Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ________________ NO. 09-24-00351-CV ________________ GARY W. SHAW AND PAMELA SHAW, Appellants V. 1910 LONGMIRE LLC, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6 Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 23-02-02487-CV ________________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION 1910 Longmire LLC (“Longmire”) sued Gary W. Shaw and Pamela Shaw (collectively, “the Shaws”) doing business as “All Metal Buildings” over the construction of two metal buildings.1 After a bench trial, the trial court signed a Final Judgment for Longmire awarding $56,703.16 in damages and $4,250.00 in attorney’s fees plus post-judgment interest. In six issues, the Shaws challenge the 1 For purposes of clarity, where necessary, we refer to Gary and Pamela by their first names. 1 trial court’s judgment complaining: in issue one, that the trial court erred in its findings of fact and application of the law; in issues two through five, that specific evidence purportedly admitted at trial supported the Shaws’ version of events; and in issue six, that Longmire failed to timely provide the Shaws with its trial exhibits. The Shaws also contend that Longmire lacked standing to bring this lawsuit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as discussed below. Background In February 2023, Longmire filed its Original Petition against the Shaws. Longmire pleaded that it entered into contracts with the Shaws for the construction of two metal buildings. Robert Powell was Longmire’s president and designated corporate representative. The record shows that the Shaws submitted proposals for the construction of the metal buildings that stated they were for “the Powell Office Building A” and “the Powell Office Building B.” Documents showed that the Shaws sent the proposals to the attention of Jack Carlisle, who was the corporate representative of In the Loop Construction, LLC, which acted as Longmire’s general contractor. That said, Powell himself signed the proposals. The record also contains multiple communications between Powell and Gary directly regarding terms, specifications, price, and delivery. Longmire alleged that Gary represented steel prices would increase in March 2022, and if Longmire paid forty percent down, Gary would “lock in” the lower steel 2 price. Longmire pleaded that it paid All Metal Buildings $45,446.17 “to enable Gary Shaw to place the order for the materials at the lower steel rate.” It claimed that Gary’s representation was false, and Gary failed to order the materials for the buildings until after Christmas 2022. Longmire also alleged that All Metal Buildings did not use any of the $45,446.17 as a down payment on the materials to lock in the lower rate for steel. It pleaded that Gary also falsely represented that the materials for one building would be delivered on December 17, 2022, and the materials for the other building would be delivered on December 22, 2022. It claimed that Gary knew this was false when he made the representations, because no materials were ordered until after Christmas 2022. Longmire asserted causes of action for breach of contract, common-law fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. It sought actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. The Shaws’ Original Answer contained a verified denial asserting that they did not contract with Longmire. Instead, they asserted that the contract was between Gary and Carlisle, the “Owner/Managing Member” of In the Loop Construction. Thus, the Shaws claimed they were not liable to Longmire as alleged. After a bench trial, on September 13, 2024, the trial court signed a Final Judgment for Longmire and awarded damages of $56,703.16 plus attorney’s fees of $4,250.00 to be paid jointly and severally by the Shaws. It also awarded post- judgment interest. The trial court based its judgment on the “trial evidence, 3 testimony and c[re]dibility of the witnesses presented at trial[.]” The Shaws timely appealed. On appeal, the Shaws provided this Court a single reporter’s record volume containing only the exhibits. They did not provide the reporter’s record that included any testimony adduced at trial. Standing To begin, the Shaws contend that Longmire lacked standing to sue, as their contract was with Longmire’s general contractor, Carlisle of In the Loop Construction. They also argue that “all communications, deliverables and delays” were due to the general contractor. “[S]tanding is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a suit[.]” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case, and standing is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). “[S]tanding focuses on the question of who may bring an action.” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998) (citation omitted). To establish standing, the plaintiff must allege “a concrete injury ... and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012) (citations omitted). Capacity and standing are necessary to bring a lawsuit. See Coastal 4 Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001). “A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 775 (Tex. 2020) (citation omitted). We review questions of standing de novo, construing the pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor and considering relevant evidence offered by the parties. See In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018). Despite the Shaws’ argument that their agreement was with Carlisle, the limited information available to us in the reporter’s record shows that although Gary sent the proposals containing the agreement’s terms to Carlisle’s attention, Powell signed the proposals. The record also reflects that Powell was the president and designated corporate representative of Longmire. While this undercuts the Shaws’ claim that Longmire should not be suing them, as their contract was with the general contractor, this is a question of legal authority implicating capacity to sue rather than standing. See Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 775; Coastal Liquids Transp., 46 S.W.3d at 884. Longmire pleaded that based on Gary’s representations, it paid a sum of money for the purchase of materials to lock in a lower price, but Gary failed to order the materials timely and deliver them as promised, resulting in higher prices for materials and damages to Longmire. Thus, Longmire has alleged “a concrete injury 5 ... and a real controversy” between it and the Shaws “that will be resolved by the court.” See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. Liberally construing the pleadings in Longmire’s favor and looking at the evidence in the record, we conclude that Longmire had standing to sue the Shaws. See In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155. Issues One through Six We now turn to the Shaws’ issues. The Shaws challenge the trial court’s judgment in six issues and complain: in issue one, that the trial erred in its findings of fact and application of the law; in issues two through five, that specific evidence purportedly admitted at trial supported the Shaws’ version of events; and in issue six, that Longmire failed to timely provide the Shaws with its trial exhibits. Each of these issues requires a complete reporter’s record for review. That said, the Shaws have submitted a single volume of the reporter’s record containing only the trial exhibits. We do not have a transcript containing the testimony adduced at trial, the parties’ objections, or the basis for any objections. The trial court did not make any express findings of fact or conclusions of law. In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and weight of the evidence and is responsible for resolving conflicts in the evidence. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819–21 (Tex. 2005); Webb v. Crawley, 590 S.W.3d 570, 578 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no 6 pet.). When there are no findings of fact or conclusions of law filed, all necessary findings to support the trial court’s judgment are implied. See Webb, 590 S.W.3d at 577; Sonnier v. Sonnier, 331 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.). “We review the trial court’s implied findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency, using the same standards applied in cases tried before juries.” Webb, 590 S.W.3d at 578 (citing Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991)). An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears the burden to furnish this Court with a record supporting their allegations, and absent a record of what the trial court considered, we must presume the omitted portions of the record support the trial court’s judgment. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (“The court of appeals was correct in holding that, absent a complete record on appeal, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial court’s judgment.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Gallagher v. Fire Ins. Exch., 950 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. 1997)); Menifee v. Chandler, No. 09-20-00127- CV, 2020 WL 7756149, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted) (“When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment against him, he cannot prevail without first meeting his burden of presenting a sufficient record on appeal because it is presumed that the omitted portions of the record support the trial court’s judgment.”). 7 “[R]eviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence necessarily entails our review of a reporter’s record since without one, ‘we do not know what, if any, evidence was presented to the trial court.’” In re D.D.H., No. 09-07-00139-CV, 2008 WL 4509343, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 9, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Marriage of Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.)). Likewise, where an appellant alleges the trial court committed error that warrants reversal, the error must have “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). Appellate courts can only assess error in the context of the entire record. See In re Commitment of Jones, 602 S.W.3d 908, 914 (Tex. 2020); Shorkey v. Wells, No. 02-25-00068-CV, 2025 WL 2989764, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “The burden is on the appellant to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal.” Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (citations omitted); see MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, Ltd. v. Gulley-Hurst, L.L.C., 664 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Tex. 2023) (citation omitted) (explaining that “[a] party complaining” of an abuse of discretion “has the burden to bring forth a record showing such abuse”). When the appellate record does not include a complete reporter’s record, absent circumstances not applicable here, “the reviewing court must presume that the evidence before the trial judge was adequate to support the [resulting] decision.” 8 MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, 664 S.W.3d at 109 (citation omitted); see also Menifee, 2020 WL 7756149, at *1 (citation omitted); King’s River Trail Ass’n v. Pinehurst Trail Holdings, L.L.C., 447 S.W.3d 439, 449–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (discussing appeals based on partial reporter’s record under Rule 34.6(c)). Here, as the party challenging sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied findings that support the trial court’s judgment, the Shaws had the burden to present us with an adequate reporter’s record on appeal. See Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at 229–30; Gallagher, 950 S.W.2d at 371; Menifee, 2020 WL 7756149, at *1. The Shaws repeatedly reference a “Bill of Lading” as Defense Exhibit 13. The reporter’s record containing the exhibits does not show that this exhibit was admitted at trial or even offered. While the Shaws presented a volume containing the parties’ exhibits, the record does not contain any testimony adduced at trial or establish that the Shaws sought to introduce this exhibit. Without this, we must presume the missing portions of the record support the trial court’s judgment. See Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at 229–30; Gallagher, 950 S.W.2d at 371; Menifee, 2020 WL 7756149, at *1. In a sufficiency challenge, without the missing portions, we cannot tell what testimony the Shaws adduced at trial. See In re D.D.H., 2008 WL 4509343, at *2 (citation omitted). 9 To the extent that the Shaws’ brief can be read to complain that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Defense Exhibit 13, this likewise cannot be established without a reporter’s record containing a transcript of the proceedings, and the Shaws bore the burden of presenting an adequate record. See MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, 664 S.W.3d at 109; Christiansen, 782 S.W.2d at 843; Shorkey, 2025 WL 2989764, at *2. Without this, we cannot see that the evidence was properly offered, what objections were made, whether any objections were meritorious, and whether the trial court’s rulings constituted an abuse of discretion. In other words, in this instance, because the Shaws failed to meet their burden to present an adequate record on appeal, we cannot assess in light of the whole record whether any alleged error “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); In re Commitment of Jones, 602 S.W.3d at 914. We overrule issues one through five. In issue six, the Shaws complain that Longmire failed to timely provide the Shaws with its trial exhibits. For the same reasons discussed in issues one through five above, we cannot tell whether the Shaws properly objected to this at trial, the basis of those objections, or that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Longmire’s exhibits. Since the Shaws failed to meet their burden to present an adequate record on appeal showing that the trial court abused its discretion, we 10 likewise overrule issue six. See MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, 664 S.W.3d at 109; Christiansen, 782 S.W.2d at 843; Shorkey, 2025 WL 2989764, at *2. Conclusion Having overruled the Shaws’ issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. AFFIRMED. W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice Submitted on June 4, 2026 Opinion Delivered October 1, 2026 Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ. 11