Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00240-CR ___________________________ ABDUL RASHID NASIRI, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1811878 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION Appellant Abdul Rashid Nasiri was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and sentenced to fifteen years confinement on each count, to run concurrently. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(a)(1). The trial court then entered an Order to Withdraw Funds (Order) from Nasiri’s inmate trust account to pay the court fees and costs incurred. The Order provides a percentage scale to calculate the payment amount that should be withdrawn from Nasiri’s inmate trust account until the total amount of the court costs and fees are paid or Nasiri is released from confinement. Nasiri does not challenge his convictions or sentences, nor does he challenge the amount of the costs assessed. Instead, he argues that the Order, and the attached bill of costs, conflicts with the judgments of conviction as to when the costs are due. Nasiri asks this court to delete the bill of costs and nullify the Order. Because the Order and attached bill of costs do not conflict with the judgments of conviction, we overrule Nasiri’s sole issue. II. DISCUSSION “[D]uring or immediately after imposing a sentence . . . , a court shall inquire on the record whether the defendant has sufficient resources or income to immediately pay all or part of the fine and costs.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.15(a- 1). If the trial court determines the defendant is unable to immediately pay said fine and costs, the court may order the fine: (1) “be paid at some later date or in a 2 specified portion at designated intervals”; (2) “discharged by performing community service”; (3) “waived in full or in part”; or (4) “satisfied through any combination of methods” of (1)–(3). Id. A funds-withdrawal notification under Texas Government Code Section 501.014(e) is a civil-collection procedure. See Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 316, 317–21 (Tex. 2009) (describing procedure as a “civil post-judgment collection action that is (1) distinct from the underlying criminal judgments assessing . . . conviction, sentence, and court costs, and (2) aimed at seizing funds to satisfy the monetary portion of those judgments”; due process is satisfied if inmate receives notice and opportunity to be heard after funds are withdrawn); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 501.014(e) (stating that on notification by a court, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) “shall withdraw from an inmate’s account any amount the inmate is ordered to pay by order of the court under this subsection”). A defendant’s indigence does not prevent the imposition of statutorily mandated court costs. See Gates v. State, No. 02-23-00004-CR, 2024 WL 482436, at *4 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Feb. 8, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (collecting cases). The trial court’s Order, that assessed court costs and fees of $305, states that funds should be withdrawn from Nasiri’s inmate trust account in various percentages until the date “the total amount to be forwarded equals the total amount which remains unpaid” or the “date the offender is released.” See Tex. Gov’t Code 3 § 501.014(e); see also 58 Tex. Jur. 3d Penal and Correctional Institutions § 63 (2024) (explaining that TDCJ must take possession of all money the inmate receives during confinement and must credit that money in an account created for the inmate). Under Article 42.15(a-1), upon determining that Nasiri did not have sufficient resources or income to immediately pay all or part of his court costs and fees,1 the trial court decided—as illustrated in the Order—that the court costs and fees should be withdrawn in designated intervals from Nasiri’s inmate trust account until paid in full or until his release, at which point—as illustrated in the judgments—he would be required to proceed to the district clerk’s office to make arrangements to pay any remaining balance. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.15(a-1)(1), (b). Thus, despite Nasiri’s allegation, there is no conflict between the Order and the judgments. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court intended for Nasiri’s court costs and fees to be paid only upon his release, but there is evidence that the trial court intended for Nasiri to begin paying his court costs and fees from his inmate trust account during his incarceration. The Order ceases to withdraw the specified portion of his inmate funds when the amount is paid or he has been released, and if there is a remaining balance at the 1 The trial court did not make this inquiry on the record but Nasiri admits that his counsel did not object to this omission. See Cruz v. State, 698 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (holding that an “Article 42.15(a-1) inquiry . . . is forfeitable” and that failing to object to the lack of an inquiry results in forfeiture of the right to the inquiry). 4 time of his release, the judgment directs Nasiri to proceed without unnecessary delay to the district clerk’s office to pay any remaining balance due. Consequently, we overrule this issue. III. CONCLUSION Having overruled Nasiri’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. /s/ Brian Walker Brian Walker Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: August 27, 2026 5