Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00120-CV ___________________________ EKEILA MARSH, Appellant V. BRENT MARSH, Appellee On Appeal from the 360th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 360-754076-24 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding dissolving the marriage between Ekeila Marsh (Wife) and Brent Marsh (Husband). Wife, acting pro se, challenges three postjudgment orders that were signed to effectuate the property division set forth in the trial court’s final divorce decree: (1) an Order Confirming Sale of Real Property (the Sale Order), (2) an Order Granting Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens, and (3) an Order on Motion to Vacate and to Expunge Notice of Lis Pendens (together with the Order Granting Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens, the Lis Pendens Orders).1 Raising seven issues, Wife contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by denying her motion for continuance; (2) “committed fundamental reversible error” by confirming the sale of the marital residence because the receiver appointed to sell the property failed to post the statutorily required bond; (3) “committed structural error” by commanding the bailiff to seize Wife’s phone and to delete her unauthorized recording of certain courtroom proceedings; (4) violated Rule 24.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure by “setting an unpayable $140,000” supersedeas bond; (5) erred by signing an order granting the receiver a writ of possession while Wife’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief was pending before 1 Wife’s notice of appeal was filed before the trial court had granted the relief requested in the Lis Pendens Orders. Nevertheless, because the Lis Pendens Orders appear to effectuate the appealed-from Sale Order and because Wife subsequently filed a motion in this court requesting a stay of the Lis Pendens Orders, we consider Wife’s issues to the extent that they pertain to those orders. See Chen v. Razberi Techs., Inc., 645 S.W.3d 773, 778–82 (Tex. 2022). 2 the Texas Supreme Court; (6) violated Rule 296 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by “ignoring” her request for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (7) “committed fundamental reversible error” by signing various “post[]judgment enforcement orders,” assessing “financial penalties,” and issuing a writ of possession “that actively contradicted, altered, and violated” the divorce decree’s terms. We will affirm. I. BACKGROUND Husband and Wife were divorced in October 2025. The final divorce decree provided that the couple’s marital residence (the Property) would be sold by a court- appointed receiver and authorized the receiver to set the “terms and conditions” of sale.2 Under the decree’s terms, Wife was to receive sixty percent of the net sale proceeds (minus certain amounts for closing costs, outstanding debts, attorney’s fees, and the receiver’s fees), with Husband receiving the remaining forty percent. The decree also ordered Wife to vacate the Property 48 hours before the sale’s closing. Wife did not appeal from the decree, and it became final. After marketing the Property and receiving a $685,000 offer, the receiver filed a report of sale and motion for confirmation in which she opined that the offer “represent[ed] the highest and best sales price readily obtainable after reasonable effort and due diligence” and asked the trial court to approve the proposed sale. In 2 The trial court signed an order appointing the receiver in August 2025. 3 her motion, the receiver also asked the trial court to order Wife to release the lis pendens that she had filed concerning the Property. After Wife filed a written objection to the receiver’s motion, the trial court issued a notice setting the matter for hearing on February 23, 2026. Five days before the hearing, Wife filed a motion requesting a 21-day continuance so that she could “secure counsel and adequately prepare.” But the motion was neither verified nor supported by an affidavit. At the February 23, 2026 hearing, the trial court issued oral rulings denying Wife’s motion for continuance, approving the proposed sale of the Property, and ordering Wife to release her lis pendens. The trial court later signed the Sale Order memorializing its oral rulings. Wife appealed. After Wife filed her notice of appeal, both Husband and the receiver filed motions to expunge the lis pendens; in the receiver’s motion, she also asked the trial court to order Wife to vacate the Property. These motions were based on Wife’s refusal to cooperate with the receiver regarding the pending sale. Although the trial court granted both motions and signed the Lis Pendens Orders, Wife did not expressly amend her notice of appeal to include these orders. Nevertheless, Wife filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief in this appeal specifically seeking a stay of the Lis Pendens Orders. We initially denied the motion but later ordered the trial court to set a supersedeas bond after Wife filed a second motion for emergency relief. 4 The trial court set a supersedeas bond, but Wife did not pay it. The trial court subsequently issued a writ of possession that has since been executed. II. DISCUSSION A. Denial of Requested Continuance In her first issue, Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for continuance.3 We disagree. As noted, Wife did not verify her motion for continuance or support it with an affidavit. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251 (requiring motion for continuance to be supported by affidavit). In the absence of such verification or a supporting affidavit, we presume that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for continuance. See Finley v. Finley, No. 02-11-00045-CV, 2015 WL 294012, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 22, 2015, no pet.) (per curiam) (citing Moreno v. Silva, 316 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied)). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wife’s motion for continuance. See id. We overrule Wife’s first issue. 3 Wife also argues that the trial court’s denial of her motion for continuance violated her due-process rights because it “subordinat[ed her] . . . constitutional right to counsel . . . to satisfy [the prospective home] buyer’s closing timeline.” But because there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil matters, we reject this argument. See, e.g., Henry v. Cook, No. 14-25-00089-CV, 2026 WL 1396084, at *3 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] May 19, 2026, no pet.). 5 B. Receiver’s Appointment In her second issue, Wife contends that the trial court erred by confirming the sale of the Property because the receiver acknowledged on the record that she had not posted the statutorily required bond.4 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 64.023. But because Wife did not appeal the order appointing the receiver and the deadline for doing so has long since passed, she has waived her complaint that the receiver’s appointment failed to abide by the statutory requirements. See State v. B & L Landfill, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); see also Rodriguez v. Harding, No. 04-02-00093-CV, 2002 WL 31863766, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 24, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that appellants had waived objections to receiver’s appointment in divorce proceeding because they had failed to timely appeal his appointment and because they had implicitly agreed to his appointment by agreeing to pay his fees). We overrule Wife’s second issue. 4 Wife argues that the receiver’s failure to post a bond deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the Sale Order. But she has cited no authority to support this jurisdictional argument, nor are we aware of any such authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Accordingly, we reject Wife’s contention that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Cf. Rogers v. Rogers, No. 14-00-01322-CV, 2002 WL 433052, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 21, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“The appointment of a receiver without a bond does not render the appointment void, merely voidable.” (first citing Payne v. Snyder, 661 S.W.2d 134, 140 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); then citing Johnson v. Barnwell Prod. Co., 391 S.W.2d 776, 785 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); and then citing Carlton v. Bos, 281 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1955, no writ))). 6 C. Temporary Seizure of Wife’s Phone In her third issue, Wife contends that the trial court “committed structural error” by ordering the bailiff to seize her phone and delete her unauthorized recording of the February 23, 2026 hearing without first issuing a “written contempt order.” We disagree. As an initial matter, Wife cites no authority to support her contention that the trial court was required to issue a written contempt order before taking such action. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). And even if a written contempt order had been required, because the recording has already been deleted from Wife’s phone, it does not appear that there is an available appellate remedy to correct the purported procedural error.5 Cf. Ex parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1967) (“In contempt proceedings . . . , there is no remedy by appeal.”). But even setting aside Wife’s inadequate briefing and the apparent lack of an appellate remedy, we discern no error in the trial court’s actions. A trial court has broad discretion to manage trial proceedings and to maintain a proper level of decorum and dignity in the courtroom. See Drake v. Chase Bank, No. 02-13-00340-CV, 2014 WL 6493411, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.) (noting that a trial court “has broad discretion to maintain control in the courtroom” (citing Dow 5 Wife does not request any particular remedy in her appellate brief. Further, she has not asserted that the reporter’s record of the February 23, 2026 hearing contains inaccuracies or that the purportedly erroneous deletion of her unauthorized recording of that hearing has prevented her from properly presenting her appeal. 7 Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam))); see also Lantrip v. State, 336 S.W.3d 343, 351–52 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (“The trial court has discretion in the administration of the courtroom in order to maintain a proper level of decorum and dignity.”). We cannot conclude that the trial court abused this broad discretion by acting as it did to enforce Rule 18c of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure—which authorizes a trial court to permit “broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing” of courtroom proceedings only in limited circumstances, none of which were present in this case—and its rules of courtroom conduct requiring all cell phones and other electronic devices to be turned off during courtroom proceedings.6 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18c. We overrule Wife’s third issue. D. Supersedeas Bond In her fourth issue, Wife complains about the amount of the supersedeas bond set by the trial court. But such a complaint is properly raised by a motion, not as an issue in an appellate brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 24.4(a). Indeed, Wife has filed numerous Rule 24.4 motions challenging the amount of the supersedeas bond in this 6 We take judicial notice of the trial court’s rules of courtroom conduct, which are posted on its website. See https://www.tarrantcountytx.gov/en/family- courts/360th-district-court/courtroom-conduct.html?linklocation=Button%20List&li nkname=Courtroom%20Conduct (last visited Oct. 28, 2026); see also Tex. R. Evid. 201(b), (c)(1); Campsey v. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d 767, 772 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (taking judicial notice of “the Local Rules of Court of Tarrant County, Texas”). 8 case, and we have denied all of them. Having already disposed of Wife’s complaint concerning the amount of the supersedeas bond through our presubmission rulings on her Rule 24.4 motions, we decline to revisit the issue here. Cf. Cao v. Senkbeil, No. 14-25-00502-CV, 2026 WL 1345279, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 14, 2026, pet. denied) (declining to address arguments raised in pro se appellant’s reply brief because, inter alia, she had previously raised identical arguments in two Rule 24.4 motions that had been denied in presubmission rulings). We overrule Wife’s fourth issue. E. Writ of Possession In her fifth issue, Wife contends that the trial court erred by “execut[ing]” a writ of possession while her Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief was pending before the Texas Supreme Court.7 But the filing of an emergency temporary-relief motion does not automatically stay lower-court proceedings pending resolution of the 7 Under her fifth issue, Wife also argues that the writ’s “execution bypassed the mandatory 24-hour written[-]warning requirement under Texas Property Code [Section] 24.0061 and substantively altered property terms in violation of Texas Family Code [Section] 9.007.” See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.0061(d)(1); Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007(a). But Wife has cited nothing in the record to support her contention that the officer executing the writ failed to give her the statutorily required 24-hour written warning. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Further, she neither explains how the writ’s execution altered the divorce decree’s property division nor identifies any particular terms of the divorce decree that were purportedly altered. See id. Accordingly, Wife waived these arguments due to inadequate briefing. See id.; Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (observing that error may be waived by inadequate briefing); McKinnon v. Wallin, No. 03-17-00592-CV, 2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2018, pet. denied) (holding that pro se appellant had waived his issues by inadequate briefing). 9 motion. See Khurram v. Ahmed, No. 01-24-00577-CV, 2026 WL 2023237, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 14, 2026, no pet. h.) (recognizing that “the filing of [an appellate] motion to stay [trial-court proceedings] does not result in a temporary stay pending the resolution of the motion”). And Wife has not cited any authority to support her contention that the trial court erred by allowing the writ of possession to be executed while her emergency temporary-relief motion was pending. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We overrule Wife’s fifth issue. F. The Trial Court’s Failure to File Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law In her sixth issue, Wife contends that the trial court violated Rule 296 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by “ignoring” her request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.8 But because Wife did not file the necessary follow-up notice of 8 Under her sixth issue, Wife also argues that the trial court violated her due- process rights by (1) incorrectly noting in the associate judge’s report that she had defaulted on Husband’s Motion for Enforcement by failing to appear at the duly noticed hearing and (2) purportedly “engag[ing] in improper ex parte administrative scheduling.” But because the record reflects that the trial court held a de novo hearing on Husband’s Motion for Enforcement and because the order granting the motion recites that Wife “appeared and announced ready” at the de novo hearing, Wife did not suffer any harm from the purportedly incorrect “default” notation on the associate judge’s report. Cf. In re Rangel, 677 S.W.3d 918, 926 n.11 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2023) (“[A]ny purported denial of due process during the administrative hearing . . . was rendered harmless through the de novo review.”). And because Wife has cited to nothing in the record to support her complaint about “improper ex parte administrative scheduling,” she has waived it due to inadequate briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284; McKinnon, 2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3. 10 past-due findings, she waived her right to complain on appeal about the lack of findings and conclusions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297 (requiring a litigant to file a notice of past-due findings when the trial court does not file findings within 20 days); Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala County, 682 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. 1984) (“Without [the] timely reminder [that Rule 297 requires], [the requesting party] waived its complaint of the failure on appeal.”); Com. Servs. of Perry, Inc. v. Wooldridge, 968 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (“The failure to file a notice of past[-]due findings of fact waives the right to complain about the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.”). And even if Wife had not waived her complaint, we would overrule it on the merits because “a trial court’s duty to file findings of fact and conclusions of law does not extend to post[]judgment hearings.” Murray v. Murray, 276 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d) (citing Johnson v. J.W. Constr. Co., 717 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ)). We overrule Wife’s sixth issue. G. Purported Improper Alteration of Divorce Decree In her seventh issue, Wife contends that the trial court erred by signing postjudgment enforcement orders that directly contradicted and substantively altered the terms of the divorce decree.9 We disagree. As noted, Wife’s appeal concerns only the Sale Order and the Lis Pendens 9 Orders. Accordingly, we will address Wife’s seventh issue only insofar as it pertains to these three orders. To the extent that Wife’s seventh issue purports to challenge any other postjudgment orders, we decline to address it. See Rainbow Grp., Ltd. v. 11 After signing a divorce decree, a trial court “may render further orders to enforce the division of property made or approved in the decree . . . to assist in the implementation of . . . the prior order.” Tex. Fam. Code § 9.006(a). However, a trial court’s enforcement orders may not amend, modify, alter, or change the property division. Id. § 9.007(a); Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. 2003). Thus, any such order that alters the substantive division of property in a final divorce decree is unenforceable. Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007(b). Here, contrary to Wife’s assertion, neither the Sale Order nor the Lis Pendens Orders altered the property division set forth in the divorce decree. Rather, they merely assisted in the property division’s implementation. See id. § 9.006(a). As noted, the divorce decree provided that the Property would be sold by a court-appointed receiver and authorized the receiver to set the “terms and conditions” of sale. Far from altering the property division, the Sale Order and the Lis Pendens Orders facilitated its implementation by attempting to ensure that the receiver could sell the Property as contemplated in the divorce decree. Wife has not pointed to any specific Wagoner, 219 S.W.3d 485, 492–93 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (holding that notice of appeal specifying the appeal of one order did not perfect appeal of a separate appealable order later entered by the trial court); cf. Thomas v. Thomas, No. 14- 02-01286-CV, 2003 WL 1088220, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 13, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (explaining that “[p]ostjudgment orders in aid and clarification of divorce decrees are appealable, provided they are final orders” (citing Reynolds v. Reynolds, 860 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied))). 12 terms of the divorce decree that the challenged orders purportedly altered, nor have we identified any. We overrule Wife’s seventh issue. III. CONCLUSION Having overruled all of Wife’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s orders. /s/ Bonnie Sudderth Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice Delivered: November 10, 2026 13