding. See id.; In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 682–83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (concluding termination for failure to legitimate paternity does not require proof that termination is in the child’s best interest); In re D.R.L., No. 01-15-00733-CV, 2016 WL 672664, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 18, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Simply put, under section 161.002(b)(1), a trial court may summarily terminate an alleged father’s parental rights when he does not file an admission of paternity or counterclaim for paternity under [c]hapter 160 ‘without requiring [the Department] to prove that the father engaged in one of the types of conduct listed in [subsection 161.001(b)(1)] of the [family -5- 04-26-00329-CV code] or that termination is in the best interest of the child.’” (quoting In re L.J., No. 07-14-00319- CV, 2015 WL 222313, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.))). “An appellant must challenge all independent bases or grounds that fully support a judgment or appealable order.” S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 682. “When a parent fails to challenge on appeal an independent ground for termination of parental rights, the appellate court accepts the validity of the unchallenged ground and affirms on that basis without examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the challenged ground.” In re A.A.T., No. 04-21-00270-CV, 2021 WL 6127926, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). By not challenging the trial court’s finding that he failed to file an admission of paternity or otherwise acknowledge his paternity of M.A.B., Father has failed to challenge each independent ground for termination. See S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 682. As such, we must accept the unchallenged finding supporting termination as true and affirm the trial court’s termination order as to M.A.B. under the unchallenged ground. 2 See id.; D.J.S., No. 04-19-00887-CV, 2020 WL 1539847, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 1, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). 2 We acknowledge that Father testified at trial that he is M.A.B.’s father. This court has held that “by appearing at trial and admitting that he is the child’s father, an alleged father triggers his right to require the Department to prove one of the grounds for termination under [subsection 161.001(b)(1)] and that termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re M.J.M.G., 543 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). Although Father’s testimony at trial triggered his right to require the Department to prove statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interest, Father has failed to challenge on appeal the trial court’s termination based on a failure to legitimate paternity. Instead, Father only challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interest, and we have held that “termination based on a failure to assert or acknowledge paternity is an independent basis for termination that does not require a best interest finding.” In re T.S.L., No. 04- 26-00070-CV, 2026 WL 2110708, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 22, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). In an identical case, this court has affirmed termination on the unchallenged failure to legitimate paternity ground even though the alleged father’s admission of paternity at trial triggered the Department’s burden to prove statutory grounds and best interest at trial. See M.J.M.G., 543 S.W.3d at 864–65, 865 n.2. Stated differently, our precedent requires that a Father who sufficiently asserts his paternity at trial must nevertheless challenge the trial court’s failure to legitimate paternity finding to avoid termination; otherwise, he will have waived error on that ground. Nevertheless, based on this record and our best interest review for the two older children, we are confident the evidence would have supported the trial court’s best-interest finding as to M.A.B. even if Father had challenged the trial court’s failure to legitimate paternity ruling on appeal. -6- 04-26-00329-CV Because termination based on a failure to assert or acknowledge paternity does not require a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, we need not address Father’s issue contending there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in M.A.B.’s best interest. See S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 683. BEST INTEREST Although we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to M.A.B. on the unchallenged ground mentioned above, we must still address Father’s contention that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in S.L.B.’s and M.S.B’s best interests. When considering the best interest of a child, we recognize the existence of a strong presumption that the child’s best interest is served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). However, we also presume that prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a). In determining whether a parent is willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment, we consider the factors set forth in section 263.307(b) of the Texas Family Code. 3 3 These factors include: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of- home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child [or] the child’s parents . . . ; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills . . . ; and (13) whether an adequate social support system . . . is available to the child. -7- 04-26-00329-CV See id. § 263.307(b). We also consider the Holley factors. 4 See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These factors are not exhaustive. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). “The absence of evidence about some of these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” Id. In analyzing these factors, we must focus on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). Evidence that proves one or more statutory ground for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (holding same evidence may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1) grounds and best interest, but such evidence does not relieve the State of its burden to prove best interest). “A best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” See In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). “A trier of fact may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct and determine whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.” Id. Drug Use and Other Pre-Removal Issues The Department initially became involved because there were allegations of domestic violence and illegal substance abuse in the home. Kari Russell, the Department’s FBSS TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b). 4 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 n.9 (Tex. 2013). -8- 04-26-00329-CV caseworker, testified Father was the perpetrator of the domestic violence against Mother, and both parents struggled with drug addiction. The Department initially put the family into FBSS in 2023 in an effort to keep the family together and prevent removal of the children. While receiving FBSS, Father only attended four domestic violence classes before he was discharged because of inadequate attendance. Father was referred to outpatient drug treatment but was discharged from this service after only four sessions due to lack of attendance and because he tested positive for drugs. Father was then referred to inpatient drug treatment; however, he refused to go to inpatient drug treatment. Therefore, the Department referred him to a second outpatient drug treatment program, but he never engaged. Russell testified that Father continued to test positive for drugs throughout the two-year period he was participating in FBSS. “Continued illegal drug use by the parent is conduct that jeopardizes parental rights and may be considered as establishing an endangering course of conduct, and that termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re J.S.R., No. 04-21-00517-CV, 2022 WL 1559107, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 18, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (alterations omitted). Although Father was always willing to work with the Department to try to overcome his drug addiction, Russell testified he would relapse “a significant amount of times” and never achieved sobriety. The children were living with Father while the family was receiving FBSS. However, Father began consistently testing positive for methamphetamines just before removal. Father admitted to Espinoza that he had a problem with methamphetamines. At some point Father was incarcerated, and Mother was not in compliance with her safety plan and could not identify a safety monitor to supervise her and the children, so the Department sought removal in April 2025. -9- 04-26-00329-CV Continued Post-Removal Drug Use Father was released from his incarceration in May 2025, and the Department created a post-removal service plan for Father to provide him with services to address the concerns that led to removal. Several of the services focused on helping Father overcome his drug addiction so that he could adequately parent the children. For example, the service plan required Father to take a drug assessment and follow all recommendations from the drug assessment and to pass random drug tests when requested by the Department. Father completed his drug assessment, and he was again referred to inpatient drug treatment. Father was successfully discharged from inpatient drug treatment and was then referred to outpatient drug treatment; however, Father only participated in outpatient drug treatments for a couple of weeks before he was discharged for failing to attend drug treatment sessions. The Department asked Father to drug test twenty-four times throughout the pendency of the case. Espinoza testified that Father understood the requirement to drug test was an order of the court. Nevertheless, Father did not take any of the drug tests and did not give the Department a reason for his failure to drug test. Father would either tell Espinoza that he would take the drug test and then fail to show up to the testing facility, or he simply would not respond to the request to drug test. The trial court could have reasonably inferred that Father failed to appear for drug tests because he was using illegal drugs, especially considering the evidence of Father’s extensive history of drug abuse. See In re B.H., No. 04-25-00494-CV, 2026 WL 158827, at *3 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Jan. 21, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, we need not even rely on inferences the trial court could have drawn because Father admitted at trial that he did not drug test following his discharge from the inpatient program because he knew the drug tests would have been positive. - 10 - 04-26-00329-CV The trial court also heard testimony that indicated the children were aware of Father’s drug use. For example, M.A.B.’s foster mother testified that M.A.B., who was five years old at the time of trial, would tell her that Father used drugs and M.A.B. referred to the activity as “druggers.” Father admitted at trial that he has a substance abuse problem but claimed at trial he would test negative for drugs. See id. (explaining the factfinder may disbelieve a parent’s self-serving trial testimony that the parent is sober, especially when the parent had a long history of drug use and refused to drug test throughout the case). Here, the trial court heard extensive testimony that Father has been unable to achieve sobriety from methamphetamine addiction despite the Department’s repeated efforts to help Father over the last three years. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8) (stating a parent’s history of substance abuse is a factor considered by the trial court in determining whether the parent is able to provide the child with a safe environment). “Illicit drug use is relevant to multiple Holley factors, including the children’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future, [a parent’s] parental abilities, the stability of [the parent’s] home, and the acts or omissions which may indicate an improper parent-child relationship.” In re A.N., No. 04-19-00584-CV, 2020 WL 354773, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 22, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Father’s extensive history of drug use and his failure to show his sobriety supports the trial court’s findings that termination is in the children’s best interests. Failure to Complete Other Services In addition to the drug-related services, Father’s service plan, which was admitted into evidence, required him to complete a psychological evaluation, participate in individual counseling, successfully complete a domestic violence course and a parenting course, and provide proof of stable housing and employment. Espinoza testified Father’s service plan was narrowly - 11 - 04-26-00329-CV tailored to reasonably address the reasons for removal. Espinoza also testified she reviewed the service plan with Father, Father understood what the service plan required from him, and he was informed that his parental rights could be terminated if he failed to complete his services. The trial court’s status hearing order—which made the service plan an order of the court—was admitted into evidence. Espinoza testified Father is not in compliance with his service plan. A parent’s failure to complete his service plan is relevant to several of the best interest factors including parental abilities, programs available to assist the parent, stability of the home, and acts or omissions of the parent. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citing several best interest factors when determining a parent’s failure to complete his service plan supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the child’s best interest). Father admitted he has not taken his psychological evaluation, though he claimed he was scheduled to take it the day after trial concluded. Regarding individual counseling, Father completed his intake but was subsequently discharged because he did not attend any counseling sessions after the intake. Espinoza asked the counselor to readmit Father, and, after Father was readmitted in January 2026, he only attended three counseling sessions in the three weeks preceding trial. Father’s counselor was unable to give Espinoza a progress report before trial because Father had only recently started attending the counseling sessions. As mentioned above, one of the Department’s primary concerns that led to removal was the domestic violence Father perpetrated against Mother. “It is axiomatic that a child’s exposure to domestic violence can produce a home environment that endangers a child’s well-being.” In re E.J.C.T., No. 04-24-00663-CV, 2025 WL 871627, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 19, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). In addition to the domestic violence between Mother and Father, the trial - 12 - 04-26-00329-CV court heard testimony that Father and a different ex-girlfriend engaged in domestic violence in front of M.A.B. See id. (holding a child’s exposure to domestic violence supports the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest even when the child is not the intended victim of the violence). Father also admitted that he had a criminal conviction for domestic violence in 2023. Given Father’s history of domestic violence, both Espinoza and the domestic violence course provider discussed with Father the importance of the domestic violence course and explained why it was necessary for him to attend and successfully complete the course. But Father never successfully completed the domestic violence course even though he started it three different times. Father was discharged from the first attempt because he went into inpatient drug treatment, and the Department excused that failed attempt. However, Father was discharged from the last two attempts to take the domestic violence course because he accrued too many absences from the course, with the last discharge occurring the day before trial commenced. Father claimed he missed one class because he had to work; however, neither Espinoza nor the course provider were given proof of employment or any proof that Father missed the class because he had to work. Although Espinoza was aware Father was currently participating in parenting classes, he never provided her with a certificate of completion. Espinoza testified Father never provided proof of employment throughout the case. Father informed Espinoza the day before trial commenced that he had a temporary job, but she could not confirm whether Father was employed because he never provided any proof of the temporary job. Father testified he plans to get a “real job” in the future, but he currently earns income by selling scrap metal. Father testified that he provided the Department “a whole pile of receipts” showing income earned from selling scrap metal. The trial court, however, could have disbelieved Father - 13 - 04-26-00329-CV and rejected his unsubstantiated assertion that he was employed. And even if the trial court believed Father, it nevertheless could have reasonably found that Father’s recent venture scrapping metal does not establish a history of stable employment or income. Father’s housing situation is even more precarious. Father admitted that he has not been able to secure stable housing using his own income or resources since 2023. Father said he moved to a sober living home when he completed inpatient drug treatment, but he had to leave after only a month and a half because he had a felony charge and was trying to evade the police. Father also testified he was unable to find employment and could not afford to stay at the sober living home. Father testified he was living in a hotel room and had been there for a little over a week. The evidence of Father’s housing instability supports a finding that Father is unable to meet the children’s needs now and in the future and weighs in favor of termination. “A fact finder may infer from a parent’s failure to take the initiative to complete the services required to regain possession of his child that he does not have the ability to motivate himself to seek out available resources needed now or in the future.” J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 270. Here, the evidence shows Father failed to complete his services for nearly two years while in FBSS and then continued to neglect his services after they were made an order of the court during the legal case, despite receiving persistent requests from the Department to complete his services. Given the concerns of drug use, domestic violence, and instability, Father’s failure to complete his services weighs in favor of termination based on several Holley factors. Father’s neglect of his services indicates he is unable to meet the children’s needs and that he lacks the stability and ability to appropriately raise the children. Because Father failed to successfully complete his domestic violence course and engage in his drug services, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the children would be subjected to emotional or physical danger if they were returned to - 14 - 04-26-00329-CV Father. Finally, Father’s derelictions throughout the case support a finding that the existing parent- child relationship is not a proper one and that Father is unable to avail himself of the programs available to promote the children’s best interests. Criminal Conduct “A parent’s criminal activities and history are relevant to a best interest analysis.” In re J.J.O., No. 04-18-00425-CV, 2018 WL 5621881, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Criminal conduct, prior convictions, and incarceration affect[] a parent’s life and his ability to parent, thereby subjecting his child[ren] to potential emotional and physical danger.” Id. Father testified at trial that he had a DWI conviction from 2019 and a domestic violence conviction from 2023. M.A.B. also told his foster mother about an instance when Father was drinking and driving and indicated M.A.B. may have been with Father when Father was arrested. Father was incarcerated when the children were removed in April 2025. Although Father had just been released from incarceration in May 2025, he was arrested again in June 2025 for unauthorized use of a vehicle, and Mother, who was with Father at the time, was arrested for possession of methamphetamine. Mother and Father did not tell the Department about the arrests; instead, the Department discovered they had been arrested when it conducted a background check just before a status hearing. Father’s failure to report the arrest supports a finding that Father was unwilling to cooperate and facilitate the Department’s close supervision. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10) (providing the trial court may consider a parent’s willingness to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision when determining whether the parent can provide the child with a safe environment that is presumed to be in the child’s best interest). To add, Father conceded that he was indicted for the unauthorized use of a vehicle allegation the day before the last day of trial. In sum, the trial court heard testimony that throughout the case - 15 - 04-26-00329-CV Father was in and out of jail, evading police, and still has unresolved criminal complaints against him. “[R]outinely subjecting a child to the probability that [the child] will be left alone because [the child’s] parent is in jail endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being.” In re R.M.H., No. 04-23-00765-CV, 2023 WL 8103188, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In this case, the trial court heard testimony that S.L.B. was often concerned that Father was incarcerated, indicating Father’s criminal activity had a direct emotional impact on the children. As such, Father’s criminal activity and its impact on the children supports the trial court’s best interest finding and weighs in favor of termination. See In re N.L.R., No. 04-23-01020- CV, 2024 WL 1184462, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 20, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Children “[T]he prompt and permanent placement of the child[ren] in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child[ren]’s best interest[s].” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a). In determining whether Father is willing and able to provide the children with a safe environment, the trial court considers their “age and physical and mental vulnerabilities[.]” Id. § 263.307(b)(1). M.S.B. is diagnosed with Prader-Willi syndrome. The disease causes M.S.B. to always feel hungry because her appetite is not satisfied. Therefore, she is on a caloric diet, and her caregiver must carefully monitor her caloric intake. Her condition also causes her to experience developmental delays. She has to take five growth hormone shots per week, must consistently attend medical appointments with different specialists, and has substantial daily needs. Russell testified the parents were not taking M.S.B. to her medical appointments in 2022 and 2023, although Father began taking M.S.B. to her appointments shortly after Russell was assigned to the case sometime in mid-2024. - 16 - 04-26-00329-CV Because of M.S.B.’s medical needs, the Department placed her and S.L.B. at a specialized home for children with medical needs. Marianna Flores—S.L.B. and M.S.B.’s residential case manager at the home—testified that when M.S.B. was placed at the home shortly after removal, she was behind on several specialty follow-up appointments, and Flores had to reestablish M.S.B.’s care with all her medical providers and specialists. M.S.B.’s nutritionist told Flores “it had been some time since she saw [M.S.B.]” M.S.B. also “had a wound on her stomach that was quite open” when she arrived at the home. The wound was caused by an old gastrointestinal tube site and M.S.B. had been picking at the wound. Flores testified the wound was so severe that M.S.B. had to see a wound care specialist and have surgery to repair the wound. Espinoza testified M.S.B. “has done extremely well” with the specialized medical care she receives at her current placement, and she has lost weight, which is a positive improvement for her condition. See C.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 653 S.W.3d 204, 218 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, no pet.) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (“[A] child’s special needs weigh[] in favor of termination to the extent the evidence suggests that termination of the parental rights would improve the outlook for the child’s health.”); In re S.D., 980 S.W.2d 758, 764 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (holding that it was in the children’s best interest to place them “in a stable environment where they can receive proper care for their special needs”). Both children needed extensive dental work when they were in Father’s custody, and those needs were not met until after they came into the Department’s care. Although S.L.B. does not have specialized medical needs, the Department also placed her at the same home with M.S.B. so the two older siblings could remain together. Espinoza testified S.L.B. and M.S.B. are doing really well in the placement. Both S.L.B. and M.S.B. are receiving - 17 -