Full Opinion

September 28, 2026 Ms. Cheryll A. Jones Kinney County Auditor Post Office Box 1219 Bracketville, Texas 78832 Opinion No. KP-0531 Re: Commissioners Court authority to approve and make purchases without approval of the County Auditor (RQ-0618-KP) Dear Ms. Jones: You raise a series of questions related to Kinney County’s July 2024 purchase of an ambulance for the County’s existing fleet. 1 You explain that the County’s Commissioners Court approved this purchase “with no clear mechanism for payment,” suggesting that the County had hoped to receive grant funding to cover the payment that ultimately failed to materialize. Request Letter at 1–2. You note that the Director of Emergency Management Services (“EMS”) later signed the sales agreement for this purchase “without a requisition being submitted or a purchase order issued by the [a]uditor’s office in accordance with the County’s purchasing policy.” Id. at 1. You also indicate that the Commissioners Court “budgeted for the purchase in the 2025–2026 [f]iscal [y]ear [b]udget.” Id. at 2. In light of the foregoing, you raise seven questions regarding the constitutional and statutory validity of this purchase and the county auditor’s authority to audit and approve the purchase. See id. Your questions fall into three broad categories. First, you ask two questions that require us to address the interplay between the authority to contract on the County’s behalf and the requirements of article XI, section 7 of the Texas Constitution. Id. Second, you inquire as to whether the Commissioners Court’s approval of the purchase in question comports with certain procurement requirements. Id. Third, you pose four questions regarding a county auditor’s role in the purchase you describe. Id. See Letter and Attachment from Cheryll A. Jones, Kinney Cnty. Auditor, to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y 1 Gen. at 2 (Sept. 29, 2025), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/request-files/request/2025/ RQ0618KP.pdf (“Request Letter” and “Attachment,” respectively) (Attachment on file with the Op. Comm.). Ms. Cheryll A. Jones - Page 2 I. County Contracting Authority and Texas Constitution Article XI, Section 7 We begin with your third question, as it presents a threshold issue that could impact our treatment of other questions you raise. You specifically ask whether a contract entered into by the EMS director binds the County. Id. Generally, the Texas Constitution grants the commissioners court “powers and jurisdiction over all county business,” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18(b), which necessarily includes “implied authority to exercise broad discretion” related thereto. Griffin v. Berkman, 266 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied). Consistent with its authority in this regard, “the commissioners court has the sole authority to enter into contracts binding the county” unless state law “authoriz[es] another county official to enter into a contract.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0229 (2004) at 8. One such statute is Local Government Code subsection 262.001(a)(3), which grants the commissioners court authority to “appoint an agent to make a contract on behalf of the county for[] . . . any . . . purpose authorized by law.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 262.001(a)(3). 2 You stipulate, however, that the Commissioners Court did not delegate contracting authority to the director under this provision, Request Letter at 1–2, and we are unaware of any other statutory authority that might apply. 3 Presuming that no such authority exists and that no delegation of contracting authority was made, the EMS Director unlawfully entered into the contract, rendering the contract void. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0395 (2001) at 2 (concluding that a contract entered into by a district attorney requiring expenditure of county funds was void as a matter of law where the district attorney had no authority to enter into the contract). “As a general rule, void contracts cannot be ratified.” Richmond Printing v. Port of Hous. Auth., 996 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). But a commissioners court is at liberty to later ratify a contract when entered into “by one without authority, who purports to act in its behalf.” Boydstun v. Rockwall Cnty., 24 S.W. 272, 273 (Tex. 1893). Indeed, we have recognized “[t]hat which the commissioner’s court could authorize in the first instance could be ratified by it at a subsequent date.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0235 (2019) at 3 n.2 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Here, however, you specifically tell us that the Commissioners Court has not approved the contract for sale signed by the EMS director. Request Letter at 1–2. Thus, presuming that is true, it remains the case that this “void contract is no contract at all; it binds no one and is a mere nullity.” XTO Energy Inc. v. Goodwin, 584 S.W.3d 481, 494 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, pet. denied). Turning to your first question, you ask whether the Commissioners Court can “approve the purchase of an asset with no mechanism for payment under article XI, section 7 of the Texas Constitution.” Request Letter at 2. That provision states, in pertinent part, that “no debt for any purpose shall ever be incurred in any manner by any . . . county unless provision is made, at the 2 Subsection 262.001(a) also authorizes the commissioners court to “appoint an agent to make a contract on behalf of the county for: (1) erecting or repairing a county building;” and “(2) supervising the erecting or repairing of a county building.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 262.001(a)(1)–(2). 3 While we generally “rely on the facts [the requestor has] provided,” we note that “additional or different facts may result in a different conclusion.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0446 (2023) at 1 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0203 (2000) at 2). Ms. Cheryll A. Jones - Page 3 time of creating the same, for levying and collecting a sufficient tax to pay the interest thereon and provide at least two per cent (2%) as a sinking fund.” TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 7(a). A “debt” for purposes of article XI, section 7 is “any pecuniary obligation imposed by contract, except such as was, at the time of the agreement, within the lawful and reasonable contemplation of the parties, to be satisfied out of the current revenues for the year or out of some fund then within the immediate control of the county.” Tex. & New Orleans R.R. v. Galveston Cnty., 169 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1943). Where, as here, there is no valid contract imposing a pecuniary obligation, no “debt” is created for purposes of article XI, section 7. 4 II. Local Government Code Chapter 262 You next ask whether the Commissioners Court’s “approval violate[s] the procurement process defined under [Local Government Code Chapter] 262 and the County’s own purchasing policy.” Request Letter at 2. We limit our analysis to the first portion of your question, as, generally “this office does not construe county ordinances or policies.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0111 (2016) at 4. You do not provide details about the “approval” in question or the process leading up to the execution of the sales agreement. See generally Request Letter at 1–3. Accordingly, we can offer only general guidance regarding the county procurement process under Chapter 262. Various provisions in subchapter C (“Competitive Bidding in General”) are potentially relevant to your inquiry. See generally TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 262.021–.037. Local Government Code subsection 262.023(a) requires a commissioners court to “comply with the competitive bidding or competitive proposal procedures prescribed by [the] subchapter” for county purchases of “one or more items under a contract that will require an expenditure exceeding $100,000.” 5 Id. § 262.023(a)(1). An “[i]tem” for purposes of this provision is “any service, equipment, good, or other tangible or intangible personal property, including insurance and high technology items.” 6 Id. § 262.022(5). An ambulance meets this statutory definition of “item,” see id., and the sales agreement that you appended to your request letter indicates that the purchase price of the ambulance at issue exceeded $400,000, see Attachment at 3. This amount is well beyond the monetary threshold that ordinarily would subject the commissioners court to the requirements in subsection 262.023(a)(1). See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 262.023(a). 4 We note that, even if a commissioners court delegated contracting authority to an EMS director under Local Government Code subsection 262.001(a)(3), the contract would create an impermissible debt only if the purchase was not reasonably contemplated to be satisfied out of current revenues for the year or out of a fund under the County’s immediate control. See Tex. & New Orleans R.R., 169 S.W.2d at 715; accord Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0652 (2008) at 3. This office has determined that this inquiry presents a “question of material fact” outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion and, thus, will not be addressed. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0652 (2008) at 4. 5 Subsection 262.023(a) also provides two alternative purchasing procedures a commissioners court may follow under certain circumstances which are not relevant here. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 262.023(a)(2)–(3). 6 An “[i]tem” does not include “professional services as defined by [s]ection 2254.002, Government Code.” Id. § 262.022(5). Ms. Cheryll A. Jones - Page 4 Subsection 262.024(a), however, contains “discretionary exemptions” to the requirements in subsection 262.023, allowing a commissioners court to grant an exemption “by order” for the purchase of a variety of items, including “an item necessary to preserve or protect the public health or safety of the residents of the county.” Id. § 262.024(a)(2). This office has previously concluded that a commissioners court may exempt by order “[a] county contract for [an] ambulance service . . . under [sub]section 262.024(a)(2) of the Local Government Code from the County Purchasing Act’s normal competitive-purchasing requirement as ‘an item necessary to preserve or protect the public health or safety of the residents of the county.’” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0136 (1999) at 8 (quoting TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 262.024(a)(2)). Central to the conclusion that ambulance service is necessary to preserve or protect the public health is the notion that this service is “incident to the police power of the [S]tate: i.e.[,] to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.” Ayala v. City of Corpus Christi, 507 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1974, no writ). If ambulance service is an item necessary to preserve or protect the public health or safety of the residents of the county, it necessarily follows that an ambulance is likewise necessary to protect county residents’ public health or safety, as there can be no ambulance service without the ambulance itself. You do not tell us whether the Commissioners Court by order granted an exemption allowing the ambulance to be purchased without complying with the competitive- purchasing requirement. Request Letter at 1–2. If the Commissioners Court did so, it was not required to follow the competitive bidding procedures set forth in Chapter 262, subchapter C. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0136 (1999) at 8; TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 262.024(a)(2). But if the Commissioners Court did not grant such an exemption, it was required to “comply with the competitive bidding or competitive proposal procedures prescribed by” subchapter C. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 262.023(a)(1). Specifically, a county must publish “notice of a proposed purchase . . . at least once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county,” or post notice “in a prominent place in the courthouse for [fourteen] days before the date of the bid opening” if the county does not have “a newspaper of general circulation.” Id. § 262.025(a). “The county official who makes purchases for the county shall open the bids on the date specified in the notice,” id. § 262.026(a), and thereafter, “shall present” the bids “to the commissioners court in session,” id. § 262.027(a). The commissioners court then “shall: (1) award the contract to the responsible bidder who submits the lowest and best bid; or (2) reject all bids and publish a new notice.” Id. § 262.027(a)(1)–(2). Absent the application of subsection 262.024(a)(2), failure to abide by these requirements could lead to litigation enjoining the county from performance of the contract and expose county officers or employees to criminal penalties. See id. §§ 262.033–.034. It is not clear from the information you provide whether the Commissioners Court by order exempted the contract to purchase the ambulance from the competitive-purchasing requirements or whether the Commissioners Court followed the competitive-purchasing process set forth in subchapter C. See generally Request Letter at 1–3; Attachment at 1–12. Accordingly, we cannot determine as a matter of law whether the Commissioners Court’s “approval” of the ambulance purchase violated the “procurement process” under Chapter 262. Request Letter at 2. Ms. Cheryll A. Jones - Page 5 III. Auditor Approval Your last four questions concern county auditor approval of county purchases. See id. These questions primarily involve a county auditor’s duties under Chapter 113 of the Local Government Code. See id. See generally TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 113.0001–.903. Local Government Code subsection 113.064(a) provides that, in counties that have a county auditor, “each claim, bill, and account against the county” is to be “examine[d] and approve[d] . . . before the meeting of the commissioners court,” and “[a] claim, bill, or account may not be allowed or paid until it has been examined and approved by the auditor.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 113.064(a). Local Government Code section 113.065 states that a “county auditor may not audit or approve a claim unless the claim was incurred as provided by law.” Id. § 113.065. And subsection 113.901(a) provides that a county auditor is not permitted to “audit or approve an account for the purchase of supplies or materials for the use of the county . . . unless a requisition[] . . . is attached to the account.” 7 Id. § 113.901(a). With those provisions in mind, we begin by addressing your fifth question: Whether the Commissioners Court may “authorize payment of goods and services without the approval of the county auditor.” Request Letter at 2. While the Commissioners Court has authority to “audit and settle all accounts against the county and . . . direct the payment of those accounts,” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 115.021, the Texas Supreme Court has explained that “the approval of the auditor is a condition precedent to the exercise of the commissioners court’s authority to order payment of claims,” Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1976, writ dism’d). In addressing the statutory predecessors to subsections 113.064(a) and 113.065(a), the Court unequivocally observed that “[t]he language of these statutes is mandatory” and “impose[s] on the auditor the responsibility, before approving a claim, to determine whether it strictly complies with the law governing county finances.” Id. Absent the auditor’s approval, a commissioners court order directing payment of a claim is void. Id. But the auditor’s “approval may not be arbitrarily withheld.” Id. Relatedly, in your seventh issue, you ask whether a county auditor can “audit a claim for payment before goods or services are received by the County.” Request Letter at 2. Subsection 113.064(a)’s plain text provides that a claim “may not be allowed or paid until it has been examined and approved by the auditor,” who must have had sufficient time to carry out these duties “before the meeting of the commissioners court.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 113.064(a) (emphasis added). This language provides no indication that receipt of goods or services must precede the required audit, nor do other provisions outside Chapter 113. For example, you reference Government Code section 2251.021 in support of the proposition that an auditor cannot audit a claim for payment before the receipt of goods. See Request Letter at 2. But that provision’s time requirements may begin on “the date the governmental entity receives the goods under the contract” or “the date the governmental entity receives an invoice for the goods or service,” TEX. GOV’T CODE 7 A requisition generally must be “signed by the officer ordering the supplies or materials and approved by the county judge,” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 113.901(a), but subsection 113.901(c) allows “[t]he commissioners court of a county that has the office of county auditor” to “by a written order, waive the requirement of the county judge’s approval of requisitions,” id. § 113.901(c). In those circumstances, “all claims must be approved by the commissioners court in open court.” Id. Ms. Cheryll A. Jones - Page 6 § 2251.021(a)(1), (3), reflecting that, in some instances, an invoice for goods might precede receipt of the goods themselves. This reality only strengthens our conclusion that subsection 113.064(a)’s silence cannot be read to preclude a county auditor from auditing a claim for payment for goods or services before the County receives those goods or services. Finally, we turn to your fourth and sixth questions. Assuming the contract for the purchase of the ambulance is valid, you ask whether a county auditor can “audit and approve the purchase when a requisition was not signed and approved prior to signing the sales agreement.” Request Letter at 2. Consistent with that inquiry, you also ask whether “vehicles” fall within the meaning of “supplies and materials” for purposes of Local Government Code subsection 113.901(a).” 8 Id. The terms “supplies” and “materials” are not defined by the statute, TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 113.901(a); thus, “we must apply their common, ordinary meaning unless a contrary meaning is apparent from the statute’s language,” Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017). We typically “consult dictionaries to discern the natural meaning of a common-usage term” under these circumstances. Sunstate Equip. Co. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 685, 697 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 866 (Tex. 2011)). The dictionary defines “supplies” as “a provision, stock, store of food or other things necessary for maintenance.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1912 (2d unabridged ed. 1987). And “materials” are “the substance or substances of which a thing is made or composed.” Id. at 1185. In addition to dictionary definitions, a “term’s usage in other statutes, court decisions, and similar authorities” is also relevant in ascertaining its meaning. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d at 35. An opinion from this office previously explained that “the terms ‘supplies’ and ‘materials’” in the statutory predecessor to section 113.901 “have a restricted meaning when applied to county purchases,” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. H-977 (1977) at 3. In reaching that conclusion, we relied upon, inter alia, Century Indemnity Co. of Chicago v. Shunk Manufacturing Co., a Kentucky Court of Appeals decision that thoroughly examined the “well-defined and understood legal significance” of the terms “supplies” and “materials” in a collection of cases from various state courts. 68 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Ky. 1934). The court observed in that case that “materials” is universally understood to be “substance or matter of which a thing is made or improvements are made,” while “supplies” are “articles furnished for carrying on work, which, from its nature, are necessarily consumed by the use in the work.” Id. at 774 (citation omitted). Relying upon that decision, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals determined that “road machinery”—such as a dump truck—“purchased by the county for its own use” did not constitute supplies or materials. Patten v. Concho Cnty., 196 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. App.—Austin 1946, no writ). We, by contrast, concluded that “[f]ood, clothing, and drugs,” as well as “most items purchased by a county for resale, including fuel” are “supplies” under section 113.901’s statutory predecessor. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. H-977 (1977) at 4. A vehicle such as an ambulance does not fall within the standard dictionary definitions of “supplies” or “materials”—nor the “restricted meaning” of those terms applied by this office to county purchases. 8 You also ask about “capital equipment.” Request Letter at 2. We presume this to mean the ambulance purchase discussed in your request letter. See id. at 1–2. Ms. Cheryll A. Jones - Page 7 The Legislature’s application of these terms in other statutes only serves to confirm that a vehicle is not a “supply” or “material.” Indeed, the Legislature notably has differentiated between vehicles and “supplies” or “materials” in other provisions within the Local Government Code. Section 325.046, for example, pertains to “proposed contract[s] for the purchase of vehicles, equipment, or supplies.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 325.046(a) (emphases added); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 116 (2012) (noting that “or creates alternatives”). Local Government Code subsection 336.156(a) likewise distinguishes between “materials,” “supplies,” and “vehicles.” See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 336.156(a) (providing that a multi-jurisdictional library district “may construct, acquire, own, lease, operate, maintain, repair, or improve any land, works, materials, supplies, improvements, facilities, equipment, vehicles, machinery, appliances, or other property as necessary” (emphases added)). Accordingly, because a vehicle is not a “supply” or “material” for purposes of subsection 113.901(a), a requisition was not required for the County’s purchase of the ambulance. See id. § 113.901(a). Thus, the auditor could audit and approve the purchase without a requisition, see id., provided that the purchase complied “with the law governing county finances,” Smith, 533 S.W.2d at 459; see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 113.065. Ms. Cheryll A. Jones - Page 8 S U M M A R Y A purchasing contract is void if it is executed by an individual who was not delegated authority to enter into the contract under Texas Local Government Code section 262.001, and if the commissioners court does not subsequently approve the contract. A void contract cannot create a debt in violation of article XI, section 7 of the Texas Constitution. We lack sufficient information from which to determine whether the contract at issue here was exempted from the competitive-purchasing requirements under Texas Local Government Code Chapter 262, subchapter C, or whether the Commissioners Court followed the competitive-purchasing process set forth therein. The Commissioners Court may not authorize the payment of goods and services without the approval of the county auditor, but the arbitrator may not arbitrarily withhold approval. Nothing in the language of Texas Local Government Code subsection 113.064(a) precludes a county auditor from auditing a claim for payment for goods or services before the county receives them. And a county auditor may audit and approve a county’s purchase of a vehicle without a signed requisition, provided that the purchase otherwise complies with the law governing county finances. Very truly yours, KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General RALPH MOLINA Deputy First Assistant Attorney General D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel MICHAEL C. COTTON Chair, Opinion Committee