Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00591-CV IN THE INTEREST OF A.V.V., J.T.V., S.V.V., and L.A.V., Children From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-PA-00899 Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 30, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant J.V. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his children, A.V.V. (born 2020), J.T.V. (born 2021), S.V.V. (born 2022), and L.A.V. (born 2023). 1 Father argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and its finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. 2 We affirm the termination order. 1 To protect the privacy of the minor children, we use initials or pseudonyms to refer to the children and their biological parents. TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 Father’s list of issues presented also challenges the portion of the trial court’s order that appoints the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the “Department”) as the children’s managing conservator. However, the body of Father’s brief does not contain any argument or authority on this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We therefore do not consider that issue. 04-26-00591-CV BACKGROUND In April of 2025, the Department removed the children from the custody of their mother, G.C. (“Mother”) because “Mother was validated for physical neglect.” When the children were removed, the home where they lived with Mother smelled like urine, had no working air conditioning, and had “open diapers and old food left around the house.” “[T]he children were wearing dirty diapers,” and “[S.V.V.] had a bruise and a mark underneath her eye” that Mother attributed to “one of the children biting her.” The Department’s concerns revolved around the condition of the children’s home environment and Mother’s lack of supervision of the children. The Department obtained temporary managing conservatorship over the children, placed them in foster care, and filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. At that time, Father was incarcerated on a drug possession charge, but he was released during this case. The three older children were placed with their paternal aunt and her fiancé. L.A.V. was originally placed in the same home, but he eventually was moved to a separate foster home. On July 2, 2026, the trial court held a bench trial at which Father appeared. The trial court heard testimony from three witnesses: (1) caseworker Catherine Robinson; (2) a CASA volunteer; and (3) Father. After hearing the evidence, the trial court signed an order finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was justified by Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and was in the best interest of the children. 3 Father then filed this appeal. ANALYSIS Applicable Law and Standard of Review The involuntary termination of a natural parent’s rights implicates fundamental constitutional rights and “divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and 3 The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights. She is not a party to this appeal. -2- 04-26-00591-CV powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent.” In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks omitted). “As a result, appellate courts must strictly scrutinize involuntary termination proceedings in favor of the parent.” Id. The Department had the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both that a statutory ground existed to terminate Father’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206. “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s order of termination, we apply well-established standards of review. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263– 64 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings, we look “at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009) (citation omitted). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider disputed or conflicting evidence. Id. at 345. A factual sufficiency review requires us to consider the entire record to determine whether the evidence that is contrary to a finding would prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. See id. The factfinder is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. at 346. -3- 04-26-00591-CV Statutory Termination Grounds Applicable Law In his first two issues on appeal, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s predicate findings under subsections (E) and (N). TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N). In general, assuming a best-interest finding, only one predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). However, because termination under subsections (D) or (E) may have implications for a parent’s rights to other children, appellate courts must address a parent’s challenges to a trial court’s findings under those subsections. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 236–37 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). We will therefore begin by addressing Father’s challenge to the subsection (E) finding. Subsection (E) allows a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under subsection (E), the trial court determines whether there is evidence that a parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. See In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). “Endangerment means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize.” Id. “It is not necessary that the parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually be injured; rather, a child is endangered when the environment or the parent’s course of conduct creates a potential for danger which the parent is aware of but disregards.” In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.) (internal quotation marks omitted). -4- 04-26-00591-CV Subsection (E) requires evidence of a voluntary and deliberate endangering course of conduct rather than a single act or omission. See, e.g., In re F.S.F., No. 04-24-00125-CV, 2024 WL 3800662, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Subsection (E) is not limited to actions directed towards the child . . . nor is it limited to the parent’s pre-removal actions.” In re A.O., No. 02-21-00376-CV, 2022 WL 1257384, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A trial court may consider actions that occurred before the child’s birth, and in some cases may consider actions that occurred while the child was not in the parent’s presence and while the child was in the Department’s custody. In re M.H., No. 02-24-00426-CV, 2024 WL 5083193, at *4 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. “Such actions are relevant because they may create an inference that similar conduct could recur and further jeopardize a child’s well-being.” In re M.H., 2024 WL 5083193, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The specific danger to the child’s well-being need not be established as an independent proposition, but may be inferred from parental misconduct.” In re E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d 310, 331 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (en banc op. on reh’g) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The relevant inquiry for a subsection (E) termination is whether evidence exists that the endangerment was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures to act.” A.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 394 S.W.3d 703, 712 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). Application “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 -5- 04-26-00591-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). “Domestic violence, want of self control, and propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment.” In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Here, caseworker Robinson testified that Mother told her Father had been “violent” and “abusive” toward her and that “[Mother] was going to put a protective order out against the father for stalking her.” Robinson testified that Mother did not give her any details regarding these alleged incidents, and Father denied having any history of domestic violence. Father conceded that he was arrested for assaulting a previous partner in 2019, but he told the trial court those charges were dropped. Despite her accusations of violence, Mother told Robinson that she wanted the children to be placed with Father. The evidence also showed, however, that Father engaged in multiple angry outbursts during this case, including some that were directed at the children or occurred in their presence. See In re M.M.M., No. 01-21-00269-CV, 2021 WL 5365102, at *3–4, *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 18, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering evidence of parent’s anger issues in subsection (E) endangerment analysis); In Interest of E.W., No. 14-14-00751-CV, 2015 WL 556399, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). Robinson testified that when she first received the case, she “was told that [Father] had become aggressive with the foster father and . . . was threatening to fight him.” See In re A.D., Nos. 10-19- 00411-CV, 10-19-00412-CV, 2020 WL 4691657, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 10, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering evidence that parent threatened children’s caregiver with physical violence). She also testified that the children had “seen [Father] become verbally aggressive with a CASA worker” and that there had “been some visits where he’s been out of control, like with the children, he gets very angry and frustrated.” Robinson acknowledged that Father had completed a four-hour anger management class of his choosing, but she did not believe that course -6- 04-26-00591-CV was sufficient to address his anger issues. When she tried to discuss a more in-depth anger management class with him, he became “[v]ery angry.” The CASA volunteer testified that she had seen Father engage in a verbal altercation with a foster father that involved “a lot of yelling on [Father’s] part” because he “did not like [L.A.V.] calling his foster parent ‘Father[.]’” The CASA volunteer added that she had seen examples of Father’s anger on more than one occasion and that she believed the incident with the foster father was part of a pattern of violent conduct on Father’s part. She testified that it was clear Father was upset about the Department’s involvement in this case. When Father’s attorney asked her whether it was normal for parents to be upset about Department intervention in their families, she said, “Not to the extent that [Father] does it.” Robinson noted that the anger issues she had personally witnessed appeared to be consistent with Mother’s report that Father was violent. She told the trial court that Father’s “anger escalates to the point where he’s not in control. . . . [H]e’s apologized to me a couple of times for his behavior and the way he treats me and things he says to me, but he will turn around and do it again.” The CASA volunteer testified that “after the visits, the children are very upset,” and Robinson testified that the children had told her that Father was “mean” and that they did not want to be placed with him. “Evidence that a parent has engaged in abusive or violent conduct in the past permits an inference that the violent behavior will continue in the future.” In re M.M.M., 2021 WL 5365102, at *10; see also In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d at 845. While there was no evidence that Father engaged in any physical violence during this case, the trial court could have reasonably found that the evidence of his anger issues was relevant to the subsection (E) analysis. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E); In re M.M.M., 2021 WL 5365102, at *11 (“The fact that . . . none of [parent’s] -7- 04-26-00591-CV conduct involved physical injury to [child] did not prohibit the trial court from considering those facts as evidence of endangerment.”); In re A.D., 2020 WL 4691657, at *5. Additionally, “[f]ailure to adequately supervise and protect a child from harm can constitute endangering conduct.” Comer v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., No. 03- 03-00564-CV, 2004 WL 2732124, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 2, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Robinson testified that Father is “not able to take care of the four kids by himself” and has “a lot of difficulties managing the children.” She noted that the children exhibit concerning behaviors during their visits with Father, “like hitting him . . . spitting, deliberately spilling milk on the couches and floor, destroying a TV. . . . There’s been incidents where the children just like will run outside and run away and—and everybody’s having to chase them.” Robinson and the CASA volunteer also testified about an incident in which Father took the children outside onto a porch and shaved A.V.V.’s and J.T.V.’s heads during a visit. Robinson told the trial court that the haircut left “numerous cuts on the boys’ scalp” and that the children cried when their caregivers later washed their heads. She described the incident as “traumatic” for the boys. The CASA volunteer similarly testified that “[b]oth [J.T.V.] and [A.V.V.] were crying” while Father was shaving their heads. She added that at that same time, “[S.V.V.] and [L.A.V.] were running around” outside and “going around the building where they couldn’t be seen.” The CASA volunteer who was present at the time “had to intervene and let the monitor know that [S.V.V.] and [L.A.V.] were out of range behind a building and the monitor had to get them.” As Father notes in his brief, there is no evidence that he intentionally injured the children during the haircuts, and the visit in question was supervised by both the Department and a CASA volunteer. However, Father does not cite any authority holding that the Department’s and/or CASA’s presence prohibited the trial court from considering Father’s own failure to notice -8- 04-26-00591-CV A.V.V.’s and J.T.V.’s injuries during the haircuts, his disregard for their expressions of discomfort, and his lack of supervision of S.V.V. and L.A.V. Finally, the trial court heard evidence that Father was incarcerated when the children were removed. It is well-established that a parent’s incarceration, without more, is not sufficient to support an endangerment finding. Nevertheless, “incarceration does support an endangerment finding if the evidence, including the imprisonment, shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312–13 (Tex. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Furthermore, even non-violent, misdemeanor offenses, and arrests for criminal conduct that do not result in conviction will support a finding of endangerment.” In re E.S.T., No. 01-22-00404-CV, 2022 WL 17096713, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). “When incarceration affects the parent’s ability to care for his child, to provide safe living conditions, or to ensure her safety and well-being, then such incarceration can be a part of a course of continuing conduct.” In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (en banc op. on reh’g). Here, Father was incarcerated on a drug possession charge. It is not clear from the record how long he was incarcerated or when he was released. However, the record shows that Robinson asked Father to go for two drug tests after his release and he failed to do so without giving her a reason. He also did not complete any drug treatment during this case. The trial court could have reasonably inferred that Father did not submit to drug testing because he was still using illegal drugs. See In re T.I.P., No. 04-25-00335-CV, 2025 WL 3157652, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 12, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re E.N.T., No. 01-25-00346-CV, 2025 WL 3083879, at *30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 5, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (factfinder -9- 04-26-00591-CV can reasonably find endangerment when parent’s drug use “is coupled with credible evidence of . . . prolonged absence from the children”). Father testified that before the Department became involved with the children, he did not have a relationship with them “because [he] was locked up.” See In re Y.W., No. 02-22-00334-CV, 2022 WL 17841830, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s lack of contact with a child and his or her absence from the child’s life endanger the child’s emotional well-being.”); In re E.N.T., 2025 WL 3083879, at *30. He also testified that the children “are going through what they’re going through because of me, because—I mean, me being incarcerated. And just because of me—me making my stupid decisions—or—is why where my kids are at right now.” See In re L.R.D., No. 01-23-00623-CV, 2024 WL 560668, at *16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering evidence that parent’s incarceration left children in the care of their other parent, who then “subjected the children to abuse and instability”). Robinson testified that while the Department characterized Father as a non- offending parent with regard to the physical neglect that led to the children’s removal, his own criminal conduct resulted in his incarceration and absence from the children’s lives. After hearing the evidence, the trial court remarked on the record: I’m going to quote Dad of why he thought this case was bad. “I didn’t do nothing. I wasn’t there.” Those are quotes in his testimony. And he’s right. When these kids under the circumstances of removal [sic], it was pretty sad, pretty desperate, and pretty bad. And, again, to quote Dad, “I didn’t do nothing. I wasn’t there.” He admits he wasn’t there and he didn’t do anything because of choices that resulted in his incarceration that he served his time for. On this record, the trial court could have reasonably determined that Father’s incarceration left the children in the custody of an inappropriate caretaker—Mother—and thus was some evidence of conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 315–16 (noting parent’s “lack of knowledge [about child’s home environment] resulted from - 10 - 04-26-00591-CV criminal conduct that led to his incarceration and his indifference to his daughter while he was incarcerated”); In re L.R.D., 2024 WL 560668, at *16; In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d at 606–07. Any one of the issues described above, without more, may be insufficient to independently support a subsection (E) finding. However, when considered as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, this evidence would permit the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that Father engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344. Additionally, the evidence contrary to that finding is not so overwhelming that it would prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. Accordingly, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s subsection (E) finding, and we overrule Father’s first issue. See id. at 344–45. We therefore need not consider Father’s second issue, which challenges the subsection (N) finding. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. Best Interest Applicable Law Father also challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interest. There is a strong presumption that a child’s best interest is served by maintaining the relationship between a child and the natural parent, and the Department has the burden to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97. To determine whether the Department satisfied this burden, the Texas Legislature has provided several factors 4 for courts to consider regarding a 4 These factors include, inter alia: “(1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, - 11 - 04-26-00591-CV parent’s willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment, and the Texas Supreme Court has used a similar list of factors 5 to determine a child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). A best-interest finding, however, does not require proof of any particular factors. See In re G.C.D., No. 04-14-00769-CV, 2015 WL 1938435, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and “[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest[.]” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018 WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Additionally, evidence that proves a statutory ground for termination may be probative on the issue of best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). Furthermore, in determining whether termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of a child, a factfinder may judge a parent’s future conduct by her past conduct. In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). Finally, we presume that prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills [. . .]; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b). 5 Those factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371– 72 (Tex. 1976). - 12 - 04-26-00591-CV Application The evidence detailed above in our discussion of subsection (E) is also relevant to the trial court’s best interest finding. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. The evidence of Father’s anger issues, his drug-related incarceration, and the haircut injuries to A.V.V. and J.T.V. all go to both statutory and Holley best-interest factors. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(7) (trial court can consider history of abusive or assaultive conduct); id. § 263.307(b)(8) (trial court can consider parent’s history of substance abuse); id. § 263.307(b)(12) (trial court can consider whether child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. As part of the best-interest analysis, a trial court can consider “the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities,” “whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(1), (5). The trial court may also consider the desires of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Because the children were 5, 4, 3, and 2 years old at the time of trial, the trial court could have reasonably determined that their “young ages render them vulnerable if left in the custody of a parent unable or unwilling to protect them or to attend to their needs.” In re B.D.A., 546 S.W.3d 346, 361 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Additionally, as noted above, the children told Robinson that Father was “mean” and that they did not want to live with him. Robinson testified that during visits, Father had told the children “to call his latest girlfriend Mom. And the kids, when they get in the car [after the visit], they’re angry. They said they’re— that’s not their mom, can’t believe their Daddy’s trying to tell them to do that.” And, as explained above, the trial court heard evidence that Father struggled to supervise all four children and was “not able to take care of” all of them by himself. Based on this evidence, the trial court could have inferred that Father was not considering the children’s desires and emotional needs and that he - 13 - 04-26-00591-CV lacked “adequate parenting skills, including . . . care, nurturance, and appropriate discipline consistent with the child’s physical and psychological development” and “guidance and supervision consistent with the child’s safety[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(12)(B), (C); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The trial court can also consider “the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision” and “the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(10), (11). As noted above, the evidence presented at trial showed that Father was not receptive to Robinson’s suggestion that he take an additional anger management class. When Robinson was asked whether Father was willing to complete his service plan, she answered, “He’s willing to do what he wants to do and when he wants to do them.” See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013) (considering parent’s failure to complete service plan in best-interest analysis). The trial court also heard testimony that Father “was very upset that CASA was actually there, and he stated that we had no place there and that we’re just volunteers. And he kept progressing from there. He had also stated that, in April, he wanted nothing to do with CASA because he stated that all we did was bad mouth him.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(10). Robinson testified that she had not seen any changes in Father’s behavior, and that based on her experiences with him, she did not believe he had “made changes needed to alleviate [the Department’s] concerns with him in regards to his anger.” Id. § 263.307(b)(11). Robinson testified that the children had come “a long way since first being placed in” foster care, and the CASA volunteer testified that all four were doing well in their current placements. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). J.T.V. and S.V.V., who were both nonverbal when they came into - 14 - 04-26-00591-CV foster care, had begun “talking in full sentences” and “talking up a storm.” A.V.V. and L.A.V. were both making progress with their behavioral issues, and all of the children were “very healthy.” The Department’s plan for the three older children was adoption by their current placement, their paternal aunt. However, the Department had not yet addressed the possibility of adoption with L.A.V.’s placement. The evidence in Father’s favor showed that after his release from incarceration, he stayed in contact with the Department, partially engaged with his service plan, and consistently visited the children. He also testified that he had been employed for seven months and that he arranged his work schedule specifically to accommodate his weekly visits with the children. Both Robinson and the CASA volunteer testified that Father and the children love each other. The CASA volunteer testified that the children are happy to see Father “at the beginning” of the visits and want to spend time with him. Robinson testified that the children appear to be happy with Father during some of the visits, but “[n]ot all the visits.” Father testified that his current home is safe and that he had offered to let Robinson inspect it but she had not done so. He also vehemently disputed the Department’s evidence of his anger issues and problems during his visits with the children. He referred to that evidence as “lies” and testified, “I never yelled at [L.A.V.’s foster father]. I talked to him just like I’m talking to you. I talked to him calm.” After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude the trial court could have found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344. Furthermore, the evidence to the contrary would not prevent a factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that the best-interest finding was true. See id. at 345. Accordingly, the evidence is legally and - 15 - 04-26-00591-CV factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding, and we overrule Father’s third issue. See id. at 344–45. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s order of termination. Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice - 16 -