Oscar Romero, Jr. v. Francis Lea Romero
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 9, 2026
Docket05-25-00968-CV
JudgeGarcia
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 9, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-25-00968-CV
OSCAR ROMERO, JR., Appellant
V.
FRANCIS LEA ROMERO, Appellee
On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. FA-22-0028
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Barbare
Opinion by Justice Garcia
Oscar Romero, (“Husband”) appearing pro se, files this restricted appeal from
a post-answer default final decree of divorce granted in favor of Francis Romero
(“Wife”). In a single issue, he argues the trial court erred in awarding his separate
property to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Wife filed an original petition for divorce alleging the marriage was no longer
supportable due to cruelty. Husband answered.
The case was subsequently dismissed for want of prosecution, but on Wife’s
motion, was reinstated. The order reinstating the case stated “This case is set for final
hearing on 2-3-25 at 9:00 a.m. No continuance will be granted unless an agreed final
order is entered before the hearing date.”
The case was called to trial on February 3, 2025 but Husband did not appear.
When the case was called, the following exchange occurred:
COUNSEL: Your Honor, we had a little problem with this case.
Whenever I was preparing the order and so forth last night I realized
that we don’t have proof that he has notice of this hearing. I need to
send a better proof to him. He is in prison. But I need to give him the
correct notice.
THE COURT: Well, the thing is he was set for a hearing before and he
didn’t show up. He was sent a notice of dismissal. He didn’t make an
appearance.
The trial continued with the prove-up of Wife’s case. Wife testified about
Husband’s violence against her and the resulting criminal charges against him for
kidnapping, continuous family violence, and obstruction or retaliation. Wife’s
Exhibit 1 showed that Husband was convicted on the first two charges and sentenced
to fifty years in prison. The protective order entered against Husband was also
admitted into evidence as well as the deed to the marital home. Wife testified that
she was asking for a disproportionate division of the community, including the
home, due to Husband’s cruel treatment. The trial court granted the divorce and
entered a final decree reciting the Husband “made a general appearance and after
due notification of the hearing date, failed to appear and has defaulted.” The decree
awarded wife the home, among other things. Husband now appeals from that decree.
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II. ANALYSIS
A restricted appeal directly attacks a default judgment. Szabuniewicz v. May,
No. 02-25-00625-CV, 2026 WL1838889, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 25,
2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). To prevail in a restricted appeal, an appellant must
establish that (1) he filed notice of the restricted appeal within six months after the
judgment was signed, (2) he was a party to the underlying lawsuit, (3) he did not
participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and did not
timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. TEX. R. APP.
P. 26.1(c), 30; Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004).
The first three requirements for a restricted appeal are jurisdictional, but the fourth
is not. Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 497 (Tex. 2020). The face of the record in a
restricted appeal consists of the papers on file with the trial court when judgment
was rendered. Clamon v. DeLong, 477 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2015, no pet.) (citations omitted). Thus, for purposes of a restricted appeal, we may
not consider evidence unless it was before the trial court when it rendered judgment.
Id.
Before we consider whether there is error on the face of the record, we must
determine whether Husband has properly invoked our jurisdiction by satisfying the
first three restricted-appeal requirements. See E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 496–97.
Regarding the first requirement, the record reflects that the default judgment was
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signed on February 3, 2025, and Husband filed his notice of restricted appeal on July
29, 2025. Thus, Husband filed his notice of restricted appeal before the six-month
deadline. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c). Husband was a party to the underlying suit.
See Reliq Health Techs., Inc. v. Resurgence Partners, LLC, No. 02-23-00211-CV,
2023 WL 8467376, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 7, 2023, no pet.). And the
record reflects that Husband did not participate in the trial court proceedings that
resulted in the judgment against him and did not file any post-judgment motions.1
See E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 495–96. Accordingly, Husband has met the three
requirements necessary to invoke our restricted-appeal jurisdiction. See id. at 497.
We next consider whether there is error on the face of the record. Generally,
no evidence is required to support a default judgment because a defendant’s failure
to appear or answer is taken as admission of the factual allegations in a plaintiff’s
operative pleading. See Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979).
However, the scope of this rule is limited in a divorce proceeding by Section 6.701
of the Family Code, which provides: “In a suit for divorce, the petition may not be
taken as confessed if the respondent does not file an answer.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.701. Thus, in a divorce case, even if the respondent fails to answer or appear, the
petitioner must adduce sufficient proof to support the material allegations in his or
1
Although Husband filed a document entitled motion to proceed pro se after the judgment was entered,
we do not view this as the type of motion seeking substantive relief that is envisioned by the Rule.
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her operative pleading. Ratisseau v. Ratisseau, 44 S.W.3d 695, 697 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d by agr.). As a result, a default judgment
rendered in a divorce proceeding is subject to an evidentiary attack on appeal.
Watson v. Watson, 286 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.); see
also Norman Comms. v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997)
(holding that an appellate court’s review of any restricted appeal may include review
of the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence).
There is, however, no sufficiency challenge here. Instead, appellant argues the
trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wife the marital home that he contends
is his separate property. In support, appellant directs us to the supplemental clerk’s
record which contains documents he sent to the trial court after the judgment was
entered. These documents were not before the trial court at the time of the hearing
so we do not consider them. See Clamon, 477 S.W.3d at 825.
The trial court in a divorce suit is charged with ordering “a division of the
estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard
for the rights of each party.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001. It is well-settled that the
trial court has broad discretion in its division of a marital estate. Murff v. Murff, 615
S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981); McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 866
(Tex. 1976). “The division ‘should be corrected on appeal only where an abuse of
discretion is shown in that the disposition made of some property is manifestly unjust
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and unfair.’” Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018); Murff, 615
S.W.2d at 698–99.
Here, the trial court’s disproportionate division of the marital estate in favor
of Wife, as recited in its final decree, on its face is not alone enough to show error
on the face of the record. See Houghtaling v. Houghtaling, No. 01-13-00547-CV,
2014 WL 3928592, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 12, 2014, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing Ginn v. Forrester, 282 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. 2009) (“Because
silence is inadequate to show error on the face of the record, we will not presume
that whatever evidence was presented at the hearing was insufficient to support the
trial court’s division of property.”)).
For purposes of the trial court’s division of the marital estate “there is no set
threshold of percentages [that is] allowed or disallowed under either the Texas
Family Code or under our jurisprudence.”); Salsman v. Salsman, No. 09-23-00379-
CV, 2025 WL 3482859, at *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 4, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op.); see also Wright v. Wright, 65 S.W.3d 715, 716 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no
pet.) (affirming an award of eighty-eight percent of the marital estate to the wife);
Simons v. Simons, No. 11-21-00066-CV, 2023 WL 2415209, at *6–8 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Mar. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming the trial court’s award of one
hundred percent of the marital estate to the wife). On the record before us, there is
nothing to establish error on the face of the record concerning the court’s award of
the marital home.
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Husband does not argue that he was not notified of the final hearing. In light
of the notice of trial setting included in the court’s order of reinstatement, we
understand Wife’s counsel’s statement about notice to mean that counsel intended
to provide notice of the hearing in addition to the notice in the court’s order on
reinstatement. We further note that the final decree also states that Husband was
notified of the hearing. Although the record reflects that Husband was incarcerated
at the time, this does not equate to lack of notice.2
It is generally presumed that a trial court hears a case only after proper notice
has been given to the parties. Campsey v. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); Custom–Crete, Inc. v. K–Bar Servs., Inc., 82
S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.). But even if our
understanding of counsel’s statement about notice is incorrect, in a restricted appeal,
the appellant bears the burden to rebut the presumption of proper notice by
affirmatively demonstrating lack of notice from the face of the record. Grant v.
Grant, No. 04-12-00315-CV, 2015 WL 5438949, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Sept. 16, 2015, no pet.). The fact that the record is silent about the sending of notices
does not establish error on the face of the record. Alexander, 134 S.W.3d at 849–50.
2
The trial court has no duty to independently inquire into the necessity of an inmate’s personal
appearance in a civil suit. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 2003).
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There is no error on the face of the record here. Husband’s issue is resolved
against him and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
/Dennise Garcia/
DENNISE GARCIA
JUSTICE
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