Joshua Peacock v. Stephanie Ann Samples
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket14-25-00875-CV
JudgeBridges
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 10, 2026
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00875-CV
JOSHUA PEACOCK, Appellant
V.
STEPHANIE ANN SAMPLES, Appellee
On Appeal from the 309th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-08991
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Joshua Peacock appeals from the trial court’s final decree of
divorce in four issues. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Peacock and appellee Stephanie Ann Samples were married in 2016. The
couple had three children. Samples filed for divorce after eight years of marriage.
Samples and Peacock eventually settled all issues related to the children. The
property division then went to trial before the bench.
Samples testified that Peacock was responsible for the marriage falling apart
because he had drug issues and anger-management problems. Samples sought a
disproportionate division of the marital estate as a result of Peacock’s issues.
Samples was a certified teacher, but once the couple had children, she became a stay-
at-home mother. Samples went back to work as a full-time substitute teacher at their
children’s school when she filed for divorce. Samples worked doing data entry and
hat design once the substitute teacher position came to an end. Peacock, on the other
hand, worked in his family’s used car business and was the primary earner for the
family.
During the marriage, the family resided in a house owned by Peacock’s
mother. Peacock acquired another house (Rental House) during the marriage that
the couple used as a rental property to supplement the family’s income. The Rental
House was located next door to Peacock’s mother’s house. Peacock testified that he
paid nothing for this property because his father bought it as a gift for him. Peacock
further testified that the deed to the Rental House was in his name only. Samples
also testified that the Rental House deed was in Peacock’s name only. Peacock
clarified during his testimony that the Rental House was never in his father’s name;
the title to the property instead transferred directly from the prior owner, someone
named David, to Peacock.
The Rental House deed was not admitted into evidence. In addition, Samples
testified that she had seen no documents supporting Peacock’s contention that the
Rental House was a gift to Peacock from Peacock’s father, or anyone else.
Additionally, Peacock, in his proposed property division submitted to the trial court
and admitted into evidence, asked the court to order the Rental House sold and the
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proceeds divided between Samples and himself. 1
Peacock also acquired the family used-car business (the Dealership) during
the marriage. Peacock testified that he bought the business from his father. The
parties did not dispute that the dealership was community property. The dispute
during the trial instead focused on the value to assign to the Dealership. Both
Samples and Peacock retained experts to provide opinions on the value of the
Dealership. Samples retained Jeremy Robin to conduct a business valuation on her
behalf. Peacock designated his own expert, but the expert did not complete a report
nor testify during the trial. Robin completed a report and testified at trial. Robin
opined that the value of the Dealership ranged from $675,000.00 to $972,000.00.
During the trial, Peacock sought to testify on the value of the Dealership.
Samples objected on numerous grounds to Peacock testifying on the Dealership’s
value. Samples argued that Peacock had not: (1) been designated as a person with
knowledge of the Dealership’s value in his discovery responses; (2) disclosed his
proposed value of the Dealership during discovery; (3) been designated as an expert;
and (4) been qualified as an expert to testify about the value of the business. Samples
also lodged numerous other objections to the questions Peacock’s lawyer asked
about the Dealership and Peacock’s subsequent answers to those questions.
Samples’ objections included speculation, hearsay, relevance, and that Peacock’s
answers were non-responsive. The trial court sustained most of these objections and
the net effect ended up being that Peacock did not offer any testimony on the value
of the Dealership when he was questioned by his trial counsel. Samples, however,
offered Peacock’s sworn inventory and appraisement into evidence as Exhibit P-68.
The inventory lists the Dealership as part of the couple’s community estate. Peacock
1
Specifically, Peacock proposed that the court split the proceeds as follows: (1) the first
$75,000.00 to Samples; (2) the remaining proceeds divided equally between the two.
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valued the Dealership at $650,000.00 on the inventory. In addition, during Samples’
cross-examination of Peacock, Samples asked Peacock if he was claiming that the
Dealership was worth $150,000.00. Peacock agreed that he was. Peacock also
admitted during cross-examination that he had previously valued the Dealership at
$600,000.00. Finally, Samples testified that she was aware that, at the time of the
trial, Peacock was claiming that the Dealership’s value was $150,000.00.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court took the matter under
advisement. The trial court issued its ruling about a month later. It determined that
the Rental House and the Dealership were both community property. The trial court
found the value of the Rental House was $411,000.00. It awarded the entire value
of the Rental House to Samples. The trial court valued the dealership at
$675,000.00. It awarded $500,000.00 of the value to Peacock and $175,000.00 to
Samples. In its rendition, the trial court awarded the Rental House to Samples and
the Dealership to Peacock. The trial court also ordered Peacock to pay Samples an
equalization payment of $175,000.00. The trial court signed the Final Decree of
Divorce on July 11, 2025. Peacock did not request findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and none were entered by the trial court. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Peacock raises four issues in his appeal. Peacock argues in his first issue that
the trial court erred when it characterized the Rental House as community property.
In his second and third issues Peacock asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
in three ways: (1) characterizing the Dealership as community property; (2)
assigning a value to the Dealership not supported by evidence; and (3) improperly
sanctioning Peacock when it prevented him from testifying on his opinion regarding
the value of the Dealership. Finally, in his fourth issue, Peacock asserts that the
cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors warrants reversal.
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I. The trial court did not err when it characterized the Rental House as
community property.
We construe Peacock’s first issue as a challenge to the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s implied finding that he failed
to overcome the community property presumption as to the Rental House.
A. Standard of review and applicable law.
The Texas Family Code defines separate property as property owned or
claimed by a spouse before marriage, acquired during the marriage by gift, devise,
or descent, or as a recovery for personal injuries sustained during the marriage. Tex.
Fam. Code § 3.001; Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001).
Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired
by either spouse during marriage. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.002; Barnett, 67 S.W.3d at
111. The characterization of property as either community or separate is determined
at the inception of title to the property. Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Inception of title occurs when a party
first has a claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested. Id. All
property possessed by either spouse during or upon dissolution of the marriage is
presumed to be community property. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(a); Barnett, 67
S.W.3d at 111.
Characterization of marital property is a conclusion of law we review de novo.
See Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987,
no writ); see also Stavinoha v. Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d 604, 608 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). We review conclusions of law
to determine whether they are correct based on the facts of the case. Stavinoha, 126
S.W.3d at 608; Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 314. We will uphold a trial court’s
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conclusions of law if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported
by the evidence. Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d at 608; Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 314.
To overcome the community property presumption a spouse claiming assets
as separate property must establish the separate character of the property by clear
and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(b); Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d at
607; Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 314. Clear and convincing evidence means the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Tex.
Fam. Code § 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002); Stavinoha, 126
S.W.3d at 607. Property one spouse acquires by gift during marriage is separate
property. Perez v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1979); Sharma v. Routh, 302
S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Tex.
Const. art. XVI, § 15). A gift is a transfer of property made voluntarily and
gratuitously, without consideration. Rusk v. Rusk, 5 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
A spouse claiming that certain property is separate must trace and clearly
identify the property as separate. Evans v. Evans, 14 S.W.3d 343, 346 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Tracing involves establishing the separate
origin of the property through evidence showing the time and means by which the
spouse originally obtained possession of the property. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 314.
The clear and convincing standard generally will not be satisfied simply by
testimony that the property is separate property when that testimony is contradicted
or not supported by documentary evidence. Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128,
139 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Any doubt as to the
character of property should be resolved in favor of the community estate. Id.
When conducting a legal sufficiency review of a trial court’s separate property
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determination, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding
to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that its finding was true. Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d at 608; see also In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding means we must (1) assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so; and (2) disregard all contrary
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to be
incredible. Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d at 608; see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at
266. If we determine that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or
conviction of the truth of the matter to be proved, we must conclude that the evidence
is legally insufficient. Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d at 608; see also In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 266. If we determine that the evidence is factually insufficient, we must
detail in our opinion why we have concluded that a reasonable factfinder could not
have credited disputed evidence in favor of the finding. Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d at
609; see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266–67.
B. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s community property
determination as to the Rental House.
Peacock argues the trial court erred when it determined that the Rental House
was community property because his father gave him the Rental House as a gift.
But, the only evidence in the record directly supporting Peacock’s contention is his
own self-serving testimony. The trial court, as the trier of fact, could have
disbelieved Peacock’s testimony. We may not second-guess or interfere with that
determination. See Hurt v. Hurt, No. 14-23-00414-CV, 2025 WL 1982875, at *5
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The credibility of
witnesses in a divorce action, including the husband and wife, is within the trial
court’s purview alone.”); Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 317 (stating that a reviewing court
is not permitted to interfere with the factfinder’s resolution of conflicts in the
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evidence or on credibility of the witnesses); cf. In re Marriage of Slagle, No. 14-16-
00113-CV, 20018 WL 2306736, at *5 n.9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May
22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Even if there were some such evidence, it would
simply create a fact issue to be resolved by the trial court and, under the standard of
review, we must presume the trial court resolved that fact issue in favor of its
separate-property finding.”). Further, while it is also true that Peacock’s mother
testified Peacock’s father bought the Rental House for Peacock and Peacock’s name
is on the Rental House’s title, she offered no testimony on Peacock’s father’s
donative intent when he allegedly bought the Rental House and transferred it to
Peacock. See Blair v. Blair, No. 14-97-00832-CV, 1999 WL 649082, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(“One controlling factor in establishing a gift is the donative intent of the grantor at
the time of the conveyance.”). Additionally, the trial court could have disbelieved
her testimony because it concluded she was biased in favor of Peacock, her son. See
Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 318 (“We must rely upon the fact finder, here the trial court,
to make findings based upon the belief or disbelief of the testimony before the
court.”).
In addition, Peacock’s testimony was contradicted by his own proposed
property division admitted into evidence during the bench trial. In his proposed
property division, Peacock asked the trial court to sell the Rental House and divide
the proceeds of the sale between himself and Samples. The trial court could have
viewed this as Peacock’s recognition that the Rental House was community
property. See In re Marriage of Williams, No. 14-15-00090-CV, 2016 WL 2997094,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The
trial court, however, did not have discretion to divest Jeff of his separate property.”).
Having reviewed the record evidence under the appropriate standard of review, we
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conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the Rental
House was community property because Peacock failed to overcome the community
property presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See Liu v. Li, No. 14-23-
00810-CV, 2025 WL 1936929, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 15,
2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding trial court erred when it characterized
spouse’s property in China as separate property in part because spouse failed to
produce any documentary evidence supporting her separate-property claim);
Graves, 329 S.W.3d at 139 (stating general rule that the clear and convincing
standard is not satisfied by testimony that property possessed at the time the marriage
is dissolved is separate property when that testimony is contradicted or unsupported
by documentary evidence tracing the asserted separate nature of the property); Blair,
1999 WL 649082, at *4 (rejecting husband’s contention that residence was separate
property because he claimed it was a gift).
We overrule Peacock’s first issue.
II. The trial court committed no errors in its handling of the Dealership.
Peacock makes multiple complaints in his second issue about the trial court’s
handling of the Dealership. Peacock begins by asserting that the trial court erred
when it characterized the Dealership as community property. Peacock next argues
that the trial court erred in its handling of the valuation of the Dealership and abused
its discretion when it allowed Samples’ expert to testify on the value of the
Dealership. Peacock further asserts that the trial court also abused its discretion
when it prohibited him from testifying on the value of the Dealership. Peacock labels
this action by the trial court as an improperly-levied sanction in his third issue.
Finally, Peacock argues that the trial court’s rulings prohibiting him from testifying
about the value of the Dealership resulted in a manifestly unjust and unfair division
of the property. We address these issues together.
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A. The trial court did not err when it characterized the Dealership as
community property.
Peacock argues that the trial court erred when it characterized the Dealership
as community property. We construe Peacock’s argument as a challenge to the legal
and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding
that he failed to overcome the community property presumption as to the Dealership.
We review this argument under the standard of review as stated in part I(A) above.
We conclude Peacock failed to overcome the community property
presumption as to the Dealership. We start by pointing out that the parties did not
dispute the community property status of the Dealership in the trial court. Further,
the evidence admitted during the trial supports the trial court’s conclusion that the
Dealership was community property. For example, Peacock testified that he bought
the Dealership from his father. In addition, Peacock’s sworn inventory and
appraisement, which was admitted into evidence, lists the Dealership as part of the
couple’s community estate. Further, in his proposed property division, Exhibit R-
41, Peacock asked the trial court to award him the Dealership but to award Samples
“a judgment in the amount of $75,000.00 to equalize the property division from the
car dealership.” Finally, Peacock offered no documentary evidence supporting his
contention on appeal that his father gave him the Dealership as a gift. We conclude
Peacock failed to overcome the community property presumption by clear and
convincing evidence and has not shown error by the trial court when it concluded
that the Dealership was community property.
B. Standard of review and applicable law on the remainder of
Peacock’s complaints in his second and third issues.
We review a trial court’s division of community property for an abuse of
discretion. Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981)). The
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test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably,
or whether it acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. We
presume the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it divided the
community estate. Id. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some
evidence of a substantive and probative character to support its decision. Id.
Each party in a divorce proceeding has a burden to present sufficient evidence
of the value of the community estate to enable the trial court to make a just and right
division. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 698–99. Because a trial court’s discretion is not
unlimited, there must be some reasonable basis for an unequal division of the
property. Knight, 301 S.W.3d at 728. Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the
legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error,
but instead factors used in assessing whether an abuse of discretion has occurred.
Id. In other words, Peacock must not only show that there is insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s findings, but also that an erroneous finding caused the
trial court to abuse its discretion in the overall division of the community estate. See
Wheeling v. Wheeling, No. 08-15-00064-CV, 2017 WL 192912, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Jan. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Accordingly, we must also
determine whether the errors of which Wife complains of on appeal, if established,
caused the trial court to abuse its discretion.”); Matter of Marriage of McCoy & Els,
488 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“We make
a two-pronged inquiry: (1) Did the trial court have sufficient information upon which
to exercise its discretion; and (2) Did the trial court err in its application of
discretion?” (internal quotations omitted)). When, as here, the trial court does not
sign findings of fact, we presume the trial court made all necessary findings to
support its judgment if those findings are supported by the evidence. Matter of
Marriage of McCoy & Els, 488 S.W.3d at 433–34.
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We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex. 2011); Moral v. Mem’l Point
Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 410 S.W.3d 397, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without regard to any
guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d
238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). We reverse an evidentiary ruling only if it probably caused
the rendition of an improper judgment. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34
S.W.3d 887, 906 (Tex. 2000); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1).
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require parties to amend and supplement
written discovery regarding a testifying expert, including the provision of the
expert’s written reports. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.5, 193.6, 194A, 195A.6. A party
who fails to amend his written discovery in a timely manner may not introduce into
evidence the material that was not timely disclosed unless the trial court finds that
(1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the
discovery response; or (2) the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the
discovery response will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.
Id. 193.6(a). The burden of establishing good cause or lack of unfair surprise or
prejudice is on the party seeking to introduce the evidence. Id. 193.6(b). A finding
of good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice must be supported by the record.
May v. Ticor Title Ins., 422 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
no pet.).
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled
Peacock’s objections to Samples’ expert testifying on the value of
the Dealership.
We turn first to Peacock’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to exclude Robin’s report that was produced four days
before trial. Peacock argued that he was surprised and prejudiced because Robin
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valued the Dealership between $675,000.00 and $972,000.00. Peacock argued that
it is “black letter” law that an expert’s report must be produced thirty-days before
trial. Peacock continued that since Robin’s report was produced well after that
deadline, the trial court should have either prohibited Robin from testifying or
continued the trial for ten days so he could prepare a response to Robin’s valuation.
Samples responded that Robin’s late valuation report was caused by
Peacock’s delays in providing requested materials, even after the trial court granted
two motions to compel. Samples stated that Robin did not receive all the materials
he needed and that had been requested through discovery until the week before trial
was scheduled to start. Samples asserted that Robin produced his report as quickly
as possible after he received the necessary materials from Peacock. Samples pointed
out that Peacock had initially valued the dealership at $650,000.00 in his sworn
inventory and appraisement, but he had then amended his inventory the day before
trial to reduce the value to $150,000.00. Samples argued that Peacock had unclean
hands in asking the trial court to exclude Robin from testifying or for a continuance
after he caused the delays. Samples also argued that Peacock could not be surprised
by Robin’s valuation because his initial sworn inventory and appraisement valued
the Dealership at $650,000.00. The trial court denied Peacock’s motion and
permitted Robin to testify regarding the Dealership’s value. Robin’s report was also
admitted into evidence.
Based on the record before us we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Peacock’s motion to exclude Robin from testifying
because the record establishes that Samples showed good cause for the delay in
producing her expert’s report. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(b); Forman v. Fina Oil and
Chemical Co., 858 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (concluding trial court
abused discretion when it excluded plaintiff’s late-designated expert because the
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plaintiff had established good cause for the late designation by demonstrating it was
caused by the defendant’s own conduct).
D. Peacock cannot show he was harmed by the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings prohibiting him from testifying about the
Dealership’s value.
Next Peacock complains about the effect of the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings during trial that, in his view, effectively prohibited him from testifying on
the value of the Dealership, a business that he owned. Peacock argues that he should
have been allowed to testify about the value of the Dealership because owners of
businesses, like owners of real property, are permitted to testify about the value of
the owner’s business. Even if we assume for purposes of appeal that Peacock
preserved this argument for appellate review and that the trial court should have
allowed Peacock’s testimony, we conclude the error was harmless because, as
summarized above, evidence regarding Peacock’s lay opinion on the value of the
Dealership was admitted during the trial through other sources. See Tex. R. App. P.
44.1(a); Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 668-70 (Tex. 2018) (holding that
exclusion of one expert’s testimony on future medical costs was harmless because
the record contained some evidence of excluded expert’s opinion).
E. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the
community property.
Peacock next argues that, because the trial court improperly excluded his
testimony regarding the value of the Dealership, it abused its discretion when it
divided the community estate because it did not have sufficient information to
exercise its discretion. Matter of Marriage of McCoy & Els, 488 S.W.3d at 433.
Because the trial court had evidence on the value of the Dealership provided by both
Samples and Peacock, and the value it assigned the Dealership was within the range
of that evidence, we conclude that Peacock has not shown an abuse of discretion by
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the trial court. See In re Marriage of Hardin, 572 S.W.3d 310, 314–15 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (concluding trial court abused discretion when it assigned
zero value to wife’s contingent annuity retirement asset because the evidence
established the retirement asset had some value); Van Heerden v. Van Heerden, 321
S.W.3d 869, 880 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (holding trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it divided community estate because the
parties offered contradictory values and the trial court’s decision was within the
range of the values presented); Knight, 301 S.W.3d at 728 (stating that a trial court
does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative
character to support its decision).
F. The trial court did not sanction Peacock.
Peacock argues in his third issue that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings
prohibiting him from testifying on the value of the Dealership functioned as an
improperly-levied sanction. We disagree. We begin by pointing out that the record
does not contain any orders signed by the trial court striking any of Peacock’s
witnesses, including his designated expert. The record instead reflects that Peacock
did not present his designated valuation expert during the trial. Further, the trial
court did not issue a ruling directly prohibiting Peacock from testifying on the value
of the Dealership. Instead, the record establishes that Samples lodged numerous
different objections to either Peacock’s counsel’s questions or Peacock’s answers
that the trial court sustained. Peacock has not challenged any of these rulings on
appeal. Additionally, Samples objected to Peacock testifying on the value of the
Dealership because he had not been disclosed as a person with knowledge of the
value of the Dealership. An exclusion on this basis is a matter of admissibility not
a sanction. See Amudo v. Amudo, No. 01-17-00318-CV, 2018 WL 3059729, at *5
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that
15
excluding evidence under Rule 193.6 is not a death penalty sanction); In re Marriage
of Collier, 419 S.W.3d 390, 407 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied) (rejecting
appellant’s argument that trial court’s ruling excluding an exhibit was a sanction
because trial court’s ruling was based on the proposed exhibit not being complete).
Because Peacock has not challenged any of Samples’ actual objections that the trial
court sustained in his appeal, he has not shown the trial court abused its discretion
on any of those rulings.
Having rejected each argument Peacock raised in his second and third issues,
we overrule those issues.
III. There was no cumulative impact of the trial court’s challenged rulings
that require reversal.
Peacock argues in his fourth issue that the trial court’s “individual and
cumulative errors” in the trial court’s just and right division of the community estate
are not de-minimus and require the case to be remanded for a new division. Because
we have already determined that Peacock has not shown reversible error by the trial
court, there can be no cumulative error or harm. See In re Nissan N. Am., Inc., 711
S.W.3d 66, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, orig. proceeding) (stating that
“where there are no errors, there can be no cumulative error.”); Haynes v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 598 S.W.3d 335, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet.
dism’d) (rejecting cumulative harm argument because reviewing court did not find
any errors); Matbon, Inc. v. Gries, 288 S.W.3d 471, 490 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009,
no pet.) (“The cumulative-error doctrine does not apply in this case because we have
not found any errors committed by the trial court that are non-reversible when
viewed in isolation.”). We overrule Peacock’s fourth issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled appellant Joshua Peacock’s issues raised in his appeal, we
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affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce.
/s/ Chad Bridges
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Wise, McLaughlin, and Bridges.
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