Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-25-00373-CV NEXT LEVEL AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, APPELLANT V. ALLIED SOLUTIONS, LLC, APPELLEE On Appeal from the Tarrant County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 2024-004794-1, Honorable Don Pierson, Presiding October 28, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. Pending before this Court is Appellee’s motion for rehearing. We grant Appellee’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our memorandum opinion of August 12, 2026, and substitute this opinion in its stead. 1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. Where there is a conflict with the precedent of this Court, this appeal has been decided in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3; Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex. 2022). Appellant, Next Level Automotive, LLC, appeals a no-answer default judgment against it and obtained by Appellee, Allied Solutions, LLC. Appellant claims the trial court improperly granted the judgment because Appellee failed to properly effect service of process and filed in an improper venue. We affirm. BACKGROUND On June 26, 2024, Appellee filed its Original Petition against Appellant for foreclosure of security interest, conversion, and a declaratory judgment related to a Consumer Loan and Security Agreement for the purchase of a vehicle. On October 1, 2024, citation and a writ of sequestration were issued against Appellant. Appellant was served on October 31, 2024, and the return was filed on November 6, 2024. On January 16, 2025, Appellee filed Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition against Appellant and Dejanique Deshay Hodges (Hodges). No additional causes of action were added against Appellant, but Hodges was added to the lawsuit for breach of contract. Based on the record, citation and a writ of sequestration were re-issued against Appellant on February 10, 2025, and against Hodges on February 14, 2025. The record contains an Officer’s Return of Service filed May 1, 2025, indicating Hodges was not served. The record does not contain a similar return regarding service or attempts of service of Appellant. Based on the record, neither Appellant nor Hodges filed an answer. On July 2, 2025, Appellee filed its Notice of Nonsuit without Prejudice as to Hodges only, which the trial court entered on July 7, 2025, effectively removing her from the case. A few weeks later, Appellee filed its Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, representing to the trial court that Appellant was duly served with process on October 31, 2024, and 2 the officer’s return was on file as required by law. Thereafter, Appellee filed a Citation Return (Amended) clarifying “Brandon Stewart, as registered agent” was served on behalf of Appellant. The trial court entered a default judgment against Appellant on September 18, 2025. On October 14, 2025, Appellant’s corporate representative, Brandon Stewart, filed its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Notice of Hearing. The trial court did not rule on this motion, so the motion was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c). On October 17, 2025, Appellant timely filed its Notice of Appeal and brief. Appellee did not favor us with a brief. By this appeal, Appellant argues the trial court’s default judgment should be set aside under the Craddock factors, claiming Appellant did not receive proper notice. We disagree. ANALYSIS Default judgments are greatly disfavored under Texas law, consistent with the strong policy preference for adjudicating cases on the merits. Tabakman v. Tabakman, 728 S.W.3d 703, 707 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam) (citing In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916, 921, 925 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)). Because no-answer default judgments are disfavored and courts lack jurisdiction over defendants who were not properly served with process, a default judgment cannot stand when the defendant was not served in strict compliance with the applicable requirements. Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam); Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 3 (Tex. 1990) (“[J]urisdiction is dependent upon citation issued and served in a manner provided for by law.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 124. The party requesting service bears the responsibility of ensuring that the record affirmatively shows strict compliance, and a failure to do so renders the attempted service of process invalid and of no effect. Garcia v. Ennis, 554 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2018, no pet.) (citations omitted). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 118 allows for “liberal amendment of the return of service to show the true facts of service.” Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 118. However, the defaulting party has the burden of proving there was no notice and must produce evidence in addition to an allegation in a motion for new trial. In re D.K., No. 02-09-00117-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 9945, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary, Appellee properly served Appellant’s registered agent, Brandon Stewart, at Appellant’s registered office pursuant to the Texas Business Organizations Code. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.201(a)–(b)(1). Appellee also ensured the record affirmatively showed strict compliance with the service requirements. The Citation Return, filed November 6, 2024, and included in the supplemental record, clearly establishes Appellee obtained proper service of citation on Appellant almost a year prior to the entry of the default judgment against Appellant. The Citation Return (Amended) filed August 7, 2025, supplemented the original citation return to accurately reflect Brandon Stewart as Appellant’s registered agent. Based on the record now before this Court, Appellant failed to prove there was no notice of Appellee’s case against it. 4 Furthermore, Appellee was not required to obtain new service of its First Amended Petition on Appellant. For a default judgment to stand, a nonanswering party must be served with a more onerous amended petition under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a; Weaver v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 570 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1978); see In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2009). “More onerous” is anything that exposes the defendant to additional liability. In re Marriage of Day, 497 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); see Caprock Constr. Co. v. Guaranteed Floorcovering, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ). Because Appellee’s First Amended Petition did not allege any new causes of action or damages against Appellant, Appellee was not seeking a more onerous judgment by this filing. Therefore, Appellee was not required to serve the amended petition upon Appellant prior to seeking its default judgment. Having found proper service in the record, to set aside the default judgment, Appellant must satisfy the three-factor standard established in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939). Assuming, arguendo, the first factor has been met, Appellant must “set up” a meritorious defense. Tabakman, 728 S.W.3d at 710 (citing Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 927–28 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam)). Appellant has asserted improper venue as his defense. However, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provide that “[a]n objection to improper venue is waived if not made by written motion filed prior to or concurrently with” all other defensive pleadings other than a special appearance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 86(1); Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1994); see Scott v. McMillian, No. 02-05-00410-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4311, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 18, 5 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Venue requirements, unlike jurisdictional requirements, may be waived, even if mandatory.”). Improper venue is not a merits-based defense; venue concerns where the action proceeds rather than the facts constituting a defense to a cause of action. Additionally, this second prong in the analysis requires Appellant to allege facts which in law would constitute a defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action, and those facts must be supported by affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof that there is such a defense to be made. See Tabakman, 728 S.W.3d at 710; Dolgencorp, 288 S.W.3d at 928. Appellant could have presented evidence to develop the record to support his potential meritorious defenses. It did not. As conclusory allegations are insufficient, Appellant did not establish the second Craddock element. Thus, we end our analysis, and we overrule Appellant’s issue. Appellant is not entitled to a new trial under the Craddock analysis. CONCLUSION Having overruled Appellant’s issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Laura A. W. Pratt Justice 6