Full Opinion

Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing Denied; Memorandum Opinion filed August 20, 2026 Withdrawn; Judgment filed August 20, 2026 Vacated; Affirmed and Substitute Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2026 In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-25-00865-CV WILMA REYNOLDS AND CARL GORDON, Appellants V. QUANTLAB FINANCIAL, LLC; QUANTLAB INCENTIVE PARTNERS I, LLC; QUANTLAB TRADING PARTNERS US, LP; AND DAVID REYNOLDS, Appellees On Appeal from the 300th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 134266-F SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM OPINION We issued a memorandum opinion on August 20, 2026, affirming the trial court’s judgment. Pro se appellants Wilma Reynolds (“Wilma”) and Carl Gordon (“Gordon”) have filed a motion for rehearing. We withdraw our memorandum opinion and judgment dated August 20, 2026, issue today’s substitute memorandum opinion and judgment in their stead, and deny appellants’ motion for rehearing. Appellants appeal pro se the trial court’s order dismissing Wilma’s lawsuit against appellees Quantlab Trading Partners, U.S., LP, Quantlab Incentive Partners I, LLC, Quantlab Financial (collectively “Quantlab”), and David Reynolds (“David”). In what we construe as two issues, appellants argue the trial court erred in granting David’s and Quantlab’s motions for summary judgment and sanctions and denying Wilma’s motion for release of in-camera documents, motion to compel discovery, and motion for a hearing continuance. We affirm. I. Background For years, appellant Wilma, represented by appellant Gordon,1 filed lawsuits seeking to access documents the trial court inspected in camera and determined were irrelevant as to her divorce proceeding against appellee David. Since then, Wilma has sought access to the documents in her belief that they reveal substantial assets that David fraudulently concealed during the divorce proceedings and the division of their marital property. The documents concern David’s employment and bonuses with appellees Quantlab. Our prior opinions provide a detailed history of the extensive litigation and appeals stemming from David and Wilma’s 2009 divorce. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Quantlab Trading Partners US, LLP, No. 14-23-00829-CV, 2024 WL 4643378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 31, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); Reynolds v. Quantlab Trading Partners US, LP, No. 14-21-00087-CV, 2023 WL 313248, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 19, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Over the past fourteen years, Wilma [and] Gordon have filed twenty-one 1 After the trial court granted the underlying judgment but before briefing was submitted to this Court, Gordon was suspended from practicing law in Texas. 2 appellate and mandamus proceedings in this court related to the underlying divorce proceeding, docketed as case Nos. 14-09-00720-CV, 14-10-00535-CV, 14-10- 00951-CV, 14-11-00002-CV, 14-11-00174-CV, 14-11-00626-CV, 14-11-01097- CV, 14-12-00379-CV, 14-13-00323-CV, 14-13-00589-CV, 14-13-00871-CV, 14- 13-00924-CV, 14-13-01029-CV, 14-14-00329-CV, 14-14-00624-CV, 14-14- 00875-CV, 14-14-00423-CV, 14-14-00080-CV, 14-15-00990-CV, 14-17-00614- CV, 14-18-00746-CV.”); see also Reynolds v. Reynolds, No. 14-09-00720-CV, 2010 WL 3418209 at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 31, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming the divorce decree because Wilma accepted the benefits of it). And this Court has numerous times explained why Wilma’s complaints and attempts at seeking the documents and relitigating the division of the marital estate are unmeritorious—she accepted the benefits of the divorce decree, failed to make a showing of extrinsic fraud, is collaterally estopped from relitigating the marital-property division, and her claims against appellees are barred by res judicata. E.g., Reynolds, 2023 WL 313248, at *5–9; Reynolds v. Reynolds, No. 14-15-00990-CV, 2017 WL 1366680, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Reynolds v. Reynolds, No. 14- 14-00080-CV, 2015 WL 4504626, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Reynolds, 2010 WL 3418209, at *4. We have even affirmed and explained why sanctions previously assessed in response to Wilma’s claims against appellees were appropriate. Reynolds, 2023 WL 313248, at *8–9. On April 29, 2025, we dismissed Wilma’s appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of her latest action against appellees. Reynolds v. Quantlab Trading Partners US, LLP, No. 14-25-00043-CV, 2025 WL 1232068, at *1 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam). The very next day on April 30, 2025, Wilma filed a “Petition for Division of Undivided 3 Property” against appellees in the underlying proceeding, reasserting her claims against appellees for common law fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, negligent misrepresentation, theft liability act, conversion, money had and received, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and for division of undivided community property. Wilma’s petition acknowledged the prior litigation between the parties over the subject matter but alleged that res judicata did not bar her claims because the facts had changed or new facts had emerged. Specifically, Wilma alleged the facts had changed because “[t]he Quantlab in camera documents have never been reviewed by a trial court or appellate court to determine if the documents are relevant to the issue of damages, division of property[,] or the issue of division of marital property.” Quantlab and David each filed a motion for traditional summary judgment and for sanctions, arguing in relevant part that all of Wilma’s claims were barred by res judicata and seeking recovery of their attorneys’ fees. Wilma filed motions for the release and transfer of the sought in-camera documents, to compel discovery, and for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing. The trial court denied Wilma’s motions. In her response to Quantlab’s motion for summary judgment, Wilma argued res judicata did not bar her claims because Wilma asserts claims against Quantlab and David for fraud, conspiracy and other related damages claims because in the divorce case [appellees] grossly undervalued the estate’s bonuses by concealing material financial information in connection with providing false testimony. . . . The Divorce Decree and subsequent judgments entered in this case do not bar Wilma’s personal injury claims on the basis of res judicata because there has been a change in material facts to negate the application of res judicata. . . . Specifically, the in camera documents and other estate material financial information will prove that material facts regarding the estate’s assets were grossly undervalued causing Wilma’s damages. 4 On June 13, 2025, the trial court granted Quantlab’s motion for summary judgment and motion for sanctions, finding that Wilma’s lawsuit was frivolous, filed in bad faith, and intended to harass and needlessly increase the costs of litigation and awarding Quantlab $66,055.00 in attorney’s fees, as well as conditional attorney’s fees, against appellants. On October 3, 2025, the trial court granted David’s motion, made the same findings, and awarded him $15,487.50 in attorney’s fees, as well as conditional appellate attorney’s fees, against appellants. This appeal followed. II. Res Judicata Appellants argue the trial court erred in granting David and Quantlab’s motions for summary judgment and sanctions and denying Wilma’s motion for release of in-camera documents, motion to compel discovery, and motion for a hearing continuance. A. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s order granting a traditional summary judgment de novo. Mid–Century Ins. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007). A defendant may establish its right to summary judgment as a matter of law by conclusively establishing each element of an affirmative defense. See Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 607 (Tex. 2013); Clark v. ConocoPhillips Co., 465 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). When the trial court’s order granting a summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied on for the ruling, the summary judgment will be affirmed if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Olmstead v. Napoli, 383 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 5 If the movant conclusively establishes its entitlement to an affirmative defense, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence sufficient to create a fact issue on at least one element of either the movant’s affirmative defense or an exception to that affirmative defense. See Mejia, City of Houston v. Mejia, 606 S.W.3d 901, 904–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. See Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2016) B. Applicable Law “Res judicata, or claims preclusion, prevents the re-litigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit.” Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). “The doctrine of res judicata in Texas holds that a final judgment in an action bars the parties and their privies from bringing a second suit ‘not only on matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit.’” Compania Financiara Libano, S.A. v. Simmons, 53 S.W.3d 365, 367 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630). “For res judicata to apply, there must be: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the first action.” Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007). “Under the transactional approach followed in Texas, a subsequent suit is barred if it arises out of the same subject matter as the prior suit, and that subject matter could have been litigated in the prior suit.” Id. (citing Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 6 631). A final judgment on an action extinguishes the right to bring suit on the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. See Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 449. “A determination of what constitutes the subject matter of a suit necessarily requires an examination of the factual basis of the claim or claims in the prior litigation. It requires an analysis of the factual matters that make up the gist of the complaint, without regard to the form of action. Any cause of action which arises out of those same facts should, if practicable, be litigated in the same lawsuit.” Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 629. “Claim preclusion prevents splitting a cause of action.” Id. Joinder of tort claims with a divorce suit is encouraged, when feasible. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. 1993). Tort claims in divorce cases, like other civil actions, are subject to the principles of res judicata. Id. at 624. Res judicata applies to the property division in a final divorce decree, just as it does to any other final judgment, barring subsequent collateral attack even if the divorce decree improperly divided the property. See Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. 1990); DeAcetis v. Whitley, No 14-08-00429-CV, 2010 WL 1077904, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that appellant’s claims of fraud, conspiracy, and conversion which related to the determination of ownership of certain real property were barred by res judicata because such property was awarded to the defendant in the final divorce decree and appellant either did or could have asserted her claims in the divorce proceeding); see also Nelson v. Williams, 135 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding res judicata barred claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, civil conspiracy, and negligence because the underlying matter, i.e., fraud concerning the value of the community estate, could have been litigated in the divorce case). 7 C. Analysis Wilma and Gordon argue that their claims are not barred by res judicata because there has been a change in the material facts between the first judgment and the underlying lawsuit. Specifically, Wilma and Gordon argue: [T]he in camera documents and other estate material financial information will prove that material facts regarding the estate’s assets and Quantlab bonuses were grossly undervalued by [appellees] causing Wilma’s damages. . . . These new material facts derived from the in camera documents therefore as a matter of law negate the application of res judicata because there has now been a change in the adjudication of material facts between the Final Decree of Divorce, subsequent judgments, and the summary judgment proceeding in this suit. Contrary to appellants’ argument, the summary judgment record does not contain the in camera documents or any evidence establishing what new material facts the documents establish, nor do appellants articulate the new facts or provide any support in the record for their allegations concerning the in camera documents. Instead, appellants’ argument is again premised on Wilma’s subjective belief of what the documents will show. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 14-15-00990-CV, 2017 WL 1366680, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). More importantly, the disputed documents, their materiality, and Wilma’s ability to obtain relief have been previously addressed by the trial court and this Court throughout Wilma’s multiple lawsuits. Here, the summary judgment record includes copies of relevant documents, such as the original petition for divorce; the final decree of divorce; Wilma’s motion in trial cause No. 48170 seeking a ruling on the in camera documents; David’s response to Wilma’s request for production in trial cause No. 48170 producing the documents for “chambers in camera review”; the trial court’s order 8 from December 7, 2011, in cause No. 48170 stating that the documents “do not show David Reynolds’ earnings, potential earnings, share or interest in Quantlab”; and Wilma’s petition for bill of review seeking access to the documents in trial cause No. 48170. The record also includes copies of this Court’s opinions regarding Wilma’s attempts to access the documents in appellate causes 14-23- 00829-CV, 14-15-000990-CV, 14-14-00624-CV, 14-14-00080-CV, 14-11-01097- CV, 14-11-00174-CV, 14-10-00720-CV. The opinions in the record show our prior explanations of our conclusion that Wilma could have and should have known of the in camera documents through the exercise of ordinary diligence: The test is whether Wilma was unaware of the claims she raises in the present case and, if she was unaware, whether she could have discovered the availability of these claims had she exercised due diligence. See [Reynolds, 608 S.W.3d at 558–59.] In 2012, when Wilma filed her bill of review, her allegations included that David had given false testimony, concealed documents, and introduced false evidence concerning the division of property. See Reynolds, 2015 WL 4504626, at *2. In the original divorce proceeding, Wilma continually sought discovery because she suspected that David and the other defendants were concealing assets from her, and she was entitled to a greater portion of the marital property. Stated differently, Wilma was aware of her potential claim for fraud since the original divorce proceeding. Thus, Wilma was previously aware of, or could have discovered through the exercise of due diligence, the same claims she raises in the present suit. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that res judicata is not negated by Wilma’s due diligence in seeking discovery. Reynolds, 2023 WL 313248, at *7; see also Reynolds, 2015 WL 4504626, at *3 (“The facts discussed in the background section above show that Wilma was aware of the community estate’s interests in [Quantlab] at the time of the property division trial, and the parties litigated the appropriate method to divide these interests.”). 9 The opinions also show our prior explanations of why Wilma is estopped from re-litigating the division of the marital estate as a result of her acceptance of the benefits of that judgment: After losing her appeal challenging the divorce decree’s property division, Wilma filed this bill of review action. In this action, as explained above, Wilma again challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate, specifically the handling of the estate’s interest in [Quantlab]. A party cannot use a bill of review as an additional remedy after that party has made a timely, but unsuccessful, appeal because that party cannot demonstrate that she has been prevented from making a claim or defense. Hatton v. Grigar, No. 14–05–01053–CV, 2006 WL 3365494, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 21, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). That is exactly the situation we face here. The question of how to divide Wilma and David’s marital estate, including the estate’s interest in [Quantlab], was litigated in the trial court and resolved by the divorce decree. Wilma then timely appealed that issue to this Court. Wilma ultimately lost that appeal based on her acceptance of the benefits of the divorce decree. Reynolds, 2015 WL 4504626, at *3; Reynolds, 2010 WL 3418209, at *2 (“Within ten days of the trial court’s signing of the divorce decree, David had transferred the $3,220,874.74 to Wilma’s account and she had spent $1.7 million of that amount.”). The opinions explain to Wilma that there already has been a determination that the in camera documents are immaterial: Wilma’s bill-of-review allegations were based, at least in part, on her belief that documents she had sought in discovery after filing a petition for modification of the parent-child relationship would reveal that David had concealed documents, given false testimony, and introduced false evidence in the property division trial. See In re L.R., 416 S.W.3d 675 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). The documents were submitted to the trial court handling the modification proceeding for in camera inspection and after that 10 inspection, the trial court found the documents were not relevant and denied Wilma’s motion to compel seeking their production. Id. The trial court then granted David’s motion for directed verdict and Wilma appealed. Id. Wilma sought discovery of the same documents in the bill-of-review proceeding at issue here. Reynolds, 2015 WL 4504626, at *2 n.1; see also Reynolds, 2023 WL 313248, at *2 (“Judge Hufstetler ruled that these documents contained ‘no relevant’ information relating to David’s QTP interest, income, or bonuses.”); Reynolds v. Reynolds, No. 14-14-00624-CV, 2015 WL 7456059, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In her first issue, Wilma contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to compel David to produce [Quantlab’s] financial records. We overrule this issue because a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to compel a litigant to produce financial records containing information found in other documents that already have been produced in discovery.”); In re Reynolds, 14-11-01097-CV, 2012 WL 51028, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 10, 2012, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“The trial court made a ruling by a November 17, 2011, letter that the documents contained ‘no relevant information.’”). We conclude the summary judgment record is conclusive that the state of the evidence and the facts known to the parties has not changed. See Reynolds, 2017 WL 1366680, at *3 (“The premise behind Wilma’s latest proceeding against David is her belief that community property—specifically David’s accrued bonuses from [Quantlab] that were retained in accounts controlled by [Quantlab]—was not divided by the 2009 divorce decree. This subjective belief by Wilma is insufficient to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to compel and granted David’s motion for protection.”). Because the evidence also conclusively establishes that res judicata bars Wilma’s claims, see Reynolds, 2023 WL 313248, at *5–7, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion when 11 it denied Wilma’s motions for release of in-camera documents, to compel discovery, and for a continuance on the summary judgment hearing. See Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2009); Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004). Appellants argue that the evidence does not establish appellees’ right to summary judgment because the trial court judgments and findings, as well as this Court’s prior opinions, that support the summary judgment are void. In support of this argument, appellants point to language in this Court’s opinion from 2025 in Wilma’s appeal from the dismissal of her 2023 “original petition” in which she asserted that appellees’ grossly misinterpreted the value of certain assets disposed of in the divorce decree. Specifically, appellants point to this Court’s language in the 2025 opinion stating: “According to the law of the case doctrine, we are bound by our prior determination that the trial court’s plenary power expired on June 17, 2009.” Reynolds, 2025 WL 1232068, at *2; see also id. at *1 (“In our most recent opinion in connection with the Brazoria County 2009 divorce, we determined that the trial court’s plenary power expired on June 17, 2009—30 days after the trial court signed the divorce decree.” (citing Reynolds, 2024 WL 4643378 at *3)). Based on this language, appellants argue that the relevant prior judgments and findings by the trial court, as well as this Court’s corresponding opinions, are void as to (1) Wilma’s post-divorce petition for the division of the community property composed of David’s interest and bonuses in Quantlab that were not divided in the divorce degree and (2) Wilma’s post-divorce petition for modification of child support. In other words, appellants argue that the trial court’s adverse judgment on Wilma’s petition for post-divorce division of community property and the trial court’s adverse finding concerning the materiality of the in-camera documents, which occurred in Wilma’s modification proceeding, are void, and the trial court 12 thus erred in granting the summary judgment in the underlying proceeding. Through this argument, appellants seeks to misconstrue and twist the extensive and confusing litigation and appeals they have incessantly engaged in to their benefit. For the reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded. Wilma and David’s divorce was litigated in the trial court under trial cause number 48170, and the trial court issued a final judgment—its final divorce decree and division of property—on May 18, 2009. Reynolds, 2024 WL 4643378 at *3. As to that judgment and the division of the marital property divided in the decree, the trial court lost plenary power on June 17, 2009. Id. In 2011, Wilma filed a petition for modification of child support and a bill of review seeking to revisit the divorce decree’s division of the marital estate, both of which the trial court had jurisdiction over. Reynolds, 2015 WL 4504626, at *2; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.001(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by this section, a court acquires continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matters provided for by this title in connection with a child on the rendition of a final order.”); S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 438 (Tex. 2022) (“The only way to obtain a ‘just and right’ division of the property after divorce was through a bill of review that could set aside the former judgment by establishing extrinsic fraud (whereas intrinsic fraud would be insufficient).”). As part of those proceedings, the trial court performed an in-camera review of the disputed documents and found that the documents were not relevant. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of Wilma’s bill of review, and we also rejected Wilma’s petition for mandamus as to the trial court’s irrelevant finding. See In re Reynolds, 2012 WL 51028, at *1; Reynolds, 2015 WL 4504626, at *2. In 2015, following those rulings, Wilma filed a petition seeking post-divorce division of community property she alleged was not divided by the trial court in 13 the divorce decree. The trial court also had continuing jurisdiction to address this claim, which was also docketed under trial cause 48170. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.201(c) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the court that rendered a final decree of divorce . . . dividing property under this title retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to render an order under this subchapter to divide property not divided or awarded to a spouse in the final decree.”); S.C., 650 S.W.3d at 439–40 (providing that Subchapter C of Chapter 9 of the Family Code “allows property that was never divided to be divided for the first time”). The trial court granted David’s summary judgment motion based on collateral estoppel and issued a final judgment as to that litigation dismissing Wilma’s claim, which we affirmed on direct appeal. Reynolds, 2017 WL 1366680, at *4. In 2023, the trial court seemingly mistakenly sent a notice of its intent to dismiss the case in trial cause 48170 for want of prosecution and signed an order to that effect. Reynolds, 2024 WL 4643378, at *2. Subsequently, Wilma and Gordon filed a new “original petition” in trial cause 48170 in June 2023, asserting claims based on Wilma’s allegation that David and Quantlab grossly misinterpreted the valued of certain of David’s assets with Quantlab in the divorce proceedings. In essence, that new “original petition” again sought to attack, relitigate, and re-divide marital property already disposed of in the original divorce decree. The trial court dismissed that 2023 “original petition,” and Wilma and Gordon appealed. In disposing of that appeal, we discussed the procedural history noted above and concluded that the trial court’s order dismissing that underlying 2023 new “original petition” was void because the trial court’s plenary power over the original divorce decree had expired on June 17, 2009. See Reynolds, 2024 WL 4643378, at *3. That opinion did not, nor was it intended to, stand for the proposition that the trial court’s orders in all the litigation that followed its May 18, 2009 final judgment on 14 the divorce proceeding were void because there were matters on which it did have continuing jurisdiction: Wilma’s petition for modification of child support and her petition for post-divorce division of previously undivided marital property. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 9.201(c), 155.001(a). Subsequent to the release of that opinion, Wilma filed yet another post- divorce division of community property lawsuit against appellees on November 13, 2024. See Reynolds, 2025 WL 1232068, at *1–2. The trial court granted appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Wilma’s claim. Id. On direct appeal, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. In reaching that conclusion, we referred to the June 17, 2009, expiration of the trial court’s plenary power over the divorce decree. That date did not govern the trial court’s plenary power over Wilma’s first post-divorce decree petition for division of undivided community property or for modification of child support. In any event, the conclusion that the trial court and this Court lacked jurisdiction over that appeal was proper. For these reasons, we reject appellants’ argument that the judgments and opinions necessary to affirm the trial court’s underlying summary judgment are void. As such, we also reject appellants’ objections to appellees’ summary judgment evidence and their argument that the evidence does not establish appellees’ right to summary judgment as a matter of law. III. Motion for Sanctions Wilma and Gordon also challenge the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Quantlab and David as sanctions pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 10 and Rule of Civil Procedure 13. A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law A trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of 15 discretion. See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004); Thottumkal v. McDougal, 251 S.W.3d 715, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action, but whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Cire, 134 S.W.3d. at 838–39. When determining if the trial court abused its discretion, we engage in a two-part inquiry. First, we determine whether the punishment was imposed on the true offender and tailored to remedy any prejudice caused. Thottumkal, 251 S.W.3d at 717. Second, we must make certain that less severe sanctions would not have been sufficient. Id. We will not conclude that a trial court abused its discretion in levying sanctions if some evidence supports its decision. Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014). Generally, courts presume that pleadings and other papers are filed in good faith. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. 1993). The party seeking sanctions bears the burden of overcoming this presumption of good faith. Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 10.004 states “[a] court that determines that a person has signed a pleading or motion in violation of [s]ection 10.001 may impose a sanction on the person, a party represented by the person, or both.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 10.004(a). Section 10.001 provides: The signing of a pleading or motion as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a certificate by the signatory that to the signatory’s best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry: (1) the pleading or motion is not being presented for any improper purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 16 (2) each claim, defense, or other legal contention in the pleading or motion is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) each allegation or other factual contention in the pleading or motion has evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual contention, is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) each denial in the pleading or motion of a factual contention is warranted on the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. Id. § 10.001. “Importantly, Rule 13 does not permit sanctions on the issue of groundlessness alone. Rather, the filing in question must be groundless and also either brought in bad faith, brought for the purpose of harassment, or false when made.” Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 362–63. A pleading or motion is not groundless merely because it is not a winner, lacks legal merit, or because we disagree with the factual and legal assertions. Mattox v. Grimes Cnty. Comm’rs Ct., 305 S.W.3d 375, 386 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). 1. Analysis Here, the trial court found that Wilma’s underlying lawsuit “is frivolous and groundless, was filed for an improper purpose including to harass and needlessly increase the costs of litigation, and was filed in bad faith[.]” On appeal, appellants argued the trial court erred because “[n]o sanctionable conduct has occurred” and “Wilma’s claims are viable in law and/or fact.” As previously discussed, this Court has numerous times addressed and explained why Wilma’s claims are not viable in law. Furthermore, we have explicitly addressed why res judicata bars Wilma’s exact claims in the underlying proceeding, which she immediately reasserted in a new trial court cause the day 17 after our opinion was released. This clearly contradicts appellants’ assertion that Wilma’s claims are viable and that no sanctionable conduct has occurred. The trial court could have reasonably found that Wilma’s pleadings were brought for the purpose of harassment or in bad faith because Wilma previously litigated the same issues and claims, has received explanations from this Court for the numerous unfavorable results, and has received sanctions by the trial court that were upheld on appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 10.001, 10.004(a); Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Reynolds, 2023 WL 313248, at *7–9. The record also conclusively establishes that Gordon has represented Wilma throughout the litigation. We reject appellants’ argument that “[n]o sanctionable conduct has occurred” and that “Wilma’s claims are viable in law and/or fact” and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees to Quantlab and David as sanctions. See Thottumkal, 251 S.W.3d at 717; Reynolds, 2023 WL 313248, at *7–9. IV. Conclusion We overrule appellants’ issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Brad Hart Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Hart and McLaughlin. 18