Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00433-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.C., A CHILD ON APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Silva, Peña, and West Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña Appellant R.C. (Father) appeals the trial court’s order terminating the parent-child relationship with respect to his biological daughter, L.M.C. 1 Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s (1) grounds for 1 To protect the identity of the child subject to this suit, we refer to the child and their relatives by initials and pseudonyms. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). termination under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(O), and (2) the trial court’s determination that terminating Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of his child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O), (b)(2). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History L.M.C. was born on March 10, 2024. Two days later, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) received a report that the child tested positive for methamphetamine, heroin, and other opioids at the hospital NICU. The Department initiated emergency removal proceedings, filing its original petition for protection of the child, for conservatorship, and for termination of H.W. (Mother) and Father’s parental rights. 2 The affidavit in support of removal stated Mother was chronically unemployed, homeless, and frequently used cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines. Mother had five other children; she has lost her parental rights to all of them. The Department was concerned about ongoing domestic violence between Mother and Father, including allegations that Father used methamphetamine with Mother during her pregnancy with L.M.C. Father would later testify at trial that he “stopped helping” Mother during her pregnancy. On March 14, 2024, the trial court signed an emergency order of removal, naming the Department as temporary sole managing conservator of L.M.C., and L.M.C. was placed with a foster family. The Department developed a family plan of service, which provided that over the course of four months, Father had to “attend all scheduled visits 2 The trial court accepted Mother’s affidavit voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights and she is not a party to this appeal. 2 [with L.M.C.]”; complete parenting, domestic violence prevention, and substance abuse classes; submit to random drug tests where “[Father] understands that . . . [n]ot submitting a test will be considered a positive test”; and “refrain from engaging in any criminal activity.” In July 2024, the Department notified the trial court that Father’s visitation rights were suspended, observing that Father had only attended three parent-child visits out of fourteen since visitation began, and that his attended visits started twenty minutes late. A month later, Father was arrested for assaulting his former spouse and jailed until February 2025. Father completed his parenting and domestic violence prevention programs while incarcerated, including a certificate for completing 0.5 hours of a drug abuse program. Department caseworker Josie Galindo would later testify that though Father “consistently” visited L.M.C. before being jailed, “[w]hat little bond that could have been formed was no longer there” after Father’s six-month incarceration. A permanency hearing was held in July 2025, 3 at which Father was ordered to undergo inpatient substance abuse treatment and submit to a drug test at the end of the hearing date. Father’s urinalysis results were positive for methamphetamines, and his visitation rights were suspended thereafter. Following a reduction in drug levels, new employment, and improved housing, the trial court reinstated Father’s visitation rights in October 2025. Four months later, the Department would once again move to suspend Father’s visitation rights, citing several concerning behaviors during that period, including: refusing to drug test eight times from 3 Section 263.401 provides for the automatic dismissal and the trial court’s loss of jurisdiction over a parental termination suit filed by the Department if trial on the merits is not timely commenced. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a), (c). On February 27, 2025, the trial court granted a Section 263.401 extension, with a new dismissal date set for September 22, 2025. Id. at § 263.401(a–c). 3 November 2025 to February 2026, advising the Department that he had “traded in one habit for another” by using marijuana instead of methamphetamines, and falling asleep during four consecutive visitations. The trial court granted the Department’s motion, suspending Father’s visitation rights prior to the parental termination bench trial. B. Bench Trial A bench trial commenced on September 10, 2025, and concluded on April 22, 2026. The Department called Galindo and Father testified on his own behalf. Father’s course completion certificates as well as proof of housing, employment, and insurance were admitted at trial. At trial, Father testified he was arrested for assaulting his former spouse and committed violence against other women in the past. The Department also noted that Father’s communications with Galindo were vulgar when receiving unfavorable news. Father apparently chuckled during this portion of Galindo’s testimony, as demonstrated by the following record excerpt: [Galindo]: When I informed [Father] that the Department and ad litem were not in agreement of [L.M.C.] getting her ears pierced, he responded “bitch” through text message. When I advised [Father] of his visits being suspended— THE COURT: Sir, that’s not funny. [Father]: Yeah, it is. THE COURT: No, it’s not. So, please refrain from making any remarks. Okay. Go ahead. [Galindo]: When I advised [Father] of his visits being suspended through text messages, he stated I was a cunt and fucking bitch. 4 [Department]: Okay. Is the Department concerned about any prior arrests that [Father] had? [Galindo]: Yes . . . [Father] and I, as well as my supervisor Caroline Sanchez, have had conversations where [Father] has openly admitted to assault charges reflecting on his criminal history. All of which have involved women. Galindo further testified that Father had completed only nine of the Department’s twenty-one requested drug tests—of the nine he completed, six returned positive for methamphetamine. 4 Father provided a litany of excuses for refusing to submit drug tests, ranging from refusing to provide urine or hair follicles “during Ramadan,” to his hair being too short, to his not “see[ing the] point in going anymore.” Galindo testified that Father’s lethargic demeanor during visitation and refusal to participate in drug tests was “a major concern [for] the Department [with respect to Father]’s ability to properly care for [L.M.C.] and [] ensure her safety.” Father subsequently participated in an Intensive Outpatient Program for substance abuse counseling ending in February 2025, where, although he received a certificate, Father completed only one half of one hour of the required fifty- hour program. Galindo testified that this drug abuse program consists of several individual and group counseling sessions totaling more than fifty hours. When asked about his drug use at the April 2026 bench trial, Father testified: [Department]: [Father], do you remember making the statement to [the Department in February 2026] that you traded one drug [f]or another? [Father]: Yeah. Trading one habit for another. [Department]: Okay. What habit did you trade marijuana for? 4 The Department’s “Notification to the Court” states that from November 4, 2025, to February 2, 2026, Father was either a no-show for drug testing or refused to drug test on eight occasions. The clerk’s record contains exhibits specifying that all of Father’s positive results were for methamphetamine. 5 [Father]: Ice. [Department]: And ice as in methamphetamine? [Father]: Yep. [Department]: And what [was] the last time you did methamphetamine? [Father]: I don’t know the last time. It’s been—I don’t know. Two months. [Department]: Two months? [Father]: About there. [Department]: Okay. So . . . that’s about when you stopped drug testing . . . [Father]: I don’t know when I stopped drug testing. It’s been a [] while. .... [Department]: Okay. When did you finish . . . [the] Intensive Outreach Program? [Father]: I can’t recall how far back it was. [Department]: Was it more than two months ago? [Father]: Yeah. [Department]: Okay. So, would you agree with me that you have then admitted that you have used since completing intensive outpatient? [Father]: Yeah. [Department]: Okay. So, is it fair to say that the program was not successful for you or not helpful for you? [Father]: No. [Department]: It wasn’t helpful? [Father]: No. 6 [Department]: Okay. How many children do you have? [Father]: Thirteen. [Department]: Thirteen. Okay. What did you learn from parenting? [Father]: It’s rough. [Department]: I’m sorry. I’ll be more specific. The parenting classes. [Father]: The parenting? What did I learn? [Department]: Yes. [Father]: I don’t recall what I learned in parenting. .... [Department]: We can see [] with your exhibits . . . [t]hat you completed parenting and that you completed intensive outpatient. So, you follow court orders then. Correct? [Father]: Giving her a paper, yeah. [Department]: Okay. So it’s just a piece of paper? [Father]: Yeah. [Department]: You didn’t take anything away from any of the programs you completed? [Father]: I don’t know. .... [L.M.C.’s ad litem]: I didn’t hear when you answered about the day in March that [L.M.C.] was born. I didn’t hear the answer. Can you clarify that up for me? [Father]: I can’t remember the date she was born. Though Father testified that he would take L.M.C. flowers during the visits he attended, Galindo testified that Father had only visited L.M.C. three out his fourteen 7 scheduled visits before his July 2024 arrest. Father’s excuses for failing to submit to drug testing and falling asleep during visitations are reflected in the following interaction: [Department]: Can you explain to the Court why you have not drug tested? [Father]: Well [Galindo’s] statement towards me is I’m not going to get the baby anyway. So why should I go give a [urine analysis] or anything else? ... [Father]: That and I went though Ramadan. That was a month. I did a month before that to prepare for Ramadan. I just didn’t see [any] point in going. [Department]: Okay. Did you explain that to [Galindo]? That you were not going for religious reasons? [Father]: No. [Department]: Okay. [] But you continued to visit L.M.C. [Father]: Yeah, she’s my daughter. [Department]: Okay. And your visits were suspended in . . . March, correct? [Father]: Yeah. [Department]: Can you provide the Court with some explanation, or can you inform the Court as to why you were falling asleep during your visits? [Father]: I’ve never been—had my daughter outside the CPS supervision in the building. Every time I asked, [CPS] said no. So, I want to sleep or lay down next to daughter. I fell asleep. I’m a diabetic. I don’t know. [Department]: Okay. But you hadn’t fallen asleep before January of 2026 during visitation. [Father]: I don’t know. I don’t know. I laid down with her. I don’t know. 8 [Department]: Okay. And you can see how it’s concerning for the Department that at the time your behaviors changed, you also quit drug testing for the Department? [Father]: Mmm—I’ve always been the same person. THE COURT: Is that a yes or a no? [Father]: No. When asked about his caregiving plans for L.M.C., Father stated he was going to get a friend to watch L.M.C., and that his current two-bedroom apartment has a bed frame for L.M.C.—mattress pending. Father’s employment and living arrangements remain inconsistent following a temporary suspension for a positive marijuana test. After living with friends and seeking housing, Father testified that he hasn’t lived in his current apartment long. Father was nonetheless employed and living alone in a two-bedroom apartment at the time of the hearing. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father “used a controlled substance ‘in a manner that endangered the health or safety’ of [L.M.C.]” and that termination was in the child’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O), (b)(2). This appeal followed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “[I]nvoluntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights” and divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (quoting In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 (Tex. 1980)); see In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.); see also In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 121 (Tex. 2014) (Lehrmann, J., 9 concurring) (“Termination of parental rights, the total and irrevocable dissolution of the parent-child relationship, constitutes the ‘death penalty’ of civil cases.”). Accordingly, termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 112. A trial court may order termination of the parent-child relationship only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent committed an act or omission described in Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) (predicate grounds); and (2) parental termination is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1), (2). The clear and convincing standard requires a “measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007. Due to the elevated burden of proof in a termination suit, we do not apply traditional formulations of legal and factual sufficiency on appeal. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018); In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 606 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). In a legal-sufficiency review, we assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if it was reasonable to do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to be incredible. In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d at 671. We must also consider undisputed evidence, if any, that does not support the finding. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 113; see In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002) (“Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence.”). Evidence is legally sufficient to support termination if a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630–31 (Tex. 2018). 10 In a factual-sufficiency review, we must weigh disputed evidence contrary to a finding against all the evidence in the finding’s favor. In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 606 (citing In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631). We defer to the factfinder’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses “so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004)). Evidence is factually insufficient to support termination if, “in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Furthermore, when reviewing for evidentiary sufficiency, we must not usurp the factfinder’s role as the sole arbiter of the witness’s credibility. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009). In a bench trial, the trial judge is the sole factfinder who weighs the evidence, resolves evidentiary conflicts, and evaluates the witnesses’ credibility. In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 607 (citing In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied)); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346. III. PREDICATE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION By his first issue, Father argues that the Department did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he used drugs “in a manner that endangered the safety” of the child, thereby failing to satisfy Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(O). We disagree. A. Applicable Law Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) provides a ground for termination based on clear and convincing evidence that the parent “used a controlled 11 substance . . . in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child, and: (i) failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program; or (ii) after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, continued to abuse a controlled substance.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O). Father focuses his legal and factual sufficiency challenge on termination ground O’s endangerment element, arguing that the Department did not establish the required nexus between Father’s illegal drug use and L.M.C.’s endangerment. The Supreme Court of Texas has continuously interpreted “endangered” in this context 5 with the same meaning it was assigned in the context of termination grounds D and E. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024) (“[A] parent’s endangering conduct need not ‘be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.’”) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). A factfinder may infer endangerment under termination ground O from a parent’s “course of conduct” when it “presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.”. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 534). Though a finding of endangerment based solely on drug use “is not automatic,” a parent’s aggregate course of conduct involving drug use, drug-related behavior and parental misconduct may be so pervasive that a factfinder could reasonably infer that the parent’s drug-related course of conduct endangers the child—despite a lack of evidence showing that parent’s drug use directly and immediately harmed the child while under 5 In 2025, the Texas Legislature repealed the former subsection (O), which had authorized termination for failure to comply with a court-ordered family plan of service. See Act of May 14, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 211, § 2. As a result, the drug-use endangerment ground—formerly subsection (P)—was redesignated as subsection (O), and all subsequent lettered grounds were redesignated accordingly. See id. 12 their care. See, e.g., Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533; In re A.C., 577 S.W.3d at 699; D.H. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 652 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, no pet.); S.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-21-00085-CV, 2021 WL 3437890, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 6, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that “Father’s continuing to test positive for illegal drugs during the first year of the case supported a finding by the district court that Father’s illegal drug use had been an ongoing habit that created an endangering environment for the children”); In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 407–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (concluding that evidence of parent’s positive drug tests, after the Department received a referral that parent used narcotics, was sufficient to support finding of endangerment under subsection (E)). A reviewing court’s consideration of endangerment allegations is a case-specific and fact- intensive process. D.H., 652 S.W.3d at 61. B. Analysis The undisputed evidence establishes that during the pendency of this case, Father tested positive for methamphetamine six times out of the nine drug tests; additionally, Father failed to submit to drug testing twelve times. The family service plan Father signed states that failure to submit a test “will be considered a positive test.” Accordingly, the trial court could have reasonably found that from L.M.C.’s birth to the first day of the bench trial—crediting his six-month stint in jail—Father tested positive for drugs eighteen out of twenty-one times, or eighty-five percent of the time during the pendency of this case. Additionally, Father’s testimony confirms that he used methamphetamine subsequent to his participation in a drug rehabilitation program, and a mere two months before the April 2026 bench trial. Thus, the trial court could have deduced that neither Father’s drug abuse 13 and parenting courses, nor his participation in a rehabilitative program, were helpful in addressing the drug-related endangerment risks noted by the Department. A court need not require evidence of physical injury to a child in order to find the child’s health and safety have been endangered by parent’s illegal drug use. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279. A pattern of drug use in the context of ongoing termination proceedings is evidence from which a factfinder may infer endangerment. See id.; In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (holding that “a parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as an endangering course of conduct,” even if the child isn’t under the parent’s direct care). And though Father later obtained employment and improved housing, “evidence of improved conduct, especially of short[ ]duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346. Appropriate deference to the factfinder “assume[s] that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding”; a reviewing court can set aside findings only if “no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction” in those findings. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and recognizing the factfinder as the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father’s continued use of illegal drugs endangered the health and safety of L.M.C. See, e.g., In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346; In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; Interest of A.L.H., No. 04-20-00452-CV, 2021 WL 1110612, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 24, 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Moreover, after reviewing all 14 the evidence, we conclude the evidence contrary to the trial court’s finding is not so significant that a factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction in favor of that finding. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s termination finding under section (O). In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279. We accordingly overrule Father’s first issue. IV. BEST INTEREST Father’s second issue challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that terminating his parental rights was in L.M.C.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). Following our finding of endangerment under termination ground O, we find the evidence presented at trial was, legally and factually, to support the trial court’s best interest determination. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). A. Applicable Law The best-interest prong of the termination inquiry “is child-centered and focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and development.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. The Supreme Court of Texas has identified several nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in determining the child’s best interest, known as the Holley factors. Holley, 544 S.W.2d 371–72. These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parenting abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by those individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the 15 home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is an improper one; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id. Evidence that is probative of grounds for termination may also be probative of the best interest of the child. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). Not all factors must weigh in favor of termination, “particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” Id. at 27. Further, undisputed evidence of just one factor may be adequate to support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child. Id.; see In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 606. B. Analysis Though L.M.C. is too young to express her desires, Galindo testified that L.M.C. “is not only thriving” but “excelling” with her caregivers: “She is well advanced for her age. She is now in Pre-K 2. She is meeting her milestones, according to her age. She’s able to identify shapes and sizes. She’s able to say several words. Almost complete sentences. She is able to run, walk, and—she’s perfectly healthy.” L.M.C. has spent minimal time in the presence of Father, and Galindo noted that any bond Father might have formed with L.M.C. before he was jailed “was no longer there” after his release and subsequent visitation suspensions. See, e.g., In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“The factfinder may consider whether a child who is too young to express herself has bonded with her foster family, is well-cared for in her foster placement, and has spent minimal time with her biological parents as a proxy for the child’s desires.”); In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 16 2018, pet. denied) (acknowledging the same); see also In re O.J.G., No. 13-25-00145- CV, 2025 WL 1912201, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 10, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). While Father stated he loved L.M.C. and would take her flowers during some of his visits, Father could not recall the day L.M.C. was born despite being asked twice at trial. Father participated in only three of his fourteen scheduled visitations before his arrest in July 2024, and despite a brief clean streak following his release, Father’s visitation rights were suspended twice thereafter for concerns related to drug use. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; see also In re A.V.G.-P., No. 10-23-00294-CV, 2024 WL 1327908, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] parent’s failure to regularly visit his children after removal may support a finding that termination of the parent’s rights is in the children’s best interest.”). Regarding the second, third, and fourth Holley factors, Father’s aforementioned course of conduct throughout the parental termination proceedings and admitted failure to learn anything from his parenting and substance abuse classes presents clear and convincing evidence that terminating Father’s parental rights is in L.M.C.’s best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Father testified that he “stopped helping” L.M.C.’s Mother during her pregnancy with L.M.C., even though Father was aware that Mother abused drugs. Galindo testified that the Department’s initial removal proceedings were based on L.M.C. testing positive for five different types of drugs at birth and domestic violence concerns between Mother and Father. See In re A.H., 679 S.W.3d 817, 833 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied) (“The circumstances that led to the child’s removal may be considered as part of the 17 parent’s past neglect or inability to meet the child’s needs.”); see In re L.S.R., No. 13-25- 00012-CV, 2025 WL 1587794 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 5, 2025, no pet.) (considering the same) (mem. op.). The Department expressed serious concerns over Father’s violent criminal history, “[a]ll of which,” Galindo testified, “have involved women”: “[L.M.C.] is one year[] old. She’s vulnerable. She cannot speak up for herself.” Father was arrested for assaulting his ex- spouse three months after parental termination proceedings began, even after acknowledging his family service plan’s requirement that he “refrain from engaging in any criminal activity.” Additionally, the evidence at trial demonstrated that Father tested negative for drugs on only three of the Department’s twenty-one requested drug tests. Accordingly, the trial court could have reasonably found that Father continued to use illegal drugs throughout the parental termination proceedings. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631; In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Regarding Holley’s fifth factor, Father testified to using methamphetamine after attending a rehabilitation program, two months before the April 2026 bench trial where he would testify that the rehabilitation program and his other drug abuse courses were simply not helpful. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d 371–72. And despite fathering thirteen children and being aware that his court-ordered parental courses were for the health and safety of L.M.C., Father continuously testified that he learned nothing from his parenting courses, and that the certificates were just “piece[s] of paper.” In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 819 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (“A parent’s . . . lack of parenting skills[] and poor 18 judgment may be considered when looking at the child’s best interests.”) (citing In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d at 893). With respect to Holley’s sixth and seventh factors considering the plans for the child by those individuals or by the agency seeking custody and the stability of the home or proposed placement, the evidence showed that L.M.C. was thriving in her current placement. L.M.C. was placed with fictive kin along with her older half-sibling brother, who has since been adopted by the same foster family. Galindo testified, that L.M.C. “is doing amazing” in her placement: “She is walking and running. Talking. She is a happy, healthy baby girl.” See In re D.A.Z., 583 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) Father testified that his caretaking plans for L.M.C. included getting a friend to watch L.M.C. and obtaining a mattress for the bed frame in his two-bedroom apartment. Even so, Father’s employment and living arrangements remains inconsistent as a direct result of his continued drug use. Id. We lastly consider the eighth and ninth Holley factors regarding acts or omissions that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is an improper one and considering any excuses for the parent’s acts or omissions. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d 371–72. Father has consistently developed excuses for not completing rehabilitative services, failing to submit drug tests, and falling asleep during visitation while not submitting drug tests. From not seeing the point in submitting drug tests, to drug testing falling “through Ramadan”, to being diabetic, Father’s litany of excuses is probative of his parental unfitness. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 836 (“[W]hen the Department has introduced evidence probative of parental unfitness, the factfinder may draw an adverse inference against a 19 parent who does not respond with a valid excuse for his or her acts or omissions by presenting additional evidence or counterargument based on existing evidence.”). After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have determined that termination was in the best interest of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). Moreover, after reviewing all the evidence, we conclude the evidence contrary to the trial court’s finding is not so significant that a factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction in favor of that finding. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Thus, the evidence before us is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment that terminating Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of L.M.C. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. V. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. L. ARON PEÑA JR. Justice Delivered and filed on the 29th day of October, 2026. 20