Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00720-CV ___________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF A.R., A CHILD On Appeal from the 477th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 24-8949-158 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION Proceeding pro se, Appellant Father appeals a final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship, which ordered that he and Appellee Mother be named joint managing conservators of their child, A.R.; granted Father’s requested possession and access schedule; ordered Father to place A.R. on his employer’s health and dental insurance; and required Father to pay Mother child support.1 Father—challenging the support-related financial obligations—contends that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, reversibly erred by not ruling on his special appearance, signed void orders, and violated his due-process rights. We will affirm. I. Background Mother and Father were never married to each other but are the parents of A.R., who was born in 2022. That year, Father filed a pro se petition in Tarrant County asking a trial court to name him and Mother as A.R.’s joint managing conservators and to grant them “shared custody 50/50.” The Tarrant County trial court dismissed the proceeding for want of prosecution the following year. Around nine months later, Father initiated the underlying case in Denton County. Father again requested the same custody and visitation rights. Mother filed a counterpetition requesting that Father have “standard visitation” and that she have We refer to the child and the parties by their initials or a pseudonym. See Tex. 1 Fam. Code § 109.002(d). 2 the exclusive right to determine A.R.’s primary residence and to designate the school A.R. would attend. As the case progressed, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) intervened and requested that the trial court “make appropriate orders for conservatorship[] and order appropriate current and retroactive child, medical, and dental support for [A.R.]”2 In response, Father filed a flurry of documents, including two special appearances and a motion to address custody before determining child support. The common thread running through Father’s special appearances and other filings was his contention that he was “appearing specially,” not generally. He stated that he was willing only to allow the trial court to “address and resolve the matter of custody and possession” without reaching the child-support issue; he demanded “fair notice, [a] meaningful opportunity to be heard, [a] neutral and impartial tribunal, [and] strict compliance with constitutional standards”; and he declared that he was not “waiving any jurisdictional objections” to the trial court’s making a child-support determination. The trial court made no rulings on Father’s special appearances or other filings. Eventually, the trial court held a final hearing on Father’s, Mother’s, and the OAG’s claims. Both Father and Mother proceeded pro se, and the OAG participated. See Tex. Fam. Code § 231.001 (designating the OAG as the State’s Title IV-D 2 agency); In re C.Y.K.S., 549 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Tex. 2018) (explaining that “the OAG has broad statutory standing to file ‘child[-]support action[s]’ in the course of providing [C]hapter 231 services” (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 102.007)). 3 After Father and Mother made opening statements, they testified about what they were requesting in terms of custody and visitation. Through the OAG’s and the trial court’s questioning, the trial court also heard evidence about child support. Father had the opportunity to call witnesses and offer evidence. He called and questioned only Mother, stated “[t]hat is it” when asked to call his next witness, and testified on his own behalf. The trial court heard closing arguments and then orally pronounced its rulings, including its custody, visitation, and child-support rulings. Father was ordered to pay $730 monthly for child support. At one point, Father asked why he was being ordered to pay child support if “we are doing 50/50.” The trial court responded, “That will be the ruling of the [c]ourt.” Later, the trial court asked, “Have I addressed all matter[s] that were before the [c]ourt today?” Father asked about the trial court’s ruling on the visitation schedule and about his appellate rights “if [the parties] agree[d] on the schedule, but [he] disagree[d] on the child support amount.” The trial court reiterated that its “rulings ha[d] been made on all matters” and that it would not advise him on how or what to appeal. Father responded, “I’ll find that out. Thank you.” The trial court directed Father to prepare a final order. Beyond that, Father made no objections and voiced no specific complaints about the proceeding, but he did file several post-trial motions, including challenging the amount of child support he had been ordered to pay. A few weeks later, the trial court signed a final order establishing the parent–child relationship that appointed 4 Mother and Father as A.R.’s joint managing conservators, created a possession and access schedule, and ordered Father to provide medical and dental insurance for A.R. and to pay $528 monthly in child support. Father appealed. II. Discussion Father’s opening brief raises five issues, which we quote: 1. Whether the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction due to failure of lawful service[.] 2. Whether orders entered without jurisdiction are void[.] 3. Whether participation or informal notice cures defective service[.] 4. Whether failure to rule on a [s]pecial [a]ppearance constitutes reversible error[.] 5. Whether equitable relief is warranted for payments made under void proceedings[.] Father’s argument concerning these five issues spans roughly two pages in his brief and is quite thin. After both Mother and the OAG attempted to respond to these issues, Father clarified in his reply brief that he “does not seek to disturb the equal[-]possession schedule” and challenges only whether the trial court imposed the support-related financial obligation “after constitutionally adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and objections.” Viewing Father’s five issues against this clarifying statement, we conclude that his issues all lack merit. A. Pro Se Litigants Before discussing Father’s issues, we observe that Rule 7 allows an individual to represent himself in civil matters and to litigate his own rights. Tex. R. Civ. P. 7; In re 5 Gerstner, No. 02-15-00315-CV, 2015 WL 6444797, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 23, 2015, orig. proceeding). But pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with the applicable laws and rules of procedure; otherwise, pro se parties “would be given an unfair advantage over [parties] represented by counsel.” Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves.”); Taylor v. Taylor, No. 02-19-00312-CV, 2021 WL 520452, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 11, 2021, no pet.). We hold Father to this standard. B. Personal Jurisdiction In his first and fourth issues, Father complains about the trial court’s failure to rule on his special appearance and the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him concerning the child-support issue. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a— governing special appearances—states that “[e]very appearance, prior to judgment, not in compliance with this rule is a general appearance.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a; Exito Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. 2004). As the petitioner in this lawsuit, Father entered a general appearance when he filed his petition. See Palmer v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., No. 14-23-00752-CV, 2025 WL 635254, at *2 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2025, no pet.) (“Because [Appellant] generally appeared when he filed his petition, he waived his personal[-]jurisdiction challenge.”). We 6 conclude that Father waived his complaints about his special appearance.3 Accordingly, we overrule his first and fourth issues. C. Due Process Father’s second, third, and fifth issues all revolve around his contention that the trial court violated his due-process rights. Although these three issues are couched in terms of “orders entered without jurisdiction,” “void proceedings,” and “defective service,” Father’s primary argument is that the trial court violated his due-process rights. Specifically, Father complains that the following cumulatively harmed him: • the trial court should have reached his pending special appearance before signing the child-support order; • he “was never provided a meaningful opportunity to understand the factual basis for the [OAG]’s involvement”; • he “was unable to adequately investigate the claims, prepare a defense, gather relevant evidence, identify witnesses, or formulate meaningful objections before the trial court imposed financial obligations”; 3 If Father had wanted the trial court to rule on his special appearance, he needed to bring that request to the trial court’s attention long before the trial court’s final hearing. By failing to secure such a ruling, Father consented to the trial court’s jurisdiction and waived his special appearance. See Morris v. Morris, 894 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no writ) (“Whe[n] [a party] allows a trial to proceed without obtaining a ruling on his Rule 120a motion, the special appearance is waived[,] and the party has consented to the court’s jurisdiction.”). Further, had Father pressed his special appearance, the fact that he listed his home address as being in Texas and testified about living and working in Texas—in addition to his filing the lawsuit—would have doomed his personal-jurisdiction arguments. See, e.g., Restrepo v. All. Riggers & Constructors, Ltd., 441 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish parties were Texas residents when they provided their Texas address in their pleading). 7 • he “was denied a meaningful opportunity to protect his interests before judgment was rendered”; and • generally “he was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to present evidence before the case proceeded to judgment” and was denied an “opportunity to be heard.” We conclude that Father failed to preserve and has therefore waived his due-process complaints, which he did not otherwise establish. Under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party must present to the trial court a timely request, motion, or objection, state the specific grounds therefor, and obtain a ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Even constitutional claims, such as a due-process complaint, must be raised in the trial court—and a ruling must be obtained—to preserve them for appellate review. See In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003); In re M.A.P., No. 02–11–00484–CV, 2012 WL 2036457, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 7, 2012, no pet.) (“[B]ecause Father did not assert a violation of substantive due process at trial, he waived that issue for appeal.”). Here, Father did not obtain a ruling on his special appearance, which was his burden, and cannot now complain that the trial court’s orders were void based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. See Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg 1994, no writ) (stating that a specially appearing defendant must both request a hearing and “specifically call that request to the trial court’s attention”). Additionally, Father participated in the final hearing and was able to question Mother and to testify on his own behalf. He did not request additional time to prepare 8 for the hearing and did not complain to the trial court that he was unable or had been denied an opportunity to gather evidence, to prepare for the hearing, or to fully participate during the hearing. In short, Father never objected that the trial court violated his due-process rights but is raising the issue for the first time on appeal. Because Father did not make the trial judge aware of his due-process complaints, he has not preserved the issue for appellate review. See In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d 44, 62– 63 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Even so, the record does not reflect any due-process violation. Due process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976)). What process is due is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances. Id. Father had notice of the final hearing and had an opportunity to be fully heard on his petition and to question Mother about her counterpetition. He did not challenge the OAG’s intervention petition and, from that petition, had notice that child support would be part of the final hearing. Even after the hearing, Father was able to get the trial court to reduce the amount of monthly child support he was ordered to pay, so if he had additional arguments or evidence, he could have presented them to the trial court. 9 We conclude that the record indicates that Father had notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch., 901 S.W.2d at 930. We therefore overrule his unpreserved second, third, and fifth issues. III. Conclusion Having overruled Father’s five issues, we affirm the trial court’s final order establishing the parent–child relationship. /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Delivered: November 12, 2026 10