Angela Marie Hite, Guarantor, Jointly and Severally Liable v. QL Titling Trust, Ltd.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket02-26-00308-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-26-00308-CV
___________________________
ANGELA MARIE HITE, GUARANTOR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE,
Appellant
V.
QL TITLING TRUST, LTD., Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024-007940-2
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack. JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
In five issues in this debt-collection case, Appellant Angela Marie Hite,1
proceeding pro se, complains about the default judgment and the order compelling
answers to post-judgment discovery, appointing a receiver, and granting turnover
relief sought by Appellee QL Titling Trust, Ltd. Because the trial court did not have
plenary jurisdiction to review the default judgment but did properly grant the order
compelling answers to post-judgment discovery, appointing a receiver, and granting
turnover relief, we will affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
A. QL Titling’s Default Judgment
From what we can ascertain,2 Hite was the personal guarantor under an
equipment finance agreement between QL Titling and Allure. On September 9, 2025,
1
Although the style of the case named Hite as “Guarantor, Jointly and Severally
Liable,” the judgment was taken against “Allure Essence Management Company,
LLC” and “Angela Marie Hite.” Allure did not appeal.
2
Hite’s brief contains no citations to the clerk’s record but attaches documents
that are not part of the appellate record. The appellate record consists of the clerk’s
record and, if necessary to the appeal, the reporter’s record. Tex. R. App. P. 34.1; see
In re G.K., No. 02-25-00420-CV, 2025 WL 3558969, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Dec. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i)
provides that an appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(i). Rather than cite to the appellate record, Hite quotes portions of
the documents attached to her appellate brief. Hite did not file a notice of election to
file an appendix in lieu of a clerk’s record. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.5a(a). Attaching
2
QL Titling took a default judgment in the amount of $117,166.14 plus costs, interest,
and attorney’s fees against Hite and Allure. Neither Hite nor Allure filed any appeal
from the judgment.
B. QL Titling’s Motion to Compel
In February 2026, QL Titling filed a motion to compel answers to post-
judgment discovery, for turnover relief, and for the appointment of a receiver. In
addition to alleging that no payments had been made towards the judgment, the
motion contended that interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for
admissions had been served on Hite and Allure in September 2025; that the time to
answer had passed; and that Hite and Allure had failed to respond. QL Titling
attached a copy of the post-judgment discovery to the motion as well as what QL
Titling contended was proof that the discovery had been served, including transmittal
letters and United States Postal Service (USPS) tracking numbers. The hearing was
documents to briefs as exhibits does not make them part of the appellate record.
Petrov v. Will-Brooks Inv, LLC, No. 11-24-00112-CV, 2026 WL 1593650, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland June 4, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Quorum Int’l v. Tarrant
Appraisal Dist., 114 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (“We
cannot look outside the record in an effort to discover relevant facts omitted by the
parties; rather, we are bound to determine this case on the record as filed.”).
Accordingly, we do not consider the documents attached to Hite’s brief that are not
part of the appellate record. See Larson v. Med. City Hosp. Fort Worth, No. 02-25-00674-
CV, 2026 WL 2357207, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2026, pet. filed.)
(mem. op.). While it is arguable that Hite waived her appeal through inadequate
briefing by failing to cite to the appellate record, we will attempt to address her issues
consistent with the supreme court’s general approach of resolving cases on the merits
and preserving appellate rights when possible. See In re Est. of Wheatfall, 729 S.W.3d
788, 793 n.3 (Tex. 2026).
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originally scheduled for March. Hite requested and was granted a continuance, and
the trial court reset the hearing for April 22.
C. Hite’s Motions
A few days before the April hearing, Hite filed her “Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment or[,] in the Alternative, Bill of Review”3 and “Motion to Stay and
Deny Turnover Proceedings.” In the motion to set aside, Hite stated that “[o]n
September 29, 2025, [QL Titling] served post-judgment interrogatories and
admissions” on her by certified mail, but she contended that she had no actual notice
of the lawsuit and had never received the post-judgment discovery.4 Her motion to
stay again argued that the post-judgment discovery was never received and that the
default judgment was void due to defective service of process.
At the April hearing on QL Titling’s motion to compel, Hite appeared and
informed the trial court that she also wanted her motions to be heard. The trial court
continued all of the motions and reset them for May 4.
3
Although the title of the motion included the words “bill of review,” there is
no bill of review in the appellate record. Moreover, QL Titling states in its brief that
Hite never filed any bill-of-review action. See In re J.J., 394 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (setting out the requirements of a bill of review,
including that it is “an independent, separate suit filed under a different cause
number”).
4
Hite also contended that service on Allure had failed. Later, at the hearing on
her motions, the trial court told Hite that because she was not a licensed attorney, she
could not represent the corporation pro se. See Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa
Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996) (“Generally a corporation may be
represented only by a licensed attorney . . . .”).
4
One day after the April hearing, Hite filed her “Motion to Challenge Venue
Based on Forum[-]Selection Clause.” In that motion, she argued that the equipment
finance agreement underlying the lawsuit contained a forum-selection clause
mandating that any lawsuit be filed in Marion County, Indiana.
Prior to the May 4 hearing, QL Titling filed a response to the motion to stay
and to deny turnover proceedings. In the response, it urged that the trial court’s
plenary power had expired and that the judgment could no longer be set aside or
stayed by Hite’s motions.
D. The Hearing and the Rulings on the Motions
At the May hearing, Hite and QL Titling’s attorney appeared and argued. The
trial court began the hearing by noting that it had lost plenary power over the
judgment after thirty days because no motion for new trial had been filed. Therefore,
the only motions that the trial court would hear were related to the post-judgment
motions. Hite argued that she had never received the post-judgment discovery, and
therefore, the motion to compel should be denied. QL Titling responded that even if
Hite had never received the discovery the first time, “she definitely got it the second
time” when it was attached to the motion to compel and that she had failed to
respond or file a “motion to un-deem” the admitted requests for admissions. The
only evidence admitted at the hearing were the requests for admissions that had been
sent twice to Hite. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Hite’s
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motion to stay and to deny turnover, granted QL Titling’s motion to compel and for
turnover, and appointed a receiver.
On the same day, the trial court signed an order compelling answers to post-
judgment discovery and granting turnover relief and the appointment of a receiver.
Two days later, the trial court rendered an order denying Hite’s motion to stay. Hite
appealed. On the same day that she filed her notice of appeal, Hite filed “Defendant’s
Emergency Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order Pending Appeal.” The appellate
record does not contain a ruling on the emergency motion.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hite asks whether (1) “the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction
over this suit in violation of the parties’ mandatory forum-selection clause requiring
that all disputes be litigated exclusively in the state or federal courts of Marion
County, Indiana”; (2) “the trial court’s statement that it had lost plenary power, made
while simultaneously granting [QL Titling’s] post-judgment motions and denying
[Hite’s] competing motions, constitutes reversible and irreconcilable error”; (3) “the
Default Judgment underlying the challenged order is void because the record does not
affirmatively show strict compliance with the rules governing service of citation,
including a blank officer’s return, insufficient diligence supporting substituted service,
and no service on the LLC obligor”; (4) “post-judgment requests for admission were
properly deemed admitted where USPS tracking records show the certified mail
containing those requests was never delivered to [Hite]”; and (5) “the trial court
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abused its discretion in denying [Hite’s] Motion to Stay Pending Appeal and Motion
to Deny Turnover and in proceeding to appoint a receiver over [Hite’s] assets.”
We will address the first three issues—dealing with the trial court’s plenary
power—together and then address the fourth and fifth issues separately. For the
reasons set out below, we reject each of Hite’s arguments.
A. Trial Court’s Plenary Power Over Judgment and Post-Judgment Matters
In her first three issues, Hite complains about the granting of the default
judgment—which was signed on September 9, 2025—in light of what she contends
was a mandatory forum-selection clause and service defects. However, these
complaints are not timely in this appeal.
A trial court retains jurisdiction over a case for a minimum of thirty days after
signing a final judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d). Generally, plenary power
expires thirty days after a final judgment is signed, unless a party files a timely motion
for new trial or other post-judgment motion, such as a motion to vacate judgment, in
which plenary power can extend for a total of 105 days. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c),
(e); see also L.M. Healthcare, Inc. v. Childs, 929 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. 1996) (op. on
reh’g) (stating that plenary jurisdiction cannot extend beyond 105 days after trial court
signs judgment). During this time, the trial court has plenary power to change its
judgment. Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex.
2000). Once the trial court’s plenary power has expired, “a judgment cannot be set
7
aside by the trial court except by bill of review for sufficient cause, filed within the
time allowed by law . . . .” Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f).
Hite filed her motion to set aside the default judgment or, in the alternative, bill
of review,5 over seven months after the judgment was entered. Among other things,
her motion complained that the judgment was “void for lack of personal jurisdiction
due to defective service of process.”6
“A judgment may be challenged as void through a direct attack or a collateral
attack.” In re Thompson, 569 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,
orig. proceeding). Importantly, a direct attack such as an appeal “must be brought
within a definite time period after the judgment’s rendition.” Id. (quoting PNS Stores,
Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2012)). “Timeliness requirements apply to
direct attacks even when they argue a judgment is void.” Cortez v. Pharia, L.L.C.,
5
A bill of review is an independent action to set aside a judgment that is no
longer appealable or subject to challenge by a motion for new trial. Wembley Inv. Co. v.
Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 926–27 (Tex. 1999). However, a petition for bill of review
must be a new lawsuit filed under a different cause number than the case whose
judgment the bill-of-review complainant is attacking. See Amanda v. Montgomery,
877 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); see also
Ross v. Nat’l Ctr. for the Emp. of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2006) (“[A] bill
of review is a separate proceeding from the underlying suit . . . .”). As noted above,
Hite did not file a separate bill-of-review proceeding.
6
In its appellate brief, QL Titling states that Hite “identifies nothing in the
appellate record supporting these [improper service] allegations.” In her reply brief,
Hite points to documents attached to her brief to support her argument. As stated
above, we cannot and do not consider documents attached to Hite’s brief that are not
part of the appellate record. See Larson, 2026 WL 2357207, at *3.
8
No. 01-24-00047-CV, 2025 WL 3481003, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Dec. 4, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Here, while the trial court retained plenary power to grant a new trial or to
vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment for thirty days after the judgment was
signed, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d), no such motion was filed. Because the default
judgment was signed in September 2025, the trial court’s plenary power expired over
six months before Hite filed her motion to set aside the default judgment. Therefore,
Hite’s motion was untimely, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider it. See
In re B.L.P., No. 05-11-00470-CV, 2012 WL 6200707, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Dec. 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that appellant’s motion, which was not
filed as an independent proceeding and did not purport to set out the prima facie
requirements of a bill of review, was an untimely motion to modify the original
judgment and that the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the motion).
Part of Hite’s second issue also complains that the trial court erroneously
exercised jurisdiction over QL Titling’s post-judgment motions because the
mandatory forum-selection clause deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. But while a
Texas court may enforce a valid forum-selection clause and require the parties to
litigate their dispute in the jurisdiction agreed to by the parties, the existence of a
forum-selection clause does not generally deprive the forum of jurisdiction over
parties. See Prosperous Mar. Corp. v. Farwah, 189 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2006, no pet.); see also Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d
9
777, 792 (Tex. 2005) (“Generally, a forum-selection clause operates as consent to
jurisdiction in one forum, not proof that the Constitution would allow no other.”).
In addition, generally, “every court with jurisdiction to render a judgment also
has the inherent authority to enforce its judgments.” Alexander Dubose Jefferson &
Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 540 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. 2018); see In re
Fluid Power Equip., Inc., 612 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020,
orig. proceeding) (“Even after its plenary power has expired, a trial court has inherent
power to enforce its judgments.”); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 308 (“The court shall cause
its judgments and decrees to be carried into execution. . . .”). Unlike plenary power, a
trial court’s post-judgment enforcement powers “can last until the judgment is
satisfied.” Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP, 540 S.W.3d at 581 (quoting
Black v. Shor, 443 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, no
pet.)); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 621a (“At any time after rendition of judgment, and so long
as said judgment has not been suspended,” the successful party may “initiate and
maintain in the trial court in the same suit in which said judgment was rendered any
discovery proceeding authorized by these rules for pre-trial matters.”).
Moreover, a court that appoints a receiver to assist with enforcement retains
continuing jurisdiction and control over the receiver and receivership property until
concluding the proceeding. Anderson v. Archer, No. 03-19-00003-CV, 2019 WL
6205524, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 21, 2019, pets. denied) (mem. op.). “A
receivership is unique in that the trial court can conduct proceedings long after
10
judgment in the main case is final.” Moore v. Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 02-24-
00117-CV, 2025 WL 353069, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op.). Therefore, the trial court still had jurisdiction to consider the post-
judgment relief sought by QL Titling.
We overrule Hite’s first, second, and third issues.
B. Post-Judgment Requests for Admissions
In her fourth issue, Hite complains that the requests for admissions should not
be deemed admitted because the original discovery was never delivered to her. QL
Titling responds with several arguments, including that even if Hite did not receive
the discovery at first, she did receive it prior to the hearing and still failed to respond
or to file a “motion to un-deem.” We agree.
As noted above, QL Titling’s motion to compel was filed on February 17 and
included copies of all of the discovery, including the requests for admissions. At the
May 4 hearing on the motion, Hite argued that the three USPS tracking numbers
containing the original post-judgment discovery reflected that they were undelivered.
QL Titling’s attorney agreed, stating that “[i]t looks like they weren’t delivered.”
However, the attorney pointed out that the matter had been set on the trial court’s
docket since February 18 and that Hite had received the requests for admissions that
were attached to its motion to compel. Therefore, according to QL Titling’s attorney,
“even if . . . she hadn’t received [them] the first time, she definitely got [them] the
second time and still hasn’t responded” or filed a “motion to un-deem.”
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“Unanswered requests for admissions are automatically deemed admitted,
unless the court on motion permits their withdrawal or amendment.” Marshall v. Vise,
767 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex. 1989); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.2(c) (“If a response is not
timely served, the request is considered admitted without the necessity of a court
order.”). Matters thus admitted are conclusively established as being true. Sherman
Acquisition II LP v. Garcia, 229 S.W.3d 802, 812 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 198.3 permits the court to allow a party to
withdraw its deemed admissions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.3. The party must state good
cause, and the court must find that the parties relying upon the responses and deemed
admissions will not be unduly prejudiced and that the presentation of the merits of
the action will be subserved by permitting the party to amend or withdraw the
admissions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.3(a), (b). Good cause can be an accident or mistake,
as long as it was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference. Marino v. King,
355 S.W.3d 629, 633 (Tex. 2011).
Here, Hite did not move to withdraw or amend the deemed admissions. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.3; Standard Fire Ins. v. Morgan, 745 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex. 1987)
(“[B]ecause Standard never requested the trial court to withdraw or amend the
admissions, the admitted facts were conclusively established.”). Rather, she argued
that she never received the original discovery. See Payton v. Ashton, 29 S.W.3d 896, 898
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (stating that before there is an obligation to
answer admissions, “it is axiomatic that the requests for admissions be served” and
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“implicit in the concept of service is the need . . . to actually receive it”); see also Tex.
R. Civ. P. 198.2(a) (providing that the responding party must serve a written response
on the requesting party within thirty days “after service of the request”). However,
Hite did not explain why she did not answer the discovery once she received QL
Titling’s motion to compel that included copies of the requests for admissions. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.2(a). In fact, she referenced the discovery, including the requests
for admissions, in both her motion to set aside the default judgment and her motion
to stay. Hite later requested and was granted a continuance of QL Titling’s motion to
compel, yet she still failed to respond to the discovery. See State Bd. of Educator
Certification v. Tran, No. 03-18-00855-CV, 2020 WL 6834219, at *11 (Tex. App.—
Austin Nov. 20, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that the party had multiple
chances to respond to the discovery, including after a motion to compel was filed).
A trial court has broad discretion to permit or deny the withdrawal of deemed
admissions. Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1996); Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Lane
Express, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. denied). “[A]
decision is not considered an abuse of discretion if supported by any theory appearing
in the record, even if unmentioned by the court or litigants.” Payton, 29 S.W.3d at 899
n.3. Because “a party’s duty to respond to requests for admissions is triggered upon
receipt of the requests,” we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
in deeming as admitted the unanswered requests for admissions that were
undisputedly sent with the motion to compel. See Etheredge v. Hidden Valley Airpark
13
Ass’n, 169 S.W.3d 378, 383 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied) (op. on
reh’g).
We overrule Hite’s fourth issue.
C. Denial of Motion to Stay Pending Appeal
In her fifth issue, Hite complains about the denial of her motion to stay
pending appeal.7 However, as QL Titling notes, the motion was never presented to
the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. McKenzie,
997 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1999) (“To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a
party must present to the trial court a timely request, motion, or objection, state the
specific grounds therefor[], and obtain a ruling.”); see also Bedrock Prop. Sols., LLC v. SR
Franchising, LLC, No. 02-25-00374-CV, 2026 WL 2130236, at *6 n.14 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth July 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A movant bears an affirmative duty
to request a hearing on its pending motion and to actively pursue a ruling from the
trial court.”).
In her reply brief, Hite agrees that the motion was never presented to the trial
court and states that she “does not press the denial of a stay as an independent
ground for reversal.” Rather, she argues that we need not separately reach this issue
as it is “mooted” by her other arguments “preventing enforcement of an order resting
Under neither her fifth issue nor any of the other issues does Hite
7
substantively attack the order appointing a receiver and granting turnover relief.
Likewise, we do not address it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
14
on a void judgment and an unauthorized post-plenary-power adjudication.” We agree
that we do not need to reach this issue. For all of the reasons that we denied Hite’s
first through fourth issues, we deny her fifth issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Hite’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order
compelling answers to post-judgment discovery and granting turnover relief and the
appointment of a receiver.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Delivered: November 12, 2026
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