Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00115-CV Rachael MORRIS, Appellant v. Marcus MORRIS, Appellee From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022-CI-05582 Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding PER CURIAM Sitting: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: September 30, 2026 ORDER ON ABILITY TO AFFORD COSTS REVERSED This is a review of the trial court’s order finding Appellant Rachael Morris can afford to pay court costs. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(g). We reverse and remand. 04-26-00115-CV BACKGROUND Appellant Rachael Morris and Appellee Marcus Morris divorced in 2022 and have two children together. 1 The final decree of divorce provided for the conservatorship, possession, and access to their two children. Both parties subsequently sought to modify the order affecting the parent-child relationship, and on January 20, 2026, the trial court rendered a final order in the underlying modification suit. The trial court appointed Rachael and Marcus joint managing conservators, awarded Marcus the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence, and ordered Rachael to make monthly child support payments of $1,041. Rachael was also ordered to pay Marcus a total of $24,256 for attorney’s fees and overpayment of child support. On February 12, 2026, Rachael timely filed a notice of appeal and “Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs” (statement). The court reporter subsequently filed a motion to require Rachael to prove her inability to afford court costs. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(e). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Rachael had the ability to pay the costs of an appeal, including the preparation of a clerk’s record and reporter’s record. APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to Rule 145 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a party who cannot afford payment of court costs—the “declarant”—must file a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs and any evidence in support thereof. TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(b), (d). The district clerk, a court reporter, or opposing party may file a motion in the trial court challenging the declarant’s claim of indigency. See id. R. 145(e); Flores v. Flores, No. 04-25-00706-CV, 2026 WL 1580547, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 3, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court must then hold “an oral evidentiary hearing” wherein “the burden is on the declarant to prove [her] inability to 1 Because Rachael has not paid costs associated with this appeal, we do not have the entire clerk’s record. This opinion is based on the limited record before us and any reasonable deductions therefrom. -2- 04-26-00115-CV afford costs.” Id. R. 145(f)(1). In the trial court, the test for determining indigence is whether the record as a whole shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant would be unable to pay the costs, or a part thereof, or give security therefor, if he really wanted to and made a good- faith effort to do so. Higgins v. Randall Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 257 S.W.3d 684, 686 (Tex. 2008); In re Marriage of Duke & Terrell, No. 04-23-00144-CV, 2024 WL 1292414, at *2 (Tex. App—San Antonio Mar. 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). When evaluating a claim of indigence, the trial court may consider certain types of financial information, including: the nature and amount of the declarant’s income and the income of the declarant’s spouse if that income is available to the declarant; real and personal property owned; cash held and available on deposit; the number of dependents; the nature and amount of monthly expenses and debts; a declarant’s ability to obtain a loan for court costs; whether an attorney is providing free legal services to the party without a contingency fee; and whether an attorney has agreed to pay or advance court costs. Higgins, 257 S.W.3d at 687; Gaskins v. Fairways of Woodlake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., No. 04-26-00009-CV, 2026 WL 1893977, at *2 (Tex. App.— San Antonio July 1, 2026, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). If the trial court determines that the declarant can afford to pay costs, its “order requiring the declarant to pay costs must be supported by detailed findings.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(f)(2). We review a trial court’s order on ability to afford court costs for an abuse of discretion. Marriage of Duke & Terrell, 2024 WL 1292414, at *2. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Gaskins, 2026 WL 1893977, at *3. A trial court acts within its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports its decision, or when its decision is based on conflicting evidence. Id. -3- 04-26-00115-CV ANALYSIS Rachael, appearing pro se, was the only witness to testify at the hearing. The evidence demonstrated that Rachael’s gross monthly income from her employment as a teacher was $4,804.17, but after deductions, her net income was $2,962.43 per month. She bartended in the summer months for extra income, but was prohibited from working another job during the school year. Her unchallenged testimony established that her monthly expenses included $1,400 in rent, a car payment of $675, $110 for car insurance, and utilities ranging from $300 to $360. She also pays a $288 monthly phone bill for her and her children, and $35 per month for internet. This left, at the most, $154.43 to spend on food, gas, and other necessities such as copays or medication. According to Rachael’s sworn statement, which accounted for those additional expenses, she spends approximately $3,540 each month. She informed the trial court that “there[] [was] not a way for [her] to be able to afford the transcript” after paying “everyday living bills.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the 2026 Federal Poverty Guidelines and found that Rachael had the ability to pay costs. In the trial court’s order, it found that Rachael’s gross annual income “is more than twice the annual 2026 Federal Poverty Guidelines threshold for a household of two,” that Rachael has “the ability for gainful employment, including during the summer months,” and that she was “not represented by legal aid.” While the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, it failed to make any findings regarding expenses and debts, despite their clear relevance to the issues before the court. In determining a person’s indigence, “[t]he issue is not merely whether a person can pay costs, but whether the person can afford to pay costs.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145, cmt. 2016. Indeed, a person cannot afford to pay costs “if paying them would preclude the person from paying for basic essentials like housing or food.” Id. Here, the uncontradicted evidence established that Rachael’s -4- 04-26-00115-CV expenses for basic essentials exceeded her income, which would logically create a hardship if she were required to pay for the preparation of an appellate record. See Garza v. Garza, 155 S.W.3d 471, 475–76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.). On this record, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the challenge to Rachael’s statement and ordering her to pay the costs of appeal. CONCLUSION Because the trial court abused its discretion by denying Rachael’s claim of indigency, we reverse the trial court’s June 8, 2026 order. PER CURIAM -5-