Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 22, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00130-CV __________ IN THE INTEREST OF C.Q.-G.D., A CHILD On Appeal from the 326th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11802-CX MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of the father to his child, C.Q.-G.D.1 in a private termination suit. Appellant, the father, brings five issues on appeal. In his first, second, and third issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the three termination grounds found by the trial court. In his fourth issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that termination of 1 To protect the identities of the child and the child’s family members, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In his fifth issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to appear remotely at the final hearing. We affirm the trial court’s order. Termination Findings and Standards A party seeking to terminate one’s parental rights must clear a high bar. See In re K.N., 741 S.W.3d 165, 178 (Tex. 2026); In re H.S., 741 S.W.3d 4, 16–17 (Tex. 2026) (re-emphasizing that terminating parental rights “‘is always the last resort’ . . . permissible to protect children from serious harm . . . [and] may be exercised only in the absence of other legitimate options.” (quoting D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. 2025))). To support termination under this heightened standard, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2026). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2019). In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Appellant: (1) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another not the parent and expressed an intent not to return pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(A); (2) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support of the child and remained away for a period of at least six months pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(C); and (3) failed to support the child in accordance with his ability during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(F). See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(A), (C), (F). The trial court 2 further found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of our deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). Because “the factfinder remains ‘the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor’” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Id. (quoting J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted against the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). Background and the Evidence Presented at Trial Appellees, the mother and her husband, the child’s stepfather, filed this private suit to terminate the parental rights of Appellant to his five-year-old son, C.Q.-G.D. Mother and Stepfather also requested that Stepfather be allowed to adopt the child. We note in this regard that multiple parties have standing to file a suit to 3 terminate parental rights, including a governmental entity—such as the Department of Family and Protective Services—and the child’s other parent. See FAM. § 102.003(a)(1), (5), (6); In re I.M.S., 679 S.W.3d 704, 712 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). Mother and Stepfather were the only witnesses to testify at the final hearing. In this regard, Appellant sought to appear remotely at the final hearing. He also objected to the final hearing proceeding in his absence. However, the trial court denied Appellant’s request to appear remotely, and the case proceeded to the final hearing without his attendance. Mother testified that Appellant is the father of the child and that she had no reason to doubt that he was the father. She and Appellant lived together at the time of the child’s conception and while she was pregnant. Mother testified that they started living together in December 2019 and the child was born in October 2020. She described their relationship as “kind of on and off again.” In that regard, Mother testified that Appellant would get “very verbally abusive at times.” She testified that Appellant lived in her house but that he did not contribute any money for her household expenses. Mother testified that she kicked Appellant out of the house in June 2020. Mother testified that Appellant knew she was pregnant and that he knew the child was born because he saw her holding a baby carrier two days after the child was born. Mother testified that Appellant has never seen the child and has never asked to see or visit the child. In that regard, Mother indicated that she had the same phone number and that Appellant knew where she lived. As of the time of trial, Appellant had never met the child or spoken to him. Mother denied that she told Appellant that he could not have access to the child. Further, Mother testified that Appellant had never provided any financial support for 4 the child. Additionally, Mother testified that Appellant had offered to sign a document relinquishing his parental rights if Mother paid him for it. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights and found termination to be in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(A), (C), (F), (b)(2). This appeal followed. Motions to Appear Remotely In his fifth issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motions to appear remotely at the final hearing. He contends that the ruling deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to be heard and probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Appellant filed numerous motions to appear remotely before the trial court. In his initial motion filed with respect to a hearing set for July 2025, Appellant indicated that he “had taken temporary work out of town” and would be unable to travel back to Taylor County for the hearing. In his second motion filed in connection with a hearing scheduled for August 2025, Appellant asserted that he was unwilling to return to Taylor County for court because he was at risk of arrest because of a “Capias Pro Fine process.” He also indicated in this motion that he had a pending federal lawsuit against Taylor County as a result of the arrest warrant.2 Additionally, Appellant contended that he had limited financial resources and lacked consistent transportation. Appellant’s next motion to appear remotely was in reference to a hearing scheduled for September 2025. Appellant indicated that he needed to appear 2 At a subsequent hearing, Appellant explained to the trial court as follows: I’m suing the Taylor County court because of their due process violations that I now have a capias pro fine warrant. However, it’s a Class C misdemeanor. It’s a burn ban violation. It wasn’t even a crime punishable by jail, yet here I am with a capias pro fine warrant, hence the lawsuit. See Black v. State, No. 11-22-00334-CR, 2024 WL 3056093, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 20, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 5 remotely for the hearing because of his indigency and his inability to arrange “consistent transportation.” He also referenced his pending federal lawsuit against Taylor County. Appellant appeared remotely for a hearing that occurred on September 12, 2025. He apparently was at a library somewhere in the Dallas-Fort Worth area for the hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial court addressed Appellant’s request to appear remotely with respect to the final hearing. The trial court stated as follows: THE COURT: At this final hearing there are going to be witnesses. [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And there is a great deal to be desired hearing witnesses remotely. And so I’m not going to do that. I need to have them in front of me so I can evaluate their credibility. [APPELLANT]: Your Honor, my witnesses are in fact, present at the court. However, my attendance is remote. Would that be acceptable by the Court? THE COURT: No, sir, not if you’re going to testify, and not if you’re going to cross examine. That has to be in the courtroom. The final hearing did not occur until April 10, 2026. Appellant filed two additional motions seeking to appear remotely for the final hearing. In a motion filed in January 2026, Appellant alleged that he needed to appear remotely because of his indigency and “financial impossibility of in-person appearance.” He also alleged that he had suffered a herniated disc that limited his ability to travel and sit for long periods. Appellant’s motion also contained an objection to the final hearing occurring in his absence. On April 7, 2026, Appellant filed a “renewed motion to appear remotely at final hearing.” He asserted three grounds for his motion: (1) his indigency; (2) that 6 he was subject to an active arrest warrant issued in Taylor County; and (3) he lacked reliable transportation. Appellant attempted to verify the motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by stating “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.” 3 However, his attempt at verification lacked a jurat as required by Section 132.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code in that it did not specify the location where Appellant executed it. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 132.001 (West 2019); In re Alarid, No. 06-26-00097-CV, 2026 WL 2559981, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 31, 2026) (orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). On appeal, Appellant relies on his claim that he had an outstanding arrest warrant in Taylor County as well as his financial and transportation limitations. He further contends that his remote participation had already proven to be feasible. In this regard, Appellant asserts that “[t]he question is not whether Appellant could theoretically have appeared in person. The question is whether the trial court reasonably denied a feasible means of participation where the foreseeable consequence was an entirely one-sided termination trial.” Rule 21d of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “[u]nless the notice of court proceeding states otherwise, a person who participates in a court proceeding does so by physical presence in the courtroom.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 21d(b)(1). However, upon appropriate notice by a party, “a court may allow or require a participant to appear at a court proceeding by videoconference, teleconference, or other available electronic means.” Id. (emphasis added); see Ballard v. Durham-Hunt, No. 15-26-00060-CV, 2026 WL 2407976, at *3 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Aug. 18, 2026) (mem. op.); Bento v. Green, No. 14-23-00587-CV, 2025 WL 1765510, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 26, 2025, no pet.) 3 28 U.S.C. § 1746 is inapplicable to state court proceedings. McMillan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 675, 676 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref’d). 7 (mem. op.) (“Nothing in Rule 21d . . . requires a court to allow a participant to appear at a court proceeding by videoconference or other electronic means.”). “[W]e review a trial court’s decision requiring in-person or remote attendance under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” In re A.C., No. 09-22-00439-CV, 2025 WL 271635, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles such that its ruling was ‘arbitrary or unreasonable.’” In re Newkirk Logistics, Inc., 718 S.W.3d 240, 246 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2004)). In determining whether a party had good cause for objecting to a method of appearance, a court should consider the following factors: (1) case type; (2) court proceeding type; (3) the number of parties and witnesses; (4) the complexity of the legal and factual issues; (5) the type of evidence to be submitted, if any; (6) technological restrictions such as lack of access to or proficiency in necessary technology; (7) travel restrictions such as lack of transportation, distance, or inability to take off work; (8) whether a method of appearance is best suited to provide necessary language access services for a person with limited English proficiency or accommodations for a person with a disability; and (9) any previous abuse of a method of appearance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21d(e): see Ballard, 2026 WL 2407976, at *4. In-person appearance is the default procedure established by Rule 21d, and remote appearance is an exception to the rule. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21d. Further, Rule 611 of the Rules of Evidence gives a trial court broad discretion in controlling the mode 8 and order of interrogation of witnesses and presentation of evidence. Dang v. State, 154 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Appellant has addressed some of the factors listed in Rule 21d(e), primarily the nature of the proceedings and his alleged travel restrictions. However, the existence of an arrest warrant is not a basis listed in Rule 21d(e) for appearing at a court hearing by remote means. Appellant also contends that it was technologically feasible for him to appear remotely. He bases this assertion on the September 2025 hearing. However, the record from that hearing does not support his contention. The reporter’s record reveals no less than three times during a fifty-page hearing that Appellant experienced technological difficulties. Here, the trial court gave Appellant at least six months’ notice that he would be required to appear in person for the final hearing. This period of notice gave Appellant an opportunity to make alternative arrangements for his personal appearance at trial as well as for resolving his capias issue in Taylor County. Further, the trial court explained its reason for denying Appellant’s request to appear remotely. That reason included the trial court’s desire for personal appearance to fulfill its role as the factfinder to determine credibility of the witnesses. As previously noted, the one hearing where Appellant appeared remotely was plagued by technological problems. Thus, the record does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Appellant’s request to appear remotely. We overrule Appellant’s fifth issue. Termination Grounds Subject to an exception for the grounds listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), “[t]o affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best interest finding— even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground.” Interest of 9 N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019). Because this appeal does not involve subsections (D) and (E), the requirement of In re N.G. is inapplicable to this case. Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) – Voluntary Abandonment In his second issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s affirmative finding of voluntary abandonment under subsection (C). Subsection (C) is known as “the abandonment ground.” In re J.R., 319 S.W.3d 773, 776–77 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (citing In re A.T.C., No. 07-08-00258-CV, 2008 WL 5204747, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re K.A.H., 195 S.W.3d 840, 841 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)). The elements of this ground are that the parent voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another, that the parent failed to provide adequate support for the child, and that the parent remained away for a period of at least six months. FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C). Appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that he voluntarily left the child with Mother. He asserts that prolonged absence, standing alone, does not satisfy subsection (C). Appellant argues that Mother’s own evidence established the lack of voluntary abandonment. Appellant essentially asserts that because he never possessed the child, he could not have voluntarily abandoned it. He additionally contends that he did not voluntarily abandon the child because Mother excluded him from having a relationship with the child prior to the child’s birth. Appellees assert that this case is analogous to the circumstances that were present in In re B.G.O., No. 11-19-00151-CV, 2020 WL 762629 (Tex. App.— Eastland Feb. 14, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). In that case, the appellant had never seen the child or attempted to initiate any contact with the child. Id. at *1.4 However, 4 In re K.M.B. involved similar facts of a father voluntarily leaving the child’s mother prior to the child’s birth. 91 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). 10 the appellant in B.G.O. did not challenge the element of voluntary abandonment. Id. at *3. We disagree with Appellant’s contentions that he could not have voluntarily abandoned the child if he never had possession of the child or if Mother excluded from having any participation in the childbirth and thereby the child’s life. These arguments ignore the statutory mechanisms provided by the Family Code for a parent to obtain access to their child. The evidence establishes that Appellant knew that Mother was carrying his child as well as the approximate due date for the child’s birth, yet he sat idly by making no attempt to either visit the child or support the child for several years. Appellant made no attempt to establish a relationship with the child until Appellees instituted this suit when the child was approximately four years old. As such, there is clear and convincing evidence that Appellant voluntarily left the child in the possession of another, that he failed to provide adequate support for the child, and that he remained away for a period of at least six months. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C). We overrule Appellant’s second issue. Because of our disposition of Appellant’s second issue, we need not consider Appellant’s first or third issues nor the trial court’s affirmative findings under subsections (A) and (F). Best Interest of the Child In his fourth issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). The trial court, as the factfinder in this case, was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. 11 Therefore, we will not disturb its determinations so long as they are not unreasonable. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving the requisite due deference to the trier of fact, we hold that, based on the evidence in the record and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). While the best interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Id. at 547; see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371– 72. In some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; see also H.S., 741 S.W.3d at 23 (Evidence that supports a finding under 12 subsection (b)(1) “may also be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under [s]ubsection (b)(2).”). In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. Moreover, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Here, there is no evidence of Appellant’s relationship with the child. As noted previously, he has never seen or spoken to the child. Additionally, the evidence offered at trial established that he has never financially supported the child. However, there is evidence of Appellant’s relationship with Mother and others. Mother testified that Appellant was verbally abusive to her when they were together. She elaborated that he would pick at her over her and her daughter’s appearance, often saying “nit-picky ugly things.” The child was six or seven at the time. When Mother kicked Appellant out in June 2020, she testified that he told her that he “was going to make [her] life a living hell and that he was going to ruin [her] life.” She testified that he repeatedly called her workplace to harass her and that he tried to get her fired from her job as a nurse. Mother also testified that Appellant would follow her around town tailgating her vehicle and he would show up in random places. Two days after the child was born, Appellant showed up in the parking lot of a softball field where Mother’s daughter was playing softball. 13 Mother testified about an occasion when Stepfather and her daughter were shopping at Walmart, Appellant got near them and stated so that they could hear him that “he had the gun in the car and he would take care of it right now.” On other occasions, Appellant would show up at Mother’s home and attempt to come inside. Mother also testified that Appellant would often use threats of suicide or self-harm to try to reunite with Mother and manipulate her. Mother testified that she was afraid of Appellant and that she tried to stay away from him. Mother also testified that Appellant has older children, and that they are fearful of Appellant. Conversely, Mother testified that Stepfather has been there to help her since the child was born. She further testified that Stepfather is essentially the child’s “dad,” and that the child does not know anything different. The amicus attorney for the child clarified with Mother that the child thinks that Stepfather is his biological father. Mother also testified that the child and Stepfather did “normal dad stuff” together. Mother testified that termination of Appellant’s rights and adoption by Stepfather was in the child’s best interest. She opined that these steps would solidify what already exists in the child’s life. Stepfather also opined that termination/adoption was in the child’s best interest. Additionally, Appellees offered into evidence a home study that supported the child’s adoption by Stepfather. Appellant’s acts and omissions with respect to the child indicate parental indifference on his part for the first several years of the child’s life. As recently noted by the First Court of Appeals: Parental indifference to one’s offspring supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest under every one of the Holley factors. Those who are unwilling to devote the time, effort, and resources required to raise and care for a child cannot meet that child’s emotional needs now or in the future. Indeed, an uninterested parent poses an emotional and physical danger to the child. Parental indifference evinces either a lack of parental ability or, worse, 14 an unwillingness to apply one’s abilities for the benefit of the child’s welfare. Whatever programs may be available to assist in promoting the child’s best interest, a parent who lacks the motivation to fulfill his or her parental duties is unlikely to utilize or benefit from these programs. Nor is an indifferent parent likely to have meaningful plans for the child or give the attention to childrearing necessary to ensure the child has a safe and stable home. Parental indifference strongly indicates the existing parent–child relationship is not a proper one and that the sole excuses for the parent’s shortcomings are unfavorable ones, namely, apathy or heedlessness. . . . In sum, indifference is inimical to the parent–child relationship. Hence, significant evidence of parental indifference weighs heavily in favor of a factfinder’s finding that termination is in a child’s best interest. . . . Put simply, when the evidence shows that a parent has declined to participate in childrearing due to his or her lack of interest, the parent– child bond is fundamentally broken, and termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child. In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823–24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). “Parental absence or lack of involvement is especially telling with respect to the best interest of very young children, like babies and toddlers, due to their inherent vulnerability and particular need for parental attention and nurturing.” Id. at 824. The evidence with respect to Appellant’s relationships with other family members is not helpful to his case. In that regard, Mother testified that he was verbally abusive with her and her daughter, and that he frequently threatened suicide and self-harm in an effort to manipulate the mother. Further, there is no evidence of Appellant’s capacity to provide a stable and nurturing environment for the child. As noted previously, the evidence shows that Appellant has never supported the child financially and there is no evidence of his ability to provide for the child in the future. Conversely, the child’s current living arrangement is stable and Stepfather is the only father figure that the child has ever known. Having considered the evidence as it relates to Appellant’s actions and inactions, the emotional and physical needs 15 of the child now and in the future, and Appellant’s lack of demonstrable parental abilities and stability, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s fourth issue. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the order of the trial court. JOHN M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE October 22, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 16