Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-26-00022-CV IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF JASPER WAYLON THOMAS On Appeal from the 115th District Court Upshur County, Texas Trial Court No. 25-230-DCCV-00070 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION Jasper Waylon Thomas was civilly committed for treatment and supervision after being adjudicated as a sexually violent predator by an Upshur County jury. On appeal, Thomas argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury to presume that Thomas was not a sexually violent predator. We overrule Thomas’s sole point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Background Thomas is a repeat sexually violent offender. Thomas was convicted of indecency with a child in 1994 and placed on ten years’ deferred adjudication. Thomas violated those terms when he was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child in 2001. He was sentenced to twenty- five years’ imprisonment. Thomas was released on parole in 2022, only to again violate his terms of supervision by being alone with children and by failing to attend “sex-offender treatment.” He was reincarcerated and is set to discharge his sentence by January 2027. The State petitioned to have Thomas declared a sexually violent predator and committed for treatment and supervision pursuant to Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, the Sexually Violent Predators Act. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001–.209. At trial, the State presented evidence from Dr. Darrell Turner, a forensic psychologist, who reviewed Thomas’s file and met with Thomas briefly for two interviews. Turner testified that he believes that Thomas has a behavioral abnormality that makes Thomas likely to reoffend sexually. Thomas, testifying on his own behalf, claimed both that he regretted his wrongful 2 actions and maintained his innocence and that the children made all of the sexual advances towards him. After the parties rested, the trial court reviewed the proposed jury instructions. The trial court struck Thomas’s ninth instruction of the jury charge and used the rest of Thomas’s instructions as the jury charge. Although the proposed jury charge containing the ninth instruction is not in the record, the reporter’s record shows that the struck portion stated that “Jasper [Thomas] is presumed not to be a sexually violent predator.” In his brief, Thomas further describes what he requested as a “typical instruction,” such as what was requested in an unrelated case, In re Commitment of Rozalez. See In re Commitment of Rozalez, No. 11-24-00010-CV, 2026 WL 246985 at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). In In re Commitment of Rozalez, the suggested instruction read, “[Appellant] is presumed not to be a sexually violent predator. The allegation by the State that the [Appellant] is a sexually violent predator creates no inference that he is a sexually violent predator at his trial.” Id. (first alteration in original). The jury did not receive that instruction, but rather received the following instructions regarding the burden of proof: The burden of proof in this case rests upon the State throughout the trial and never shifts to [Thomas]. The State has the burden of proving that [Thomas] is a sexually violent predator and it must do so by proving this beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not required that the State prove this beyond all possible doubt. It is required that the State’s proof exclude all reasonable doubt concerning whether or not [Thomas] is a sexually violent predator. In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not [Thomas] is a sexually violent predator after considering all the evidence before you and these 3 instructions, you will say by your verdict that [Thomas] is not a sexually violent predator. Thomas was found to be a sexually violent predator by the jury and was ordered civilly committed. Thomas appeals over the struck jury instruction. II. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s refusal to submit a jury instruction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012); In re Commitment of Williams, 539 S.W.3d 429, 444–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). “A trial court may refuse to give a requested instruction or definition that is not necessary to enable the jury to render a verdict, even if the instruction or definition is a correct statement of the law.” In re Commitment of Renshaw, 598 S.W.3d 303, 316 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (quoting In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied)). The trial court’s judgment should not be reversed “for a charge error unless the error ‘probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or “probably prevented the [appellant] from properly presenting [his] case” on appeal. Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 687 (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 61.1 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a))); see In re Commitment of Williams, 539 S.W.3d at 444. III. Analysis Thomas argues that, although civil commitments are civil in nature, they carry loss of liberty implications and standards of proof akin to a criminal proceeding. Therefore, Thomas reasons that the trial court should submit to the jury explanatory instructions to clarify the presumption of his status of not being a sexually violent predator. 4 Our sister courts have reviewed this argument and “have held that it is not error to refuse to submit the instruction that [Thomas] requested.” In re Commitment of Rozalez, 2026 WL 246985, at *9. The First Court of Appeals determined that the trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to give an instruction about a presumption that is not mandated by either statute or caselaw. In re Commitment of Jarvis, No. 01-23-00555-CV, 2025 WL 594620, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re Commitment of Pearson, No. 07-23-00208-CV, 2023 WL 8248052, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, Nov. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)). As noted by the Second Court of Appeals, “[s]imply, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing an instruction that the jury apply a presumption mandated solely by Appellant’s concept of fairness but not by the law.” In re Commitment of Shield, No. 02-24- 00497-CV, 2025 WL 1271928, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Further, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals has held that an instruction stating that the State carries the burden is sufficient, and that an additional “presumption” instruction is not required because it reiterates the same concept. In re Commitment of Mueller, No. 14-23-00044-CV, 2023 WL 8943743, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 28, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, we agree and conclude that the jury instructions given by the trial court were sufficient without the additional language requested by Thomas. The jury instructions state, “The State has the burden of proving that [Thomas] is a sexually violent predator and it must do so by proving this beyond a reasonable doubt.” That instruction properly signaled that the sexually violent-predator status must be proven and is therefore not presumed. It explains 5 clearly that the State carried the burden of proof under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Thomas’s requested instruction would have reiterated the same concepts already contained in this language. For these reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give additional instruction that Thomas was presumed not to be a sexually violent predator. We, therefore, overrule Thomas’s sole point of error. IV. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice Date Submitted: July 30, 2026 Date Decided: August 27, 2026 6