Full Opinion

September 16, 2026 The Honorable Cecil Bell, Jr. Chair, House Committee on Intergovernmental Affairs Texas House of Representatives Post Office Box 2910 Austin, Texas 78768-2910 Opinion No. KP-0527 Re: Scope of municipalities’ authority to enter into intergovernmental support agreements with U.S. military installations (RQ-0608-KP) Dear Representative Bell: Your request pertains to whether the City of Socorro, a home-rule municipality, may legally enter into an intergovernmental support agreement (“IGSA”) with a federal military installation. 1 You explain that the City “has tentatively agreed to perform custodial services for” the United States Army Garrison Fort Bliss, Texas in exchange for payment. Request Letter at 1– 2. Yet this agreement, as you tell us, has raised concerns regarding whether it “is an appropriate governmental function for the City,” with you reasoning that the Texas Constitution limits “city funds [to] be spent only to carry out a municipal purpose.” Id. at 2 (referencing TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 51, 52(a); id. art. VIII, § 3). We thus understand your inquiry to be whether the expenditure of “public funds” to fulfill the City’s agreement with Fort Bliss comports with the Texas Constitution. Id. at 1–2. As this office does not “construe or approve specific contracts,” we respond generally as to the pertinent legal principles, without opining on the validity of the City’s IGSA. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0099 (2016) at 1. IGSAs are a product of federal law, in which state law governs a reciprocal framework that applies to home-rule municipalities. An IGSA is a statutory creature. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 2679; TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 793.001–.002. Codified in title 10, section 2679 of the United States Code, an IGSA is a particular kind of “legal instrument . . . between the Secretary concerned and a [s]tate, local, or 1 Letter and Exhibits from Hon. Cecil Bell, Jr., Chair, H. Comm. on Intergovernmental Affairs, to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. at 1 (July 16, 2025), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/request- files/request/2025/RQ0608KP.pdf (“Request Letter” and “Exhibits,” respectively) (Exhibits on file with the Op. Comm.). See generally Exhibit B at 1–51 (City’s charter). Though you reference a specific exhibit—a “Performance Work Statement” in Exhibit A, see Request Letter at 1—none was provided. See Exhibit A at 1–9 (listing services provided by other governmental bodies presumably under IGSAs). The Honorable Cecil Bell, Jr. - Page 2 tribal government.” 10 U.S.C. § 2679(f)(4). This can include an agreement between a “municipality,” see id. § 2679(f)(2), and the Secretary of the Army, see id. § 101(a)(9)(A), who is the “head of the Department of the Army,” id. § 7013(a)(1). The instrument specifically involves the provision, receipt, or sharing of “installation-support services,” id. § 2679(a)(1), which are “those services, supplies, resources, and support typically provided by a local government for its own needs[,] . . . without regard to whether such services, supplies, resources, and support are provided to its residents generally,” 2 id. § 2679(f)(1); e.g., Exhibit A at 1 (exemplifying waste removal, public transportation, and custodial services as types of installation-support services). An IGSA is further limited to those “installation-support services” that the providing party “already provides . . . for its own use.” 10 U.S.C. § 2679(a)(3). Under section 2679, the Secretary concerned may enter into an IGSA after first “determin[ing] that the agreement will serve the best interests of the department by enhancing mission effectiveness or creating efficiencies or economies of scale, including by reducing costs.” Id. § 2679(a)(1). The state counterpart is found in Chapter 793 of the Government Code, which governs the reciprocal authority for “local government[s].” See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 793.002. Section 793.002 permits “a local government” to enter into an IGSA “with a branch of the armed forces of the United States” under the above federal framework “to provide installation-support services to a military installation located in this state.” Id. This must be done “[i]n accordance with the provisions that apply to an interlocal contract under Chapter 791” of the Government Code. Id. A “local government” under this provision includes a “municipality,” see id. §§ 791.003(4)(A), 793.001, which, of course, encompasses a home-rule municipality, see Town of Lakewood Vill. v. Bizios, 493 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. 2016) (explaining that Texas law recognizes home-rule municipalities as a type of municipality); see, e.g., PPC Enters., Inc. v. Texas City, 76 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753, 763 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (discussing Chapter 791 in reference to an interlocal agreement where at least one “local government” was a home-rule municipality). This state framework thus applies to home-rule municipalities. Cf., e.g., City of Corpus Christi v. O’Brien, No. 13-08-00267- CV, 2009 WL 265281, at *6 & n.8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 5, 2009, pet. denied) (including home-rule municipalities under the term “municipality” in a different framework). Home-rule municipalities entering into an IGSA under the federal framework may not act inconsistently with Chapter 793 of the Government Code. Chapter 793, however, must be viewed in conjunction with the reality that home-rule municipalities, like the City, are a unique kind of government entity. Instead of looking to the Legislature for grants of power, these municipalities derive their power from the Texas Constitution. See Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1975); see also TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). This derivation means they carry the “full power of local self-government,” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 51.072(a), that is exercised in accordance with their municipal charter, see id. § 5.004. But a home-rule municipality’s “broad discretionary powers” do not provide a pass to freely disregard the Constitution or state law. City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of 2 Section 2679 expressly excludes certain services from this definition, none of which are relevant here. See 10 U.S.C. § 2679(f)(1). The Honorable Cecil Bell, Jr. - Page 3 Tex., 794 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. 1990). Article XI, subsection 5(a) of the Texas Constitution prohibits a municipal charter or ordinance from “contain[ing] any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State[] or the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). As such, the Legislature can limit a home-rule municipality’s powers so long as it does so with “unmistakable clarity.” Lower Colo. River Auth., 523 S.W.2d at 645 (quoting City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. 1964)). And if “a home-rule municipality chooses to take advantage of a statutory [framework] when it is not required to do so,” it will be subject to the legislative limitations imposed by that framework. Greater New Braunfels Home Builders Ass’n v. City of New Braunfels, 240 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. App.— Austin 2007, pet. denied); see, e.g., City of Carrollton v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 170 S.W.3d 204, 211–14 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that once a home-rule municipality seeks to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity, it is subject to the statutory procedures related to the issuance and discontinuance of that certificate). Put simply, home-rule municipalities “are subject to and may be limited only by their charters or by the Constitution or by general law.” Lower Colo. River Auth., 523 S.W.2d at 644. The result is that home-rule municipalities that wish to enter into an IGSA under the federal framework may not act inconsistently with the state statutory framework. See id.; see also City of Carrollton, 170 S.W.3d at 211–16. We understand the City seeks to enter into an IGSA that would be subject to Chapter 793. 3 See Request Letter at 1–2. But as a threshold matter, you appear to suggest that this action would be inconsistent with the City’s charter. See id. at 2–3. Determining whether that is the case would certainly involve construing the charter, which is generally outside the scope of the opinion process. 4 See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0511 (2026) at 1. Nonetheless, your inquiry concerning the constitutionality of the expenditure of public funds to fulfill the IGSA would be moot if the City did not have authority to enter into the agreement in the first place. We therefore presume for purposes of this opinion that the charter permits the City to enter into an IGSA that is consistent with section 793.002. Of your three constitutional concerns, only the limitation imposed by article VIII, section 3 of the Texas Constitution could be triggered by your inquiry. Authority to enter into an IGSA is just one part of the equation. As you tell us, the IGSA at issue will involve the expenditure of “public funds in order to provide services.” Request Letter at 2. The Texas Constitution “prevent[s] the application of public funds to private purposes.” Byrd 3 You do not appear to challenge whether the IGSA at issue is consistent with section 793.002. See Request Letter at 1–3; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 793.002. We presume it is for purposes of this opinion. 4 You note that the charter lacks an “explicit[] authoriz[ation]” to enter into the IGSA at issue. Request Letter at 2–3. Yet, the City presumably construed its charter to permit it to enter into the IGSA when it “tentatively agreed” to do so. Id. at 1. The charter also states that “[t]he enumeration of particular powers by [the] [c]harter shall not be adjudged to be exclusive” and “it is intended that the City shall have and may exercise all the powers which would be competent for [the] [c]harter to enumerate specifically.” Exhibit B at 9 (quoting Socorro, Tex., City Charter, art. II, § 2.01(C) (2020)). Even more, the charter grants the City “all such authorities and privileges that are now or hereafter provided to cities by State [l]aw and such power and authority, both express and implied, as necessary to accomplish and enforce any such duty, program[,] or public purpose.” Id. at 11 (quoting Socorro, Tex., City Charter, art. III, § 3.04 (2020)). At bottom, this all only highlights the existence of a question of the charter’s construction, which this office declines to answer in the opinion process. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0511 (2026) at 1. The Honorable Cecil Bell, Jr. - Page 4 v. City of Dallas, 6 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1928). This includes the provisions you reference: article III, section 51 and subsection 52(a) and article VIII, section 3. See TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 51, 52(a); id. art. VIII, § 3; accord Byrd, 6 S.W.2d at 740; see also Request Letter at 2. The expenditure of public funds to fulfill an IGSA thus yields to these constitutional limitations to the extent applicable. Cf., e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. KP-0035 (2015) at 3 (exemplifying that statutory authority does not relieve compliance with the Constitution), GA-0078 (2003) at 3 (same). In determining the constitutionality of such an expenditure, we consider only those provisions you reference, as “an exhaustive treatment” of your inquiry is outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. AC-0003 (2023) at 2 n.5. Two of the provisions you reference complement one another. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0234 (2019) at 2. Section 51 of article III restricts the Legislature from “mak[ing] any grant or authoriz[ing] the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations whatsoever.” TEX. CONST. art. III, § 51. Subsection 52(a) of the same article restricts the Legislature from “authoriz[ing] any . . . city . . . to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, association or corporation whatsoever.” Id. art. III, § 52(a). Relevant here, these provisions apply only if the receiver of an alleged gift is an individual, association, or corporation. See id. art. III, §§ 51, 52(a). It is a longstanding principle that “the United States” does not fit into these categories for the purposes of these provisions. See King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Austin 1941, writ ref’d w.o.m.); cf., e.g., State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, 47 P.2d 637, 646–47 (Mont. 1935) (per curiam); Malone v. Peay, 17 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tenn. 1929); Lancey v. King Cnty., 45 P. 645, 646–47 (Wash. 1896). This office has affirmed as much with respect to the application of subsection 52(a) to a federal agency. 5 See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0008 (2015) at 2–3. It is well settled that the Army is part of the “armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4). The Army is, of course, “within the Department of the Army.” Id. § 7062(b). The Department of the Army is, in turn, part of the “Department of Defense,” id. § 111(a), (b)(6), which is itself an “executive department of the United States,” id. § 111(a). 6 Cf. also Botello v. United States, No. CV B-08-67, 2008 WL 11464849, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2008) (acknowledging that these departments are federal agencies). It therefore follows that section 793.002 does not trigger the limitations in article III, section 51 and subsection 52(a) of the Texas Constitution, as “a branch of the armed forces of the United States” for IGSA purposes is not an individual, association, or corporation under these constitutional provisions. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 793.002; see TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 51, 52(a). Stated differently, section 793.002 does not violate these two provisions. Neither provision would thus prohibit a municipality from expending public funds to fulfill an IGSA with the Army that is subject to section 793.002 of the Government Code. 5 We recognize that several older opinions applied section 51 to circumstances where the federal government was the recipient. See, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. MW-25 (1979) at 1–2, H-257 (1974) at 1, 3–4. Given the similarities between subsection 52(a) and section 51, we find KP-0008, the most recent guidance on this matter, to be persuasive for section 51 claims as well. See generally Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0008 (2015) at 2–3. 6 A recent executive order has ordered that the Department of Defense be “once again . . . known as the Department of War.” Exec. Order No. 14347, 90 Fed. Reg. 43893 § 1 (Sept. 5, 2025). However, the executive order also states that “[s]tatutory references to the Department of Defense . . . shall remain controlling until changed subsequently by law.” Id. at 43893, § 2(e). We are unaware of a law that has since changed the reference to “Department of Defense” in section 111. See 10 U.S.C. § 111(a). The Honorable Cecil Bell, Jr. - Page 5 Section 3 of article VIII, however, uses different language that makes no reference to an individual, association, or corporation. Compare TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, with id. art. III, §§ 51, 52(a). Instead, it simply provides that “[t]axes shall be levied and collected . . . for public purposes only.” Id. art. VIII, § 3. This language has been described as “control[ling] purpose directly,” as opposed to controlling the purpose “by specifying who may not receive it.” GEORGE D. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 609 (1977). Thus, this provision requires tax dollars to be expended for a public purpose. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Lubbock, 326 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. 1959); Neal v. Boog-Scott, 247 S.W. 689, 690–91 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1923, no writ). The limitation imposed by article VIII, section 3 could therefore be triggered by your inquiry if the expenditure at issue involves tax dollars. A home-rule municipality’s expenditure of tax dollars to enter into an IGSA subject to section 793.002 of the Government Code, when permitted by its charter, could constitute a public purpose of the municipality, but the City must determine in the first instance if that is the case here. Assuming tax dollars are involved, that raises the issue as to whether an expenditure to fulfill an IGSA achieves a “public purpose[].” TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. The question of “[w]hat is a public purpose cannot be answered by any precise definition further than to state that if an object is beneficial to the inhabitants and directly connected with the local government[,] it will be considered a public purpose.” Davis v. City of Taylor, 67 S.W.2d 1033, 1034 (Tex. 1934) (quoting 6 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 292 (2d ed. 1928)); see also Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF Loc. 975, 692 S.W.3d 288, 304 (Tex. 2024) (recognizing this principle). It is clear though that any public purpose will not suffice: It must be a public purpose of the governmental entity providing the funds—i.e., for a “municipal purpose.” 7 Davis, 67 S.W.2d at 1034–35; accord, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0104 (2016) at 1–2 (limiting the accomplishment of a “public purpose” to “a public purpose of a county” for subsection 52(a) purposes). 8 But “[t]he determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a legislative function,” Bland, 37 S.W.2d at 293, that is entitled to deference unless that purpose for which public funds are expended is “clearly not [for] public purposes,” Davis, 67 S.W.2d at 1034; accord Bland, 37 S.W.2d at 293. This reality is bolstered by the fact that where the Code Construction Act applies, statutes are presumed to be constitutional and to favor the public interest over any private interest. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021(1), (5); see, e.g., id. §§ 1.002, 311.002 (relating to the Code Construction Act’s application). 7 To the extent you refer to a “governmental function” as distinct from a “proprietary function,” see Request Letter at 2 (citing Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. S-55 (1953)), it has been held in cases involving a city that the “municipal purpose” required under article VIII, section 3 does not reflect any such dichotomy, Goodnight v. City of Wellington, 13 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1929); see also Bland v. City of Taylor, 37 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. App.— Austin 1931), aff’d sub nom. Davis, 67 S.W.2d at 1036 (Tex. 1934) (citing Goodnight where a home-rule municipality was involved). 8 Like the Texas Supreme Court, we recognize that the public purpose element under article VIII, section 3 is similar to an element of article III, subsection 52(a) that requires an expenditure to “accomplish a . . . public purpose.” See Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 301, 304. We therefore find opinions and cases construing that element of subsection 52(a) persuasive here. See, e.g., id. at 304 (quoting Davis v. City of Taylor, an article VIII, section 3 case, when construing this element of subsection 52(a)). The Honorable Cecil Bell, Jr. - Page 6 Against this background, we address what we understand to be the root of your concern with the IGSA at issue—whether the expenditure achieves a municipal purpose. See Request Letter at 2. An expenditure will achieve a public purpose of a municipality “[t]o the extent a municipal expenditure . . . serves one of the municipality’s powers or functions.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0181 (2018) at 2; see, e.g., Davis, 67 S.W.2d at 1035 (looking at a city’s authority to conclude advertising “can reasonably be included in the general powers and purposes of the municipal government” to justify an expenditure of tax dollars). This is so even if an expenditure that “accomplish[es] an authorized municipal purpose . . . incidentally benefits a private person.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0528 (2007) at 3; accord Wheeler v. City of Brownsville, 220 S.W.2d 457, 462–63 (Tex. 1949). Here, we presume the charter permits the City to enter into an IGSA that is subject to Chapter 793 of the Government Code. See supra p. 3. The Code Construction Act applies to section 793.002 of that statutory framework, see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1.002, meaning it is presumed to favor the public interest and to be constitutional, see id. § 311.021(1), (5). Indeed, this provision does not on its face “clearly” indicate that expending tax dollars to fulfill an IGSA would not serve a public purpose of a municipality. Davis, 67 S.W.2d at 1034; see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 793.002. On the contrary, the Legislature’s express requirement that these agreements abide by the interlocal agreements framework in Chapter 791, see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 793.002, supports the public purpose of “increas[ing] the efficiency and effectiveness of local governments,” id. § 791.001. Further, acting to maintain a stable or harmonious relationship can, at times, be deemed to “benefit[] the public,” Borgelt, 692 S.W.3d at 305–06, and these agreements are federally recognized to “strengthen meaningful, long term ties with communities and strategic stakeholders” and “form[] partnerships,” U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG. 5-9, INSTALLATION AGREEMENTS ¶ 8-2(a)–(b). It therefore follows that tax dollars spent to fulfill the municipal power to enter into an IGSA would generally indicate that the expenditure serves a public purpose of a municipality. See Davis, 67 S.W.2d. at 1035; see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0181 (2018) at 2. Nevertheless, it is ultimately for the City to determine in the first instance, subject to judicial review, whether a particular expenditure to fulfill its IGSA with Fort Bliss serves a public purpose of the City. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. KP-0099 (2016) at 2, KP-0104 (2016) at 2. The Honorable Cecil Bell, Jr. - Page 7 S U M M A R Y Article VIII, section 3 of the Texas Constitution requires tax dollars to be spent for public purposes. When a home-rule municipality’s charter permits entry into an intergovernmental support agreement subject to section 793.002 of the Texas Government Code, the municipality’s expenditure of tax dollars to fulfill this municipal power may constitute a public purpose of the municipality. Nevertheless, the City of Socorro must determine in the first instance if a particular expenditure of tax dollars to fulfill its IGSA with the United States Army Garrison Fort Bliss, Texas accomplishes a public purpose of the City. Very truly yours, KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel MICHAEL C. COTTON Chair, Opinion Committee