Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00364-CV ROEL GUERRA, APPELLANT V. MARIA FABIOLA GUERRA AND ELMA GUERRA CHAVEZ, APPELLEES On Appeal from the 229th District Court Starr County, Texas1 Trial Court No. DC-23-226, Honorable Baldemar Garza, Presiding September 29, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ. The matter before us is an interlocutory appeal stemming from a trust dispute among siblings. Roel Guerra, Appellant, challenges the trial court’s rulings below through three issues. We affirm. 1 This cause was originally filed in the Fourth Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. BACKGROUND In 1976, Nicasio and Benita Guerra created NB Guerra, LTD, a family limited partnership. They transferred approximately 3,000 acres to the partnership. In 1982, they created Guerra Cattle Company (GCC) with their son Roel. Nicasio died in 1997, and his will was probated in Starr County Court at Law, Cause No. PR-97-023. His will created a residuary trust with Benita as Trustee and Roel as Successor Trustee. Benita died in August 2021, and her estate is currently pending in probate, Cause No. PR-22- 015, in Starr County Court at Law. Multiple inventories filed in Benita’s probate include interests in NB Guerra, LTD and interests in GCC. On May 11, 2023, Roel’s sister, Maria, filed a Suit to Compel Trust Accounting against Roel as Successor Trustee. On October 31, 2023, the trial court entered an Order Granting Motion to Compel Trust Accounting requiring Roel to provide an accounting by November 10, 2023. On December 19, 2023, the trial court entered an Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees. On January 18, 2024, Roel appealed both orders but subsequently dismissed that appeal. On June 25, 2024, Maria filed a First Amended Suit raising additional issues and seeking appointment of a receiver, temporary injunction, and other relief. On August 22, 2024, the trial court entered a Temporary Injunction Order and Order Appointing Person to Carry Out Winding Up of NB Guerra, LTD Partnership. Roel filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal on April 14, 2025. Roel argues that the October 31, 2023 and December 19, 2023 orders constituted a final judgment disposing of all parties and claims, causing the trial court to lose plenary power by April 2, 2024, at the latest. All subsequent orders, he posits, are therefore void. 2 Additionally, Roel contends the Starr County Court at Law has original, exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters, including the Family LP and GCC interests listed in the pending Benita Guerra estate, making the district court’s orders void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. By this appeal, Roel requests the Court to order the trial court to vacate all orders after April 2, 2025, as void for lack of plenary power and/or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Maria and Elma ask the Court to affirm all trial court orders at issue (i.e., the Accounting Order, Fee Order, Wind Up Order, and Temporary Injunction (TI) Order), finding the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction. ANALYSIS As an initial matter, Maria and Elma point out that Roel failed to pay for the reporter’s record. Email correspondence from the court reporter indicates the master and exhibit volumes were pending payment. By letter dated February 25, 2025, the San Antonio Court of Appeals directed Roel to provide proof of payment for the reporter’s record or the court would only consider those issues or points that did not require a reporter’s record for a decision. Maria and Elma argue this is Roel’s burden and the Court should not review issues requiring the record. We agree. See Aguero v. Aguero, 225 S.W.3d 236, 237 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2006, no pet.) (appellant has the burden to properly request the completion of a record that is sufficient to illustrate reversible error; if an appellant does not, and the issues raised involve matters omitted from the record due to the failure to request or pay for same, those complaints are waived). We note also that a reporter’s record is necessary to successfully challenge a motion for temporary 3 injunction. See Prappas v. Entexami, No. 04-05-00886-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2157, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 22, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Marriage of Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.). See also See Webb Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marshall, No. 24-0339, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 350, at *16 (Tex. Apr. 24, 2026). STANDARD OF REVIEW Subject matter jurisdiction “refers to a court’s authority to adjudicate a case.” Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003) (citing Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000)). We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. 2024). ISSUE ONE—FINAL JUDGMENT Roel argues the two trial court orders compelling an accounting of a trust and awarding fees constitutes a final judgment as a matter of law. Maria and Elma claim the Accounting Order and Fee Order are not final appealable orders because they do not dispose of all claims. We resolve the issue against Roel. We find the Accounting Order and Fee Order are not final appealable orders because they lack finality language and do not dispose of all claims. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001) (providing requirements for an order to become a final judgment). Further, the Wind Up Order is not final because it does not contain finality language, does not dispose of all claims, and contemplates further court action. Id. See also In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-16-00503-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4 1701, at *12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“If the order does not end a phase of the proceedings, but instead sets the stage for the resolution of the proceedings, then the order is interlocutory.”). The order contemplated the submission of a plan, and the assets of NB Guerra could not be liquidated or transferred without additional court orders. This clearly is not a final order. Trial courts retain plenary power over their judgments until they become final. In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2020). Because the Accounting, Fee, and Wind Up orders are not final, the trial court did not lose its plenary power in the underlying matter. Id. Further, even if those orders had been final, the trial court retained its power to enforce its judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 308; Ortiz v. Legal Concierge, Inc., 263 S.W.3d 385, 391 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). Only the TI Order is statutorily appealable, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4), but, as noted above, a reporter’s record is necessary to successfully challenge that order, and none was presented here. See In re Marriage of Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d at 646. Without a reporter’s record, we presume the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court’s order and findings.2 See Marshall, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 350, at *16. 2 The Temporary Injunction Order states an evidentiary hearing was held on July 16, 18, 24, and August 5, 2024, and the trial court considered the pleadings, affidavits, exhibits, testimony, argument of counsel, and all things properly before the court in making its decision to issue the temporary injunction. 5 ISSUE TWO—STARR COUNTY COURT AT LAW JURISDICTION Roel contends the Starr County Court at Law had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over property listed as estate assets in the pending probate case. We disagree. The County Court at Law has no jurisdiction over the Trust through Nicasio’s Estate because it was closed in 2000, eliminating any pending probate proceeding. See In re Estate of Aguilar, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1701, at *6 (the jurisdiction of a probate court attaches at the time an application for the probate of a will is filed and continues until the estate is closed). See also Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 223 n.8 (Tex. 2015). The Trust is non-testamentary as to Benita, making it a non-probate asset outside her Estate’s interest. TEX. EST. CODE § 111.052(a)(1)(A); In re Estate of Perez-Muzza, 446 S.W.3d 415, 422 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied). Accordingly, we overrule Roel’s second issue. ISSUE THREE—DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION Lastly, Roel contends the 229th District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider and rule on Maria’s and Elma’s motions filed more than 105 days after the trial court granted a trust accounting and attorney’s fees. As noted above, the District Court retained plenary power over the proceedings before it and the orders at issue were not final. Further, the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over trust proceedings, receivership, and partnership wind up matters. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 115.001; Carroll v. Carroll, 304 S.W.3d 366, 368 (Tex. 2010). We thus overrule the issue. 6 CONCLUSION Having overruled the issues presented by this interlocutory appeal, we affirm the orders of the trial court. Alex Yarbrough Justice 7