Sandom Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00196-CV Sandom Baumgardner, Appellant v. Brazos River Authority, Appellee On appeal from the 170th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Jim Meyer, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2017-3971-4 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION In five points of error, Appellant Sandom Baumgardner contends that the trial court erred in granting judgment for Appellee Brazos River Authority (the “BRA”) on each of Baumgardner’s and the BRA’s claims for relief. In his first point of error, Baumgardner argues that the BRA’s denials of his permits to construct a concrete boat entryway and on-water boat dock for the benefit of his property were arbitrary and capricious. Relatedly, in his fourth and fifth points of error, Baumgardner asserts that the trial court erred in entering judgment for the BRA on its trespass and breach of restrictive covenant claims because the BRA’s denials of his permit applications were arbitrary and capricious. Finally, in his second and third points of error, Baumgardner argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an injunction requiring Baumgardner to remove his improvements and that, even if the trial court had jurisdiction, injunctive relief is not proper in this case. We affirm. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Factual Background Appellee Brazos River Authority is a political subdivision of the State of Texas established as a conservation and reclamation district under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution. Baumgardner v. Brazos River Auth., 714 S.W.3d 597, 600, 603 (Tex. 2025). The BRA was established in 1929 for the purpose of managing portions of the watershed of the Brazos River. Id. at 600. In 1941, the BRA completed construction of the Morris Sheppard Dam, which impounded water up to 1000 feet above mean sea level—known as the “1000’ contour line”—to create Possum Kingdom Lake (the “Lake”). The BRA has owned all of the property beneath the 1000’ contour line since the BRA Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 2 created the Lake. Additionally, prior to 2009, the BRA owned certain lots adjacent to the Lake above the 1000’ contour line. The BRA leased many of these lots to both residential and commercial occupants. By 2009, there were approximately 1,500 residential leased lots at the Lake owned by the BRA. In 2009, the Texas Legislature passed HB 3031, codified as TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8502.020, requiring the BRA to divest itself of, among other property, its “Leased Tract,” comprising several lots that the BRA leased prior to 2009. TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8502.020(b)-(c). The Legislature further required the BRA to encumber the lots sold with certain enumerated restrictive covenants. TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8502.020(d). The BRA sold all of the roughly 1,500 leased lots to Patterson PK Land Partnership in October of 2010. The special warranty deed delivered to Patterson excluded from the conveyance all property beneath the 1000’ contour line, leaving that property under the BRA’s ownership. The deed further specified that Patterson took the property subject to certain deed restrictions—including those required by HB 3031—listed in a Declaration of Restrictive Covenants, Easements, and Conditions filed by the BRA in the official public records of Palo Pinto County, Texas. The Declaration provided that divested lots were subject to the BRA’s Shoreline Management Plan, a Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 3 document created by the BRA in 2006 to manage and restrict the use of property adjacent to the Lake. Patterson subsequently sold various lots in the Leased Tract, including Lot 11, Area 12, District Tract 32-1-48, the lot at issue in this suit. Baumgardner is the current owner of Lot 11, Area 12, District Tract 32-1-48. Baumgardner acquired the property from the estate of Elton Bridges, who had acquired the property from Patterson. Both Bridges’s and Baumgardner’s recorded deeds provide that the Lot is subject to the restrictions in the Declaration. Baumgardner further testified at trial that he received a copy of the Shoreline Management Plan when he purchased the property from Bridges. At the time Baumgardner acquired the property, it contained a house as well as a dock and adjoining walkway for the benefit of his property. 1 The Shoreline Management Plan prohibited the construction of additional improvements beneath the 1000’ contour line or on the surface of the Lake without prior approval from the BRA. In 2014, Baumgardner sought to dredge the property located beneath the 1000’ contour line but above the shoreline of the Lake, which was over 200 feet beneath Baumgardner’s dock at the time. Further, Baumgardner 1 These structures are not at issue in this suit. Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 4 sought to construct a “concrete boat entry way,” 2 purportedly for “erosion control.” Baumgardner contacted Kent Edwards, an inspection supervisor for the BRA at the Lake, who informed Baumgardner that the BRA could not grant him a permit for the boat entryway. Baumgardner claims here that Edwards also informed him that he would need a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers prior to completing any dredging work. Baumgardner received approval from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to complete the work on September 10, 2014. Four days later, Baumgardner submitted an application to the BRA for a permit to complete the dredging work and construct the boat entryway. The BRA responded by email, approving Baumgardner’s dredging work but denying him permission to construct the concrete boat entryway. As grounds for its denial, the BRA cited Section 3.7 of the Shoreline Management Plan, which prohibits the construction of new privately-held boat ramps on “leased lots.” 3 2 We will refer to the concrete boat entryway as either the “boat entryway” or the “boat ramp” throughout this opinion. 3 In October of 2014, the BRA amended the Regulations applicable to properties at the Lake to, in part, provide that “[n]ew privately held boat ramps and rail systems [were] no longer authorized for installation” on properties subject to the Regulations. The parties dispute whether, prior to this amendment, Baumgardner raised the issue that Section 3.7 only applied to “leased lots,” which Baumgardner apparently believed did not include his property. Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 5  Baumgardner built the boat ramp anyway. Construction of the boat ramp, which was completed in April of 2015, was largely beneath the 1000’ contour line. In April and May of 2015, the BRA sent three letters to Baumgardner demanding that he remove the boat ramp. Baumgardner did not do so. Baumgardner also failed to remove the boat ramp after receiving demands from the BRA in November of 2016 and November of 2017, and the boat ramp remained on the BRA’s property at the time of trial of this cause in January of 2024. In October of 2017, Baumgardner submitted another application to the BRA, seeking a permit to modify his existing dock and adjoining walkway to attach a floating boat dock. 4 The BRA denied his application on the grounds that it would not consider granting him a permit until he had resolved the issues with the boat ramp. The BRA further threatened to revoke his permit for the existing on-water facilities on the grounds that Baumgardner was in default of the permit. Baumgardner installed the floating boat dock anyway. The BRA discovered the boat dock in March of 2020. On March 20, 2020, the BRA notified Baumgardner that his failure to remove the boat dock within 30 days 4 Throughout this opinion, we will refer to the boat ramp and boat dock together as “the improvements.” Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 6 would amount to a trespass and a violation of BRA regulations. Baumgardner did not remove the boat dock. B. Procedural History Baumgardner filed suit against the BRA in McLennan County District Court in November of 2017, seeking a declaration that the BRA could not require him to remove the boat ramp. The BRA removed the suit to the Western District of Texas, Waco Division, and that court remanded the suit back to the McLennan County District Court. Before remand, the BRA filed its answer and asserted counterclaims against Baumgardner for trespass, breach of restrictive covenant, and attorneys’ fees. Baumgardner subsequently amended his petition to assert a substantive due process claim against the BRA. Baumgardner alleged that the BRA’s denials of his permit applications were arbitrary and capricious and requested the court to order that his permit applications be approved. The BRA sustained its counterclaims through remand and requested an injunction ordering Baumgardner to remove the boat ramp and boat dock. The parties tried the case to a jury in January of 2024. The jury found that Baumgardner’s boat ramp and boat dock trespassed on the BRA’s property, that Baumgardner had breached the restrictive covenants by constructing the improvements, and that the BRA’s denials of Baumgardner’s Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 7 permit applications were not arbitrary or capricious. After denying Baumgardner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdicts. The trial court granted the BRA’s requested injunction. The final injunction required Baumgardner to remove the portion of the boat ramp beneath the 1000’ contour line and the entirety of the floating boat dock. Baumgardner appealed to this Court. After we determined that the case may fall under the Fifteenth Court of Appeals’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Texas transferred the appeal to the Fifteenth Court. The BRA moved to re-transfer the appeal to this Court, and the Fifteenth Court of Appeals forwarded the motion to the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued an opinion, reported at Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority, 714 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. 2025), in which it determined that the appeal did not fall within the Fifteenth Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to this Court. II. JURISDICTION Both parties make jurisdictional arguments on appeal. In response to Baumgardner’s first, fourth, and fifth points of error, the BRA argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the BRA’s decisions on Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 8 Baumgardner’s permit applications. According to the BRA, it is entitled to immunity from suit, and neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction to decide Baumgardner’s claims absent waiver or abrogation of immunity. In his third point of error, Baumgardner argues that the trial court erred in granting the BRA’s requested injunction because the injunction can only be awarded through successful pursuit of a forcible detainer action. Because the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction over forcible detainer actions, Baumgardner contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the injunction. We will address each of the preceding jurisdictional arguments in order. A. Governmental Immunity The BRA argues that governmental immunity deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear Baumgardner’s substantive due process claim. The BRA is entitled to governmental immunity, which makes it immune from both suit and liability. See Karl v. Brazos River Auth., 494 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. denied). Governmental immunity from suit divests Texas courts of jurisdiction to hear claims filed against a governmental unit absent waiver or abrogation of immunity. See State v. Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 9 Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009); see also City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 375 (Tex. 2011). Issues of subject matter jurisdiction, including governmental immunity, may be raised for the first time on appeal. 5 Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Tex. 2012). We review issues of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dept. of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Because we address jurisdiction for the first time in this Court, we “must construe the pleadings in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction”— here, Baumgardner—“and, if necessary, review the record for evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Id. at 96. If the pleadings or the record conclusively negate jurisdiction, we must dismiss the claims; however, if the pleadings and record neither demonstrate jurisdiction nor conclusively negate it, then the BRA bears the burden to establish that Baumgardner “would be unable to show the existence of jurisdiction if the cause were remanded to the trial court and such opportunity afforded.” See id.; see also Harris Cnty. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 61 v. Magellan Pipeline Co., L.P., 649 S.W.3d 630, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (applying the Black 5 The BRA asserted governmental immunity in the trial court. However, in the pretrial hearing, the BRA conceded that immunity did not apply to Baumgardner’s claims except to the extent Baumgardner sought to recover attorney’s fees if successful in his defense of the BRA’s claim for breach of the deed covenant. The trial court deferred its ruling on the issue of governmental immunity as a bar to Baumgardner’s claim for attorney’s fees, stating it would decide the issue if the jury found for Baumgardner on the BRA’s claim for breach of restrictive covenant. Because the jury decided that claim in favor of the BRA, the trial court did not address the issue of governmental immunity, and we address it as a jurisdictional issue for the first time here. Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 10 standard of review where the governmental party did not raise governmental immunity as a bar to jurisdiction prior to the entry of final judgment). Our initial inquiry is whether the pleadings or record establish or conclusively negate jurisdiction. Baumgardner argues on appeal that the BRA’s immunity is abrogated since it asserted affirmative counterclaims for monetary relief, citing City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 375 (Tex. 2011). The BRA’s assertion of counterclaims, Baumgardner argues, required the BRA to participate in the suit as a normal litigant not entitled to governmental immunity. We disagree. Where a governmental entity pursues affirmative claims for monetary relief, including counterclaims, the entity’s immunity is judicially abrogated as against opposing claims that are “germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to” the entity’s claims and which serve to offset the entity’s recovery on any of its claims. City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 374– 75 (Tex. 2011). An opposing party’s claim is germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to the government’s claim where the opposing party’s claim is relevant to and “would at least inferentially rebut” the government’s claim. Id. at 375. An inferential rebuttal operates to rebut an essential Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 11 element of the claim relied upon for recovery. Id. (citing Dillard v. Tex. Elec. Coop., 157 S.W.3d 429, 430 (Tex. 2005)). In its answer, the BRA asserted counterclaims for trespass, breach of restrictive covenant, and injunctive relief. The counterclaims for trespass and breach of covenant seek monetary relief. See Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 505–06 (Tex. 2018) (stating that Reata emphasizes a difference between monetary relief “as opposed to injunctive and other types of relief”) (emphasis orig.). Thus, governmental immunity does not apply if Baumgardner’s claims are germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to the BRA’s trespass and breach of covenant claims and if Baumgardner’s claims seek to offset any recovery by the BRA on its affirmative claims. As provided in his Fourth Amended Petition, Baumgardner sought a declaration that the BRA’s denial of his permit applications constituted arbitrary and capricious conduct. Baumgardner further alleged that the BRA’s actions discriminated against him in violation of the Texas Constitution and sought a declaration to that extent. Finally, Baumgardner sought a declaration that the BRA does not have the right to fine or censure him for his refusal to remove boat ramp or boat dock or to order him to remove the improvements on the ground that the BRA’s denial of his permit applications was wrongful. Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 12  Baumgardner’s claims are not properly defensive to the BRA’s counterclaims for monetary relief. The only issue on both the trespass and breach of covenant claims is whether the BRA consented to Baumgardner’s construction of the improvements on the BRA’s property. For Baumgardner to show consent, he must have been authorized by the BRA to construct the boat ramp and boat dock. 6 Baumgardner never obtained authorization from the BRA. Notwithstanding his failure to obtain authorization, Baumgardner requests that we order the permit applications to be granted if the BRA’s denials of those applications were arbitrary and capricious. We do not have authority to do so. See City of Shoreacres v. State, 582 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 7 In short, our power ends at our determination, if any, that the BRA’s denials were arbitrary and 6 Section 7.01 of the Declaration provides that an owner or lessee of a Leased Tract—which the evidence conclusively establishes includes Baumgardner’s property—must comply with the restrictions found in the Shoreline Management Plan. Section 7(a) of Appendix A to the Plan requires approval from a BRA Area Project Manager prior to installing new on-water facilities such as the boat dock. Section 18(V) of the Plan prohibits “locating or constructing improvements on Authority lands or waters without written permission (permit).” Hence, the Plan obligated Baumgardner to obtain permits prior to constructing the boat ramp and boat dock. 7 In Shoreacres, the First Court of Appeals stated: [A] court has no right to substitute its judgment and discretion for the judgment and discretion of the governing body upon whom the law visits the primary power and duty to act. Of course, if such governing body acts illegally, unreasonably, or arbitrarily, a court of competent jurisdiction may so adjudge, [b]ut there the power of the court ends. Id. (quoting Barrington v. Cokinos, 338 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1960)). Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 13 capricious. See, e.g., Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Tex. Dept. of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d 873, 882 (Tex. 1984) (setting aside, rather than issuing a denial of, a permit erroneously granted by the Texas Department of Water Resources); Starr Cnty. v. Starr Indus. Servs., Inc., 584 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. App.—Austin 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (where governmental entity acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the appellee’s permit application, “the district court correctly… remanded the cause to the agency for further proceedings”) (emphasis added). We cannot usurp the BRA’s statutory power to make decisions on Baumgardner’s permit applications. See TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8502.020(d)(26). Even if we were to set aside the BRA’s permit denials, Baumgardner’s claims would not be properly defensive to the BRA’s counterclaims because Baumgardner never had the right to construct the improvements on the BRA’s property. Because setting aside the permit denials will not give Baumgardner that right, Baumgardner’s claims cannot inferentially rebut the lack of consent underlying the BRA’s counterclaims for trespass and breach of restrictive covenant. See City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 375 (Tex. 2011). The BRA thus retains its immunity from suit despite its assertion of affirmative counterclaims for monetary relief. Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 14  We hold that the pleadings and record in this case conclusively negate the existence of jurisdiction. The record reveals that Baumgardner’s claims are not properly defensive to the BRA’s counterclaims, and the BRA’s immunity is not abrogated. Baumgardner has not pointed to any statute waiving the BRA’s immunity. 8 Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Baumgardner’s substantive due process, equal protection, 9 and declaratory judgment claims. We overrule Baumgardner’s first, fourth, and fifth points of error. B. Jurisdiction to Grant Injunctive Relief In his third point of error, Baumgardner contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a mandatory injunction requiring Baumgardner to remove his improvements from the BRA’s property. Baumgardner argues that this type of mandatory injunction can be awarded only in a forcible- detainer proceeding over which the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction, and that the trial court in this case did not have jurisdiction to grant the injunction. We disagree. 8 Although Baumgardner did not raise it as a basis for waiver of immunity, the BRA argues that the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not waive its immunity here because Baumgardner has not challenged the validity of an ordinance or statute. See Schmitz v. Denton Cnty. Cowboy Church, 550 S.W.3d 342, 353–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We agree. 9 Though we do not address the equal protection claim, we note that the success of that claim would also require invalidation of the BRA’s permit denials rather than a judicial grant of those permits to Baumgardner. The equal protection claim thus fails to abrogate the BRA’s immunity for the same reason as the substantive due process claim. Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 15  The justice court has original jurisdiction in cases of forcible entry and detainer. Kassim v. Carlisle Interests, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2010, no pet.). The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to immediate possession of the premises. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). The remedy for a successful forcible detainer is a writ of possession, entitling the prevailing party to immediate possession of the property enforceable by an officer of the executive branch. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.0061. Baumgardner relies solely on Kassim v. Carlisle Interests, Inc. to support his jurisdictional argument. 308 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). In Kassim, a landlord terminated a lease after discovering that the tenant had withheld sublease revenue in violation of the lease agreement. Id. at 539. The tenant filed suit against the landlord seeking a temporary injunction requiring the landlord to reinstate the lease. Id. The Fifth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of the injunction, holding that, because the nature of the requested injunction concerned only matters pertaining to the tenant’s right to immediate possession of the leased premises, jurisdiction to award the injunction rested in the justice court. Id. at 541. According to that court, the requested injunction was available only Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 16 in a forcible detainer proceeding in the justice court. Id. We decline to follow Kassim under the circumstances present in this suit. As the BRA points out, numerous Texas courts—including this Court— recognize injunctive relief as a proper remedy for a trespass. E.g., Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Watson, 626 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The injunction was likewise proper as appellant was trespassing on appellees’ property”); Beathard Joint Venture v. W. Houston Airport Corp., 72 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (“where a trespass invades the possession of a person’s land, or destroys the use and enjoyment of that land, an injunction is a proper remedy”); Bass v. Champion Intl. Corp., 787 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1990, no writ) (“an injunction suit is proper against a ‘naked trespasser who forcibly or fraudulently intrudes upon the land of an owner in possession’”) (quoting Frost v. Mischer, 463 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1971)); Peter and Camella Scamardo, FLP v. 3D Farms, No. 10-15-00163-CV, 2016 WL 102633 at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 7, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In Scamardo, Scamardo brought suit for trespass against 3D Farms, the owner of property adjacent to Scamardo’s, after 3D Farms—similar to Baumgardner—constructed an irrigation canal that encroached on Scamardo’s property. See Scamardo, No. 10-15-00163-CV, 2016 WL 102633 Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 17 at *1. Scamardo, like the BRA, sought a mandatory permanent injunction requiring 3D Farms to remove the encroachment. Id. We reversed the trial court’s denial of the injunction and remanded for the trial court to grant the injunction ordering the removal of the encroachments. Id. at *5. In doing so, we recognized that a mandatory injunction is a proper remedy for trespass provided the prerequisites for obtaining an injunction are met. See id.; see also Allen v. Virginia Hill Water Supply Corp., 609 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1980, no writ) (“when structures are placed on one’s property without his consent, remedy may be had… by obtaining an injunction”). Texas courts have also recognized the propriety of injunctive relief as a remedy for breach of restrictive covenant claims. E.g., Jim Rutherford Invs., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Assoc., 25 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (affirming trial court’s grant of injunction to homeowners’ association seeking to enforce restrictive covenant); Musgrave v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Assoc., 990 S.W.2d 386, 399 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (same); Park v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Assoc., 457 S.W.3d 571, 600 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.) (same); Dao v. Mission Bend Homeowners Assoc., 667 S.W.3d 304, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (same); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 18 S.W.2d 16, 21 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (affirming trial court’s award of injunction to homeowners seeking to enforce restrictive covenant). Moreover, the injunction in this case does not pertain to Baumgardner’s right to possession of the BRA’s property because Baumgardner never had the right to possess that property. Rather, the injunction simply gave effect to the BRA’s right to remove Baumgardner’s wrongful improvements. See Allen v. Virginia Hill Water Supply Corp., 609 S.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1980, no writ). Kassim is thus inapposite, and the injunction here is not one which the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction to grant. We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the injunction. Baumgardner’s third point of error is overruled. III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF In his second point of error, Baumgardner contends the trial court erred in awarding an injunction to the BRA ordering Baumgardner to remove the improvements. To support this contention, Baumgardner makes several distinct arguments. We will consider each of these arguments in turn. We review a trial court’s grant of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion. See Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex. 1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 19 to guiding rules or principles. Gilbreath v. Horan, 682 S.W.3d 454, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). Specifically, a trial court has no discretion to grant injunctive relief violative of constitutional guarantees or without supporting evidence. Operation Rescue-National, 975 S.W.2d at 560. In reviewing the trial court’s decision on injunctive relief, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a party must prove (1) a wrongful act, (2) imminent harm, (3) an irreparable injury, and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Pike v. Texas EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 792 (Tex. 2020). Texas distinguishes between mandatory and prohibitive injunctions—a mandatory injunction compels affirmative action while a prohibitive injunction forbids status-quo-altering conduct. Tex. Health Huguley, Inc. v. Jones, 637 S.W.3d 202, 214-15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). The injunction in this case is a mandatory injunction. A. Adequate Remedy at Law First, Baumgardner argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the injunction because the BRA has an adequate remedy at law to recover possession through either a forcible detainer action or through an Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 20 action for trespass to try title with an ancillary writ of sequestration. We disagree. Texas courts are authorized to grant injunctive relief where there is no “clear, full, and adequate relief at law.” Huynh v. Blanchard, 694 S.W.3d 648, 684 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co., 226 S.W.2d 615, 619 (Tex. 1950)). The remedy available at law as an alternative to injunctive relief must be “as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.” Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 685 (quoting Brazos River Conservation and Reclamation Dist. v. Allen, 171 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. 1943)). The BRA does not have an action for forcible detainer. Such an action requires proof of a landlord-tenant relationship. Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.). In the absence of evidence in the record establishing a landlord-tenant relationship between the BRA and Baumgardner, 10 we cannot agree with Baumgardner that the BRA had an adequate remedy in the form of a writ of possession granted from a successful forcible detainer action. Further, a writ of sequestration does not constitute an adequate remedy at law in this case. Although Baumgardner is correct that a writ of 10 Indeed, Baumgardner made the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship an integral part of his substantive due process claim. In his appellate brief, Baumgardner states emphatically, “[Baumgardner’s] purchase was of a fee simple interest. He did not lease the property[.]” Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 21 sequestration may be an adequate remedy at law preventing the issuance of injunctive relief, Westside Airways, Inc. v. JR Aircraft Corp., 694 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ), an injunction is a proper remedy “against a naked trespasser who forcibly or fraudulently intrudes upon the lands of an owner in possession.” Frost v. Mischer, 463 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. 1971); McMahon v. Fender, 350 S.W.2d 239, 240–41 (Tex. App.— Waco 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Frost and McMahon stand for the proposition that a writ of sequestration is a proper remedy only where the question of title to the disputed property is at issue. Frost, 463 S.W.2d at 168 (citing McMahon, 350 S.W.2d 239). Conversely, where the trespasser asserts no legitimate claim to title of the disputed property—a “naked trespasser”— trespass to try title is excused and an injunction is proper. See Frost, 463 S.W.2d at 168 (citing Ives v. Karnes, 452 S.W.2d 737, 740–41 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 1970, no writ)). Baumgardner is a naked trespasser who cannot claim title to the land at the Lake beneath the 1000’ contour line. Accordingly, an injunction is proper to remove Baumgardner’s improvements from the BRA’s property. Moreover, the remedies suggested by Baumgardner as alternatives to the injunction are neither as practical nor as efficient because injunctive relief allowed the judge to tailor the remedy to the particular injuries present Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 22 in this case. Baumgardner’s suggested remedies do not allow the same tailoring, which is required to permit the BRA to fulfill its public duty under the Texas Constitution to preserve the natural resources at the Lake. See TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8502.001(a)-(c) (providing that the BRA “is created under and is essential to accomplish the purposes of Section 59, Article XVI, Texas Constitution”); TEX. CONST. ART. XVI, § 59(a) (“The preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State [are]… hereby declared public rights and duties”). For example, enforcement of writs of possession or sequestration may create issues of federal preemption if approval from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is required prior to removal of Baumgardner’s boat ramp. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403; Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; see also BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter, 251 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. 2008) (“state law is impliedly preempted if… state law obstructs accomplishing and executing Congress’ full purposes and objectives”). The injunction, on the other hand, mandates that Baumgardner seek approval from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers prior to removing the installations. Further, writs of possession and sequestration could not prevent Baumgardner from using the boat ramp and boat dock prior to removal, while the injunction in this case expressly prohibited Baumgardner from Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 23 doing so. 11 The inability of writs of possession and sequestration to prevent Baumgardner’s use of the ramp prior to removal make them inadequate in comparison to the injunction issued here. The BRA cannot pursue a forcible detainer action, and an injunction is proper in lieu of a writ of sequestration against a naked trespasser like Baumgardner. Further, neither a writ of possession nor a writ of sequestration could redress the BRA’s injury as efficiently or practically as the injunction issued in this suit. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the BRA had no adequate remedy at law. B. Irreparable Harm Baumgardner argues that the trial court erred in granting the injunction because the BRA failed to sufficiently establish irreparable harm. Baumgardner’s arguments to this extent may be divided among the trespass and breach of covenant claims. On the trespass claim, Baumgardner argues that, to qualify for a mandatory injunction, 12 the BRA was required to present evidence of irreparable harm. On the breach of covenant claim, 11 Michael McClendon, the Upper Basin Regional Manager for the BRA, testified at trial that the introduction of contaminants from boats launched in the Lake was one of the BRA’s particular concerns in denying applications to construct boat ramps. 12 Baumgardner asserts that the BRA was required to show extreme hardship to obtain a mandatory injunction. We disagree. A showing of extreme hardship to obtain a mandatory injunction is only required for temporary injunctions, where mandatory injunctive relief is viewed as problematic because it alters the status quo. Henry v. Smith, 637 S.W.3d 226, 244 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied). Moreover, we have authorized mandatory injunctions in the absence of a finding of extreme hardship. Peter and Camella Scamardo, FLP v. 3D Farms, No. 10-15-00163-CV, 2016 WL 102633 at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied). Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 24 Baumgardner argues that, in the absence of irreparable harm, the trial court erred in granting the injunction because it did not find that Baumgardner’s breach was substantial or distinct. Even if it did make such a finding, Baumgardner argues, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. Finally, Baumgardner argues that, even if his breach was substantial or distinct, the trial court erred in granting the injunction because the BRA failed to establish that it suffered any injury arising from his breach. We address each of these contentions in turn. 1. Trespass Baumgardner asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the injunction because the BRA failed to establish irreparable harm. We disagree. Texas courts have recognized that where a person repeatedly or continuously trespasses on another’s property, an injunction is the proper remedy because the requirements of inadequate remedy at law and irreparable harm are satisfied. E.g., Bass v. Champion Intl. Corp., 787 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1990, no pet.) (“when a person repeatedly trespasses on one’s property, the remedy of injunction is appropriate to restrain such continued trespasses. Thus the requirements of no adequate remedy at law and irreparable damage are satisfied.”); Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority Page 25 Beathard, 72 S.W.3d at 432 (“an injunction is also a proper remedy to restrain repeated or continuing trespasses… In such situations, the requirements of no adequate remedy at law and irreparable damage are satisfied”); Aguilar v. Morales, 162 S.W.3d 825, 836 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (stating that injunctive relief is a proper remedy on a successful claim for repeated or continuous trespass); Henry v.