In the Interest of A.R., a Child v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket02-25-00720-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00720-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF A.R., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 477th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 24-8949-158
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Proceeding pro se, Appellant Father appeals a final order in a suit affecting the
parent–child relationship, which ordered that he and Appellee Mother be named joint
managing conservators of their child, A.R.; granted Father’s requested possession and
access schedule; ordered Father to place A.R. on his employer’s health and dental
insurance; and required Father to pay Mother child support.1 Father—challenging the
support-related financial obligations—contends that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction over him, reversibly erred by not ruling on his special appearance, signed
void orders, and violated his due-process rights. We will affirm.
I. Background
Mother and Father were never married to each other but are the parents of
A.R., who was born in 2022. That year, Father filed a pro se petition in Tarrant
County asking a trial court to name him and Mother as A.R.’s joint managing
conservators and to grant them “shared custody 50/50.” The Tarrant County trial
court dismissed the proceeding for want of prosecution the following year.
Around nine months later, Father initiated the underlying case in Denton
County. Father again requested the same custody and visitation rights. Mother filed a
counterpetition requesting that Father have “standard visitation” and that she have
We refer to the child and the parties by their initials or a pseudonym. See Tex.
1
Fam. Code § 109.002(d).
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the exclusive right to determine A.R.’s primary residence and to designate the school
A.R. would attend.
As the case progressed, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) intervened
and requested that the trial court “make appropriate orders for conservatorship[] and
order appropriate current and retroactive child, medical, and dental support for
[A.R.]”2 In response, Father filed a flurry of documents, including two special
appearances and a motion to address custody before determining child support. The
common thread running through Father’s special appearances and other filings was
his contention that he was “appearing specially,” not generally. He stated that he was
willing only to allow the trial court to “address and resolve the matter of custody and
possession” without reaching the child-support issue; he demanded “fair notice, [a]
meaningful opportunity to be heard, [a] neutral and impartial tribunal, [and] strict
compliance with constitutional standards”; and he declared that he was not “waiving
any jurisdictional objections” to the trial court’s making a child-support
determination. The trial court made no rulings on Father’s special appearances or
other filings.
Eventually, the trial court held a final hearing on Father’s, Mother’s, and the
OAG’s claims. Both Father and Mother proceeded pro se, and the OAG participated.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 231.001 (designating the OAG as the State’s Title IV-D
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agency); In re C.Y.K.S., 549 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Tex. 2018) (explaining that “the OAG
has broad statutory standing to file ‘child[-]support action[s]’ in the course of
providing [C]hapter 231 services” (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 102.007)).
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After Father and Mother made opening statements, they testified about what they
were requesting in terms of custody and visitation. Through the OAG’s and the trial
court’s questioning, the trial court also heard evidence about child support.
Father had the opportunity to call witnesses and offer evidence. He called and
questioned only Mother, stated “[t]hat is it” when asked to call his next witness, and
testified on his own behalf.
The trial court heard closing arguments and then orally pronounced its rulings,
including its custody, visitation, and child-support rulings. Father was ordered to pay
$730 monthly for child support. At one point, Father asked why he was being ordered
to pay child support if “we are doing 50/50.” The trial court responded, “That will be
the ruling of the [c]ourt.” Later, the trial court asked, “Have I addressed all matter[s]
that were before the [c]ourt today?” Father asked about the trial court’s ruling on the
visitation schedule and about his appellate rights “if [the parties] agree[d] on the
schedule, but [he] disagree[d] on the child support amount.” The trial court reiterated
that its “rulings ha[d] been made on all matters” and that it would not advise him on
how or what to appeal. Father responded, “I’ll find that out. Thank you.” The trial
court directed Father to prepare a final order.
Beyond that, Father made no objections and voiced no specific complaints
about the proceeding, but he did file several post-trial motions, including challenging
the amount of child support he had been ordered to pay. A few weeks later, the trial
court signed a final order establishing the parent–child relationship that appointed
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Mother and Father as A.R.’s joint managing conservators, created a possession and
access schedule, and ordered Father to provide medical and dental insurance for A.R.
and to pay $528 monthly in child support. Father appealed.
II. Discussion
Father’s opening brief raises five issues, which we quote:
1. Whether the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction due to failure of
lawful service[.]
2. Whether orders entered without jurisdiction are void[.]
3. Whether participation or informal notice cures defective service[.]
4. Whether failure to rule on a [s]pecial [a]ppearance constitutes
reversible error[.]
5. Whether equitable relief is warranted for payments made under void
proceedings[.]
Father’s argument concerning these five issues spans roughly two pages in his
brief and is quite thin. After both Mother and the OAG attempted to respond to
these issues, Father clarified in his reply brief that he “does not seek to disturb the
equal[-]possession schedule” and challenges only whether the trial court imposed the
support-related financial obligation “after constitutionally adequate notice and a
meaningful opportunity to present evidence and objections.” Viewing Father’s five
issues against this clarifying statement, we conclude that his issues all lack merit.
A. Pro Se Litigants
Before discussing Father’s issues, we observe that Rule 7 allows an individual to
represent himself in civil matters and to litigate his own rights. Tex. R. Civ. P. 7; In re
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Gerstner, No. 02-15-00315-CV, 2015 WL 6444797, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct.
23, 2015, orig. proceeding). But pro se litigants are held to the same standards as
licensed attorneys and must comply with the applicable laws and rules of procedure;
otherwise, pro se parties “would be given an unfair advantage over [parties]
represented by counsel.” Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex.
1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel
and the other for litigants representing themselves.”); Taylor v. Taylor,
No. 02-19-00312-CV, 2021 WL 520452, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 11, 2021,
no pet.). We hold Father to this standard.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
In his first and fourth issues, Father complains about the trial court’s failure to
rule on his special appearance and the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
over him concerning the child-support issue. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a—
governing special appearances—states that “[e]very appearance, prior to judgment,
not in compliance with this rule is a general appearance.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a; Exito
Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. 2004). As the petitioner in this
lawsuit, Father entered a general appearance when he filed his petition. See Palmer v.
Off. of the Att’y Gen., No. 14-23-00752-CV, 2025 WL 635254, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2025, no pet.) (“Because [Appellant] generally appeared
when he filed his petition, he waived his personal[-]jurisdiction challenge.”). We
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conclude that Father waived his complaints about his special appearance.3
Accordingly, we overrule his first and fourth issues.
C. Due Process
Father’s second, third, and fifth issues all revolve around his contention that
the trial court violated his due-process rights. Although these three issues are couched
in terms of “orders entered without jurisdiction,” “void proceedings,” and “defective
service,” Father’s primary argument is that the trial court violated his due-process
rights. Specifically, Father complains that the following cumulatively harmed him:
• the trial court should have reached his pending special appearance
before signing the child-support order;
• he “was never provided a meaningful opportunity to understand the
factual basis for the [OAG]’s involvement”;
• he “was unable to adequately investigate the claims, prepare a
defense, gather relevant evidence, identify witnesses, or formulate
meaningful objections before the trial court imposed financial
obligations”;
3
If Father had wanted the trial court to rule on his special appearance, he
needed to bring that request to the trial court’s attention long before the trial court’s
final hearing. By failing to secure such a ruling, Father consented to the trial court’s
jurisdiction and waived his special appearance. See Morris v. Morris, 894 S.W.2d 859,
862 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no writ) (“Whe[n] [a party] allows a trial to
proceed without obtaining a ruling on his Rule 120a motion, the special appearance is
waived[,] and the party has consented to the court’s jurisdiction.”). Further, had
Father pressed his special appearance, the fact that he listed his home address as being
in Texas and testified about living and working in Texas—in addition to his filing the
lawsuit—would have doomed his personal-jurisdiction arguments. See, e.g., Restrepo v.
All. Riggers & Constructors, Ltd., 441 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no
pet.) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish parties were Texas residents
when they provided their Texas address in their pleading).
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• he “was denied a meaningful opportunity to protect his interests
before judgment was rendered”; and
• generally “he was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to present
evidence before the case proceeded to judgment” and was denied an
“opportunity to be heard.”
We conclude that Father failed to preserve and has therefore waived his due-process
complaints, which he did not otherwise establish.
Under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party must present to the trial court
a timely request, motion, or objection, state the specific grounds therefor, and obtain
a ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Even constitutional claims, such as a due-process
complaint, must be raised in the trial court—and a ruling must be obtained—to
preserve them for appellate review. See In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003);
In re M.A.P., No. 02–11–00484–CV, 2012 WL 2036457, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth June 7, 2012, no pet.) (“[B]ecause Father did not assert a violation of
substantive due process at trial, he waived that issue for appeal.”). Here, Father did
not obtain a ruling on his special appearance, which was his burden, and cannot now
complain that the trial court’s orders were void based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction. See Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 1994, no writ) (stating that a specially appearing defendant must both
request a hearing and “specifically call that request to the trial court’s attention”).
Additionally, Father participated in the final hearing and was able to question
Mother and to testify on his own behalf. He did not request additional time to prepare
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for the hearing and did not complain to the trial court that he was unable or had been
denied an opportunity to gather evidence, to prepare for the hearing, or to fully
participate during the hearing. In short, Father never objected that the trial court
violated his due-process rights but is raising the issue for the first time on appeal.
Because Father did not make the trial judge aware of his due-process complaints, he
has not preserved the issue for appellate review. See In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d 44, 62–
63 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
Even so, the record does not reflect any due-process violation. Due process at
a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex.
1995) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976)). What
process is due is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical
requirements of the circumstances. Id.
Father had notice of the final hearing and had an opportunity to be fully heard
on his petition and to question Mother about her counterpetition. He did not
challenge the OAG’s intervention petition and, from that petition, had notice that
child support would be part of the final hearing. Even after the hearing, Father was
able to get the trial court to reduce the amount of monthly child support he was
ordered to pay, so if he had additional arguments or evidence, he could have
presented them to the trial court.
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We conclude that the record indicates that Father had notice and an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Univ. of
Tex. Med. Sch., 901 S.W.2d at 930. We therefore overrule his unpreserved second,
third, and fifth issues.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled Father’s five issues, we affirm the trial court’s final order
establishing the parent–child relationship.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: November 12, 2026
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